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ABSTRACT 
The proliferation of international agreements has raised the challenge of resolving disputes that 
simultaneously fall under different specialised regimes within international law. The emergence of 
specialised regimes, and the establishment of independent judicial institutions to oversee them, has 
contributed to the ‘fragmentation’ of international law. Furthermore, recent agreements negotiated 
within a particular specialised regime have included provisions that address subject matters outside of 
their ‘specialised’ mandate.  
The potential for jurisdictional conflict is seen in the tension between the international environmental 
and trade regimes, where environmental agreements have increasingly included trade-related 
measures that operate outside of the World Trade Organization framework. Agricultural biotechnology 
provides a pertinent example following the negotiation of the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity to govern the trans-boundary movement of living modified 
organisms. This thesis explores the potential for overlapping jurisdiction between the specialised 
regimes of international environmental and trade law, with a particular focus on trade disputes involving 
agricultural biotechnology. 
This thesis initially considers the concept of fragmentation of international law and the consequences 
of the proliferation of judicial institutions. Next, the historical development of international environmental 
law and international trade law is explored, which has laid the foundation for potential parallel dispute 
proceedings before multiple judicial institutions. The thesis then analyses the principles of conflict of 
jurisdiction that may assist to resolve these disputes, and applies them to the case study of trade 
disputes involving agricultural biotechnology. The thesis concludes by considering the options available 
for addressing conflict of jurisdiction between the international trade and international environmental 
law regimes. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with the potential for conflicts of jurisdiction from the engagement of multiple 
judicial institutions as a consequence of the crossover of normative provisions between the specialised 
regimes of international trade law and international environmental law. In particular, this thesis 
examines the potential conflict of jurisdiction involving the trade in agricultural biotechnology as a case 
study. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Public international law is a complex web of specialised areas comprising highly technical agreements 
negotiated to address areas of global concern. Accordingly, as international law has evolved, it has 
developed specialised regimes along subject lines — for example, international environmental law and 
international trade law. The ‘fragmentation’ of international law into these specialised areas has been 
the focus of academic analysis for a considerable period of time.1 Over recent years, the expansion of 
public international law through the proliferation of bilateral and multilateral agreements has brought 
new challenges relating to the resolution of disputes that simultaneously fall under different specialised 
areas of international law.  
In the area of international environmental law and international trade law the line between these two 
specialised regimes is sometimes blurred. Agricultural biotechnology provides a clear example of the 
overlap between the international trade and international environmental regimes. For the purpose of 
this thesis, ‘agricultural biotechnology’ refers to genetic modification technology in the rural sector, 
including genetically modified (GM) crops, GM food and GM products. On 29 January 2000, a large 
group of nations negotiated the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(‘Biosafety Protocol’),2 a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) governing the trans-boundary 
movement of living modified organisms (LMO), namely agricultural biotechnology. The Biosafety 
Protocol is an international environmental agreement negotiated as a protocol to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (‘CBD’).3 Following the Biosafety Protocol entering into force, the international trade 
of agricultural biotechnology is now governed by both the provisions in the Biosafety Protocol and the 
agreements under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
                                                     
1 A basic search on Google Scholar using the search terms ‘fragmentation of international law’ produced 3,400 
documents, dating back to the late 1950s and early 1960s. For examples of the earlier scholarly work see:  RR 
Baxter et al, 'Jurisdiction over visiting forces and the development of international law: Proceedings of the American 
Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting' (1958) 52 American Society of International Law 174; Francis 
Deak, 'Observations on International Law in Underdeveloped Areas' (1962) 56 American Society of International 
Law Proceedings 54. A boolean online search using Westlaw International with the search terms ‘fragmentation 
w/4 of international law’ resulted in 934 documents (this searched the Journal databases for the United States, 
United Kingdom and Canada). 
2 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 29 January 2000, 
2226 UNTS 208 (entered into force 11 September 2003) (‘Biosafety Protocol’). 
3 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 
December 1993) (‘CBD’). 
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As both the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO have dispute resolution provisions, it is theoretically and 
practically possible that a State could commence an action challenging a trade restrictive measure of 
another State under either or both of these dispute resolution regimes. This gives rise to the potential 
for parties to commence simultaneous and/or successive dispute proceedings under the Biosafety 
Protocol and under the WTO dispute resolution procedures. It is this potential conflict of jurisdiction 
between the international trade and international environmental regimes — both generally and 
specifically relating to agricultural biotechnology — that forms the focus of this doctoral thesis. A conflict 
of jurisdiction will arise where the same subject matter involving the same disputing parties is brought 
before different international judicial institutions simultaneously or sequentially.4 The originality of this 
research lies in the comprehensive analysis of the principles of conflict of jurisdiction in the sphere of 
public international law, with particular focus on the specialised regimes of international trade law and 
international environmental law, and the application of these principles specifically to disputes involving 
the trade in agricultural biotechnology.5 The context for this analysis is situated within the larger debate 
involving the fragmentation of international law. 
II FRAGMENTATION 
The evolution of modern-day international law has developed through the creation of sub-set systems 
of specialist laws categorised by a specific theme, object or purpose.6 A simple survey of any university 
law school subject guide or legal text book will reveal the common divisions of international law into 
specialist areas such as trade law, human rights law, environmental law, European Union (EU) law,7 
finance law and criminal law. The large number of international agreements and the growing body of 
international jurisprudence has demonstrated the legitimacy of international law as a recognised legal 
system. However, the expansion of ‘international law’ through the successful negotiation of specialised 
subject-specific agreements has raised the concern that international law is now fragmented. Such 
concerns relate to the integrity of international law, its lack of unity and the absence of any hierarchy 
between the specialist areas or their dispute resolution mechanisms. Since the creation of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 1899, a staggering number of both permanent and ad hoc 
international courts, tribunals and dispute bodies have been established.8 Throughout this doctoral 
                                                     
4 Wen-chen Shih, 'Conflicting jurisdictions over disputes arising from the application of Trade-Related 
Environmental Measures' (2009) 8 Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 351, 363. 
5 At points during the thesis, readily available statistical data is included to provide context and background 
information. The original authors of the data are fully referenced. 
6 'Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law' (Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, 
International Law Commission, 2006) [13]. 
7 When the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009, the ‘European Union’ became the official 
name for legal purposes. Prior to this date, the ‘European Communities’ or ‘European Community’ was used. For 
ease of reference the title ‘European Union’ or ‘EU’ will be used throughout this thesis, except when referencing 
the official title of earlier cases where the European Communities was a party. See: World Trade Organization, The 
European Union and the WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm>  
8 See: Ruth Mackenzie et al, The Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, USA, 
2nd ed, 2010). 
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thesis, the phrase ‘judicial institutions’ is adopted and is taken to include the different international 
dispute forums that involve an independent ‘judicial’ adjudication between the parties to the dispute.  
A particular focus of the debate has involved the plethora of international judicial institutions that have 
been created to oversee each of these ‘self-contained’ regimes of international law. On the one hand, 
the creation of these bodies can be held as a positive indication of the preference of States to utilise 
international judicial institutions to resolve disputes and therefore points to the strength of international 
law. However, there have emerged three key issues of concern regarding the proliferation of 
international judicial institutions: 
1. Specialist regimes will apply and interpret general norms so as to fulfil their own narrow 
mandate, ultimately diminishing the universal application of these norms. 
2. Specialist regimes will interpret and apply norms which are outside their narrow area of 
specialisation in a manner that may be inconsistent with the original objectives of these norms. 
3. Specialist regimes will ignore applicable legal principles of other regimes when determining 
disputes. 
It would be too simplistic to propose that the multiplication of international judicial institutions of itself 
weakens the integrity of international law.9 Indeed, if each specialised area of international law operated 
in complete isolation from each other, then the plethora of judicial institutions specific to each regime 
would, at least in theory, not be problematic. However, perhaps as a reflection of the ‘globalised’ 
character of international disputes, recent international agreements negotiated under the purview of 
specialised regimes have included (either in whole or in part) provisions that address subject matters 
outside of their ‘specialised’ mandate. This ‘cross-fertilisation’ is clearly seen in the tension between the 
international environmental and trade regimes, and more specifically in the example of agricultural 
biotechnology, where the international community has developed environmental agreements that 
contain trade measures operating outside of the WTO framework. In the absence of clear provisions 
resolving conflict of jurisdiction for disputes that cross over two or more specialised regimes, States are 
left with the option to commence proceedings in the international judicial institution that is most likely to 
resolve the dispute in their favour. In this scenario, jurisdictional overlap has the potential to undermine 
the authority of dispute settlement mechanisms by creating ‘legal uncertainty for the parties, endless 
proceedings through forum-shopping and re-litigation of the same dispute before different courts and 
tribunals’.10 This conflict of jurisdiction between the dispute bodies of ‘specialised’ international legal 
regimes has not been resolved by the international legal community. For these reasons, the current 
pressing issue is not whether international law is ‘fragmented’ into specialised collections of norms, but 
the multiple judicial institutions created by the crossover of these specialised regimes. 
                                                     
9 Mario Prost and Paul Kingsley Clark, 'Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How Much 
Does the Multiplication of International Organizations Really Matter?' (2006) 5(2) Chinese Journal of International 
Law 341, 341. 
10 Nikolaos Lavranos, 'The MOX Plant and IJzeren Rijn Disputes: Which Court Is the Supreme Arbiter?' (2006) 
19(01) Leiden Journal of International Law 223, 242. 
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The phrases ‘conflicting jurisdiction’, ‘overlapping jurisdiction’ and ‘competing jurisdiction’ have been 
used in the literature, with varying definitions.11 For the purpose of this doctoral thesis, the phrase 
‘conflict of jurisdiction’ will be primarily adopted (although the alternate phrases may be used to enhance 
readability) and is taken to refer to a factual context involving the same disputing parties and the same 
subject matter that is brought before different international judicial  institutions either simultaneously or 
sequentially. 
In 2002, the International Law Commission (ILC), an international body established by the United 
Nations (UN), created a Study Group to analyse the fragmentation of international law and the 
associated integration and resolution of the inconsistencies between substantive norms across 
specialised regimes. In 2006, the ILC produced a consolidated report of the Study Group titled 
‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law' (‘ILC Report’).12  However, in the ILC Report, the ILC did not consider the issue of 
jurisdictional conflict based on institutional competency, stating that this issue was best left to the 
institutions involved in the dispute.13 In turning down the opportunity to provide guidance to the 
international legal community on jurisdictional conflict, the ILC decided to focus on the more attainable 
(and somewhat less ‘political’) goal of addressing conflicts of norms posed by fragmentation. In taking 
on the challenge avoided by the ILC, this doctoral thesis contends that jurisdictional conflict between 
specialised areas of international law is more than a mere theoretical or ‘abstract’ concern and needs 
scholarly attention and consideration. In this way, the thesis addresses a gap deliberately left wide open 
by the ILC.14  
The challenges posed by the conflict of jurisdiction due to the crossover of norms between specialised 
regimes is illustrated in the dispute involving the  Mixed Oxide (MOX) Plant, in which the same factual 
dispute was considered by three different international judicial institutions.  
 
Case Study: MOX Plant dispute 
This case involved the MOX Plant at the Sellafield nuclear processing facility situated on the Irish 
Sea coast of the United Kingdom (UK). The plant produced radioactive emissions which leaked into 
the sea causing contamination off the Irish coast. There were high incidences of cancer in the 
                                                     
11 See for example: Nikolaos Lavranos, 'Regulating competing jurisdictions among international courts and 
tribunals' (2008) 68(3) Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 575; Joost Pauwelyn and 
Luiz Eduardo Salles, 'Forum shopping before international tribunals: (real) concerns, (im)possible solutions' (2009) 
42 Cornell International Law Journal 77 and Kyung Kwak and Gabrielle Marceau, 'Overlaps and Conflicts of 
Jurisdiction between the World Trade Organization and Regional Trade Agreements' (2003) 41 Canadian Year 
Book of International Law 83. 
12 'Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law' (International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, 2006) (‘ILC Report’). 
13 Ibid 13. 
14 Literature has focused on the potential for conflict of norms as distinct from jurisdictional issues. See for example: 
Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003). This is particularly the case in relation to the overlaps 
between international trade law and international environmental law; see for example: Shih, above n 4. 
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people living in the coastal areas affected by the Plant’s emissions.15  In 2001, Ireland commenced 
international dispute resolution proceedings against the UK in two different forums: (1) the OSPAR 
Commission (pursuant to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North 
East Atlantic;16 and (2) before an arbitral tribunal formed pursuant to Annex VII to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’).17 The OSPAR proceedings involved a claim by 
Ireland that the UK was in breach of its obligations to provide information to it that had been deleted 
from British Reports on the MOX Plant facility. The UNCLOS claim by Ireland was that in operating 
the MOX Plant, the UK was in breach (or would breach) the various provisions in Article XII of 
UNCLOS including: the obligation to protect the marine environment of the Irish Sea (Articles 192–
194, 207, 211, 213 and 217 of UNCLOS); the obligation to cooperate with Ireland to protect the 
marine environment (Articles 123 and 197 UNCLOS); and the requirement to conduct an 
environmental impact assessment of the potential effects of the MOX Plant on the marine 
environment of the Irish Sea (Article 206 of UNCLOS). While waiting for the formation of the 
UNCLOS Annex VII arbitral tribunal to determine the merits of its claim, Ireland requested an order 
for provisional measures from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) — a 
permanent judicial institution established under UNCLOS. In order to grant provisional measures, 
ITLOS must first be satisfied that the Annex VII arbitral tribunal would have prima facie jurisdiction 
to determine the merits of the dispute.18  In this regard, Article 292 of UNCLOS provides that if there 
are provisions in a general, regional or bilateral agreement between the parties which provide for 
binding dispute resolution proceedings, then the provisions in that agreement will apply in lieu of 
the UNCLOS dispute provisions. The UK contested the prima facie jurisdiction of the Annex VII 
arbitral tribunal on the grounds that the dispute with Ireland involved complaints governed by 
regional agreements providing for alternative and binding means of resolving disputes, namely the 
OSPAR Convention and also the EU law pursuant to Article 175 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (‘EC Treaty’) and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community (‘Euratom Treaty’), pursuant to which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had 
exclusive jurisdiction.19 Relevantly, Article 282 of UNCLOS provides: 
                If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise, that such 
                                                     
15 Nikos Lavranos, 'The Epilogue in the Mox Plant Dispute: an end without findings' (2009) 3 European Energy and 
Environmental Law Review 180, 180. 
16 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, opened for signature 22 
September 1992, OJ L104 (entered into force 25 March 1998). 
17 Ireland alleged that the UK breached the following provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered into force 16 November 1994) 
(‘UNCLOS’): Art 206 (failure to carry out a proper assessment of the potential effects of the MOX Plant on the 
marine environment of the Irish Sea); Article 123 and 197 (failure to cooperate with Ireland as its neighbour); Article 
192-194, 207, 211, 213, 217 (failure to take all the steps necessary to protect the marine environment of the Irish 
Sea).  
18 UNCLOS Article 290(5). 
19 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, opened for signature 25 March 1957, 298 UNTS 
167 (entered into force 1 January 1958), Treaty Establishing the European Community, opened for signature 7 
February 1992, [1992] OJ C 224/6 (entered into force 1 November 1993). These agreements have been 
consolidated into the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 
326/47 (entered into force 26 October 2012) (‘Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union’). This objection to jurisdiction was raised on the basis of Article 282 of UNCLOS. 
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dispute shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a 
binding decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in this Part, unless 
the parties to the dispute otherwise agree. 
In finding that Article 282 of UNCLOS did not apply so as to nullify the prima facie jurisdiction of an 
Annex VII arbitral tribunal, ITLOS recognised: 
               [T]hat the dispute settlement procedures under the OSPAR Convention, the EC Treaty and the 
Euratom Treaty deal with disputes concerning the interpretation or application of those agreements, 
and not with disputes arising under the Convention;20 
                [E]ven if the Convention, the EC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty contain rights or obligations similar 
to or identical with the rights or obligations set  out in the Convention, the rights and obligations under 
those agreements have a separate existence from those under the Convention.21  
The Annex VII arbitral tribunal was then formed to determine the merits of the dispute. The UK 
again objected to the jurisdiction of the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal on the grounds of Article 292 of 
UNCLOS, since the proceedings involved issues of EU law, the ECJ had exclusive jurisdiction.22 
The UNCLOS arbitral tribunal suspended proceedings until a determination on jurisdiction could be 
made by the ECJ.23 Proceedings were brought by the Commission of the EU against Ireland in the 
ECJ alleging that in commencing the UNCLOS arbitration, Ireland was in breach of its obligations 
under Articles 10 and 292 of the EC Treaty (exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ over treaty disputes) 
as well under Articles 192 and 193 of the Euratom Treaty.24  
The ECJ held that the provisions of UNCLOS fell within the scope of competence of the EU, and 
accordingly formed part of the EU legal order. In addition, competence over environmental issues 
is specifically given to the EU by virtue of Articles 174 and 175 of the EC Treaty.25  The ECJ held 
that the issues in dispute became a question of EU law. Accordingly, the ECJ found Ireland in 
breach of its obligation to bring the dispute with the UK before the ECJ, given the Court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine matters involving questions of EU Law.26 The ECJ went one step further 
                                                     
20 The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Request for Provisional Measures - Order of 3 December 2001) 
(2002) 41 ILM 405 [49]. 
21 Ibid [50]. 
22 This objection was raised on the basis of Article 282 of UNCLOS. 
23The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Order No. 3 — Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and 
Merits) (2003) 42 ILM 1187; Lavranos, above n 15, 180. 
24 As noted above, these provisions can now be found in the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. 
25 These provisions are now Articles 191 and 192 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
26 Commission of the European Communities v Ireland (C-459/03) [2006] ECR I-4635, [127]–[129] and [133]. 
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and also held that Ireland should have brought the dispute before the ECJ to determine whether or 
not it had jurisdiction:  
               It is for the Court, should the need arise, to identify the elements of the dispute which relate to 
provisions of the international agreement in question which fall outside its jurisdiction.27 
The UNCLOS arbitral tribunal then granted Ireland’s request to dismiss the proceedings on 6 June 
2008 on the basis that the ECJ had exclusive jurisdiction.28 
In this case, the ECJ seized the opportunity to declare its exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving 
its Member States and EU law, vis-à-vis other international judicial institutions.29 UNCLOS is a ‘mixed 
agreement’ in that the EU, Ireland and the UK are each parties to the agreement. Mixed agreements 
provide unique challenges given that both the EU and individual EU Member States have the 
competence to enter into international relations. This is also referred to as ‘parallel competence’ or 
‘shared competence’.30 The UK submitted that, as between EU Member States, the rights and 
obligations under UNCLOS should be judicially considered by the ECJ.31 In this regard, the ECJ has 
determined that it has jurisdiction over disputes that involve ‘mixed’ agreements.32  However, the MOX 
Plant dispute is relevant to this research in that the rulings of the ECJ and the decisions made by the 
UNCLOS arbitral tribunal turn on the access that EU Member States have to dispute resolution 
proceedings in mixed agreements, particularly in light of the competence of these nations to enter into 
international agreements in their own right.  
The ruling of the ECJ cements its exclusivity (at least from the perspective of the ECJ) as the judicial 
institution for the resolution of legal disputes involving EU law as between EU Member States. Whether 
exclusive jurisdiction clauses such as the ECJ clause will be upheld by other international judicial 
institutions as effective in foreclosing their jurisdiction (for example, whether the WTO will defer to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ), is further considered in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. The ruling of 
the ECJ in the MOX Plant dispute also purported to extend the exclusivity of the ECJ further, in finding 
that it is for the Court to determine, not Member States, if issues fall outside the jurisdiction of the ECJ, 
effectively requiring that all disputes between EU Member States be brought before the ECJ on the 
‘possibility’ that exclusive jurisdiction may exist. Whether this ruling forecloses the availability of dispute 
resolution avenues in non-EU agreements (such as in an MEA or the WTO) to disputes involving EU 
Members, particularly in ‘mixed’ agreements, is yet to be seen.  
In exercising judicial comity, the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal refrained from determining the dispute until 
the potential jurisdiction of the ECJ was determined. The decision by the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal to 
                                                     
27 Ibid [135]. 
28 The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) Order No. 6 — Termination of Proceedings, 6 June 2008. 
29 Lavranos, above n 15, 181. 
30 Isabelle Buffard et al, International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation, Festschrift in Honour of 
Gerhard Hafner.(Baetens) (2009). 
31 The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom), Rejoinder of the United Kingdom — Pleadings (24 April 2003) 
<http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1148>, [4.32]. 
32 Hermès, Case C-53/96[1998] ECR I-3603; Dior and Others (C-300/98 and C-392/98) [2000] ECR I-11307; 
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland (C-13/00) [2002] ECR I-02943. 
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refrain from exercising its own jurisdiction over issues in dispute involving the provisions contained in 
its parent treaty is somewhat surprising. On the one hand this can be viewed as a positive outcome in 
that the informal judicial steps taken by the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal avoided potential parallel 
proceedings. However, while the conflict of jurisdiction was resolved in this specific factual scenario by 
the actions of the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal, neither the ECJ nor the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal actually 
ended up determining the substantive issues in the case: that is, the original claim by Ireland that the 
UK was in breach of its obligations under UNCLOS. The approach taken by UNCLOS in the MOX Plant 
dispute casts some doubt over the effectiveness and status of the judicial arm of UNCLOS. Arguably, 
the protection for the international marine environment afforded under UNCLOS and the status and 
power of the UNCLOS dispute resolution process has been weakened by the UNCLOS arbitral 
tribunal’s subrogation of its jurisdiction to the ECJ.   
Also of interest in the MOX Plant case is that the more ‘specialist’ judicial institution, namely the 
UNCLOS arbitral tribunal, subrogated its jurisdiction to a more ‘generalist’ judicial institution. This goes 
against the legal principles of conflict resolution (both in relation to conflict of norms and conflict of 
jurisdiction) that give preference to the more specialised over the general. This will be discussed in 
further detail in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
In contrast to the approach taken by the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal, the OSPAR Commission did not 
defer the dispute involving the MOX Plant to the ECJ, and proceeded to determine the case before it.33 
Furthermore, the OSPAR Commission elected to apply the disclosure obligations under its Convention, 
not the more stringent EU obligations on information disclosure between EU member States. The 
divergence in the approaches taken by the OSPAR Commission, the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal and the 
ECJ in the MOX Plant case highlight that even within one factual scenario various international judicial 
institutions may rule differently on the matter of conflict of jurisdiction arising out of parallel 
proceedings.34  
The MOX Plant case demonstrates the complexities in international law where the same factual dispute 
can be brought simultaneously before different international judicial institutions involving the same 
broad legal issues — in this case it was provisions of environmental law and the law of the sea. The 
regulatory framework for agricultural biotechnology is another example of the conflict of jurisdiction 
arising out of the fragmentation of international law — namely, where specialised regimes develop rules 
of international law that extend beyond their specialised area. Chapter 2 of this doctoral research further 
examines the debate over the fragmentation of international law, highlighting the concerns over the 
proliferation of international tribunals and the challenges faced by the crossover of norms between 
specialised regimes.  
                                                     
33 Ireland claimed that the UK was in breach of its obligations under the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic, to provide Ireland with the data it requested on the MOX Plant. On 2 July 
2003 the OSPAR commission found that the UK was under no legal obligation to provide the information requested 
by Ireland: OSPAR Arbitration Ireland v United Kingdom (Final Award) (2 July 2003).  
34 It is noted that the the European Union is a sui generis regime that has its own court which is more similar to the 
ICJ than to the WTO regime with its dispute settlement panels/Appellate Body. The nature of the WTO dispute 
resolution provisions will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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III TWO SPECIALIST REGIMES: TRADE AND 
ENVIRONMENT  
In the context of the concerns about fragmentation of international law, this doctoral research focuses 
on the specialised regimes of international environmental law and international trade law. This doctoral 
thesis approaches the analysis of these two specialised regimes from the perspective of the potential 
conflict of jurisdiction, thus distinguishing this research from the body of literature that has focused on 
problems associated with the conflict of norms of these two specialised regimes.35 To provide context 
to the contemporary jurisdictional issues, chapter 3 of this doctoral thesis examines the historical 
tension between international environmental law and international trade law which has created potential 
for parallel proceedings. To further illustrate the crossover between the international environmental and 
international trade regimes and the potential for conflict of jurisdiction, the trade in agricultural 
biotechnology is used in this doctoral thesis as an example.  
In this thesis, the phrase ‘international environmental law’ refers to the set of legal rules embodied in 
international environmental treaties and agreements. Specific consideration is given in this thesis to 
those international environmental agreements which bear a connection in some way to the international 
trade regime. The broader concept of the ‘environment’ (including environmental concerns and/or 
environmental harm) is adopted in the thesis where such considerations provide useful context to the 
development of international environmental law and in particular, the tensions with international trade 
law. The phrase ‘international trade law’ is used in this thesis to refer to the set of international 
agreements and treaties under the framework of the WTO, as well as Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs) — including free trade agreements (bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements) and custom 
union agreements. 
A Historical Development and Tensions 
The first part of chapter 3 briefly considers the historical development of the modern-day international 
trade and environmental law regimes and the intersection between these two regimes. Through 
establishing the historical context, the contemporary challenges emerging from the crossover between 
international trade law and international environmental law involving the trade in agricultural 
biotechnology can be better understood. Accordingly, chapter 3 explores the following two issues: 
1. The piecemeal creation of the body of international environmental law and international trade 
law that has resulted in the development of two separate specialised regimes with normative 
and jurisdictional provisions that cross over. 
2. The historical linkages between the international environment and trade regimes and the points 
of tension that exist today between the two regimes. 
                                                     
35 See: Pauwelyn, above n 14. 
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B The Emergence of Two Specialised Regimes  
As of February 2015, the International Environmental Agreements Database Project has listed over 
1100 multilateral and 1500 bilateral international agreements that contain provisions relating to the 
protection of the environment.36 It is clear from the sheer volume of these agreements that international 
environmental law has developed as a distinct discipline, notwithstanding the absence of any specific 
policymaking organ or judicial institution.37  These individual agreements contain broad environmental 
principles and regulatory frameworks for the implementation of obligations.38 However, these 
agreements are standalone, signatories vary across the agreements and there is no centralised dispute 
resolution institution.  
Looking at the modern day international trade regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1947 (‘GATT 1947’) was negotiated at the end of the Second World War and was followed by a period 
of rapid growth in world trade between 1950 and 1973.39 As world trade continued to expand after the 
end of the Cold War, negotiations commenced on the new WTO framework, culminating in the signing 
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (‘Marrakesh Agreement’) in 
1994.40 The WTO was established as a global institution with formal rules and enforceable dispute 
settlement provisions.41 Its creation, after lengthy negotiations over almost half a century, was highly 
anticipated and was heralded as a new era of international trade liberalisation.42 
In addition to the WTO, there has been a growing trend since the 1990s for States to negotiate RTAs.43 
The purpose of these RTAs is to give preferential treatment by liberalising market access between the 
parties to the agreement. Well known RTAs include the North American Free Trade Agreement 
                                                     
36International Environmental Agreements Database Project, Data from Ronald B. Mitchell. 2002-2015, developed 
in association with the National Science Foundation University of Oregon Environmental Studies Program (Version 
2014.3) <http://iea.uoregon.edu/>. 
37 For a discussion on the acceptance of international environmental law as a distinct discipline, see: Tim Stephens, 
The Role of International Courts and Tribunals in International Environmental Law (Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, 
University of Sydney, 2005) <http://hdl.handle.net/2123/706>, 279-286. 
38 Ibid 287; Edith Brown Weiss, 'International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a 
New World Order' (1992) 81 The Georgetown Law Journal 675, 686. 
39General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 194 (entered into 
force 1 January 1948) (now incorporated into the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 1A (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994)). For details on the growth in international trade during 1950-1973, see: 
World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2008: Trade in a Globalizing World (2008) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr08-2b_e.pdf>. 
40 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘Marrakesh Agreement’). 
41 The agreements, which form the core of the WTO, are annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement. Further discussion 
is included in this doctoral thesis on the dispute resolution provisions of the WTO found in the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 
1 January 1995) Annex 2 (Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes) (‘DSU’). 
42 See some of the contemporary literature written around the time of the negotiation of the new WTO: Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, 'The dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization and the evolution of the GATT 
dispute settlement system since 1948' (1994) 31(6) Common Market Law Review 1157; Thomas J Dillon Jr, 'The 
World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World Trade' (1994) 16 Michigan Journal of  International Law 
349 and G Richard Shell, 'Trade legalism and international relations theory: an analysis of the World Trade 
Organization' (1995)  Duke Law Journal 829. 
43 See data provided by:  World Trade Organization, WTO Regional Trade Agreement Database (14 November 
2013) <http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx> and  
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/publicsummarytable.aspx>. 
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(‘NAFTA’),44 the Treaty Establishing a Common Market (Asunción Treaty) between the Argentine 
Republic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of 
Uruguay,45 and the Australia — New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement.46 Article 
XXIV of GATT 1994 permits the negotiation of RTAs as a special exception to the WTO rules. 
As the international environmental legal regime and international trade regime have developed in 
parallel, so has the tension between these two specialised regimes. The concept of environment 
protection — specifically, sustainable development — and the objective of free flowing international 
trade are intrinsically linked. The rapid deterioration of the environment affects the world’s delicately 
balanced eco-system, influencing not only biodiversity, but food supplies, poverty and health. 
Accordingly, environmental issues have effects on trade; similarly, free trade can significantly affect the 
environment both directly through the trade of environmentally sensitive products, and indirectly through 
its role in accelerating economic development. The trade in GM products raises specific environmental 
concerns including impacts on non-targeted species and crops and invasive GM crops. These concerns 
will be discussed further below. As recognised by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP): 
Trade in agricultural products is a major driver of changes in land-use and agricultural practices. While 
trade offers many opportunities, land-use changes and farming practices that lead to a loss of biodiversity 
and ecosystem services can have immediate impacts on human well-being.47 
The impact of trade on the environment was specifically recognised through the inclusion of exemption 
provisions on environmental grounds in Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(‘GATT 1994’),48 as well as in the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, where the Parties to the 
agreement recognised that their trade relations should be conducted to raise living standards:  
while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing 
so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development.49 
Through the late 1990s, tension in the global community between the trade objectives of the WTO and 
environmental considerations increased.50 In 1999, protests occurred in Seattle against the WTO, its 
                                                     
44 North American Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature 17 December 1992 (1993) 32 ILM 605 (entered 
into force 1 January 1994). 
45 Treaty Establishing a Common Market (Asunción Treaty) between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic 
of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, opened for signature 26 March 1991, 
2140 UNTS 319 (entered into force 29 November 1991). 
46 Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, signed 28 March 1983, 1329 UNTS 175 
(entered into force 1 January 1983). 
47 'Brochure on Trade and Biodiversity: Trade-related Policy Assessment Agriculture and Biodiversity' (United 
Nations Environment Programme, 2010) 
 <http://www.unep.ch/etb/publications/Trade%20and%20Biodiversity/UNEP_BrochureBioTrade.pdf>. 
48 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 1A (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994) (‘GATT 
1994’). 
49 Marrakesh Agreement, Preamble.  
50 Gregory Shaffer, 'The World Trade Organization under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the 
WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters' (2001) 25(1) Harvard Environmental Law Review 1, 1. 
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rules and its dispute settlement determinations.51 The tension between the trade and environment 
regimes crosses a range of issues: including the different objectives of the two regimes; the inclusion 
of trade provisions in the new environmental agreements and competing compliance frameworks. The 
WTO has made it clear that it is not an environmental agency.52 While the WTO has developed the 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) and has attempted to address environmental concerns 
both in the WTO agreements and in its determinations of disputes under the WTO Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (‘DSU’),53 the WTO objective of free trade 
always maintains predominance.54 Despite this, the WTO has been called upon to determine trade 
disputes involving environmental issues. Whether this is desirable, or even acceptable, is largely 
determined by the classification of the dispute as either a ‘trade’ dispute or an ‘environmental’ dispute. 
Such classification will influence the resolution of any conflict of norms and the priority given to 
upholding diverging environmental or trade objectives. The tension between the environment and trade 
regimes is further considered in chapter 3 of this thesis as a foundation for analysing the overlap 
between international trade and international environmental law. 
C Trade-Related Environmental Measures 
Chapter 3 also explores the inclusion of trade-related environmental measures (TREMs) within 
international environmental agreements as a tool to address environmental concerns. According to the 
UNEP, in 2005 over 20 MEAs included trade provisions in what are otherwise international 
environmental agreements.55 These trade provisions have been negotiated and implemented outside 
of the WTO regime. Some examples of current international environmental agreements that contain 
TREMs include: the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which bans trade 
between parties and non-parties in certain ozone-depleting substances;56 the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora which prohibits the commercial 
trade in specified endangered species and regulates trade in species threatening to become 
endangered;57the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal which contains provisions relating to the trade of hazardous wastes, including 
restricting trade with States that are not parties to the Convention;58 and the Rotterdam Convention on 
the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International 
                                                     
51 Ibid. 
52 For a detailed discussion on this, see: Shaffer, above n 50. See also the WTO’s own literature: World Trade 
Organization, Understanding the WTO: The environment: a specific concern 
 <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey2_e.htm>.  
53 The DSU sets out the framework for the resolution of disputes between WTO Parties in relation to obligations in 
the WTO agreements specified in the DSU. 
54 Understanding the WTO, above n 52. 
55 'Environment and Trade: A Handbook' (United Nations Environment Programme, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, 2005) <http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=754> Chapter 5. 
56 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 16 September 1987, 1522 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1989). 
57 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature 3 
March 1973, 993 UNTS 243 (entered into force 1 July 1975). 
58 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, opened 
for signature 22 March 1989, 6737 UNTS 57 (entered into force 5 May 1992). 
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Trade which regulates the trade of certain chemicals and pesticides including the provision of specific 
information and labelling.59  
From a legal perspective, the inclusion of trade provisions in international environmental agreements 
provides the scope for conflict of norms between the trade obligations that exists under the MEAs and 
the trade obligations that exists under the WTO agreements. Modern day international environmental 
law and international trade law is a complicated matrix of MEAs, the WTO and RTAs. With the growing 
number of MEAs containing trade provisions and conversely the negotiation of RTAs containing 
environmental provisions, as well as the WTO agreements, the scope for parallel dispute proceedings 
pursuant to these various agreements is significant. The range of environmental agreements that 
contain TREMs will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
IV TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Turning now to the specific case study used in this thesis, agricultural biotechnology is a rapidly growing 
technology that has provoked much debate around the world.60 The rise of agricultural biotechnology 
and the regulatory framework for trade of these products will be briefly discussed below. 
A What is Gene Technology? 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines biotechnology as ‘the 
application of science and technology to living organisms as well as parts, products and models thereof, 
to alter living or non-living materials for the production of knowledge, goods and services’.61 Gene 
technology is a specific category of biotechnology involving the manipulation and modification of genetic 
material between living organisms and cells to obtain particular characteristics.62 
In relation to agricultural biotechnology, there are three common groups of GM crops.63  First generation 
crops are those that have been genetically modified to alter some aspect of production. The most 
common crops in this group are herbicide tolerant and insect resistant plants. Second generation GM 
crops have been altered to provide increased nutritional benefits. Third generation GM plants are 
cultivated to provide vaccines for specific illnesses and diseases. ‘GM foods’ is the term usually given 
to food products derived from plants and animals which have been genetically modified through the 
transference of genes from one cell to another.64 The purpose of this modification is to improve a 
                                                     
59 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade, opened for signature 10 September 1998, 2244 UNTS 337 (entered into force 24 
February 2004). 
60 A basic search in Google Scholar using the search term ‘agricultural biotechnology’’ resulted in 2,310,000 
references; narrowing the search phrase to ‘agricultural biotechnology concerns’ still produced 422,000 results. 
61 OECD, Statistical Definition of Biotechnology, Innovation in science, technology and industry 
<http://www.oecd.org/science/inno/statisticaldefinitionofbiotechnology.htm>. 
62 Australian Biotechnology, A National Strategy, 2000 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/measures/abs/msr-abs-au4-
en.pdf>8. 
63 Phillip Killicoat, 'Food phobias: behind the fuss over GM crops' (2004) 20(1) (Autumn 2004) Policy 17, 17. 
64'GM foods and the consumer, ANZFA’s safety assessment process for genetically modified foods' (Australia New 
Zealand Food Administration, June 2000), 4. 
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particular characteristic of the GM food product, for example taste, quality, size, colour or yield. It is 
worth noting that a distinction is made between the genetic manipulation of the gene sequence in a lab 
and the evolution of plant/animal species through traditional breeding techniques – this doctoral thesis 
is concerned with agricultural biotechnology that is the result of the aforementioned genetic 
manipulation. 
B The Rise of Agricultural Biotechnology 
While key scientific breakthroughs in the development of agricultural biotechnology took place from the 
early 1970s, investment and production has accelerated noticeably since the turn of the millennium. It 
was in 1973 that the first successful recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) experiment was 
conducted using bacterial genes. In 1981, the first successfully genetically engineered plant was 
reported.65 Then the first GM food product, T FlavrSavr® tomato, received US Food and Drug 
Administration approval in 1994.66 By 2008, a total of 25 counties were reported as planting GM crops,67 
and in 2015, GM crops entered their 20th consecutive year of commercialisation. The global status of 
commercialized GM crops was summarised in the 2013 report of the International Service for the 
Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA), a not-for-profit research organisation (the ISAAA also 
assists with the transfer and delivery of proprietary biotechnology applications to various 
stakeholders).68 The ISAAA reported that a record 175.2 million hectares of GM crops were grown 
globally in 2013 (up 5 million from 170 million hectares in 2012).69  This is an increase from only 1.7 
million hectares in 1996 — at an annualised growth rate of 94 per cent over the period — making GM 
crops, according to the ISAAA, the fastest adopted crop technology in recent history.70 
Graph 1.1 and Table 1.1 present data sourced from the ISAAA report.71  This data shows that 27 
countries were recorded in 2013 as growing GM crops, of which 19 were developing and eight were 
industrial countries. The top 10 countries each grew more than 1 million hectares of GM crops. The 
ISAAA reports that more than half the world’s population live in the 27 countries planting GM crops. The 
United States continued to be the leading producer of GM crops globally with 70.1 million hectares 
planted, followed by Brazil, Argentina, India and then Canada. What is quite interesting, particularly in 
the context of international relations and trade, is that in both 2012 and 2013 developing countries were 
recorded as planting more GM crops than industrial countries. Latin American, Asian and African 
farmers collectively planted 54% of the global 175 million GM hectares in 2013.72 In the EU, the debate 
                                                     
65 Biotechnology Institute, Timeline of Biotechnology <http://www.biotechinstitute.org/what-is-
biotechnology/timeline>. This experiment was undertaken by Stanley Cohen of Stanford University and Herbert 
Boyer of the University of California, San Francisco. 
66 Biotechnology Online, A Food Biotechnology Timeline Biotechnology Australia 
<http://www.biotechnologyonline.gov.au/foodag/timeline.html>. 
67 Margaret Karembu, et al, 'Biotech Crops in Africa: The Final Frontier' (The International Service for the Acquisition 
of Agri-biotech Applications AfriCenter, 2009). 
68 Clive James, 'Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2013' (ISAAA Brief 46, International Service 
for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, 2013) 
 <http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/46/executivesummary/default.asp>. 
69 Ibid Executive Summary. 
70 Ibid Executive Summary. 
71 Ibid. These tables are available in the Executive Summary and on the website of the ISSA for the 2013 report. 
72 Ibid Executive Summary. 
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over agricultural biotechnology continues with Monsanto's insect-resistant MON810 maize the only GM 
crop currently being grown in small quantities in Spain and Portugal (although three other GM crops 
have EU approval). Another strain of GM maize, Pioneer 1507 passed through the meeting of the 
European Council in February 2014 (although no qualified majority was reached) and is now waiting 
final approval from the European Commission.73 The ISAAA predicted for the overall trend in growth in 
agricultural biotechnology around the world to continue. 
Table 1.1 also shows that of the 27 States growing GM crops in 2013, all but one of these States are 
members of the WTO. In regards to the Biosafety Protocol, 21 out of the 27States (78 per cent) are 
members to that agreement. Only Sudan is a member of neither the WTO nor the Biosafety Protocol. 
This demonstrates a significant crossover of membership to both trading regimes (the WTO and the 
Biosafety Protocol) among the 27 States growing GM crops. 
  
                                                     
73 For an overview of the EU approval process for GM maize Pioneer 1507, see: Pioneer’s GM maize 1507: a case 
history, Agricultural and Rural Convention <http://www.arc2020.eu/front/2014/07/pioneers-gm-maize-1507-a-
case-history/>. 
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Source: Clive James.74
                                                     
74 James, above n 68. 
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Table 1.1: Area of GM Crops by Jurisdiction in 2013 and membership of the WTO and parties to the Biosafety Protocol 
Jurisdiction Area (million hectares) GM crops WTO Biosafety Protocol 
USA 70.1 Maize, soybean, cotton, canola, sugar beet, alfalfa, papaya, squash Yes No 
Brazil 40.3 Soybean, maize, cotton Yes Yes 
Argentina 24.4 Soybean, maize, cotton Yes No 
India 11.0 Cotton Yes Yes 
Canada 10.8 Canola, maize, soybean, sugar beet Yes No 
China 4.2 Cotton, papaya, poplar, tomato, sweet pepper Yes Yes 
Paraguay 3.6 Soybean, maize, cotton Yes Yes 
South Africa 2.9 Maize, soybean, cotton Yes Yes 
Pakistan 2.8 Cotton Yes Yes 
Uruguay 1.5 Soybean, maize Yes Yes 
Bolivia 1.0 Soybean Yes Yes 
Philippines 0.8 Maize Yes Yes 
Australia 0.6 Cotton, canola Yes No 
Burkina Faso 0.5 Cotton Yes Yes 
Myanmar 0.3 Cotton Yes Yes 
Spain 0.1 Maize Yes Yes 
Mexico 0.1 Cotton, soybean Yes Yes 
Colombia 0.1 Cotton, maize Yes Yes 
Sudan 0.1 Cotton No No 
Chile <0.1 Maize, soybean, canola Yes No 
Honduras <0.1 Maize Yes Yes 
Portugal <0.1 Maize Yes Yes 
Cuba <0.1 Maize Yes Yes 
Czech Republic <0.1 Maize Yes Yes 
Costa Rica <0.1 Cotton, soybean Yes Yes 
Romania <0.1 Maize Yes Yes 
Slovakia <0.1 Maize Yes Yes 
Total 175.2  96 per cent 78 per cent 
Source: Clive James,75 author’s calculations. 
                                                     
75 Ibid. 
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Graph 1.2, Table 1.2 and Graph 1.3 set out the number of regulatory approvals for GM crops granted 
by each jurisdiction for food use, feed use and/or for environmental release or planting. According to 
the data released by the ISAAA, a total of 2,833 regulatory approvals have been granted involving 27 
different GM crops and 336 GM events (unique DNA recombinations in one plant cell used to generate 
entire GM plants) — of which 1,321 were for food use (direct use or processing), 918 for feed use (direct 
use or processing) and 599 for environmental release or planting.76 Graph 1.3 below shows the GM 
crops that have received approval (on the left-hand side of the graph) and the number of jurisdictions 
that have approved each particular crop (on the right-hand side of the graph). Maize has the most 
number of approved events with 130 approvals events in 27 countries. This is more than double the 
approved events recorded for cotton, which is the next highest crop with 49 approved events in 22 
countries. 
The number of regulatory approvals granted for GM products is spread reasonably evenly across the 
various jurisdictions of GM-using States. This can be contrasted with the data above on the ‘Area of 
GM crops’ where there is large gap between the top five States that have planted GM crops and the 
remaining 22 other GM planting States. Japan has the most number of events approved (at 198 
approvals), despite there being no commercial production or cultivation of GM crops in Japan. The high 
number of approvals reflects that Japan is one of the world’s leading importers (per capita) of GM food 
and feed.77 Japan imports annually approximately 15 million metric tonnes of corn and three million 
metric tons of soybean, principally from the United States, approximately three-quarters of which are 
GM crops.78  
Like the States that plant/cultivate GM crops, all jurisdictions that have granted approval for agricultural 
biotechnology are members of the WTO and 70 per cent are parties to the Biosafety Protocol. The 
scope for trade disputes between States is readily apparent. When one combines the number of States 
that grow/produce agricultural biotechnology with the number of States approving the use/distribution 
of agricultural biotechnology, the complexity of the matrix for the development, approval and trade of 
this technology and the complication of dual membership to the regulatory regimes of the WTO and the 
Biosafety Protocol.  
 
                                                     
76 Ibid Executive Summary. 
77 Suguru Sata and Elizabeth Autry, 'Japan - Japan's approval remains a key for the commercial release of GE 
crops' (United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Biotechnology Annual, GAIN Report Number: JA302, 
2 July 2013)  
<http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20Annual_Tokyo_Ja
pan_8-27-2013.pdf>. 
78 Ibid. 
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79 James, above n 68. 
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Table 1.2: Number of Approvals for GM Products by Jurisdiction and  
Membership of the WTO and parties to the Biosafety Protocol 
As of 30 November 2013 
Jurisdiction Approvals WTO Biosafety Protocol 
Japan 198 Yes Yes 
USA* 165 Yes No 
Canada  146 Yes No 
Mexico  131 Yes Yes 
South Korea  103 Yes Yes 
Australia  93 Yes No 
New Zealand  83 Yes Yes 
EU** 71 Yes Yes 
Philippines  68 Yes Yes 
Taiwan  65 No No 
Colombia  59 Yes Yes 
China  55 Yes Yes 
South Africa  52 Yes Yes 
Total of jurisdictions  92 per cent 69 per cent 
* Not including stacked events 
** Including approvals that have expired or under renewal process 
Source: Clive James,81 author’s calculations. 
                                                     
81 Ibid. 
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C  ‘Safety’ of Agricultural Biotechnology 
The ‘safety’ of GM products has been a significant issue in the debate around this new technology. 
There have been strong disagreements between those for and against GM foods and agricultural 
products.82 These safety concerns can largely be divided into two categories: (1) human health 
concerns from the consumption of GM products; and (2) ecological and environmental concerns 
surrounding the proliferation of GM products.83 Associated with these ‘safety’ concerns are the ethical 
issues relating to gene technology. While this doctoral thesis will not conduct a detailed assessment of 
the arguments pertaining to the safety of agricultural biotechnology, it is necessary to briefly discuss 
these concerns to provide context for the legal issues that have arisen as a consequence. 
The main human health concerns include the introduction of new toxins and allergens and the potential 
increase in antibiotic resistance. These concerns were shaped by food scares that occurred in the late 
1990s such as mad cow disease, and contributed to public conceptions about the dangers of GM food.84 
Looking at the environmental issues surrounding agricultural biotechnology, ecologists have expressed 
concerns about the risk of invasiveness from the introduction of non-native organisms into the 
ecosystem and the transfer of introduced genes to other organisms.85 However, it is noted that not 
many ‘introduced’ GM crops have become invasive.86  Concern has also been expressed about the 
indirect impacts of GM crops on the population of non-target species. To address the potential for cross-
breeding, the solution of ‘terminator’ genes has been proposed. This ‘terminator’ gene would prevent 
the original GM gene from surviving outside of the host organism. However, this could be overcome (if 
so desired) through the application of chemical sprays provided by the owners of the transgenetic seed 
company, raising debates over commercialisation and ownership.87  
On the other hand, positive effects of agricultural biotechnology include higher crop yields, improved 
quality and taste, increased nutrition (biofortification), better weed control, improved resistance to pests 
                                                     
82 See: Geoffrey Barrows, Steven Sexton and David Zilberman, 'Agricultural Biotechnology: The Promise and 
Prospects of Genetically Modified Crops' (2014) 28(1) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 99; Om V Singh et 
al, 'Genetically modified crops: success, safety assessment, and public concern' (2006) 71(5) Applied microbiology 
and biotechnology 598; Calestous Juma, ''Satan's Drink' and a Sorry History of Global Food Fights', Financial 
Times UK 9 February 2006; Steven Sexton and David Zilberman, 'Land for food and fuel production: The role of 
agricultural biotechnology' in The intended and unintended effects of US agricultural and biotechnology policies 
(University of Chicago Press, 2011) 269; Fanny Rollin, Jean Kennedy and Josephine Wills, 'Consumers and new 
food technologies' (2011) 22(2) Trends in Food Science & Technology 99; Chittharanjan Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction 
of International Tribunals (Kluwer Law International, 2003); Calestous Juma, The New Harvest: Agricultural 
Innovation in Africa (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
83 See: José L Domingo and Jordi Giné Bordonaba, 'A literature review on the safety assessment of genetically 
modified plants' (2011) 37(4) Environment International 734. And also: Barrows, Sexton and Zilberman, above n 
82; Frank Hartung and Joachim Schiemann, 'Precise plant breeding using new genome editing techniques: 
opportunities, safety and regulation in the EU' (2014) 78(5) The Plant Journal 742; Sexton and Zilberman, above 
n 82; Rollin, Kennedy and Wills, above n 82. 
84 Juma, above n 82. 
85 L L Wolfenbarger and P R Phifer, 'The Ecological Risks and Benefits of Genetically Engineered Plants' (15 
December 2000) 290 Science 2088, 2088. 
86 Ibid 2008. 
87 Holly Saigo, 'Agricultural biotechnology and the negotiation of the Biosafety Protocol' (1999) 12 Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review 779, 789. 
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and diseases and more efficient farming practices.88 Creating genetic resistance to diseases may lead 
to a reduction in topically applied pesticide chemicals.89  Also, GM technology has the potential to 
increase the tolerance level of crops to extreme environmental conditions, offsetting the effects of 
climate change. This technology is expected to assist farmers to combat many problems associated 
with conventional farming in communities around the world that experience harsh environmental 
conditions such as water shortage due to drought, nutrient-poor soil, soil erosion and salinity 
problems.90 Biotechnology also provides for greater selectivity and precision over traditional plant 
breeding techniques allowing for expedient and accurate results.91 
With the advances in agricultural biotechnology in the late 1990s, increased concerns were raised by 
States about the ‘safety’ of the technology, equitable access to the technology, exposure to risks and 
the varying legal regulations (or lack thereof) between States governing the import, export, use, release 
and labelling requirements.92 The tensions in the debate followed the split between ‘Northern States’ 
(technology owners/developers and higher income States) versus ‘Southern States’ (technology users 
and lower income States). It is against this backdrop that the regulation of agricultural biotechnology 
was raised in the negotiating forum of the Convention of Biological Diversity, with an ad hoc group of 
experts convened to draft the Biosafety Protocol in 2000.93  
Despite the successful negotiation of the Biosafety Protocol, tensions in the international community 
regarding agricultural biotechnology did not vanish. The anti-GM campaign was largely led by the EU 
during the 1990s and early 2000s, with EU Member States opposed to agricultural biotechnology. This 
tension between the EU (against agricultural biotechnology) and the United States (supporting 
biotechnology) played out in a dispute in the WTO dispute European Communities — Measures 
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (‘EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products’).94 This case study will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. African nations also 
adopted a cautious approach towards agricultural biotechnology, leading to such memorable incidents 
as the refusal by Egypt to commercialise the GM potato (resistant to insect damage) and the refusal by 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi in 2002 to accept food aid from the United States as it 
was unmilled GM maize.95  Given the substantial potential benefits of agricultural biotechnology for 
African nations, the anti-GM attitudes have slowly changed. In a turning point for European attitudes 
                                                     
88 'Fact Sheet 12: Implications of Biotechnology for the Rural Sector, ' (Gene Technology Information Service, 
Biotechnology Australia, December 2001), 1-2. 
89 Saigo, above n 87, 785. 
90 Fact Sheet 12, above n 88, 5. 
91 Saigo, above n 87, 784. 
92 Ibid 800. 
93 Decision adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its Second 
Ordinary Meeting — Decision II/5 — Consideration of the need for and modalities of a Protocol for the Safe 
Transfer, Handling and use of Living Modified Organisms, COP 2 Decisions II/5 (16-17 November 1995). 
94 Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
WTO Doc WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (29 September 2006) (‘EC — Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products’). 
95 Juma, above n 82, 41. See also: Famine and the GM debate BBC News - World Edition 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2459903.stm>. 
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towards agricultural biotechnology in 2011, eight European countries (Spain, Czech Republic, Portugal, 
Romania, Poland, Slovakia, Germany and Sweden) planted GM maize.96 
In 2011, Domingo and Bordonaba published a review of the scientific literature (from 2006-2010) on 
potential toxic effects/health risks of GM plants.97 They found that few scientific studies has been 
published specifically on the safety of GM plants.98 Of those published studies, they found the division 
relatively even between those that suggested GM products (mainly maize and soybeans) were as safe 
and nutritious as the respective conventional non-GM plant, and those studies that maintained concerns 
about the overall ‘safety’ of GM plants.99 Domingo and Bordonaba concluded that the controversial 
debate on GMOs remains completely open at all levels.100 
Also in 2011, seven scholars published a report of a systematic review on the health impact of diets 
containing GM maize, potato, soybean, rice, or triticale.101 Together they reviewed studies involving 
GM-fed animals,102 including 12 long-term studies (of more than 90 days, up to 2 years in duration) and 
12 multigenerational studies (the effect of GM plants on next generations of the animals when the 
present generation was fed GM plants). They found that the results from all 24 studies did not suggest 
any health hazards and, in general, there were no statistically significant differences within parameters 
observed.103 It was concluded that the studies examined demonstrated that GM plants are nutritionally 
equivalent to their non-GM counterparts and can be safely used in food and feed.104 The authors of the 
report made a written declaration that they had no conflicts of interest. The report was independently 
funded by the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), the AgriParisTech (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs) and the University Paris-Sud, France. 
These two independent literature reviews demonstrate the ongoing debate regarding agricultural 
biotechnology. With the rapid adoption of agricultural biotechnology, innovations in this technology will 
continue to occur. As the statistics publishing in the ISAAA 2013 report demonstrate, there continues 
to be rapid growth in the GM food and agricultural products industry. For this reason, the international 
trade of these products, and in particular the regulation of the trade of these products, has become an 
increasingly important issue in the international diplomatic arena. 
                                                     
96 Juma, above n 82, 37. 
97 Domingo and Giné Bordonaba, above n 83. 
98 Ibid 741. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Chelsea Snell et al, 'Assessment of the health impact of GM plant diets in long-term and multigenerational 
animal feeding trials: a literature review' (2012) 50(3) Food and Chemical Toxicology 1134. 
102 These studies involved the use of rats, mice, dairy cows, bulls, goats, pigs, sheep, hens, broiler chickens, and 
quails as subjects. 
103 Snell et al, above n 101, 1134. 
104 Ibid. 
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D Dual Regulatory Framework for Trade in 
Agricultural Biotechnology 
As discussed above, at the global level, international ‘trade’ is regulated through the WTO and the suite 
of agreements that form part of the WTO framework. The three WTO Agreements relevant to the trade 
in agricultural biotechnology are GATT 1994, the Agreement of the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (‘SPS Agreement’), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (‘TBT 
Agreement’) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS 
Agreement’).105 GATT 1994 is the ‘umbrella’ agreement, setting out the trading rules between the WTO 
Members. Article XX of GATT 1994 provides a number of specific exemptions to these rules. Relevantly, 
Articles XX(b) and XX(g) permit Member States to maintain trade restrictive provisions for the protection 
of the environment, provided such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or are a disguised restriction on international trade. The SPS Agreement allows for health and food 
safety restrictions on imports to be imposed only where the measures are scientifically justified, founded 
on international standards and based on an appropriate ‘risk assessment’ providing evidence of an 
ascertainable risk to human health.106 The SPS Agreement authorises precautionary trade restrictions 
where scientific evidence of risk is uncertain, however such measures must be provisional in nature 
and subject to the on-going review of scientific information.107 The TBT Agreement seeks to ensure that 
technical regulations and standards relating to product specifications do not create unnecessary 
obstacles to trade. In the preamble to the TBT Agreement it is recognised that such measures may be 
implemented by Member States to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In 
relation to agricultural biotechnology, these WTO agreements are relevant in ensuring firstly the free 
trade of these products in accordance with the framework established by the WTO; and secondly, that 
any trade restrictive measures of WTO Member States that limit or ban the importation of agricultural 
biotechnology meet the requirements set out in the GATT 1994 Article XX exemptions and the SPS 
Agreement. The interpretation and application of these agreements was considered in the Biotech 
Products Dispute between the EU and the United States (see the case study in the next section of this 
chapter). 
A unique requirement of the WTO regime established in 1994 is that Member States must sign all of 
the WTO Agreements and agree to be bound by the dispute settlements provisions contained in the 
DSU. Unlike the informal framework of the earlier GATT 1947 system, the DSU was set out in a detailed 
agreement establishing a formal dispute settlement process. WTO Panels are established ad hoc upon 
                                                     
105 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 1A (Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures) (‘SPS Agreement’); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for 
signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 1A (Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade) (‘TBT Agreement’); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened 
for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 1C (Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) (‘TRIPS Agreement’). 
106SPS Agreement Article 5. 
107 Ibid Article 5.7. 
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the request of a WTO Member to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The Report of the Panel becomes 
binding on the parties following its adoption by the DSB. This occurs by reverse-consensus, in that the 
Report is taken to be automatically adopted by the DSB unless the DSB determines by consensus not 
to adopt the report, or one party to the dispute appeals the Panel Report.108  Article 22 of the DSU 
provides for compensation and the suspension of concessions if the recommendations and rulings are 
not implemented by the Member State (that is, the Member fails to bring the measure found to be 
inconsistent with a Covered Agreement into compliance). The level of the suspension of concessions 
or other obligations authorised by the DSB is limited to the level of the nullification or impairment.109 
While the international movement and handling of agricultural biotechnology is naturally regulated under 
the WTO trade agreements, international environmental law, through the Biosafety Protocol, also 
addresses the trade of these products.110 This represents a classic example of the cross-fertilisation of 
norms between two ‘specialised’ regimes. 
As previously mentioned, in 2000, the international community responded to the growth in agricultural 
biotechnology by negotiating provisions in the Biosafety Protocol governing the trade of these products. 
The Biosafety Protocol was adopted on 29 January 2000 as a supplementary agreement to the CBD 
and came into effect on 11 September 2003.111 The Biosafety Protocol regulates the ‘transboundary 
movement, transit, handling and use of all LMOs that may have adverse effects on the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity’.112 As the origin of the Biosafety Protocol lies in a parent 
convention designed around environmental protection, the Biosafety Protocol aims to regulate the 
transboundary movement of LMOs in accordance with the precautionary principle.113 The precautionary 
principle, a cornerstone principle for environmental protection regulation, originates from Principle 15 
of the United Nations Declaration on Environment and Development (agreed at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in 1992, which is examined in more detail 
in chapter 3) which states: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
                                                     
108 Article 16(4) of the DSU. 
109 Article 22(4) of the DSU. 
110 It is also noted that the Codex Alimentarius has developed international food standards and guidelines relating 
to genetically modified food. The Codex Alimentarius was established jointly by the World Health Organization and 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. See for example: Codex Alimentarius, Principles for 
the Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern Biotechnology, CAC/GL 44-2003 (adopted 2003) 
<http://www.codexalimentarius.org/standards/list-of-standards/>; Codex Alimentarius, Guideline for the Conduct of 
Food Safety Assessment of Foods Derived from Recombinant-DNA Plants, CAC/GL 45-2003 (adopted 2003) 
<http://www.codexalimentarius.org/standards/list-of-standards/>; Codex Alimentarius, Guideline for the Conduct of 
Food Safety Assessment of Foods Produced Using Recombiant-DNA Microorganisms, CAC/GL 46-2003 (adopted 
2003) <http://www.codexalimentarius.org/standards/list-of-standards/>. Although strict compliance with the Codex 
Alimentarius food standards is not mandatory, the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement recognise the Codex 
Alimentarius International Food Standards as a reference point for trade in food products. 
111 Biosafety Protocol. 
112 Ibid Article 4. 
113 Anais Kedgley Laidlaw, 'Is it better to be safe than sorry? The Cartagena Protocol versus the World Trade 
Organisation' (2005) 36(2) (August 2005) Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 427, 429. 
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scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.114 
Consistent with the over-arching aim of environment protection, the objective of the Biosafety Protocol, 
as set out in Article 1 of the Protocol is: 
In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate 
level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting 
from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on 
transboundary movements.  
The cornerstone of the Biosafety Protocol is the ‘advanced informed agreement’ provisions relating to 
the import/export of products containing LMOs based on a risk assessment. Article 10.6 embraces the 
precautionary principle as part of the decision-making process, authorising States to take trade-
restrictive measures to prevent potential (but not necessarily scientifically certain) risks to human health 
or the environment.  
The Biosafety Protocol created a regulatory regime outside of the WTO, governing the trade of LMOs. 
Parties to the Biosafety Protocol are obligated to implement and enforce the provisions of the agreement 
in domestic law (Article 2(1)). The Biosafety Protocol includes a reporting and monitoring mechanism. 
In October 2010, the Parties to the Biosafety Protocol adopted the Nagoya — Kuala Lumpur 
Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress, which will enter into force 90 days after the date of 
deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, accession or approval.115 
The Biosafety Protocol emphasises ‘protection’ as its objective and balances the regulation of free trade 
against the precautionary principle. In contrast, the WTO’s ‘overriding purpose is to help trade flow as 
freely as possible — so long as there are no undesirable side-effects — because this is important for 
economic development and well-being’.116 When issues regarding the trade of GM products arise, these 
two regimes operate simultaneously. There is a substantial academic literature on the potential conflict 
of norms between the WTO and the Biosafety Protocol.117 What is of interest in this doctoral research 
is the potential for jurisdictional conflict between the two regimes regarding the resolution of disputes, 
using agricultural biotechnology as a case study. In this context, the conflict of jurisdiction between 
                                                     
114 United Nations Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992). A 
distinction is made between the precautionary principle and a general precautionary ‘approach’ when assessing 
risk – this is further discussed in chapter 3. 
115 Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, opened for signature 7 March 2011, Doc: UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/5/17 (not yet in force) As of 
December 2014, only 28 Parties have ratified/accepted/approved the Supplementary Protocol. 
116 Understanding the WTO: Basics - What is the World Trade Organization? World Trade Organization) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm>. 
117 Shih, above n 4, 354. Shih established the large amount of literature on the potential conflict of norms by using 
‘GATT 1994 Article XX AND disputes’ as a key search term in the Westlaw legal periodical database which 
produced more than 400 journal articles. Repeating this search in September 2013 produced 795 journal articles.  
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international trade law and international environmental law has not been comprehensively analysed in 
the legal scholarly literature. 
E Dual Dispute Resolution Avenues 
The Biosafety Protocol and the WTO agreements contain separate avenues for the resolution of 
disputes arising under each specific regime. Under the Biosafety Protocol, disputes between parties to 
the Protocol are governed by the general dispute resolution provisions in the CBD.118 Article 27 of the 
CBD requires parties to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the CBD by 
negotiation and then, if needed, the use of ‘good offices’ or mediation. If no agreement is reached, the 
Parties to the CBD can accept in writing (at any time) the compulsory settlement of disputes through 
submission to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).119 If no such declaration has been 
made, the dispute will be submitted to conciliation. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties to the 
dispute, the conciliation commission is composed of five members, two appointed by each party and a 
President chosen jointly by those members.120 
The WTO has its own compulsory dispute settlement regime involving consultations, determination by 
a WTO Panel and appellate review. The process is regulated by the rules contained in the DSU and 
each stage has a timetable for completion. 121 The specific details for resolving disputes under the DSU 
and the Biosafety Protocol will be discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
Given the dual dispute settlement regimes of the WTO and the Biosafety Protocol, it is theoretically and 
practically possible that a State could commence an action challenging a trade restrictive measure of 
another State under either or both of these dispute resolution regimes. This situation arose in the 
dispute between Mexico and the United States involving taxes on soft drinks, where proceedings were 
brought under both the NAFTA and the WTO dispute settlement regimes.122 This case study is 
discussed in further detail in chapter 6. This conflict of jurisdiction has not been resolved by formal 
international agreement or by informal practice by the international legal community. It is against this 
background that the dual dispute resolution avenues for agricultural biotechnology trade disputes is 
analysed in chapter 5 of this thesis.  
When looking at the trade in GM products, a conflict of jurisdiction could clearly arise when the States 
are parties to the Biosafety Protocol and are WTO members and the dispute involves the interpretation 
of a TREM in the Biosafety Protocol (that is potentially inconsistent with the WTO agreements). Less 
                                                     
118 Biosafety Protocol Article 32 - which provides that ‘Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the provisions 
of the Convention relating to its protocols shall apply to this Protocol’. 
119 CBD Article 27(3). 
120 Ibid Article 1 of Part 2 in Annex II. 
121 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: settling disputes - a unique contribution 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm>; World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement 
System Training Module: Chapter 1 - Introduction to the WTO dispute settlement system 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s3p3_e.htm>. 
122 Panel Report, Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO Doc WT/DS308/R (7 October 
2005) and Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO Doc 
WT/DS308/AB/R, AB-2005-10 (6 March 2006). 
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clear is the situation where one of the States in the dispute is not a party to either the Biosafety Protocol 
or the WTO agreements. Given the principle of State sovereignty, the provisions of international 
agreements are applicable only to the States that have become a party to that international agreement. 
It would follow that the dispute resolution provisions in international agreements therefore only apply as 
between parties to the international agreement and cannot be invoked against non-parties. This will be 
further considered in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
The potential for conflict between the two regimes is highlighted in Table 1.3 below. As of February 
2015, there are 139 States/economies that are parties to both the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO. 
Interestingly, there are 27 parties to the Biosafety Protocol that are not WTO members and conversely 
there are 21 WTO Members that have not enacted into force the Biosafety Protocol (including the United 
States, Canada and Australia). This gives rise to potential conflicts between these 199 
States/economies. In each of these scenarios, parties could seek to resolve the dispute in accordance 
with the dispute resolution proceedings under the Biosafety Protocol, the WTO DSU, both regimes or 
neither.  
Table 1.3: Members of the WTO and Parties to the Biosafety Protocol 
 Biosafety Protocol   
in force 
Biosafety Protocol   
not in force 
Total 
WTO Member 139 21 160 
WTO Non-Member 27 12 39 
Total 166 33 199 
Sources: WTO website;123 Biosafety Protocol website.124 
Where a trade restrictive measure is prohibited under both the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO trade 
rules (where the provisions of the two agreements are prima facie consistent), an interesting issue is 
raised regarding the obligations of WTO Member states under the DSU to commence dispute resolution 
proceedings in the WTO to the exclusion of other judicial institutions. Article 23.1 of the WTO DSU 
obliges WTO Members States to utilise the WTO settlement bodies to resolve disputes rather than 
taking unilateral action. Article 23.1 provides that: 
When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits 
under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered 
agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding. 
                                                     
123 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization — Members and Observers 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm>. 
124 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Parties to the Protocol and signature and ratification of the Supplementary 
Protocol <http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/>. 
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The function of Article 23 is to prevent unilateral action by one WTO Member State in relation to a trade 
dispute. Article 23 does not prevent other tribunals from having jurisdiction over a dispute involving a 
trade provision in a MEA.125 The WTO has expressed the view that Article 23 gives it exclusive 
jurisdiction over disputes specifically involving WTO Agreements.126  The question remains as to 
whether Article 23 bestows the WTO with exclusive jurisdiction to determine trade disputes involving a 
specific norm in an MEA that potentially conflicts with WTO provisions. This will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 5 of this thesis. The decision of the ECJ in the MOX Plant dispute outlined above may 
well provide guidance on this issue, but as previously noted, the ECJ ruling does not form a binding 
precedent in international law.  
In the absence of a specific clause in either the WTO DSU or in the CBD dispute settlement provisions 
relating to jurisdictional conflict with other international institutions, we are left with the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and private international law principles to determine the 
appropriate judicial forum.127 
There is no specific legal principle under general international law that determines which international 
tribunal has primary or sole jurisdiction when more than one tribunal has a legal claim to jurisdiction 
over the same dispute.128 Nevertheless, some assistance may be found in Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states: 
When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier 
or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.129 
This principle, which is a codification of the principle of law of lex posterior, becomes problematic when 
applied to conflict of jurisdiction. Lex posterior is founded in the domestic legal framework of legislative 
intent.130 In international law, there is no single legislative body that created the treaty and it is difficult 
to attribute one particular ‘date’ as the start of a treaty given that such agreements are often re-
negotiated, expanded, modified, interpreted and implemented at different times by the various States 
that are party to the treaty.131 Guiding principles also exist in private international law for jurisdictional 
conflict: electa una via (when there is concurrence of means, s/he who has chosen one cannot have 
recourse to another); forum non conveniens (‘forum not agreeing’ — a more appropriate forum available 
to the parties); lis alibi pendens (jurisdiction should be declined if there are proceedings elsewhere 
pending); and res judicata (once determined, parties cannot recommence proceedings on the same set 
of facts in another court). However, the relevance of these principles to public international law disputes 
is debateable. In any event, they have not been consistently applied by international tribunals to resolve 
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jurisdictional conflict in public international law disputes.132 In order to guarantee the application of these 
principles to a dispute involving public international law, the MEA and the WTO would need to directly 
incorporate these principles in their texts.133  These principles of conflict of jurisdiction, as well as Article 
30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, will be further considered in chapter 4 and then 
applied to the case study of agricultural biotechnology in chapter 5. 
To date, all disputes involving a TREM in a MEA have been brought before the WTO for resolution; the 
only exception to this is the Chile—Swordfish case. In this dispute between the EU and Chile concerning 
the restrictions in Chile’s national laws on unloading of swordfish in Chilean ports, proceedings were 
commenced simultaneously in the WTO (by the EU) and also pursuant to UNCLOS dispute provisions 
(by Chile). However, the dispute was resolved between the States without the need to consider the 
potential conflict of jurisdiction between the WTO and the ITLOS — and both sets of proceedings were 
withdrawn.134 This case will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.  
Also, the WTO has not yet been called upon to rule on a dispute challenging a measure adopted to fulfil 
an obligation in a MEA (where this measure conflicts with WTO obligations).135 It was anticipated that 
some of these legal questions involving the conflict between MEAs and the WTO agreements would be 
addressed in the EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products case however this proved not to 
be the case.136   
Case Study: EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
In the early 2000s, trade involving agricultural products became the centre of an international trade 
dispute between the United States and the EU. The tension involved the measures taken by 
members of the EU with regard to GM agricultural and food products. Pursuant to EU Council 
Directive 90/220, which required notification to be given to an EU member State within whose 
territory a GMO was to be deliberately released, many EU member States were delaying the 
approval of GM agricultural and food products. 
In 2003, the United States, Canada and Argentina invoked the dispute settlement provisions of the 
WTO to challenge this de facto moratorium on the importation of GM food and crops in place in the 
EU.137 The complainants argued that the EU member state measures were in breach of the SPS 
Agreement. The EU maintained that the provisions in the CBD and the Biosafety Protocol should 
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be taken into account by the WTO Panel in making its determination.138  As the United States was 
not a party to the CBD and neither Argentina, Canada nor the United States were a party to the 
Biosafety Protocol (and in fact the Biosafety Protocol entered into force after the Panel in the dispute 
had been formed), the Panel held that the provisions of these agreements were not applicable in 
the relations between the parties.139 Accordingly, the WTO did not determine the priority or weight 
to be given to the conflicting provisions in the SPS Agreement and the Biosafety Protocol. Further, 
as the complainants were not parties to the Biosafety Protocol, the issue of conflict of jurisdiction 
between the dispute resolution mechanisms of the WTO versus the Biosafety Protocol — such as 
in the MOX Plant case — did not arise. The Biotech Products Dispute was narrowed to the question 
of the EU breach of WTO law. Despite this, the WTO Panel did make a general comment on whether 
it would consider provisions of MEAs in its ruling.  
The Panel held that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was sufficiently 
broad enough to encompass consideration of treaties and agreements ‘between the parties’ when 
interpreting WTO rules.140 However, the Panel adopted a narrow construction of the term ‘parties’, 
ruling that consideration of the provisions of multilateral agreements is only mandatory where all 
WTO members are a ‘party’ to the non-WTO agreement.141  The Panel held that it did not need to 
determine this issue any further as many WTO members, including the United States, were not a 
party to the Biosafety Protocol or the CBD.142  The Panel left open the scenario where all of the 
parties to the dispute acceded to a multilateral agreement that was not accepted by all WTO 
members.  
In conclusion, although the EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products case involved trade 
issues for agricultural biotechnology, the dispute did not involve a conflict of norms between the 
WTO and the Biosafety Protocol, nor did it involve jurisdictional conflict between these two regimes. 
The EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products case before the WTO was framed in terms of 
a breach of WTO obligations. Accordingly, the EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products case 
provides no definitive ruling on the resolution of jurisdictional conflict for trade disputes involving 
agricultural biotechnology. 
V ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THESIS 
This doctoral thesis considers the challenges posed by jurisdictional conflict between the specialised 
regimes of international trade law and international environmental law, both in the broader context and 
specifically in relation to trade disputes involving agricultural biotechnology. There has been no 
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comprehensive legal research produced on the framework for the resolution of agricultural 
biotechnology trade disputes in light of the potential conflict of jurisdiction between the international 
environment and trade regimes. The policy research has focused on issues such as risk analysis tools, 
capacity building, innovation and know-how, and bio-diplomacy issues.143 The legal research has 
focused primarily on the conflict of norms between the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO agreements.144 
Given the continued growth in the biotechnology industry, the prospect of international trade disputes 
is a real issue. Consequently, this thesis makes a highly original contribution to the literature on the 
conflict of jurisdiction between specialised regimes of international law using the case study of 
agricultural biotechnology, and makes recommendations for the way forward. 
The following legal issues are addressed in this doctoral thesis, both broadly and using agricultural 
biotechnology as a case study: 
1. Is the fragmentation of international law into specialised regimes, and the associated 
proliferation of international judicial institutions, a concern? 
2. Is there a primary jurisdiction for the resolution of trade disputes that falls under both the 
specialised regimes of international trade law (the WTO and RTAs) and international 
environmental law (a TREM in an MEA), using the case study of agricultural biotechnology? 
3. If there is no primary jurisdiction, what, if any, are the ramifications of having parallel 
jurisdictions? 
4. If there is no primary jurisdiction, what, if any, legal tools are available to resolve the conflict of 
jurisdiction between the dual dispute resolution options under the international trade law and 
international environmental law regimes and, specifically, in the case study of agricultural 
biotechnology?   
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5. What, if any, reforms are necessary to address jurisdictional conflict, both specifically for the 
trade in agricultural biotechnology and more broadly for the competing specialised areas of 
international environmental law and international trade law?  
In answering these questions within the scope of the hypothesis that the ‘fragmentation of international 
law has given rise to a conflict of jurisdiction for disputes involving agricultural biotechnology,’ this 
doctoral thesis is outlined as follows: 
Chapter 2 considers the concept of fragmentation of international law, the notion of specialised 
international legal regimes and the consequences of the proliferation of international judicial 
institutions (addresses questions 1, 2 and 3).  
Chapter 3 then analyses the historical development of international environmental law and 
international trade law and the tension and overlaps between the two regimes laying the 
foundation for potential parallel dispute proceedings (addresses questions 1, 2 and 3).  
Chapter 4 considers and analyses the principles of conflict of jurisdiction in relation to public 
international law that exist to resolve parallel and successive dispute proceedings (addresses 
questions 3 and 4).  
Chapter 5 then applies the principles of conflict of jurisdiction to the case study of a dispute 
involving the trade in agricultural biotechnology (addresses questions 2, 3 and 4).  
Chapter 6 considers the options available going forward to address conflict of jurisdiction 
between the specialised regimes of international trade law and international environmental law, 
including multiple proceedings for an agricultural biotechnology trade dispute (addresses 
question 5).  
Chapter 7 sets out the concluding remarks and recommendations for addressing conflict of 
jurisdiction for dual dispute proceedings pursuant to the international trade and international 
environmental law regimes, including for the trade in agricultural biotechnology. 
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CHAPTER 2: FRAGMENTATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
I INTRODUCTION 
The phrase ‘fragmentation of international law’ has been adopted by scholars and legal practitioners to 
refer to the expansion of international law by way of self-contained (or ‘specialised’) regimes, and the 
associated proliferation of international judicial institutions. While this phrase is relatively contemporary, 
the central concerns in the debate about fragmentation are not new. Such concerns include: the 
systematic and institutional nature of international law; the absence of any judicial or normative 
hierarchy, judicial coherence and consistency; and the fracture caused by the specialisation of laws.  
The interaction between multiple international judicial institutions will continue to be of significance in 
light of the cross-over of norms between specialised international legal regimes and the potential for 
parallel proceedings. This chapter will consider the phenomenon of the fragmentation of international 
law and the issues posed by the development of specialised regimes and their associated judicial 
institutions. In this chapter, international ‘judicial institutions’ are referred to and are taken to be 
synonymous with international ‘judicial bodies’. As stated in chapter 1, this phrase is taken to include 
proceedings before international judicial institutions that involve an independent adjudication between 
the parties to the dispute.  
II FRAGMENTATION OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
A Defining the Problem: Fragmentation 
As the number of international legal agreements increased in the second half of the 20th century, 
concerns about the fragmentation of international law gained momentum. In 1953, Jenks raised 
concerns that in the absence of a ‘world’ legislative body, international treaties would develop in a 
number of separate historical, functional and regional groups whose mutual relationships would be 
analogous to those of separate systems of municipal law. Jenks predicted that this would give rise to 
conflicts between treaty regimes.1 In 1964, Friedmann stated that the ‘fragmentation’ of international 
law could be attributed to the 'changing structure of international law' by way of expansion into new 
areas beyond the scope of classical international law.2 Then, in 1971, Luhmann hypothesised that 
global international law would continue to expand along social sectoral lines (as opposed to purely 
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territorial lines) associated with scientific, technological and economic interests.3 In 1998, Sands 
considered the issue of fragmentation and postulated  that in a ‘few years from now the body of case 
law will probably require us to address how to maintain coherence among the various forums at which 
international environmental issues are litigated’.4   
Consistent with these early predictions, technically specialised areas such as trade, investment, 
information technology, health and environmental science have increasingly raised legal issues 
transgressing national boundaries; such issues demanded regulation at the international level. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, the international legal community divided into two spheres; the 
political sphere — through the creation of the United Nations (UN) to address the political challenges 
of the post-war global community, and the economic sphere — through the establishment of the Bretton 
Woods framework (which included the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (‘GATT 1947’),5 now under the World Trade Organization (WTO)) 
to address global economic issues.6 This was perhaps an attempt to avoid political disagreements from 
interfering with the progress for economic solutions, at least between ‘like-minded’ States.7 However, 
since the end of the Cold War, interaction between States on the global level has increased, with a 
broader range of countries participating in global political and economic forums,  (for example, with 
China joining the WTO in 2001).8 Further, modern day international law has seen greater participation 
by private individuals, multinational corporations, intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations in the international legal and economic arena — a reflection of the phenomenon we now 
commonly refer to as ‘globalisation’. The awareness of ‘global’ issues and the push for inter-state 
collaboration has led to the formation of cooperative legal ‘networks’ (for example, international 
environmental law and trade law) to address specific subject matters and in turn, the negotiation of 
multilateral treaties tailored to the needs and interests of that specialised regime.9 This phenomenon of 
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‘fragmentation’ of international law into specialised sub-set systems has created a tension between the 
desire for unity and coherence in international law balanced against the benefits of specialisation and 
independence of specialised regimes and associated judicial institutions.  
B International Law as a Legal System 
Theoretical discussions on the ‘fragmentation’ of international law concentrate on whether international 
law as a ‘legal system’ is fragmented. Historically there was much debate over whether international 
law enjoyed the status of a ‘legal system’. Hart, in his 1961 publication, described the essential element 
of a modern legal ‘system’ to be the combination of both primary rules (rules that govern conduct) and 
secondary rules (rules that allow for the creation, alteration, or extinction of primary rules). Put another 
way, primary rules impose duties and secondary rules confer power. The ‘secondary’ rules create 
uniformity, certainty and establish a process for adjudication and amendment of the primary rules.10 In 
Hart’s opinion, these secondary rules differentiate modern legal systems from laws in primitive 
societies.11 Given the absence of secondary rules of this kind in international law, Hart’s view was that 
international law formed a simple social structure characterised by the presence of an ad hoc collection 
of norms of conduct, rather than a ‘system’ of law.12 
Predictably, Hart’s views sparked many years of academic debate over the nature of international law. 
The ‘conception’ of international law and its description in terms of form and structure (or lack thereof), 
has widely been considered and is closely linked to the ideology and the social and political beliefs of 
the particular theorist. Contemporary international law has been described in various ways including: 
as a network of government officials, legislators and judges;13 as a ‘system of rule’ operating beyond 
the State;14 as a dense web of overlapping and detailed prescriptions in diverse subject areas creating 
a structural network of legal order;  15 and as a combined ‘system’ and ‘hierarchy’ with centralized norms 
spread out over world space.16 From a sociologically oriented systems theory, Burke-White 
characterises the international legal order as a pluralist system with multiple specialised legal regimes 
co-existing within the one sphere of operation.17 That is, international law follows the development of 
the global ‘civil society’ and is divided into the following autonomous social systems operating in 
isolation from each other: the economy, science; culture; technology; health; the military; transport; 
tourism; and sport.18 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner also include in this list of global ‘villages’ — in a 
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restricted form — law, politics and welfare.19 Interestingly, the ‘environment’ is omitted from the list 
(although arguably it would be included as a subset of the categories ‘science’, ‘culture’, ‘health’ and/or 
‘technology’). It is noted that these categories proposed by Fischer-Lescano are taken from their article 
published in 2004 — perhaps, now, some ten years later, the ‘environment’ would be included as its 
own individual category. 
There is clearly an argument that international law has some ‘collectiveness’, despite the contradictions 
and lack of coherence between the collections of treaties. As Craven suggests, there is something 
unitary about the endeavour — however imperfect that unity might be.20  In his book published in 1995, 
Franck went as far as saying that ‘international law has entered its post-ontological era and that its 
lawyers no longer need to defend its very existence as a ‘system of law’.21  Further, the recognition of 
‘international law’ as a body of law can be readily seen by its acceptance as an area of specialisation 
for both lawyers and academics as well as by the provision of separate independent units of study on 
international law by prominent universities.  
The expansion of international legal norms, the growing body of international jurisprudence and the 
increasing global nature of modern society has largely put to rest the debate over whether international 
law exists as a ‘body of law’.22 However, recognising international law as a body of legal norms forming 
a legal order is distinct from any evaluation of its functionality, cohesiveness, adherence and 
enforceability. This leads us to a key concern of this thesis — the effectiveness and unity of the dispute 
resolution framework in international law. 
C Fragmentation: The Debate about Unity 
The debate has now moved on from whether international law exists as a distinct ‘legal order’, towards 
considerations about the unity of international law and the relationship between the specialised rules 
and rule-systems in international law.23  The concern is that the development of these specialised sub-
systems has posed a challenge to the ‘unity’ of international law.  
The discussions over the unity of international law are not without irony and paradoxes.24 The 
phraseology associated with ‘fragmentation’ is that the system is somehow broken and therefore 
ineffective and weak. However, the fragmentation of international law is not due to some inherent 
weakness in the system or lack of integrity in the international legal order.25 Rather, the concerns about 
‘unity’ stem from the expansion of international law into new areas and the creation of institutions to 
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oversee and implement these new legal norms. Fragmentation is, to some extent, a reflection of the 
strength and success of international law. The globalisation of issues crossing State boundaries has 
led to the creation of specialised norms with their own institutions to oversee and resolve conflicts that 
fall within their subject matter. It is the maturity of international law and the breadth and depth of its 
growing number of agreements that has led to potential normative inconsistency.26  Further, the growth 
of judicial institutions increases the scope of the justiciability of international disputes, enticing parties 
to seek judicial resolution to disputes, and in turn strengthens the international legal order.27 
The selection of the phrase ‘fragmentation’ implies that in order for international law to be fragmented 
(or in this context, ‘broken’) it must once have been unified. In challenging the claim that international 
law is in fact ‘fragmented’, it could be argued that as international law was never unified, the concept of 
‘fragmentation of international law’ is unfounded. However, this argument is misplaced. The better view 
is that international law has developed in a fragmented way, as opposed to having once been a cohesive 
legal system that subsequently split into specialised areas. 
So why should we be concerned about whether international law is unified? It is because in the absence 
of this ‘unity’, the prioritisation of competing issues in dispute, the development of legal obligations and 
the engagement of particular international dispute institutions are subject to the influence and 
manipulation of the power dynamics between States. Craven surmises that if fragmentation is occurring 
there is no obvious reason to suppose that it is entirely benign.28 Similarly, Stephens argues that this is 
more than a simple ‘abstract concern’ as the ‘legitimacy and authority of rules of public international law 
depend substantially upon their predictability, consistency and universality’.29 
In contrast, Koskenniemi concludes that the competing specialised regimes are not a problem to solve, 
but a beneficial prologue to a pluralist community and will reflect the shifts in political preferences.30 In 
the 2005 re-issue of his seminal publication, while noting the ‘functional differentiation’ (fragmentation) 
of international law from the inside, Koskenniemi reflects that the ideal of a ‘consensually based legal 
order between equal and self-determining collectivities has retained its political appeal despite the 
theoretical, doctrinal and practical problems with the ideas of consent, self-determination and inter-state 
equality.’31 There is weight to the argument that specialisation and the resulting competition between 
these specialised regimes will result in ‘better’ law, with coherent rules developing through the 
combination of negotiations and market forces.32 On this basis, Cogan advocates strongly for 
competitive adjudication in international law as a tool for maintaining effective judicial control.33  
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While acknowledging these differing viewpoints, it is submitted that the mere existence of specialised 
regimes and multiple international judicial institutions is not necessarily problematic — the concern is 
where the overlap of the operation of these specialised areas (either due to competing norms or 
competing jurisdiction) results in parallel proceedings and/or divergence between judicial rulings. 
Accordingly, there is a need to connect the ‘different islands’ or branches of international law in some 
form of a ‘systematic’ approach.34  
The pure clustering of unrelated legal norms challenges the attribution to the creators of the legal norms 
of an overall objective driving the purposeful creation of each legal rule within a structured legal order. 
In this way, the ‘legal interpretation’ of the purpose and substance of the legal rules is used to assess 
and justify the inter-relationship of these rules.35 As surmised by Craven, there is a ‘developmental 
sociology’ underlying the continued effort to harmonise and codify the disparate parts of international 
law through ‘systematisation’.36 It is this lack of unification in international law that the legal community 
finds challenging. 
III THE ‘PROBLEM’ OF FRAGMENTATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Recognising the concerns about fragmentation, the International Law Commission (ILC) included it as 
a topic in its long-term work program in 2000. Established in 1948 by the UN General Assembly, the 
ILC has the power to undertake studies and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the 
progressive development of international law and its codification. The ILC consists of 34 members 
elected by the UN General Assembly based on their expertise as leaders in their field of study. These 
members act as individuals not as representatives of their State. In 2002, the ILC created a Study Group 
to focus on the pressing issue of fragmentation of international law. After four years of research, in 2006 
the ILC released its final Report titled: Fragmentation of International Law: difficulties arising from the 
diversification and expansion of international law (‘ILC Report’). The ILC Report acknowledged the 
concern of international lawyers that the phenomenon of fragmentation may result in conflicts between 
rules or rule-systems, deviating institutional practices and, possibly, the loss of an overall perspective 
on the law.37    
The fragmentation of international law raises two concerns: the creation of self-contained regimes of 
specialised laws (the substantive aspect); and the proliferation of judicial institutions (the institutional 
aspect). The ILC Report attempted to provide a conceptual framework for the legal profession to utilise 
in resolving conflicts of norms between specialised regimes. As discussed in chapter 1, the institutional 
challenges posed by overlapping jurisdiction between the specialised regimes were not addressed in 
the ILC Report. The discussion turns now to consider these two core concerns.  
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A Self-Contained Regimes 
1 Historical perspective 
The phrase ‘self-contained regime’ can be traced to the judgment in the S.S. Wimbledon case before 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1923.38  In this case, the PCIJ was asked to 
determine whether the general provisions regarding German waterways in the Treaty of Versailles 
1919, specifically applied to the Kiel Canal.39 The Court noted that the Treaty of Versailles also 
contained a separate section with rules pertaining exclusively to the Kiel Canal, which differed to those 
governing other internal navigable waterways in the general provisions.40 The Court concluded that 
these specific provisions relating to the Kiel Canal were ‘self-contained’: 
[t]he provisions relating to the Kiel Canal in the Treaty of Versailles are therefore self-contained; if they 
had to be supplemented and interpreted by the aid of those referring to the inland navigable waterways 
of Germany in the previous Sections of Part XII, they would lose their ‘raison d’être’ . . . The idea which 
underlies [the specific provisions regarding the Kiel Canal] is not to be sought by drawing an analogy from 
these provisions but rather by arguing a contrario, a method of argument which excludes them.41  
When discussing fragmentation of international law, the phrase ‘self-contained regime’ is now 
commonly used in the following three different contexts.  
1. Special ‘additional’ rules developed under the customary international law of State 
responsibility to address the breach of the provisions in a primary treaty. For example, in the 
Case concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of 
America v Iran), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) identified diplomatic law as a self-
contained regime (vis-à-vis the customary international law of state responsibility) on the basis 
that it had established its own framework for addressing breaches: 
The rules of diplomatic law, in short, constitute a self-contained regime which, on the one hand, 
lays down the receiving State’s obligations regarding the facilities, privileges and immunities to 
be accorded to diplomatic missions and, on the other, foresees their possible abuse by members 
of the mission and specifies the means at the disposal of the receiving States to counter any 
such abuse.42 
2. Special rules (not necessarily ‘additional’ rules) developed to address a specific problem in a 
manner that differs from the provisions that would apply under general international law. As 
discussed above, in the S.S. Wimbledon case, the Court considered that the separate 
provisions contained in the Treaty of Versailles relating specifically to the Kiel Canal were ‘self-
                                                     
38  S.S. "Wimbledon" (Judgment) [1923] PCIJ (ser A) No 1. 
39 Treaty of Versailles, signed 28 June 1919, 225 CTS 188. 
40  S.S. "Wimbledon" (Judgment) [1923] PCIJ (ser A) No 1, 23-24. 
41 Ibid 24. 
42 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) (Judgment) [1980] ICJ 
Rep 3, 40. 
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contained’ and were distinct from the other principles in the treaty relating to the general 
regulation of inland navigable waterways.43   
3. Whole fields of law covering specialised areas and described as ‘self-contained’ (whether or 
not that word is used) in which special rules and techniques of interpretation and administration 
are thought to apply. For example, bodies of law known as international trade law, international 
environmental law and international human rights law.44 
This doctoral thesis is primarily concerned with the third category — the notion of self-contained regimes 
as whole fields of international law. 
2 Self-Contained Regimes — a misnomer? 
In 1971, the Survey of International Law suggested that international law can be divided into 17 different 
‘topics’ or ‘branches’.45 Modern day international law has expanded to contain sub-set areas of law such 
as  trade law, environmental law, human rights law, criminal law, law of the sea, diplomatic law, space 
law and European law (to name a few).46 Despite the regular use of the phrase ‘self-contained regimes’ 
to describe these sub-set areas of international law, growing opposition has developed to the use of 
this term to denote fully autonomous legal subsystems.  
In dispelling the existence of ‘self-contained’ regimes, scholarly research has focussed on the narrow 
question of whether such regimes are fully isolated from general international law.47  In this way, the 
debate has been framed with a threshold test that in order to be ‘self-contained’ these regimes must 
operate completely separately from general international law.48  Not surprisingly, these supposedly self-
contained regimes fail this test. In the ILC Report, the ILC found that self-contained regimes are not 
‘closed-circuits’ and that they are supplemented by the rules of general international law and that 
recourse to these general principles is permitted where the ‘special regime’ fails:  
But no regime is self-contained. Even in the case of well-developed regimes, general law has at least two 
types of function. First, it provides the normative background that comes in to fulfil aspects of its operation 
not specifically provided by it ... Second, the rules of general law also come to operate if the special regime 
fails to function properly. Such failure might be substantive or procedural, and at least some of the avenues 
open to regime members in such cases are outlined in the Vienna Convention itself. Also the rules on 
State responsibility might be relevant in such situations. Third, the term ‘self-contained regime’ is a 
misnomer. No legal regime is isolated from general international law.49 
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44 See the discussion in: Simma and Pulkowski, above n 15, 491-493. 
45 'Survey of International Law - Working Paper Prepared by the Secretary-General' (Yearbook, Report to the 
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47 ILC Report, above n 9, 79. 
48 See: Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, 'Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur' (Vol. II, Part One, Yearbook 1992), 40. 
49 ILC Report, above n 9, 100. 
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As pointed out by Simma and Pulkowski, it is highly unlikely that legal subsystems coexist in isolation 
from the remaining bulk of international law.50 Similarly, Arangio-Ruiz in applying the definition that self-
contained regimes must be a set of rules that were hermetically isolated from general law, found that 
none of the supposedly self-contained regimes seem to materialize in concreto.51  
Taking the example of international trade law as a subsystem in international law, it clearly would fail 
the ‘isolation’ test. Article 3(2) of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (‘DSU’) provides: 
Members recognize that it [the WTO dispute settlement system] serves to preserve the rights and 
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.52 
In US — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, the WTO Appellate Body regarded 
Article 3(2) of the DSU to mean that the WTO agreements should not be interpreted in ‘clinical isolation 
from public international law’.53 The relationship between WTO law and other rules of international law 
was notably explored by Pauwelyn in his book published in 2003 on this subject.  Pauwelyn submits 
that WTO law forms part of, or a ‘branch’ of, public international law — a proposition that is also 
supported amongst other legal scholars.54 However, international trade law is commonly regarded as a 
classic example of a self-contained regime in international law.  
So how do we reconcile the findings of the ILC that self-contained regimes do not exist with the literature 
on fragmentation of international law? The ILC Report is premised on ‘general international law’ as the 
central key body of law, with specialised primary and secondary rules having been devised to cover 
particular problems in a manner that is different from the general international law.55 In this way, the 
ILC’s research has been framed around conflict of norms, focusing on whether the laws of these subset 
areas of international law can exist in isolation (with presumably conflicting legal norms). But is this 
really the correct way to view it? Did the creation of treaties occur so as to depart from principles of 
general international law or were treaties negotiated to cover the gaps?  It is proposed that international 
legal norms (at least in regards to treaties) have developed on an incremental basis through the co-
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operative negotiation of States in response to global issues — that is, to cover the gaps created by new 
issues and technology (e.g climate change) or in response to revised thinking on existing issues (e.g. 
crimes against humanity).  
It is contended that the phrase ‘self-contained regimes’ is a misnomer. In turn, if the phrase ‘specialised 
regimes’ is adopted, then many of the problems relating to the legal characteristics of this ‘definition’ 
(i.e. isolated operation from general international law) fall away. Pauwelyn refers to these specialised 
areas of international law as ‘inter-connected islands’, which provides a helpful visual description of 
their operation.56 It would hardly be contentious to propose that international law has specialised 
regimes or ‘subset’ regimes containing subject-specific norms. Accordingly, analysing the complexities 
of fragmentation through the prism of the definition of ‘self-contained’ regimes is, ultimately, unhelpful 
and distracts from the more important question of the relationship between these specialised regimes.  
3 Specialised Regimes 
In accepting that there are specialised regimes in international law, the next question is, what, if any, 
challenges does this present to the unity, cohesiveness and effectiveness of international law? In other 
words, how do these specialised regimes operate in relation to general law and with respect to each 
other? The phenomenon of ‘fragmentation’ of international law in the context of these specialised 
regimes refers to three different types of conflict scenarios:  
1. Fragmentation through conflicting interpretations of general law by the different specialised 
regimes. 
2. Fragmentation through the emergence of specialised regimes as exceptions to the general law. 
3. Fragmentation through the development of different types of specialised regimes which may 
conflict with the provisions of other specialised regimes in international law.57 
The conflict of jurisdiction between disputes involving both international trade and international 
environmental law falls into the third category. As mentioned in chapter 1, this thesis contends that the 
cross-over of normative provisions of the specialised regimes of international law creates the potential 
for conflict of jurisdiction arising out of parallel proceedings.  Accordingly, it is necessary to briefly 
comment on the principles relating to conflict of norms, because if the normative provisions were 
consistent (that is, with the same legal obligations, causes of action and remedies), then there may not 
be a conflict of jurisdiction — although concerns relating to multiple proceedings per se would remain. 
In terms of conflicts of norms, the ILC concluded that principles such as lex specialis (a specific treaty 
override a general treaty), lex posterior (a later treaty prevails over an earlier inconsistent treaty), inter 
se agreements (agreements as between the parties), and ‘peremptory norms’ (also known as jus 
cogens) are readily employed to resolve conflicts of norms due to fragmentation.58  
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Particularly relevant to the discussion of specialised regimes is the first above-mentioned principle, lex 
specialis. The ILC Report found that international case law appears to accept the lex specialis maxim, 
however, without great elaboration.59 Although lex specialis might be held out as a solution for resolving 
conflicts of norms between specialised regimes (and with general law), its application is not without 
difficulties. As a technique for legal interpretation, lex specialis requires the determination of which law 
is the ‘general’ law and which law is the ‘specialised’ law. This is not necessarily an easy task. Should 
this be determined by the subject matter, the number of parties to the agreements, the date of the 
agreements, the substantive coverage of the provisions or the enforcement mechanisms? The ILC 
Report readily accepted that approaching the question from these various starting points may result in 
different conclusions.60 Further complicating the application of this maxim is the unavoidable interplay 
of the subjective values of the interested parties to the dispute. This tension plays out in disputes 
involving both trade and environmental issues, as the categorisation of the subject matter of the dispute 
depends on which provisions are of critical importance to the party. As recognised in the ILC Report, 
conflict of norms between two specialised areas poses a particular challenge: 
‘Trade law’ and ‘environmental law’, for example, have highly specific objectives and rely on principles 
that may often point in different directions.61 
The relationship between lex specialis and other maxims is also unclear. Specifically, how does lex 
specialis work with the maxim lex posterior (later law overrides prior law)? 62 Is there a hierarchy in 
international law governing the priority to be given to conflicting norms? The ILC submitted in the ILC 
Report that although there is no formal hierarchy between the sources of international law, nonetheless 
an informal hierarchy has evolved due to a ‘forensic’ or a ‘natural’ aspect of legal reasoning. The 
hierarchy in descending order, as found in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, is adopted: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized 
by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law.63 
Although useful, this approach does not solve conflicts that invoke legal obligations falling under two 
different specialised regimes. Arguably, the legal obligations under both regimes enjoy equal weight. 
Further, the acceptance of a normative hierarchy based on jus cogens, does not necessarily transfer to 
the convergence of jurisdiction. For example, in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
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Rwanda, the ICJ recognised that the crime of genocide was a norm having the character of jus cogens, 
however the Court held: 
the fact that a dispute relates to compliance with a norm having such a character, which is assuredly the 
case with regard to the prohibition of genocide, cannot of itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the 
Court to entertain that dispute. Under the Court’s Statute that jurisdiction is always based on the consent 
of the parties.64 
In Hafner’s study on fragmentation of international law, he points to the dangers outlined by legal 
scholars associated with the absence of conceptual-doctrinal consistency namely, lack of hierarchy of 
norms and the absence of a clear judicial hierarchy.65 These two problems are not new, and interestingly 
it has been suggested by the ILC that any issues posed by fragmentation can be addressed through 
legal-interpretative techniques commonly utilised by international lawyers.66  While this may be true for 
conflicts of norms (as considered in detail by the ILC), it is yet to be convincingly demonstrated that 
legal interpretative principles (e.g. lex specialis and lex posterior) or conflict principles such as judicial 
comity (grant of reciprocity from the court of one State to the court of another State), res judicata (final 
judgment on the merits), lis alibi pendens (dispute elsewhere pending) will actually solve conflicts of 
jurisdiction between specialised regimes.67 This will be discussed in more detail in chapters 4 and 5 of 
this thesis.   
If all specialised regimes truly were isolated and operated autonomously within their own sphere, then 
arguably conflict of norms or conflict of jurisdiction would simply not arise. However, the complicated 
nature of international relations means that disputes often involve issues that cross over various 
specialised areas. These overlaps between specialised regimes mean that no one issue fits solely 
within a compartmentalised area of international law. Further complicating the dynamics between these 
specialised regimes is the growing trend for the inclusion of norms that fall outside the subject-specific 
area of that particular regime. As will be further discussed in chapter 3, the tension between 
environment and trade has seen the inclusion of trade provisions in what are otherwise international 
environmental agreements. This doctoral research analyses international environmental and trade law 
in the area of agricultural biotechnology as a specific example of this phenomenon. Specialised regimes 
no longer (if ever) operate in complete isolation from each other.68 The pressing issue has moved 
beyond whether or not international law is fragmented into specialised regimes; it is submitted that the 
new challenge stems from the cross-over of these specialised regimes due to the increasing ‘globalised’ 
character of international disputes and the conflict of jurisdiction between the judicial institutions created 
to oversee these specialised areas. 
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B Multiplicity of International Judicial Institutions 
Associated with the development of these specialised regimes is the creation of judicial institutions to 
oversee the relevant agreements. The establishment of international judicial institutions has provided 
viable options for States to pursue judicial resolution of disputes, in turn contributing to the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of international adjudication.69 However, the proliferation of international judicial 
bodies has also raised concerns relating to forum shopping, overlapping jurisdiction and inconsistent 
judicial rulings.70 The proliferation of international tribunals raises two concerns — doctrinal 
inconsistency and overlapping jurisdiction.71  With greater choice of dispute forums, there are increased 
opportunities for parallel proceedings and conflicting judgments. From a systematic viewpoint, there is 
concern that these new ‘judicial’ bodies will apply international norms in a manner relevant only to their 
own specialised regime, and potentially derogate from the ‘universally’ accepted interpretation of 
general international legal norms.72  
In 1997, the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT) was formed. PICT was a joint 
endeavour between the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development in London, 
and the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. Through the combined research 
efforts of Sands, Mackenzie and Shany, PICT produced the publication The Manual on International 
Courts and Tribunals (‘The Manual’). 73 The Manual was first published in 1999 and the second edition 
was released in 2010.  While providing a useful guide to the range of judicial dispute institutions 
available to the international lawyer and the proceedings before such institutions, The Manual does not 
attempt to address the specifics of overlapping jurisdiction. 
To demonstrate the potential for overlapping jurisdictions in international law, current judicial institutions 
include (but are not limited to) the: 
- ICJ   
- Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 
- Panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
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- International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
- International Criminal Court 
- European Court of Human Rights 
- Court of Justice of the European Union (comprising the European Court of Justice, the General 
Court and the Civil Service Tribunal) 
- International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
- International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
- United Nations Compensation Commission 
- World Bank Inspection Panel 
- Andean Community Court of Justice 
- Benelux Court of Justice 
- Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association States 
- Economic Court of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
- African Court on Human and People's Rights 
- Statute of the Court of Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
- Caribbean Court of Justice 
- Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) dispute settlement system 
- North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) dispute settlement system 
- Tribunal of The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Nuclear 
Energy Agency 
- United Nations Dispute and Appeals Tribunal 
- Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation 
- Administrative Tribunal of the International Monetary Fund 
There also exist several quasi-judicial committees for dispute settlement and compliance including the:  
- United Nations Human Rights Committee 
- Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
- Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
- Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
- Committee against Torture 
- Committee on the Rights of the Child 
- Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
- Committee on Enforced Disappearances 
In addition, a range of ad hoc arbitral and conciliation panels are formed on a case-by-case basis. 
With this staggering number of international dispute forums, each with varying judicial ‘powers’,   
jurisdictional conflict is a real issue. However, the concern about fragmentation of international law is 
not simply directed at the number of international ‘judicial’ institutions. Looking at the legal systems of 
nation States, such as Australia and the United States, there is a plethora of judicial institutions. But 
these developed States have ‘mature’ legal systems comprising a finely-tuned balance of judicial 
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independence and control that involves judicial accountability, frameworks for resolving jurisdictional 
conflict, legal precedence and a jurisdictional hierarchy with decisions appealable to the highest national 
court.74 Thus, there can easily be a diversity of tribunals; the key point is that they exist within the one 
judicial system. Abi-Saab explains this concept as: 
the depiction or representation of the ‘constellation’ of courts and tribunals within the legal order, a 
‘constellation’ that is, by definition, correlated. Even the most independent tribunals within the legal order, 
e.g., military tribunals, are defined, in their role and the ambit of their jurisdiction, in terms of their relation 
to the regular courts structure.75 
In comparison, in international law, judicial institutions operate independently, applying their own 
concepts and principles, with different sources of obligations and accountability. Koskenniemi describes 
it as the ‘hegemonic struggle where each institution, though partial, tries to occupy the space of the 
whole’.76 It is for this reason that the integrity of international law as a ‘whole’ homogenous system may 
be called into question.77   
If disputes were able to be carved up according to the specific issues in the dispute, then arguably the 
specialised judicial institutions could determine their own discrete issues and there would be no 
overlapping jurisdiction. However, rarely can a dispute between parties be cleanly separated into 
different and segregated issues. Often issues are interwoven with, for example, a trade dispute raising 
environmental concerns, or a human rights case involving health issues, breaches of environmental law 
and international criminal law. This highlights the tension between pluralism and cohesion in 
international law and the problem with attempting to compartmentalise issues in international legal 
disputes into disparate and segregated boxes.  
Complicating the matter further is the recent trend for specialised regimes to include norms covering 
issues that would otherwise be outside their specialised areas. As will be discussed in the remaining 
chapters of this doctoral thesis, the international environmental regime has created a trading framework 
for agricultural biotechnology that operates outside of the WTO framework. The cross-over of norms 
between specialised regimes has increased the potential for parallel proceedings to be commenced 
(involving the same parties) pursuant to provisions under the different specialised regimes with 
ultimately conflicting judicial rulings. As stated in Chapter 1, the cross-over of normative provisions 
between specialised regimes gives rise to a concern that doctrinal inconsistency will result from: 
1. Narrow interpretations by specialised regimes in-keeping with their own mandate,  ultimately 
diminishing the universal application of international legal norms; 
2. Inconsistent interpretation of international legal norms by specialised regimes that depart from 
the original objectives of these principles.  
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In this way, the proliferation of tribunals raises the possibility of conflicting jurisprudence involving 
substantive norms. Koskenniemi and Leino concisely summarise this problem in the following way: 
Here, perhaps, is the core of the problem: not so much in the emergence of new sub-systems but in the 
use of general law by new bodies representing interests or views that are not identical with those 
represented in old ones.78 
However, this behaviour by judicial institutions is not at all that surprising. These specific institutions 
have been created to oversee specific treaties. Their competence is derived from their own parent 
treaty. In fact, when bringing a dispute before these tribunals, it would be expected by the Parties that 
the international judicial institution would apply the law of that specific regime. A pertinent example is 
the Prosecutor v Tadic case where the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY found that it was limited by the 
scope of power under its statute: 
There is no question, of course, of the International Tribunal acting as a constitutional tribunal, reviewing 
the acts of the other organs of the United Nations, particularly those of the Security Council, its own 
‘creator.’ It was not established for that purpose, as is clear from the definition of the ambit of its ‘primary’ 
or ‘substantive’ jurisdiction in Articles 1 to 5 of its Statute.79 
Interestingly, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY nevertheless found that it did have power to examine 
the plea against its jurisdiction based on the invalidity of its establishment by the Security Council. Also 
looking at the scope of the WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies, the DSU limits the jurisdiction to the list 
of agreements contained in Appendix 1 to the DSU. At this point, a distinction is drawn between the 
applicable law of the international judicial institution and jurisdictional competence. Concerns about 
doctrinal inconsistency stems from the interpretation and application of substantive norms by the judicial 
institution. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the resolution of these conflict of norms between 
specialised regimes was considered in depth in the ILC Report and a ‘toolkit’ for legal practitioners was 
suggested utilising concepts such as lex specialis and lex posterior and the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’).80  
Turning back to judicial competence and jurisdictional conflict, if multiple international judicial institutions 
have competence to determine a dispute, the judge is faced with the following questions: what approach 
should be taken by an international judicial institution faced with several other judicial forums also 
claiming jurisdiction over a dispute; should a judicial institution refrain from determining a dispute 
already determined by another judicial institution; and how should conflicting judicial reasoning between 
courts be resolved?81   
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In analysing these questions, one is ultimately directed to the consideration of the absence in 
international law of any holistic ‘structural’ provisions governing jurisdictional hierarchy, precedence or 
conflict of jurisdiction between the specialised regimes. There is no ‘highest’ international court or a 
universal ‘appellate’ court. Even the ICJ, which is the principal judicial organ of the UN and often referred 
to as the ‘World Court’, is limited by its own statute:  
The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular 
case.82 
In the absence of any such formal hierarchy, the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts is left to provisions 
in the agreements between the parties, the procedures of the institution itself for subrogation of its 
jurisdiction and judicial interpretation of general conflict of law provisions.  
Some members of the bench of the ICJ have been particularly vocal in expressing their concern about 
these issues. The Hon Stephen M. Schwebel, then President of the ICJ, chose to comment on the 
proliferation of international tribunals in his speech to the UN General Assembly in 1999.83  His Honour 
welcomed the development of specialised international judicial bodies on the basis that it will lead to 
more disputes being submitted to international judicial settlement. However, he expressed concern 
about the possibility of conflicting interpretations of international law and suggested that these 
international tribunals could request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on issues that are of importance 
to the unity of international law.84  His Honour also advocated caution in the creation of new universal 
courts in respect of inter-State disputes.85 However, this view on fragmentation has not been shared by 
all members of the bench of the ICJ. Dame Rosalyn Higgins (President of the ICJ from 2006 to 2009) 
surmised that fragmentation and the accompanying increase in the number of international tribunals is 
‘an inevitable consequence of the busy and complex world in which we live and is not a cause of 
regret.’86   
Similarly, not all academics believe that the proliferation of international judicial institutions is 
problematic. For example, Cogan advocates that instead of striving for uniformity across international 
judicial institutions, we should accept and develop a system of ‘competitive adjudication in international 
law’.87 Cogan frames his research in terms of ‘competition’ and ‘control’ and submits that the 
weaknesses of existing controls over international courts will lead States to avoid international courts, 
abandon them, or disregard their decisions, potentially condemning courts to irrelevance.88 He bases 
this conclusion on the structural constraints on international law-making, the intricacies of international 
politics and diplomacy, and the inability of States to remedy any interpretive errors made by courts or 
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to direct judges to decide cases in certain ways.89 On face value, Cogan’s argument for increased 
competition between international judicial institutions appears contrary to the more conventional 
objective of coherence and predictability. However, in advocating for increased competition between 
international judicial institutions, Cogan recognises the potential need to restrict parties to the filing of 
proceedings before one international judicial institution.90 The increased competition between judicial 
institutions, as advocated by Cogan, raises particular concerns associated with forum shopping by 
parties. As stated by the Hon Gilbert Guillaume:  
Every judicial body tends - whether or not consciously - to assess its value by reference to the frequency 
with which it is seised. Certain courts could, as a result, be led to tailor their decisions so as to encourage 
a growth in their caseload, to the detriment of a more objective approach to justice. Such a development 
would be profoundly damaging to international justice.91 
Although the ILC was tasked with considering the fragmentation of international law, the Study Group 
elected to not consider the issue of jurisdictional conflict based on institutional competency, stating that 
this is best left to the institutions involved in the dispute.92 At first instance it appears astonishing that 
the ILC decided to ignore one of the key components of the fragmentation challenge. So why, then, did 
the ILC not address the institutional challenges from overlapping jurisdiction?  As surmised by Leathley, 
the reason most likely reflects a mixture of legal and political motivations.93  It is possible, given the 
limited mandate of the ILC that it may not enjoy the power to propose such significant changes to the 
international legal judicial order.94 This argument is advanced by Leathley who points out that the UN 
General Assembly (which created the ILC to report back to it) does not possess any legislative powers, 
which would be necessary to create a judicial hierarchy in international law.95 While this may be true, it 
is not convincing that the absence of legislative powers would limit the scope of the ILC from considering 
the conflict of jurisdiction between international judicial institutions. Would such reasoning not have 
equally applied to the power of the ILC to consider the conflict of norms arising from fragmentation?  
This leads us to the political motivations for abstaining from considering overlapping jurisdictions in 
international law. Pragmatically, any such research would have involved controversial analysis of the 
roles, limits, competence and hierarchy between the existing judicial institutions. If a hierarchical 
solution were to be proposed, which court would prevail? The complexities of the international judicial 
institutions reflect the preferences of States for specialisation. It is difficult to divorce State preferences 
and political motivations from the analysis of reforming the judicial institutional framework. It is possible, 
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that at the time, the ILC put this issue into the ‘too hard’ basket and determined to focus its efforts on 
providing recommendations for conflicts involving substantive norms.96  
The creation of judicial institutions is the consequence of the development of specialised norms to 
promote particular political interests and societal agendas. For this reason, the reality is that the 
proliferation of tribunals is due, in part, to political motivations and not the result of a technical mistake 
or an unfortunate consequence of the development of a deliberate global order.97  With the desire to 
maintain State sovereignty, States have only agreed to be bound by international law in specific 
contexts, or even on a case-by-case basis. Benvenisti and Downs advance the argument that 
fragmentation is in part the result of a calculated strategy by powerful States to create a legal order that 
advances their own interests by: (1) preferring narrow agreements on specific subjects over broad, 
integrative agreements; (2) formulating one-time agreements; (3) avoiding the creation (or not acceding 
to the jurisdiction) of judicial institutions; and (4) shifting to alternative venues when the original one 
becomes too responsive to the interests of weaker States.98 In essence, in keeping international judicial 
institutions weak, State sovereignty remains strong. 
Given the growing number of international, regional, multilateral and bilateral agreements with their own 
dispute resolution mechanisms, the scope for parallel proceedings between international judicial 
institutions is only set to increase. It is now a question of the willingness of the international community 
to address the proliferation of international judicial institutions and devise ‘solutions’ promoting judicial 
cohesion for conflicting jurisdiction. 
IV REGIME COLLISION: TOWARDS JUDICIAL 
COHESION  
With the divergent legal and scholarly views on whether the development of multiple international 
judicial institutions is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, we are ultimately left with the reality that proliferation simply has 
occurred. The question then is what measures, if any, should be taken to address regime collision in 
the event of conflict of jurisdiction? This will be briefly discussed below and then further developed 
throughout the thesis. 
A Harmonization — An Informal Approach 
In concluding the ILC Report, the ILC found that the challenges of conflicts of norms posed by the 
fragmentation of international law can be addressed through the process of ‘harmonization’. In this 
context, harmonization is based on a strong presumption against normative conflict.99  Applying this 
same concept of ‘harmonization’ to the resolution of jurisdictional conflict, judicial ‘harmonization’ can 
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be achieved through the consistent application of binding legal principles, irrespective of any pre-
disposition for an institution to give preference to its own mandate. In this way institutional cohesion is 
achieved informally with international judicial institutions acting with deference to each other and 
embracing conflict resolution principles such as electa una via (when there is concurrence of means, 
s/he who has chosen one cannot have recourse to another); forum non conveniens (‘forum not 
agreeing’ — a more appropriate forum available to the parties); lis alibi pendens (jurisdiction should be 
declined if there are proceedings elsewhere pending); and res judicata (once determined, parties cannot 
recommence proceedings on the same set of facts in another court).100 
This informal judicial ‘harmonization’ is consistent with an international ‘legal pluralism’ approach 
advanced by Burke-White, who proposes that fragmentation can be reconciled by developing  informal 
links between international institutions — a ‘transjudicial’ dialogue on issues of global critical concern.101  
However, the approach of ‘harmonization’ is premised on the application by these judicial bodies of 
‘hard’ law. This becomes problematic when considering the nature of certain specialised regimes which 
have developed their own subject-specific legal ‘principles’. For example, in international environmental 
law there is the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle and the policy objective of 
‘sustainable development’.102  These ‘soft law’ principles do not receive the same legal standing as 
‘hard law’ and consequently, if the ILC approach is to be followed, may be set aside in favour of legally 
binding ‘hard’ law. Further complicating the matter is the potential for divergent interpretations of such 
soft law principles by other specialised regimes and the real danger that such principles will not be 
applied at all — leaving the status of such soft law principles in doubt. For example in the European 
Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) case the Appellate Body of 
the WTO elected not to apply the precautionary principle on the basis that the status of the 
‘precautionary principle’ as a general principle of international law was not yet settled.103 This position 
was followed by the WTO Panel in the European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products case and accordingly, the WTO Panel found it unnecessary to consider 
the application (and relevance) of the precautionary principle to the dispute.104   
The ILC readily acknowledges the limits of harmonization to resolve genuine conflicts. However the 
Report states that ‘[b]etween the parties, anything may be harmonized as long as the will to 
harmonization is present’.105 In this way, ‘harmonization’ is then hostage to the willingness of nation 
States to relinquish sovereignty, which only happens on a case-by-case basis when the benefits to the 
nation State clearly outweigh the costs. Is it at all acceptable to rely on the ‘willingness’ of parties (in 
this case, States) to agree to an informal solution to potential conflicts of jurisdiction? Does such an 
approach take into account the power dynamics of the disputing nations, where arguably developed 
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countries have stronger negotiating positions relative to developing countries? This ad hoc approach 
provides little guidance, security or support to the State attempting to navigate through the confusing 
area of conflict of jurisdiction at the international level. There is also the danger that the real issues in 
dispute will fall to the side and/or be significantly delayed, as parties focus on negotiating a solution to 
the conflicting judicial forums. This is indeed what happened in the MOX Plant dispute where the merits 
of the dispute relating to the leakage of radioactive emissions into the Irish Sea were never determined 
by the judicial institutions engaged in the dispute (see the case study in chapter 1 on the MOX Plant 
dispute).106   
Collision between regimes, and specifically between judicial institutions, will continue to become more 
prevalent given the increasing interconnectivity between States, corporations and individuals in the 
global marketplace. With the proliferation of international tribunals, many of which have such specific 
and specialised mandates, it is not sufficient to leave the resolution of the conflicting jurisdiction to the 
realm of individual judges in particular international judicial institutions. In the absence of any normative 
provisions, these judicial institutions have no incentive to forgo their own jurisdiction to hear a dispute. 
If the informal method of ‘harmonization’ provides no real solution to jurisdictional conflict posed by the 
proliferation of international institutions, what possible solutions remain?  
B Legal and Political Solutions? 
The ‘solutions’ proposed for the fragmentation of international law fall into the following categories: 
1. Legal solution — creation of a judicial hierarchy. 
2. Political solution — negotiation by States and public debate. 
3. A hybrid framework — this thesis proposes including choice of forum clauses in international 
agreements (and as such is a hybrid solution comprising both legal and political 
components).107   
From the legal perspective, the collision of judicial institutions and conflict of jurisdiction is attributed to, 
generally, the inconsistency between the provisions of international legal norms, and specifically, the 
absence of a judicial and normative hierarchy. The solution, in this regard, is a systematic ‘hierarchical’ 
one — a reflection of the national legal systems of sovereign States. Such models range from the 
‘formal’ creation of a judicial hierarchy by, for example, investing the ICJ with appellate jurisdiction or 
the authority to make preliminary rulings on jurisdictional conflict, to the ‘informal’ hierarchical solution 
of the application by judges of conflict of jurisdiction principles such as judicial comity, res judicata and 
lis alibi pendens.108   
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The Hon Gilbert Guillaume advocated for a hierarchical solution whereby disputes involving the 
interpretation of general international law are referred to the ICJ for advisory rulings on this aspect of 
the dispute: 
In order to reduce the risks of conflicting interpretations of international law, should we not encourage 
other international courts to seek the opinion of the Court on doubtful or important points of general 
international law raised in cases before them?109  
However appealing, this approach is fraught with problems. First, the consensual nature of the ICJ 
jurisdiction potentially acts as a bar to any referral in the absence of the consent of the parties. Second, 
is the willingness (or lack thereof) of the institutions of the specialised regime to carve out its decision 
making power over such legal points and ‘defer’ to the ICJ matters which they are otherwise competent 
(in terms of jurisdiction) to determine. Third, is whether the division of issues between those that are 
questions of general international law and those that are questions of specialised law is practically 
feasible or desirable. As succinctly summarised by Dame Higgins:  
I can see no reason why States who have deliberately chosen such new bodies to respond to their real-
life needs should support the slowing down of the work of these specialist tribunals to allow some form of 
reference to the ICJ. And I find it ironic that the proponents of 'unity' in international law should think it 
possible for a specialist tribunal to retain full powers in 'specialist' areas of law while referring over to the 
ICJ the issues of 'general' international law.110  
The creation of any comprehensive formal judicial hierarchy in international law is realistically 
impossible, with the protection of State sovereignty, different value-systems, legal preferences and 
political dynamics hampering the possibility of any such universally accepted hierarchical solution. The 
hierarchical solution (and the possibility of a simpler, two-tiered hierarchy) will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis.   
In this way, solutions directed at creating institutional hierarchies (either for norms or jurisdictions) are 
inadequate in the absence of political solutions addressing the underlying political motivations and 
power mechanisms. This political perspective attributes the fragmentation of international law to the 
collection of issues-based treaties negotiated solely to reflect specific political interests with no regard 
to existing obligations, legal unity or consistency. As proposed by Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, 
conflicts from fragmentation will not be avoided through the scholarly pursuit of an international 
jurisdictional hierarchy or assigning theoretical priorities for competing norms. Legal norms are simply 
the ‘mirror’ of political policies of individual States.111 Accordingly: 
                                                     
109 Justice Gilbert Guillaume, 'The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: the outlook for the international 
legal order' (Speech by the President of the International Court of Justice delivered at the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations)  New York, 27 October 2000 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pr=85&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1> 
110 Rosalyn Higgins, 'A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench' (2006) 55(4) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 791, 799. 
111 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, above n 3, 1003. 
56  
 
the only possible perspective for dealing with such policy conflicts is the explicit politicization of legal norm 
collisions through power mechanisms, negotiations between relevant collective actors, public debate and 
collective decisions.’112 
Supporters of the political solution propose a solution to fragmentation through collective negotiation 
between the State actors and public debate. But, negotiating ‘what’, exactly? Again, as international law 
is a reflection of the multi-dimensional fragmentation of global society, it is not clear how a global 
normative framework can be negotiated to give priority between these specialised areas.113 
In this tension between politics, culture and ideologies lies the challenge posed by fragmentation of 
international law against any attempts at normative or institutional ‘unity’. However, the greater the inter-
connection between global issues, the greater is the need for co-existence between these legal ‘islands’ 
of specialised regimes. This is the classic tension between a State’s formal independence (sovereignty) 
and actual independence.114  As summarised by Weiler and Paulus: 
And, yet, the more the future world comes to rely or depend for its material and spiritual future well-being 
on common values such as sustained development, human rights, free human and material exchange, 
the more the 'world community' will require a unitary, hierarchized international law.115 
Accordingly, a ‘solution’ to overlapping and conflicting jurisdiction is worth striving for. This doctoral 
thesis proposes and analyses a third solution — the creation of institutional priorities for the resolution 
of disputes through clauses in each specific treaty. These ‘choice of forum’ clauses set out the 
opportunity for parties to the dispute to elect and invoke the jurisdiction of one particular international 
judicial institution, to the exclusion of others. In a way, this third ‘solution’ is a combination of both the 
hierarchical solution framework — in that it creates a judicial hierarchy between the parties in dispute 
— and the political solution — in that it is negotiated by the parties to that particular treaty. This ‘solution’ 
will be further discussed in chapter 6.  
V CONCLUSION 
The fragmentation of international law has both pros and cons — on the one hand, the specialisation 
has led to tailored legal norms overseen by regimes with specific expertise; on the other hand the 
specialised regimes and proliferation of international judicial institutions potentially threatens the 
reliability and uniformity of international law.116 Substantial academic consideration has been given to 
the fragmentation of international law and specifically, the existence of specialised regimes (in the 
context of their operation in isolation from general international law) and conflict of norms. This still 
leaves the issue relating to conflict of jurisdiction arising from the proliferation of international judicial 
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institutions — an issue deliberately not considered in the ILC Report released in 2006. Instead, the ILC 
Report focused on the narrower question of the fragmentation through the conflict of norms between 
specialised regimes. That is not to say that the ILC Report is not of value. On the contrary, for conflict 
of norms, the ILC Report provides a valuable set of ‘tools’ for achieving a practical resolution between 
disputing parties. As found by Murphy, ‘there is evidence that the Report is being read and relied 
upon’.117 While acknowledging the contribution of the ILC Report to the body of knowledge on 
fragmentation of international law, the issues relating to the conflict of jurisdictions between specialised 
regimes as a consequence of fragmentation remain unresolved. The decision of the ILC to refrain from 
considering the relationship between fragmentation and conflict of jurisdiction from the proliferation of 
international tribunals was a missed opportunity for detailed and considered research in this area. 
Where a dispute involves issues crossing a number of regimes (which is often the case), the core legal 
questions, from an institutional perspective, become: which judicial institution has competence, and 
how will overlapping jurisdiction between competing international judicial institutions be resolved? There 
is a growing body of international disputes involving both issues of trading rights and environmental 
protection. As the overlap between these two specialised areas will continue to become more prevalent, 
it is necessary to comprehensively consider the challenges posed by the conflict of jurisdiction from the 
cross-over of norms between international environmental law and trade law. The tension that lay the 
foundation for the cross-over of norms between these two specialised areas will now be considered in 
chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 3: ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 
TENSION 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the tension between environmental law and trade law is well 
established. Particularly since the 1970s, the potential conflict between these two specialised regimes 
has come to prominence in the international legal arena. From the environmental perspective, 
apprehension has centred around the potential negative impact that an open trading system may have 
on the environment. On the other hand, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and some countries have 
expressed concerns about the impact of stronger environmental protection laws on free trade. The 
tension between the environmental law and trade law regimes stems from different objectives, 
conflicting legal norms and separate compliance and dispute resolution frameworks. This tension has 
been further complicated by the inclusion of trade provisions in what are otherwise international 
‘environmental’ agreements.  
This chapter explores the historical tension between the international trade and environment regimes 
— in particular, how the same factual dispute can invoke multiple (and conflicting) obligations under the 
WTO framework, regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the relevant environmental agreements, with 
the option of recourse to different dispute resolution frameworks. 
I CONFLICT AND CO-EXISTENCE 
A Historical Overview 
The intellectual foundation for the concept of global free trade can be traced back to 1776 and the 
scholarly work of Adam Smith in his publication, Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations.1 In particular, Smith proposed that a country’s wealth was derived from the goods and services 
that it creates and accordingly supported the value of free trade and competition.2 Smith’s work must 
be placed in the context of his time — the era of the British Empire and the protection of British industries 
and its ‘wealth’ through trade restrictions on its colonies.  
Following on from Smith’s work on the importance of trade, the integration of world markets and the 
emergence of the modern ‘global economy’ can clearly be seen from the mid 1800s. In 1869 both the 
Suez Canal and the Union Pacific railroad were completed. Together with steamships, these were 
significant milestones in improving the mode of transportation of tradable commodities around the 
world.3 During this period, ‘environmental’ issues were addressed on a regional basis (or through 
colonial ties) with the focus on the conservation of wildlife (fisheries, birds and seals) and the protection 
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of waterways (mainly rivers). Some of these early environmental agreements adopted trade measures 
as tools to achieve their objections. From the start of the First World War in 1914 to the 1950s, national 
economies turned ‘inwards’, tariff barriers rose across the world and international trade substantially 
declined. In particular, the infamous 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff in the United States sparked the tariff 
wars of the 1930s as trading partners retaliated.4 In contrast, international trade expanded rapidly after 
the Second World War, with the volume of world merchandise exports rising by more than 8 per cent 
per annum over the 1950-73 period.5 Economists explain the growth in world trade as being a function 
of rapid economic recovery in the wake of the post Second World War and the removal of protectionist 
measures.6  
As world trade increased during the latter half of the 20th century, this coincided with the growing 
concerns about the state of the global environment.7 From the 1970s through to the 1990s, the global 
environment protection movement gained momentum, with the first global conference hosted through 
the United Nations (UN), the Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 and the creation of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The 1990s was an important decade for the 
development of our current day framework for international environmental law and international trade 
law. In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was held. 
This conference resulted in the successful negotiation of a range of global environmental agreements 
that recognised the need to integrate global activities and to enforce compliance with environmental 
obligations in order to address the serious concerns about the deterioration of the world’s environment. 
The principle of ‘sustainable development’ became the underlying principle for all international 
environmental law from 1992 onwards.  Then, in 1994, the international community negotiated the 
framework for the current day WTO — creating a global regime for trade. It is in the wake of the more 
‘formalised’ regulatory regimes for international environmental law and international trade law that the 
tension between environmental concerns and trade objectives became amplified. 
In analysing the historical development of international environmental agreements, trade agreements 
and related international organisations, there are two main points that become clear: 
1. International environmental agreements and international trade agreements (and also the 
development of international environmental and trade organisations) were negotiated without 
any cohesive ‘master’ plan regarding a comprehensive institutional legal framework. It is this 
‘fragmented’ history of the development of international environmental law and international 
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trade law that naturally leads to the fragmentation of, and tension between, the two regimes 
today. 
2. Although the development of these various international agreements and bodies occurred in a 
‘fragmented’ manner, the linkages between environment and trade has deep-rooted historical 
ties, with early environmental agreements using trade measures as a tool to achieve 
environmental goals and past trade agreements containing provisions to address 
environmental concerns of nations. 
It is against this broad historical context that the linkages between trade law and environmental law will 
be considered in the first part of this chapter. 
1 19th Century — mid 1950s: The Early Years 
Connections between trade provisions and environment protection date back to the late 1800s.8  These 
early agreements were ostensibly trade provisions that contained an environmental element. For 
example, in 1877, the United Kingdom restricted the imports of vegetables which posed a risk of 
introducing the Colorado Beetle into the country,9 and in 1890 the United States prohibited the 
importation of adulterated food, drugs or alcohol that had been mixed with any poisonous or noxious 
chemicals.10 These unilateral trade measures imposed trade restrictions on imports based on 
environmental and health reasons. 
During this period, the link between trade and environment was particularly evident in relation to the 
sustainable management of fisheries.11 This led to a range of agreements in the 1800s between 
countries regulating this practice. For example, in 1882, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Prussia and the Netherlands negotiated the Convention for Regulating the Police of the North 
Sea Fisheries.12  This agreement regulated fisheries in the North Sea, outside the territorial waters of 
the contracting Parties. In the second half of the 19th century, there were also a range of agreements, 
and amending protocols, regulating the transport of explosive, inflammable, corrosive and poisonous 
substances on the Rhine River.13   
Moving into the early years of the 20th century, the state of the world environment was on the political 
agenda. In 1913, in a significant move that recognised the need for a global approach to environmental 
                                                     
8 For a general discussion and some examples of historical national legislation see:  
Steve Charnovitz, 'A Taxonomy of Environmental Trade Measures' (1993) 6 Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 1, 16-18. 
9 The Destructive Insect Act, 1877, 40 & 41 Vict. Ch. 68 sec 1 (repealed). 
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219 (entered into force 15 May 1884). 
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issues, 17 States signed the Act of Foundation of a Consultative Commission for the International 
Protection of Nature.14 This agreement resulted in the establishment of the Consultative Commission, 
made up of representatives from the contracting parties, to examine the question of the protection of 
nature on a global scale. Significantly, this agreement was signed by 16 European nations and the 
United States — demonstrating an inter-continental attempt at addressing environmental issues. 
However, the first meeting of the Consultative Commission was cancelled due to the outbreak of the 
First World War, and efforts, primarily led by Switzerland, to revive the Consultative Commission in the 
years following the end of the war were unsuccessful.15 Nevertheless, this agreement highlights that 
environmental agreements with global reach were starting to be negotiated in the early 20th century. 
Consistent with the recognition of environmental issues during the early 20th century, some of the early 
international trade agreements included exemptions from their trading provisions on environmental 
grounds – for example, the International Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs 
Formalities of 1923 included an exemption to the trade rules for measures taken by parties relating to 
the health of human beings, animals or plants.16  The recognition in these early trade agreements of 
the necessity for the inclusion of environmental or health exemptions to the trading rules has been 
carried through to the modern day trade agreements currently in force. 
The linkages go both ways, with early 20th century multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) 
specifically containing trade provisions to achieve environmental objectives.17 In 1900, the Convention 
for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds, and Fish in Africa,18 an agreement for the conservation of 
wildlife in the African colonies of European states, contained a provision stating that the most effective 
means of preserving the various forms of animal life existing in a wild state included the: 
Imposition of export duties on the hides and skins of giraffes, antelopes, zebras, rhinoceroses, and 
hippopotami, on rhinoceros and antelope horns, and on hippopotamus tusks.19 
This agreement was superseded in 1933, when the Governments of the Union of South Africa, Belgium, 
the United Kingdom, Egypt, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan negotiated 
the Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State (‘London 
Convention’).20  Although the London Convention was an environmental agreement for the preservation 
                                                     
14 Act of Foundation of a Consultative Commission for the International Protection of Nature, opened for signature 
19 November 1913, 219 CTS 32 (entered into force 19 November 1913). 
15 Fred Van Dyke, Conservation Biology: Foundations, Concepts, Applications (McGraw Hill, 2nd ed, 2008), 19. 
16 International Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities, opened for signature 3 November 
1923, 30 LNTS 371 (entered into force 27 November 1924) Article 17; International Convention for the Abolition of 
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WTO as Linkage Machine' (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 146.  
18 Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds, and Fish in Africa, of 19 May 1900, IPE Vol IV 1605 
19 Ibid Article II (10). 
20 Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, opened for signature 8 
November 1933, 172 LNTS 241 (entered into force 14 January 1936). This Convention was superseded in 1968 
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of fauna and flora, it included trade provisions regulating the import and export of ‘trophies’ taken from 
the protected species listed in the Convention. Specifically, Article 9 of the London Convention 
prohibited the import and export of trophies unless the importer/exporter had been granted a certificate 
by a competent authority permitting such trade in the trophies. Such a certificate could only be issued 
where the trophies had been lawfully imported or lawfully obtained.21  
In the first half of the 20th century, trade measures were once again employed to achieve environmental 
objectives concerning the protection of sea life and fisheries. In 1911, Great Britain, Japan, Russia, and 
the United States signed a treaty for the ‘preservation and protection’ of fur seals and sea otters.22 
Article 3 of this Convention prohibited the importation into the territories of the Parties of sealskins taken 
in the waters of the North Pacific Ocean in violation of the Convention. In another example, in 1921, 
Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) signed a convention to prohibit 
trade in fish caught by methods that adversely affected the ‘spawning and preservation’ of fisheries.23  
In the trade sphere more broadly, 1927 saw the negotiation of the International Convention for the 
Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions 1927 (‘Import and Export Convention 
1927’),24 referred to as the world’s first international trade agreement. The Import and Export 
Convention 1927 ambitiously called for the abolition, in the respective territories of each of the member 
States, of all non-tariff import and export restrictions within 6 months of the Convention coming into 
effect.25 Exceptions were provided for restrictions permitting countries ‘vital interests.’  A specific 
exception was included in Article 4(4) for the environment in the following terms: 
for the protection of public health or for the protection of animals or plants against disease, insects and 
harmful parasites. 
Such exceptions in the Import and Export Convention 1927 were subject to the provision that ‘they are 
not applied in such a manner as to constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination between foreign 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade’.26 The 
Import and Export Convention 1927 failed to receive general acceptance, with many States ratifying the 
Convention subject to reservations, limiting its effectiveness.27 In an attempt to give effect to the Import 
and Export Convention 1927, the United Kingdom, United States, Portugal, Japan, Sweden, Denmark 
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21 Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, opened for signature 8 
November 1933, 172 LNTS 241 (entered into force 14 January 1936), Article 9(2). 
22 Convention Respecting Measures for the Preservation and Protection of the Fur Seals in the North Pacific Ocean, 
opened for signature 7 July 1911, 214 CTS 80 (entered into force 15 December 1911) 
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25 Ibid Article 2. 
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and the Netherlands agreed on December 1929 to uphold its provisions between themselves.28 
However, in 1931, Portugal formally withdrew from the Convention.29 Then, by notice on June 1933, 
the United Kingdom withdrew,30 which then prompted the withdrawal of the United States in June 1933, 
stating in the telegram delivered to the League of Nations that:  
It is with great reluctance that the American Government has been forced to take this action. It had been 
hoped that the principle embodied in this convention would be widely accepted by the nations of the world. 
The reverse of this has, however, been true, and the withdrawal from the convention of other nations 
leads to the conclusion that the existing convention may not be fully adapted to present economic and 
commercial conditions.31 
Notwithstanding its overall failure, the environmental provisions negotiated in the Import and Export 
Convention 1927 were the forerunner to the environmental provisions included in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (‘GATT 1947’) and ultimately, the current provisions that stand 
in-force today in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘GATT 1994’).32  
Around the same time, one of the first international trans-boundary pollution disputes involving two 
countries took place: the dispute from 1925 to 1941 involving the zinc and lead smelter located in Trail, 
British Columbia, Canada.33 Sulphur dioxide emissions from the smelter were drifting across the 
US/Canada border causing damage to crops and forests in the surrounding areas. Although originally 
the dispute involved the local US residents and the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of 
Canada, the dispute was elevated to the international level as the Governments of both the US and 
Canada became involved. Two separate tribunals held the Canadian government responsible for the 
damage suffered by the US residents.34 The Trail Smelter case was important in establishing two core 
principles of environmental law: the duty upon States to prevent trans-boundary environmental harm; 
and the polluter pays principle. 
In the late 1940s, the first Director General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), Sir Julian Huxley, worked towards creating an international conservation 
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organisation under the auspices of the UN.35  On 5 October 1948, in Fontainebleau, France, 
23 governments, eight international organizations, and 126 national nature conservation organizations 
attended a conference led by UNESCO and signed an agreement for the creation of the International 
Union for the Protection of Nature (IUPN). This organisation subsequently became the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), which is the largest global environmental network, 
comprising more than 1,200 member organizations including over 200 government and over 900 non-
government organizations.36 
By the time negotiations were taking place on what was to become GATT 1947, various disparate MEAs 
containing trade-related environmental measures (TREMs) already existed.37 In light of the growing 
global environmental movement at the time, as highlighted by the creation of the IUPN/IUCN shortly 
afterwards, it is surprising that the links between environmental protection and trade were not 
specifically addressed in a separate provision in GATT 1947. Rather, like the failed Import and Export 
Convention 1927, environmental concerns were dealt with by way of an ‘exception’ to the trading rules 
set out in Article XX. This has been explained on the grounds that given the challenges faced by the 
global community in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the tension between 
environment and trade was not a high priority on the international political agenda at that time, 
particularly relative to the challenges of post-war reconstruction and development.38  While it appears 
that economic concerns and international security were much more prominent at this time, there was 
still activity at the global level regarding environmental concerns.  
As noted above, GATT 1947 provided for exceptions to the trade provisions for environment-related 
issues in paragraph (b) of Article XX for measures ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health’ and in paragraph (g) of Article XX for measures ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption’. Exceptions are subject to the chapeau in Article XX that ‘such measures 
are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade’. 
Although MEAs containing trade measures continued to be negotiated in the period following GATT 
1947, there were no ‘legal’ disputes regarding the Article XX provisions. This is perhaps best explained 
on the basis that, historically, environmental agreements and trade agreements were negotiated 
somewhat separately between the relevant States on a case-by-case basis. The ‘formalisation’ of the 
world trading regime after the Second World War with global rules slowly changed the playing field.  
Subsequent to GATT 1947, there was the negotiation of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community (‘EEC Treaty’) in 1957.39 This treaty established a customs union between the 
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Member States of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and led to 
the founding of the European Economic Community (now the European Union (EU)) on 1 January 1958. 
Article 36 of the EEC Treaty included a number of exceptions allowing for restrictions or bans on imports 
and exports in the following circumstances: 
prohibitions or restrictions in respect of importation, exportation or transit which are justified on grounds 
of public morality, public order, public safety, the protection of human or animal life or health, the 
preservation of plant life, the protection of national treasures of artistic, historical or archaeological value 
or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, 
constitute either a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States. (emphasis added)  
Following on from the negotiation of GATT 1947, there was significant growth in world trade between 
1950 and 1973.40 In support of free trade, the United States, under the Kennedy Administration, led the 
cause for the radical reduction in tariff rates pursuant to the provisions of GATT 1947.41 Intra-European 
trade expanded, with European countries authorising foreigners to move funds for current account 
purposes freely from one country to another, a key development in the establishment of an open 
international economy.42 Also during this period, newly industrialised Asian economies emerged. The 
rapid growth in the Japanese economy resulted in it being the world's second largest capitalist economy 
by the 1970s.43  This expansion in world trade, particularly the growth in the export markets of Japan 
and Europe, can partly be attributed to post Second World War reconstruction. However, this movement 
for trade liberalisation petered out in the 1970s. Nontariff barriers spread in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
developing countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa became progressively less open to international 
trade.44 
2 1970s and 1980s: Growing Environmental Concerns 
Global concern over the state of the world’s environment increased during the 1970s, with the issues 
being discussed through the UN. At the initiative of the government of Sweden, the UN held the 
Conference on the Human Environment in June 1972 and created the UNEP. This was the first 
international conference held by the UN specifically to discuss environmental issues, and resulted in 
the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.45 The conference was 
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attended by representatives from 113 countries, 19 inter-governmental agencies and over 400 inter-
governmental and non-governmental organizations.46  
In recognition of the link between trade and environment, the Secretariat of GATT 1947 was asked to 
make a contribution to the UN Conference on the Human Environment.47 The Secretariat prepared a 
report titled ‘Industrial Pollution Control and International Trade’ which highlighted the concern from the 
trade perspective that environmental measures can be used as trade barriers, constituting a new form 
of protectionism.48 Following the circulation of the study of the WTO Secretariat, GATT 1947 members 
called for further consideration of this issue.49 Accordingly, in November 1971, the GATT 1947 Council 
of Representatives established the Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade (EMIT 
Group) for participation by GATT 1947 signatories.50 However, the agreement establishing the EMIT 
Group provided that it would only actually convene upon the request of a GATT 1947 member. It was 
not until late 1991, some 20 years later, that the European Free Trade Association (EFTA; consisting, 
at the time, of Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) requested 
the EMIT Group to convene.51  EFTA made this request due to the upcoming UNCED in 1992, 
explaining that the EMIT Group should contribute to the UNCED.52 The request by the EFTA also 
coincided with the landmark United States — Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (‘Tuna-Dolphin I’) case 
before the WTO in which the potential for the use of environmental measures of a foreign State to act 
as a bar on exports/imports was demonstrated.53 This case highlighted the growing tension between 
trade and environmental protection in the 1990s and is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.54  
The protection of the global environment was also being deliberated through international organisations 
during the 1970s. In particular, the IUCN acted as a forum for the negotiations on the need for a global 
agreement addressing the international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants so as to ensure 
their survival. These discussions reflect the growing recognition during the 1970s of the interconnection 
between trade and conservation. The negotiations launched by the IUCN culminated in the text of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (‘CITES’), which 
was agreed at a meeting of representatives of 80 countries on 3 March 1973.55 CITES regulates 
international trade in over 30,000 species, banning trade in some while establishing conditions for trade 
in others. There are currently 180 Parties to CITES. Although the purpose of CITES is the trade of 
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endangered flora and fauna, this agreement was negotiated within the environmental sphere, not under 
the auspices of GATT 1947.56 What is interesting about CITES, for the purpose of this doctoral thesis, 
is that it contains its own dispute resolution provisions in Article XVIII of CITES, thus creating parallel 
dispute resolution avenues for disputes involving trade in endangered flora and fauna — under CITES 
and under the WTO. Further, the non-compliance procedures under CITES permit the imposition of 
trade embargos against States for non-compliance. These provisions are discussed in more detail 
below. 
Following on from CITES, throughout the 1980s the global environmental movement increasingly 
focussed on the potential environmental impacts of free trade.57 The concept of ‘sustainable 
development’ was advanced in a 1987 report titled Our Common Future, produced by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (an independent body created by a resolution of the 
UN General Assembly in 1983), and quickly became a key objective in international environmental 
policy.58 The Report defined ‘sustainable development’ as development that ‘meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.59 The tension 
between sustainable development, environment protection and free trade shaped the debate from the 
1980s through to the present day. 
3 1990s: Contemporary International Trade and 
Environmental Law Frameworks 
From the early 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the associated reduction in concerns over 
international security, environment protection became a higher political priority in the domestic policy 
agenda of developed nations, with implications for international trade.60 The end of the Cold War also 
opened the way for more international consensus than had been possible in previous decades, where 
east-west tensions predominated.  
The 1990s was significant for the development of our contemporary international legal frameworks for 
both trade and the environment. In 1992, the UNCED (also known as the ‘Earth Summit’) was held in 
Rio de Janeiro. This conference was attended by representatives from 172 Governments and an 
estimated 2,400 representatives of non-governmental organizations and was significant in bringing 
about global awareness of, and cooperation towards, preserving the world’s natural resources.61 The 
conference resulted in the production of a number of key international environmental agreements 
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including the United Nations Declaration on Environment and Development, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (‘CBD’) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘UNFCCC’).62 At 
the conclusion of the conference, Member States adopted Agenda 21, a ‘wide-ranging blueprint for 
action to achieve sustainable development worldwide’.63 The Secretary-General of the conference, 
Maurice Strong, called the conference a ‘historic moment for humanity’.64 
While trade measures had been used historically to achieve environmental objectives, this practice 
increasingly caused controversy between States in the new, more ‘formalised’ global trading regime. A 
clear example of this trade/environment tension is seen in the dispute involving Austria’s tropical timber 
laws. In 1992, Austria introduced laws relating to tropical timber which included mandatory labelling and 
an increase in the tax on imports of all products made from or containing tropical wood from 8 per cent 
to 70 per cent.65 These new Austrian laws contemplated extraterritorial application and were to go into 
effect on 1 September 1992. Many counties producing tropical timber, particularly ASEAN nations, 
objected to these new laws. In November 1992, Malaysia sought resolution of the dispute under GATT 
1947. However, before the dispute was determined, the tropical timber exporting countries, in particular 
Malaysia and Indonesia, threatened to ban all Austrian imports,66 and in response to this pressure from 
the ASEAN contracting parties, Austria repealed its legislation in March 1993.67  Also during this period, 
the United States and the EU embarked on new eco-labelling and packaging laws, both of which would 
impact on imports, particularly from developing countries.68 The debate continues to this day, with 
national traceability labelling requirements for agricultural biotechnology products a key issue in dispute 
between the United States and the EU. Disputes regarding tropical forestry have also largely been 
overtaken by the provisions under the UNFCCC and the UN collaborative initiative on Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (‘REDD’) in developing countries.69  
It is against this background that environmental issues were elevated to an issue of concern during  the 
Tokyo Round (and remained as an important issue through to the Uruguay Round) trade negotiations 
and consequently were incorporated into the new WTO framework in 1994.70 The preamble to the 1994 
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Scheme, 880/92 [1992] OJ 99/1 and Eco-Audit Regulation 1836/93 [1993] OJ 168/1.  
69 United Nations - Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) <http://www.un-
redd.org/Home/tabid/565/Default.aspx>. Including countries the REDD+ program. 
70 Sanitary and phytosanitary concerns were raised during the Tokyo Round negotiations in the context of non-
tariff trade barriers and resulted in an early version of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 1979 (also 
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Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (‘Marrakesh Agreement’) obliges 
members to conduct their trade and economic endeavours in a manner that allows:  
for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner 
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.71 
Environmental concerns were addressed in the new WTO regime through the inclusion of the Article 
XX exceptions (as noted above, the language used in Article XX can be traced back through GATT 
1947 to the Import and Export Convention 1927). Under Article XX, WTO members can be exempted 
from GATT 1994 rules where such measures are necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health (Article XX(b)), or relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources (Article XX(g)). 
Like GATT 1947, such measures must not be applied in a manner which would constitute ‘a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail’, and is not 
‘a disguised restriction on international trade’. 
In addition, two new specialised agreements relating to environmental and health standards — the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (‘SPS Agreement’),72 and the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (‘TBT Agreement’)73 — were negotiated during the Uruguay 
Round and they came into effect upon the establishment of the WTO on 1 January 1995. The SPS 
Agreement sets out the framework for food safety, animal and plant health standards and affirms that 
States can establish their own standards providing such standards are based on scientific principles 
and a risk assessment has been carried out. The TBT Agreement sets out a code of good practice to 
ensure that the regulations, standards, testing and certification procedures of different countries do not 
operate as disguised restrictions on trade. 
Unlike the negotiation of GATT 1947, the linkages between environment and trade were well recognised 
during the 1994 negotiations for the WTO. This manifested in the Decision on Trade and Environment, 
which was adopted by the Ministers at the meeting of the WTO Trade Negotiations Committee in 
Marrakesh in April 1994.74 The Decision on Trade and Environment states that: 
                                                     
known as the ‘Standards Code’). The Standards Code included technical requirements relating to food safety and 
animal and plant health measures. Following the Tokyo Round, there was increased interest in expanding the 
debate to negotiate more comprehensive sanitary and phytosanitary measures and a Working Group was formed 
in 1988 to draft the text for a new agreement. 
71 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘Marrakesh Agreement’). 
72Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 1A (Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures). 
73 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 1A (Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade). 
74 World Trade Organization, Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, Uruguay Round 
Agreement (adopted on 15 April 1994) <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/issu5_e.htm> 
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There should not be, nor need be, any policy contradiction between upholding and safeguarding an open, 
non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system on the one hand, and acting for the protection 
of the environment, and the promotion of sustainable development on the other.75 
This broad statement has proven to be overly optimistic in practice, with the experience of the past 20 
years involving considerable tension between environment and trade objectives, resulting in disputes 
between States. While, in theory, environmental and trade policy may operate without contradiction, the 
reality is different on the ground, particularly when the interests of sovereign States collide in a specific 
factual scenario. In fact, the very next statement in the Decision on Trade and Environment appears to 
take a step back from this ‘equal’ treatment for trade and the environment, stating that the desire of the 
Ministers is to: 
coordinate the policies in the field of trade and environment, and this without exceeding the competence 
of the multilateral trading system, which is limited to trade policies and those trade-related aspects of 
environmental policies which may result in significant trade effects for its members.76 (emphasis added) 
This statement indicates that trade policies have priority over environmental policies in the deliberations 
of WTO institutions. 
The Decision on Trade and Environment also called for the creation of the present day Committee on 
Trade and Environment (CTE) to be formed as a working group under the WTO. The CTE was formed 
by the WTO General Council on 31 January 1995, and took over from the GATT 1947 EMIT Group. 
There was some debate over the mandate to be given to the newly created CTE. Ultimately, as the 
WTO is a trade institution, it was agreed that the focus of the CTE should be on the trade impacts of 
environmental measures. The reciprocal focus — environmental impacts of trade measures — has 
been left to other international institutions, such as the IUCN and the UNEP.77 The work of the CTE will 
be further discussed in the next section. 
4 2000s to the Present Day: Global Environmental and Trade 
Movements 
In the past decade, there have been heightened concerns over the state of the world’s environment. 
The following ten issues have been listed as major environmental challenges of the 21st century: 
- Global warming and climate change 
- Clean and renewable energy 
                                                     
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid 
77 See:  'Environment and Trade: A Handbook' (United Nations Environment Programme, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, 2005) <http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=754>; 'Brochure on Trade and 
Biodiversity: Trade-related Policy Assessment Agriculture and Biodiversity' (United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2010)  
<http://www.unep.ch/etb/publications/Trade%20and%20Biodiversity/UNEP_BrochureBioTrade.pdf>; Richard G 
Tarasofsky, 'Towards a mutually supportive relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
World Trade Organization' (International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), 2002); 
and also,  Shaffer, above n 7, 23. 
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- Ocean systems collapse 
- Electronic and nuclear waste 
- Water degradation 
- Land rush 
- Biodiversity conservation 
- Increased human population 
- New technologies 
- Habitat loss.78 
To promote global awareness of these concerns, the UN declared 2008 to be the International Year of 
Planet Earth,79 and then 2010 to be the International Year of Biodiversity.80  At the ninth meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to the CBD in 2008, many States agreed to targets to address the loss of the 
world’s biodiversity by 2010.81  However, reviews conducted in 2010 indicated that, overall, these 
targets were not met.82 This is not surprising, as the degradation of the world’s environment and the 
ensuring problems we now face was hundreds of years in the making.83    
At the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD, held in Nagoya, Japan in 2010, 
governments adopted the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, with the aim of halting the loss of 
biodiversity by 2020.84 The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the accompanying Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets,85 include a total of 20 targets, such as: 
- At least halve and, where feasible, bring close to zero the rate of loss of natural habitats, 
including forests; 
- Establish a conservation target of 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water areas and 10 per 
cent of marine and coastal areas; 
- Restore at least 15 per cent of degraded areas through conservation and restoration activities. 
The concern about the state of environment during the first decade of this century also carried over into 
the trade sphere. In 2001, the Doha Round of trade negotiations commenced. The broad issue of 
‘environment’ was on the agenda at the Ministerial Conference in Doha, and more specifically, the 
relationship between the WTO and MEAs. Demonstrating the intention of WTO Members to take into 
account environmental considerations in the work of the WTO Committees, the Ministers agreed to 
                                                     
78 10 most important environmental issues facing the world Global Environmental Matters <http://gbmaq.org/10-
most-important-environmental-issues-facing-the-world/>. 
79 International Year of Planet Earth, United Nations GA Res 60/192, 60th sess, 68th plen mtg, Agenda item 52 
(a), UN Doc A/RES/60/192 (22 December 2005). 
80 International Year of Biodiversity, United Nations GA Res 61/203, 61st sess, 83rd plen mtg, Agenda item 53 (f), 
UN Doc A/RES/61/203 (20 December 2006). 
81 Decision adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its Ninth Meeting 
- Decision IX/33 - International Year of Biodiversity, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/33 (9 October 2008). 
82 'Global Biodiversity Outlook 3', Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2010) 
<http://www.cbd.int/gbo3>; Alexander Gillespie, Conservation, biodiversity and international law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2011), 1. 
83 Gillespie, above n 82, 1. 
84 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Nagoya, Japan (18 to 29 October 2010) <https://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=12268>. 
85 Aichi Biodiversity Targets 2011-2020, Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, Nagoya, Japan (2010) <https://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/>. 
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commence negotiations in the CTE on the relationship between the WTO rules and MEAs and on 
increasing collaboration between the MEA secretariats and the relevant WTO Committees.86  
Specifically, Paragraph 31, 32 and 33 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration relate to environment and 
trade, with a focus on three main areas for deliberations: 
- the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs),  
- information exchange between MEA Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees,  
- the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental 
goods and services.87 
The first two abovementioned issues are particularly relevant to this doctoral research. Pursuant to the 
mandate in Paragraph 31(ii) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration on information exchange, the CTE has 
collaborated and cooperated with the Secretariats of various MEAs and the UNEP.88 Such collaboration 
has included: 
- information exchange between the Secretariats of UNEP/MEAs and the WTO;  
- MEA Information Sessions in the CTE;  
- WTO technical assistance workshops (‘side events’) in parallel to some of the main MEA 
Conference of the Parties' meetings;  
- WTO trade and environment regional seminars;  
- UNEP-UNCTAD Capacity Building Task Force (CBTF);  
- MEA observer status at the WTO; and  
- WTO observer status in UNEP and MEAs.89   
The CTE has also commenced work on paragraph 31(i) of its mandate — the relationship between 
trade-related measures that exist in MEAs and the WTO rules. In 2011, the CTE released a Draft 
Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment.90 The Draft Ministerial Decision on Trade and 
Environment provides that, where there is a dispute between member States involving an MEA, the 
WTO may call upon the advice of experts on the MEA in question. The following language is suggested 
(still in draft format): 
The Committee on Trade and Environment shall 
[Encourage Members,] [Require Members,] who are parties to a dispute regarding the relationship 
between existing WTO rules and a specific trade obligation contained in a multilateral environmental 
agreement, to seek the advice of experts on the MEA in question; the Committee shall encourage 
                                                     
86 Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, World Trade Organization, WTO Doc 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (20 November 2001, adopted 14 November 2001) [31]. 
87 Ibid. 
88 World Trade Organization Committee on Trade and Environment, Note by the Secretariat - Existing Forms of 
Cooperation and Information Exchange between UNEP/MEAs and the WTO, TN/TE/S/2/Rev.2 (16 January 2007) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_mea_e.htm>. 
89 For more information on each of these activities, see: ibid. 
90 World Trade Organization Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session, Report by the Chairman, 
Ambassador Manuel A. J. Teehankee, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/TE/20 (21 April 2011). 
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as well disputing Members [to agree] [to request] that the dispute panel hearing their dispute utilize 
the procedures under Article 13 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes to seek advice and information in relation to the MEA in question.91 
In contrast, the EU proposed that this statement should use mandatory wording requiring that the ‘WTO 
panel shall call for and defer to, in the relevant points, the expertise of the MEA in question’. The final 
wording of the paragraph is still being negotiated. The Draft Ministerial Decision on Trade and 
Environment also includes the following suggested paragraph by Norway relating to the governing rules 
for disputes involving both MEAs and the WTO:  
Until now STOs [Specific Trade Obligation] among parties to MEAs have not been contested in the WTO 
and should a situation arise of a WTO Member bringing such cases before the WTO, WTO rules would 
be applicable: observing also that STOs that are multilaterally negotiated, between parties and specific in 
nature are unlikely to be challenged in the WTO;92 (emphasis added) 
The first half of this statement is not particularly controversial — in the event that an MEA is sought to 
be contested (or upheld) in the WTO, it makes sense that the WTO will apply its own rules. Indeed, it is 
unlikely that the WTO has judicial competence to apply anything other than its own law and general 
international law given its mandate is limited to the settlement of disputes between Members, 
concerning their rights and obligations under the provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement and the 
covered agreements in Appendix 1 to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU).93 The dispute settlement regime under the WTO is designed to 
determine the question of the breach of the provisions of the WTO agreements. The pro forma terms 
of reference for the establishment of a Panel is set out in Article 7(1) of the DSU, referring to the 
determination of a dispute under the Covered Agreements (that is, the list of WTO Agreements detailed 
in Appendix 1 of the DSU): 
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the 
parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document ... and to make such 
findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in 
that/those agreement(s).94 
Accordingly, the Panels and Appellate Body are mandated to consider and apply the provisions of the 
WTO Covered Agreements. However, Article 3(2) of the DSU provides that WTO agreements are to be 
interpreted with reference to ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’. This reflects 
the accepted approach to treaty interpretation found in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’).95  In US — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
the WTO Appellate Body held Article 3(2) of the DSU to mean that the WTO agreements should not be 
                                                     
91 Ibid Annex 1.B. 
92 Ibid 8. 
93 Article 1(1) of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 
April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 2 (Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes) (‘DSU’). 
94 Ibid Article 7(1). 
95 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into 
force 27 January 1980). 
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interpreted in ‘clinical isolation from public international law’.96 While it is clear that regard must be had 
to principles of general international law, the WTO Panels and the Appellate Body are not empowered 
to diminish the rights or obligations afforded under the WTO agreements.97 The result being that the 
DSU prevents WTO provisions being set aside in favour of conflicting provisions in any other 
international agreements.98  
The second half of Norway’s suggested paragraph in the Draft Ministerial Decision on Trade and 
Environment that STOs (being MEAs) are unlikely to be challenged in the WTO, is more contentious. 
While a party does not have standing to bring a dispute to the WTO solely on the basis of an 
infringement of a right or obligation under a MEA, it is highly conceivable that the provisions of MEAs, 
particularly those that contain TREMs, will be raised as a matter for consideration in WTO disputes (for 
example, as a point of defence). In fact, this occurred in the European Communities — Measures 
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (‘EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products’) case where the EU sought to rely on the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (‘Biosafety Protocol’) in support of its de facto moratorium on agricultural 
biotechnology products.99 The WTO did not need to determine the issue in this particular case, as the 
US is not a party to the Biosafety Protocol and so the agreement did not apply as between the parties 
to the dispute.100 However, given the rapidly increasing number of MEAs and RTAs being negotiated, 
it is conceivable that TREMs in MEAs will be challenged in the WTO in future. Further, the suggested 
wording by Norway in the Draft Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment stops short of addressing 
the situation of dual dispute resolution proceedings being commenced by the parties under the MEA 
and under the WTO. The focus in the Draft Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment (as has 
largely been the focus in the literature) remains on the potential conflict of norms between the WTO and 
MEAs, with the potential conflict of jurisdiction remaining unaddressed. 
Work was also undertaken by the CTE in 2011 to compile a draft list of examples of environmental 
goods of interest to Members, reflecting the negotiations taking place in relation to Paragraph 31(iii) of 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration — the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods 
and services.101 
In 2013, the CTE met twice to discuss the effect of environmental measures on market access, 
especially in relation to developing countries (mandated in Paragraph 32 of the Doha Ministerial 
                                                     
96 Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc 
WT/DS2/AB/R and WT/DS4/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (29 April 1996), 17. 
97 For further discussion on this, see 'Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law' (International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, 2006) (‘ILC 
Report’); Martii Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, 'Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties' (2002) 
15(03) Leiden Journal of International Law 553 at 572. 
98 Koskenniemi and Leino, above n 97 at 572. 
99 Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
WTO Doc WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (29 September 2006) (‘EC — Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products’). See the case summary of this dispute in chapter 1 of this doctoral thesis. 
100 Ibid [7.68]-[7.75]. 
101 World Trade Organization Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session, Report by the Chairman, 
Ambassador Manuel A. J. Teehankee, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/TE/20 (21 April 2011). 
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Declaration). In the CTE Report 2013, it was noted most of the negotiations during that year concerned 
carbon footprint and labelling initiatives.102  Several delegates were concerned that: 
environmental footprinting schemes could be used as a disguised restriction to trade and impose 
burdensome requirements, specifically for developing countries and thereby impede their access to import 
and export markets.103 
These recent negotiations demonstrate that one of the current specific concerns in the CTE is the 
impact of the tension between environment and trade on developing countries. 
B Proliferation of International Agreements: MEAs 
and RTAs 
It is clear that environmental concerns are now at the forefront of the global political agenda.  In the 
international environmental sphere, States have negotiated treaties specifically targeted to address 
these environmental issues. The International Environmental Agreements Database Project lists over 
1100 multilateral and 1500 bilateral environmental agreements (including amendments to those 
agreements) that contain provisions relating to the protection of the environment; all of these 
agreements can be considered to be MEAs in the context of this thesis.104 International environmental 
concerns are also addressed in separate Protocols negotiated as supplementary agreements to the 
primary treaty. The upward trend over the past 150 years in the negotiation and signature of MEAs and 
bilateral environmental agreements can be seen in Graph 3.1 and Graph 3.2. Data on multilateral 
agreements negotiated between 2002 and 2014 appear to still be being collated by the International 
Environmental Agreements Database Project, so the number of agreements for this period should be 
viewed as incomplete. Allowing for this, it can still be concluded from the graphs that the negotiation of 
these environmental agreements increased rapidly in the 1990s and remained at an elevated rate over 
the 2000s. 
                                                     
102 WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, Report of the Committee on Trade and Environment, WTO Doc 
WT/CTE/20 (11 November 2013). 
103 Ibid [10]. 
104 International Environmental Agreements Database Project, Data from Ronald B. Mitchell, 2002-2015, developed 
in association with the National Science Foundation University of Oregon Environmental Studies Program (Version 
2014.3) <http://iea.uoregon.edu/>. 
76  
 
  
Source: author’s own graph, data sourced from: Mitchell, International Environmental Agreements 
Database Project.105 
 
Source: author’s own graph, data sourced from: Mitchell, International Environmental Agreements 
Database Project.106 
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While the international trade laws are predominately centralised into the WTO agreements, since the 
early 1990s there has been a rapid increase in the number of RTAs under Article XXIV of GATT 1994, 
including free trade agreements (bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements) and custom union 
agreements. These agreements detail specific trade obligations and preferential treatments between 
the Parties to the RTA. As of January 2015, the WTO lists over 250 RTAs in force, and drawing on a 
broader range of sources, it appears that over 300 RTAs have been signed.107  As demonstrated in 
Graph 3.3, there has been an upward trend in the number of negotiated RTAs since the 1950s, with a 
particularly large increase since the 1990s.108 We are halfway through the 2010s decade and there 
have already been over 50 RTAs that have come into force since 1 January 2010, and there are at least 
a further 70 draft RTAs under negotiation. This proliferation of RTAs from the 1990s onwards 
corresponds to the increase in MEAs and BEAs.  
 
Source: author’s own graph, based on data from multiple sources.109 
                                                     
107 World Trade Organization, WTO Regional Trade Agreement Database (21 January 2015) 
<http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx>; and World Trade Organization, WTO Regional Trade 
Agreement Database  — Some Figures on Regional Trade Agreements notified to the GATT/WTO and in force 
(21 January 2015) <http://rtais.wto.org/UI/publicsummarytable.aspx>. 
108 It is noted that the graph measures the decade in which current RTAs first came into force, which may bias 
down earlier decades, since some RTAs could have come into force and may no longer be in force. 
109 Data sourced from: World Trade Organization, WTO Regional Trade Agreement Database — Regional trade 
agreements notified to the GATT/WTO and in force (23 January 2015) 
<http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicPreDefRepByEIF.aspx>; World Bank, Global Preferential Trade Agreements 
Database (23 January 2015) < http://wits.worldbank.org/gptad/library.aspx>; Australian Government Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Free Trade Agreements (23 January 2015) < https://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/>;  European 
Commission, Free Trade Agreements (23 January 2015) 
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To further demonstrate the growing complexity of the international trade law regime, we can examine 
the trade provisions that have been negotiated by the G-20 nations. This grouping is worthy of more 
detailed examination since, in 2012, the G-20 nations accounted for 86 per cent of world GDP and 75 
per cent of world goods and services exports.110 The G-20 nations also provide broad global 
representation by including the largest economies from each of the inhabited continents, ranging in 
economic development (using the World Bank country classifications) from lower-middle-income 
economies, such as India and Indonesia, to high-income members of The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) such as the United States and Japan.111 As stated on the 
website of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the G-20 is: 
the premier forum for international economic cooperation and decision-making. The G20 leaders, finance 
ministers and central bank governors meet regularly to discuss ways to strengthen the global economy 
and reform international financial institutions.112 
Given their dominance of international trade and the global economy, significant trade disputes are 
particularly likely to involve the G-20 nations. Furthermore, these countries are relatively well placed in 
terms of resources and experience to pursue their disputes through international legal forums. 
In recent years, the G-20 nations have also been playing an increasing role in setting the international 
trade agenda. In the wake of the global financial crisis, the Leaders of the G-20 nations declared in 
November 2008 at their Washington Summit that they would: 
refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export 
restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate 
exports. Further, we shall strive to reach agreement this year on modalities that leads to a successful 
conclusion to the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda with an ambitious and balanced outcome. We 
instruct our Trade Ministers to achieve this objective and stand ready to assist directly, as necessary. We 
also agree that our countries have the largest stake in the global trading system and therefore each must 
make the positive contributions necessary to achieve such an outcome.113  
                                                     
agreements/free-trade-agreements>; Canada Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada’s Free Trade 
Agreements (23 January 2015) <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-
acc/fta-ale.aspx?lang=eng>; Department of Trade and Industry Republic of South Africa, Trade Agreements (23 
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110 Fact Sheet: Australia and the G20  
<https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/documents/factsheets/G20Factsheet61213.pdf>. 
111 The World Bank, Country and Lending Groups Data <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
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112 The G20, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade <http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/g20/>. 
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The Leaders of the G-20 have reaffirmed this commitment to refrain from protectionist measures at 
subsequent Summits, most recently in St Petersburg in September 2013.114 The Leaders have also 
tasked the WTO, OECD and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
with compiling annual reports on trade restrictive/opening measures to promote trade liberalisation. In 
addition, in September 2013 the Leaders approved an annex to the Leaders Declaration on ‘Advancing 
Transparency in Regional Trade Agreements’,115 committing G-20 members to comply with existing 
transparency obligations relating to RTAs under the WTO.  
In their most recent Leaders Declaration, the G-20 Leaders noted the importance of RTAs, and their 
contribution to trade liberalisation. Consistent with the prominence given to RTAs, all of the G-20 nations 
have signed RTAs, and are engaged in negotiations towards future RTAs (Graph 3.4). In particular, the 
EU has signed 35 RTAs and is negotiating a further 12, while other major economies, such as the 
United States, China and Japan have each signed or are negotiating around 20 RTAs.  
  
Sources: authors own graph, based on data from multiple sources 116 
The degree of complexity extends well beyond the sheer number of RTAs that have been signed or are 
being negotiated, and can be further explored by examining the convoluted web of RTAs between the 
G-20 nations themselves (Table 3.1). Apart from Russia, all the G-20 nations have entered into 
preferential trading arrangements with other G-20 nations extending beyond the requirements of their 
                                                     
114 G20 Leaders' Declaration, G20, Russia (September 2013) 
<https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Saint_Petersburg_Declaration_ENG_0.pdf>. 
115 'Advancing Transparency in Regional Trade Agreements', G20, Russia (September 2013) 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000013980.pdf>. 
116 Sources of data are the same as graph 3.3 – see above at n 109 and accompanying list of data sources. 
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membership of the WTO. In total, there are over 100 links or potential links between the G-20 nations 
outlined in Table 3.1 (involving 54 links through existing RTAs, and a further 53 potential links through 
RTAs currently under negotiation). The participation of G-20 nations in MEAs that contain trade 
provisions will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The web of RTAs is multi-layered, involving: 
- multilateral agreements with broad (but far from universal) membership, such as the Global 
System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (‘GSTP’),117 the Protocol Relating 
to Trade Negotiations Among Developing Countries Agreement (‘PTN’),118 and the Trade in 
Services Agreement (TiSA; under negotiation) 
- multilateral agreements with membership loosely based on geography, such as the Latin 
American Integration Association (ALADI),119 the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA)120 and 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP; under negotiation) 
- more formal regional trading blocks, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’),121 the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU), the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). Sometimes the members States in these blocks choose to jointly 
negotiate further RTAs with non-member States.  
- a large number of RTAs directly between States on a bilateral basis. 
The web is further complicated by particular combinations of States entering into multiple RTAs from 
the various layers of the web. For example, Mexico and the United States are both members of NAFTA, 
but are also both negotiating the TPP and TiSA. Arrangements are also increasingly complex in Asia; 
for instance Indonesia and India already have preferential trading arrangements via GSTP and an RTA 
between India and ASEAN (which includes Indonesia), but are also engaged in negotiations towards a 
separate RTA between India and Indonesia. 
The burgeoning growth of RTAs is directly contributing to the conflict of jurisdiction between 
international trade and international environmental law regimes. This is highlighted by an analysis of 
the RTAs in the WTO database, which have been classified by the subject areas of their clauses. Of 
the 271 RTAs in this database on 23 January 2015, 51 agreements included clauses that directly 
address environmental issues and 133 agreements included sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures. By directly addressing environmental issues and including SPS measures, the clauses in 
these RTAs have the potential to directly conflict with the provisions of existing MEAs. Analysing RTAs 
                                                     
117 Agreement on the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries, signed 13 April 1988, 
1534 UNTS 119 (entered into force 19 April 1989). 
118 Protocol Relating to Trade Negotiations Among Developing Countries Agreement, signed 8 December 1971, 
WIPO Lex N.: TRT/PTN/001. 
119 Treaty Establishing the Latin American Integration Association, signed 12 August 1980, 20 ILM 672 (1981). 
120 First Agreement on Trade Negotiations Among Developing Member Countries of the Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, signed on 31 July 1975, WIPO Lex No. TRT/APTA/002 (entered into force 
17 June 1976). 
121 North American Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature 17 December 1992 (1993) 32 ILM 605 (entered 
into force 1 January 1994). 
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between G-20 members in particular, Table 3.2 lists 14 RTAs currently in force that include 
environmental or SPS measures. It is important to note that all of these RTAs also include their own 
dispute settlement procedures. This highlights the potential for the growing number of RTAs with 
environmental or SPS measures to provide divergent avenues for dispute settlement were these RTAs 
to conflict with MEAs. 
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122 Sources of data are the same as graph 3.3 – see: above n 109 and accompanying list of data sources. 
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Table 3.2: Regional Trade Agreements between G-20 Members 
Parties to RTA Entry into 
force 
Includes 
environmental 
measures 
Includes SPS 
measures 
Includes dispute 
settlement 
mechanism 
ASEAN — China 2005  Yes Yes 
EU — Korea 2011 Yes Yes Yes 
EU — Mexico 2000  Yes Yes 
EU — South Africa 2000 Yes  Yes 
EU — Turkey 1996  Yes Yes 
EU (enlargement to 
25) 
2004 Yes Yes Yes 
India — Japan 2011 Yes Yes Yes 
Japan — Indonesia 2008 Yes  Yes 
Japan — Mexico 2005 Yes Yes Yes 
Korea — Turkey 2013 Yes Yes Yes 
MERCOSUR 1991  Yes Yes 
NAFTA 1994 Yes Yes Yes 
SACU 2007  Yes Yes 
US — Australia 2005 Yes Yes Yes 
Source: WTO Regional Trade Agreement Database; 123 author’s analysis of individual agreements. 
Given the sheer volume of MEAs and RTAs currently in force (in addition to the WTO agreements), the 
scope for tension and conflicts between these agreements in undeniably substantial. What has evolved 
is a complex web of potentially conflicting agreements (each with their own dispute resolution clauses) 
that include overlapping MEAs, RTAs and the WTO agreements. This trend is set to continue with a 
number of major multilateral trade agreements currently under negotiation, including the TPP, the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between US and EU and the TiSA.  
We are now at the stage that both the international trade law and international environmental law 
regimes readily recognise the potential points of tension and cross-over between the two disciplines, 
but the way forward — to resolve these points of tension — seems less clear. This next section of this 
chapter examines some of the points of tension. 
                                                     
123 WTO Regional Trade Agreement Database, above n 109. 
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II THE POINTS OF TENSION 
Since the early 1990s, the published literature on the tension between trade and environment has been 
extensive.124 The basis for this tension crosses a range of issues, including: the different objectives of 
the two regimes; the inclusion of trade provisions in the new environmental agreements; and competing 
compliance frameworks. 
A Different Objectives 
The first point of tension between the two regimes centres around the impacts on the environment from 
free trade. Trade can have an impact on environmental quality through three avenues: (i) where goods 
are produced; (ii) the scale of economic activity; and (iii) the production techniques used. The concern 
of environmental groups is that an open trading regime may hasten environmental degradation and 
create ‘pollution havens’ in developing countries that have lower environmental protection standards. 
Economists argue the opposite — that trade boosts national incomes, and that richer populations then 
care more about the environment. The study conducted by Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor, found that 
for each one percent that free trade raises per capita income in a nation, the result is that pollution (as 
measured by sulphur dioxide concentrations) falls by one percent.125 The authors found that as the 
country becomes richer, there is a call for ‘cleaner’ techniques of production. Similar findings were 
reached in the subsequent study conducted by Frankel and Rose, which looked at the effect of trade 
on a country's environment and concluded: 
Our examination of seven different measures of environmental quality provides little evidence that trade 
has a detrimental effect overall. We reject the hypothesis of an international race to the bottom driven by 
trade. There is also no evidence for the pollution haven hypothesis, which claims that trade encourages 
some countries to specialize in dirtier environments.126 
The interplay between trade restrictions imposed on environmental grounds on the one hand and trade 
liberalisation on the other, has routinely been a key debate in the international diplomatic arena. Public 
tension has also at times run high. Outside the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in 1999, it was 
estimated that around 50,000 members of the public turned out to protest, leading to the Seattle police 
and National Guard declaring a state of emergency. The reported concern of the majority of these 
protestors was the alleged unfairness of the current trade law framework for developing countries, 
                                                     
124 A search conducted in the online legal database ‘Westlaw’ on 14 November 2014, using the connector/Boolean 
search phrase; ["international environmental law" and "trade" w/20 tension] found 309 articles across US and UK 
journals. A search on Google Scholar on 14 November 2014, using the following search phrase; [“international 
environmental law and trade law tension conflict”] found 170,000 results. 
125 Werner Antweiler, Brian Copeland and M Scott Taylor, 'Is Free Trade Good for the Environment?' (2001) 91(4) 
American Economic Review 877. 
126 Jeffrey A Frankel and Andrew K Rose, 'Is Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? Sorting out the Causality' 
(2005) 87(1) Review of Economics and Statistics 85, 90. It is noted by the authors that an exception where trade 
and growth may have a detrimental effect on environment exists in the case of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
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specifically with regard to environmental and labour standards.127 Interestingly, it was reported that the 
then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his conference address to the WTO, acknowledged the 
validity of the concerns of the activists and commented that:  
The industrialised world must not try to solve its own problems at the expense of the poor. It seldom makes 
sense to use trade restrictions to tackle problems whose origins lie not in trade but in other areas of 
national and international policy. By aggravating poverty and obstructing development, such restrictions 
often make the problems they are trying to solve even worse. The United Nations and its specialised 
agencies are charged with advancing the cause of development, the environment, human rights and 
labour. We can be part of the solution.128 
The tension between the environment and trade regimes can partly be attributed to their different 
objectives: the environmental movement is concerned with the protection and conservation of natural 
resources, while the trade regime promotes free trade to improve ‘world economic welfare’.129 The 
apprehension is that environmental objectives could be used to justify trade restrictions that would 
otherwise be in breach of WTO trade law. In fact, the EMIT Group was convened in 1991 (after being 
idle for 20 years) not solely due to concerns about environment protection, but at the request of EFTA 
due to concern that its trade interests needed to be protected in the wake of the plethora of new 
environmental regulations being enacted.130 One representative of EFTA has been recorded as stating 
that GATT 1947 needed to address the growing environmental movement ‘because many of these 
agreements used trade measures to realize their objectives.’131 So prominent is the concern about 
‘green protectionism’ that developing countries protested against the formation of the CTE (which 
ultimately took over from the EMIT Group) for fear that it would provide a platform for the US and EU to 
push for trade restrictions on environmental grounds.132  
For developing countries, the concerns include: (1) the vulnerability of their export-based natural 
resource market to import restrictions by developed countries on environmental grounds; (2) increased 
costs of compliance with higher standards of ‘cleaner’ production methods; and (3) economic impacts 
from the movement for conservation of global ‘environmental public goods’ — such as tropical 
rainforests — that become a resource ‘in-situ’ for developing countries.133 
                                                     
127 See generally: 'Protests overshadow WTO talks', BBC News, World Edition 30 November 1999 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/542622.stm>. 
128 Excerpts of the speech have been published by various sources: see 'Trade must benefit the developing world, 
says UN Secretary-General', Africa Recovery, a United Nations Publication  
<http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol13no4/30tradbx.htm>; Chakravarthi Raghavan, 'Developing 
nations reject labour issues in WTO', Third World Network  <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/deb9-cn.htm>. 
129John Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 414; Tim 
Stephens, The Role of International Courts and Tribunals in International Environmental Law (Doctor of Philosophy 
Thesis, University of Sydney, 2005) <http://hdl.handle.net/2123/706>, 42. 
130 Shaffer, above n 7, 21. 
131 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held in the Centre William Rappard, 6 February 1991, C/M/247, 20-22. 
132 Shaffer, above n 7, 18; Cristina Hernandez, 'Green Protectionism: Does the End Justify the Means?' in Liselotte 
Isaksson and Colin Moorcraft (eds), Striking A Green Deal: Europe’s Role in Environment and North-South 
Relations (1993) 9. 
133 M Scott Taylor, Trade, Development and the Environment <http://works.bepress.com/taylor/6>. 
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There may be weight to the argument that States push environmental agendas only so far as it suits 
their economic interests. While the CTE is mandated to promote sustainable development,134 ultimately 
it is a body subject to the political agendas of its member States. Economic interests are a prominent 
force shaping the international trade and environmental agendas. This is particularly evident when it 
comes to the trade in agricultural biotechnology, where the US has been quick to protect its trade 
interests and domestic agricultural and pharmaceutical industries by restricting the reach of the CTE on 
the basis that the ‘WTO was not an environmental organization and it lacked the competence to insert 
MEA goals in WTO agreements.’135  
In relation to agricultural trade, the international environmental community has coalesced around the 
principle of ‘sustainable intensification’ for crop and livestock production.136 For example, in the 
document ‘The Future We Want’, produced at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in 2012, it was stated that: 
Noting the diversity of agricultural conditions and systems, we resolve to increase sustainable agricultural 
production and productivity globally, including through improving the functioning of markets and trading 
systems and strengthening international cooperation, particularly for developing countries, by increasing 
public and private investment in sustainable agriculture, land management and rural development.137 
In comparison, the long-term objective stated in the Preamble to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture is 
to ‘establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system’, which is less explicitly focused on 
environmental concerns.138 However, Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture provided for ongoing 
negotiations for reform, specifically taking into account “non-trade concerns” – which includes issues 
such as environmental protection, biodiversity and food security.139 It is acknowledged that relatively 
little has been achieved towards opening trade in agricultural products due to a plethora of conflicting 
policy objectives between States.140   
The divergence in objectives between international environmental law and international trade law is 
also particularly apparent with regards to the ‘precautionary principle’ and SPS measures. In 
                                                     
134 World Trade Organization, Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, Uruguay Round 
Agreement (adopted on 15 April 1994) <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/issu5_e.htm>. 
135 Committee on Trade and Environment, Report of the Meeting held 11-13 September 1996 WT/CTE/M/12, 21 
October 1996, [39]. 
136 Michael Cardwell and Fiona Smith, 'Renegotiation of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture: Accommodating the 
New Big Issues' (2013) 62(04) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 865. 
137 The Future We Want, Outcome of the Conference, United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, 
A/Conf.216/L.1 (19 June 2012) [110]. 
138 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 1A (Agreement on Agriculture) (‘Agreement on Agriculture’). 
139 Ibid Article 20(c). This debate is also known as the ‘multifunctionality’ policy debate — for more information on 
the multifunctionality policy debate regarding the use of non-trade issues and protection measures involving 
agriculture, see: Fiona Smith, ''Multifunctionality'and'non-trade concerns' in the agriculture negotiations' (2000) 3(4) 
Journal of International Economic Law 707; Clive Potter and Jonathan Burney, 'Agricultural multifunctionality in the 
WTO — legitimate non-trade concern or disguised protectionism?' (2002) 18(1) Journal of Rural Studies 35 and 
Arild Vatn, 'Multifunctional agriculture: some consequences for international trade regimes' (2002) 29(3) European 
Review of Agricultural Economics 309. 
140 Joseph A McMahon, 'The Agreement on Agriculture: Setting the Scene' in JA McMahon and MG Desta (eds), 
Research Handbook on the WTO Agriculture Agreement: New and Emerging Issues in International Agricultural 
Trade Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) 1. 
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international environmental agreements, the precautionary principle has been readily adopted as an 
underlying approach balancing innovation and technological development with environmental 
protection. Although the precautionary principle has various articulations in the different environmental 
agreements, the principle is premised on the approach set out in Principle 15 of the United Nations 
Declaration on Environment and Development that where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not prevent a party from postponing cost-effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation.141 In relation to agricultural biotechnology, the Biosafety Protocol 
adopts the precautionary principle and specifically states: 
lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the 
extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity shall not prevent a party from prohibiting imports.142 
Despite the inclusion of the precautionary principle in key environmental agreements,143 WTO dispute 
panels and the Appellate Body have consistently ruled that the status of the precautionary principle as 
a ‘principle of general international law’ is uncertain and have declined to apply it in the determination 
of trade disputes.144 This will be discussed further in the last section of this chapter on the ‘greening’ of 
trade jurisprudence. 
B Trade Provisions in Environmental Agreements 
Many of the newly negotiated MEAs have included provisions to control environmental impacts through 
the restriction of trade. Since the mid-2000s, the WTO’s CTE has been monitoring the trade provisions 
of MEAs, and in its ‘Matrix on Trade-Related Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements’145 in October 2013, the WTO’s CTE identified and analysed 16 key MEAs that contain 
trade measures (14 of these MEAs are in force, while a further two are not in force due to an insufficient 
number of Parties):146 
- International Plant Protection Convention (‘IPPC’) 
- International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (‘ICCAT’) 
- CITES 
- Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (‘CCAMLR’) 
- Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (‘Montreal Protocol’) 
                                                     
141 United Nations Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992). 
142 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 29 January 
2000, 2226 UNTS 208 (entered into force 11 September 2003) (‘Biosafety Protocol’), Article 10(6). 
143 See for example: Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered 
into force 29 December 1993); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 
May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994); Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants, opened for signature 22 May 2001, 2256 UNTS 119 (entered into force 17 May 2004); Treaty on 
European Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992 [2009] OJ 115/13 (entered into force 1 November 1993). 
144 See: Panel Report, EC —Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products WTO Doc WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, 
WT/DS293/R. 
145 Matrix on Trade-Related Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements,  above n 145. 
146 Committee on Trade and Environment Special Session, Note by the Secretariat WT/CTE/W/160/Rev 3, 16 Feb 
2005. 
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- Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal (‘Basel Convention’) 
- CBD 
- Biosafety Protocol 
- UNFCCC 
- Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘Kyoto 
Protocol’) 
- International Tropical Timber Agreement (‘ITTA’) 
- United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (‘UNFSA’) 
- Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals And Pesticides in International Trade (‘PIC’) 
- Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (‘SCPOP’) 
- Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (‘Nagoya 
Protocol’; not in force) 
- Nagoya — Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety (‘NKLSP’; not in force).147 
Relevant details from the WTO CTE’s report are set out in Table 3.3 below, which summarises the 
membership, trade-related provisions and the dispute resolution provisions in these 16 key MEAs.148 
                                                     
147 For the full citations of these international agreements, see the list of Treaties in the Bibliography. 
148 It is noted that the United Nations Environment Programme listed 20 MEAs that contain trade provisions: 
Environment and Trade: A Handbook, above n 77. 
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Table 3.3: MEAs including Trade-related Measures 
MEA In 
force 
Parties WTO 
members 
Trade-related measures Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms 
IPPC 2005 179 150 Parties can require phytosanitary certification for trade 
in plants and plant products, including the power to 
refuse entry to non-compliant imports  
Parties may request the FAO 
Director-General appoint a 
committee of experts to 
provide a non-binding report to 
the parties and to the 
competent body of the WTO 
ICCAT 1966 47 42 Makes recommendations (binding) and resolutions for 
the conservation of tunas and tuna-like species in the 
Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas. For example, in 
1999 and 2000, it was Recommended that the Parties 
impose a prohibition on the imports of Atlantic bigeye 
tuna and Atlantic bluefin tuna and their products from 
Equatorial Guinea.  
No provisions 
CITES 1975 178 151 Places restrictions on trade in endangered species. Parties may consent to submit 
the dispute to arbitration, in 
particular, to the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) at 
The Hague 
CCAMLR 1982 36 35 Parties are required to determine that cod ice fish 
harvested in the Convention Area that are imported 
into or exported from its territories were caught in a 
manner consistent with CCAMLR conservation 
measures. 
Parties to the dispute can 
consent to refer the dispute for 
settlement to the ICJ or to 
arbitration 
Montreal 
Protocol 
1989 197 156 Requires members to impose trade restrictions on 
ozone-depleting chemicals 
Parties may accept arbitration, 
submission to the ICJ or 
conciliation 
Basel 
Conven-
tion 
1992 180 146 Provisions on trade of hazardous wastes, including 
restricting trade with States that are not parties 
Parties to the dispute can 
consent to refer the dispute for 
settlement to the ICJ or to 
arbitration 
CBD 1993 193 155 Contains a number of provisions that are generally 
understood to require measures by Parties which may 
have consequences for trade — e.g. Article 6 requires 
Parties to integrate the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity into sectoral or cross-
sectoral plans, programmes and policies 
Parties may accept arbitration, 
submission to the ICJ or 
conciliation 
Biosafety 
Protocol 
2003 166 139 Provisions for trade between States involving living 
modified organisms 
Provisions for dispute 
resolution under the CBD 
apply: parties may accept 
arbitration, submission to the 
ICJ or conciliation 
NKLSP N/A 17 16 Supplementary protocol to the Biosafety Protocol sets 
out provisions for damages and liability resulting from 
living modified organisms which find their origin in a 
transboundary movement 
Parties may accept arbitration, 
submission to the ICJ or 
conciliation 
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Table 3.3 (continued): MEAs including Trade-related Measures 
MEA In 
force 
Parties WTO 
members 
Trade-related measures Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms 
UNFCCC 1994 195 156 Does not have provisions that directly restrict trade, 
but domestic actions of countries implementing the 
UNFCCC could have trade implications — e.g. Article 
3.5 requires Parties to cooperate to promote a 
supportive and open international economic system 
that would lead to sustainable economic growth and 
development in all Parties. 
Parties may accept arbitration, 
submission to the ICJ or 
conciliation 
Kyoto 
Protocol 
2005 192 154 Emission limits and reduction commitments for 
greenhouse gases — these measures have trade 
implications 
Dispute provisions under 
UNFCC apply: parties may 
accept arbitration, submission 
to the ICJ or conciliation 
ITTA 2011 65 64 The updated mandate of the International Timber 
Organisation contains eight trade-related objectives of 
the agreement in Article 1 — to promote the expansion 
and diversification of international trade in tropical 
timber from sustainably managed and legally 
harvested forests 
Referred to the International 
Tropical Timber Council for a 
binding decision 
UNFSA 2001 81 68 Regulates the activities of fishing vessels for 
promotion of conservation measures which may have 
impacts on trade — for example, Article 23 authorises 
States to prohibit landings and trans-shipments if the 
catch has been taken in a manner which undermines 
the effectiveness of subregional, regional or global 
conservation and management measures on the high 
seas 
Either party can submit for 
binding decision to the 
International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea, the ICJ or an 
arbitral tribunal (excludes 
sovereign rights disputes, 
which are conciliated) 
PIC 2004 154 135 Regulates the trade of chemicals and pesticides 
including provision of information and labelling 
Parties may accept arbitration, 
submission to the ICJ or 
conciliation 
SCPOP 2004 179 148 Prohibits the import and export of the certain 
chemicals except in limited circumstances 
Parties may accept arbitration, 
submission to the ICJ or 
conciliation 
Nagoya 
Protocol 
N/A 24 18 A number of provisions which may have 
consequences for trade, including a system of prior 
informed consent and a certificate of compliance for 
sharing of genetic resources 
No provisions 
Source: Matrix on Trade-Related Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements.140 
Only three of these MEAs came into force prior to the end of the Cold War, with five MEAs coming into 
force in the late 1980s-1990s, seven since 2000 and two yet to come into force. There is considerable 
variation in the number of Parties to these 16 MEAs, and incomplete overlap with the membership of 
the WTO, with each agreement having Parties that are not members of the WTO, and non-Parties that 
are members of the WTO. For instance, there are 166 Parties to the Biosafety Protocol, only 139 of 
which are WTO members, leaving 27 Parties to the Biosafety Protocol that are not Members of the 
WTO. Conversely, there are 21 WTO members that are not party to the Biosafety Protocol.149 This 
                                                     
149 For details on State membership to the WTO and parties to the Biosafety Protocol, see Table 1.1 in chapter 1. 
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relationship between membership of the WTO and the Biosafety Protocol is set out in Table 1.3 in 
chapter 1. The implications of inconsistency between the membership of the WTO and the Biosafety 
Protocol in relation to the application of the Biosafety Protocol by a WTO Panel in a dispute will be 
discussed further in chapter 5.  
Returning to the consideration of the 16 MEAs in Table 3.3, the agreements include a diverse range of 
TREMs. Some of these MEAs, such as the Montreal Protocol, the Biosafety Protocol, the Basel 
Convention and CITES have explicit provisions that relate to trade. These provisions prompt members 
to use trade measures to change environmental policy and practices of other States — potentially in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the obligations under the WTO regime.150 Others, such as the CBD, 
contain provisions that, upon the implementation by Parties, may have consequences for trade. The 
trade provisions in the Biosafety Protocol are outlined in the below case study.  
Biosafety Protocol:  TREMs 
In 1995, pursuant to Article 19(3) of the CBD, the Conference of the Parties established an ‘Open-
ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Biosafety’ to draft a protocol on the safe transfer, handling and 
use of living modified organisms, specifically relating to the ‘transboundary movement of any living 
modified organism resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.’151  
The motivation for the development of the Biosafety Protocol is evident in the statement of concern 
expressed in the Decision adopted by the CBD in 1995 that:  
               significant gaps in knowledge have been identified, specifically in the field of interaction between 
living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology and the environment, taking 
into account the relatively short period of experience with releases of such organisms, the relatively 
small number of species and traits used, and the lack of experience in the range of environments, 
specifically those in centres of origin and genetic diversity. 
In recognising the growth in biotechnology, and specifically LMOs, the Conference of the Parties 
found a need to develop a framework governing the transboundary movement of these organisms: 
               … international action on biosafety should offer an efficient and effective framework for the 
development of international cooperation aimed at ensuring safety in biotechnology through effective 
risk assessment and risk management for the transfer, handling and use of any LMO resulting from 
modern biotechnology that may have adverse environmental impacts that could affect the 
                                                     
150 Bradly Condon, Trade, environment and sovereignty: developing coherence between WTO law, international 
environmental law and general international law (Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, Bond University, 2004), 3. 
151 Decision adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its Second 
Ordinary Meeting- Decision II/5 - Consideration of the need for and modalities of a Protocol for the Safe Transfer, 
Handling and use of Living Modified Organisms, COP 2 Decisions II/5 (16-17 November 1995). 
92  
 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking into account the risks to human health 
…152 
The Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Biosafety held six meetings between July 1996 and 
February 1999, culminating in the submission of a draft text of the protocol to the Conference of the 
Parties of the CBD for consideration. The Biosafety Protocol was adopted on 29 January 2000 as 
a supplementary agreement to the CBD and came into effect on 11 September 2003.153 
The Biosafety Protocol regulates the transboundary movement of LMOs through the Advanced 
Informed Agreement (AIA) provisions (Article 7) and the Biosafety Clearing-House.  
The AIA provisions establish a framework for the intentional transboundary movement of LMOs to 
ensure the importing country is provided with sufficient time and notice to assess the risks of the 
LMO. The AIA provisions set out requirements relating to the four different stages of the 
transboundary movement of an LMO: (1) notification by the exporting Party of the LMO to the 
importer, (2) acknowledgment of receipt of notification by the importing Party, (3) procedures 
governing the decision of the importing Party to approve/prohibit the import of the LMO, and (4) 
review of decisions of importing countries.154 It is noted that the AIA procedures do not apply to 
LMOs in transit (Article 6), LMOs destined for contained use (Article 6) and LMOs intended for direct 
use as food or feed or for processing (Article 7.3). The AIA procedures are premised on a risk 
assessment that must be carried out in a scientifically sound manner and based on the 
methodologies in Annex III to the Biosafety Protocol.155 However, as mentioned earlier, the 
precautionary principle is also reflected in the Biosafety Protocol. Specifically, Articles 10.6 and 
11.8 state: 
               Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding 
the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human 
health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import 
of the living modified organism in question as referred to in paragraph 3 above, in order to avoid or 
minimize such potential adverse effects. 
The tension between the precautionary principle (as a principle in international environmental law) 
and international trade law is discussed later in this chapter. 
The Biosafety Protocol established the Biosafety Clearing-House to facilitate the exchange of 
scientific, technical, environmental and legal information on, and experience with, LMOs.156 The 
Biosafety Clearing-House also provides a simpler mechanism (utilising the parties domestic 
regulatory laws) for agreement between importing and exporting Parties for the transboundary 
movement of the LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed or for processing (which are excluded 
                                                     
152 Ibid. 
153 Biosafety Protocol. 
154 Ibid Articles 7 – 12. 
155 Ibid Article 15. 
156 Ibid Article 20. 
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from the AIA procedures).157 In addition, Parties to the Biosafety Protocol may also specify in 
advance to the Biosafety Clearing-House that it will exempt certain imports of LMOs from the AIA 
procedure.158 
The provisions in the Biosafety Protocol relating to the resolution of disputes are discussed in detail 
in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
Unlike the WTO agreements, only one of the key MEAs in Table 3.3 appears to have a dedicated 
permanent dispute settlement mechanism (the International Tropical Timber Council), with twelve of 
the MEAs listing arbitration or the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a dispute settlement option for 
consideration by the Parties to a dispute. In this context, it is notable that the WTO CTE reported that 
no formal trade-related disputes had yet arisen under any of the dispute resolution mechanisms in these 
MEAs. However, the CTE noted that under the IPPC, many disputes had arisen, but had to date been 
resolved in informal discussions. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the G-20 nations dominate global trade and are therefore particularly 
likely to be involved in disputes with both trade and environmental dimensions. In this context, it is 
important to consider the extent to which the G-20 nations are Parties to these key MEAs with TREMs. 
Table 3.4 summarises whether each of the G-20 nations are Parties to each of the 16 MEAs, and 
highlights the tremendous variation in the extent to which each nation has agreed to be bound by the 
international environmental regime. At one end of the spectrum, the United States — the world’s largest 
economy — is only a Party to half of the MEAs. At the other end of the spectrum, the EU is a Party to 
all bar two of the MEAs, although even within the EU, there is variation, with France, Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom not all being Parties to the same MEAs; this variance in membership adds an 
additional layer of complexity to disputes with trade and environmental dimensions involving members 
of the EU (an example of the complex jurisdictional issues that can arise in MEAs involving EU States 
is the MOX Plant dispute that was discussed in chapter 1). Focussing on the Biosafety Protocol in 
particular, only three quarters of G-20 nations are Parties, with Argentina, Canada, Australia, Russia 
and the United States all non-Parties. Overall, the variation in the membership of the MEAs with TREMs 
gives rise to many scenarios where environmental/trade disputes could arise involving States that may 
or may not be Parties to the relevant MEA or the WTO — this raises the potential for conflict of 
jurisdiction, which is currently left to the various dispute resolution mechanisms to be resolved on a 
case-by-case basis. 
It should be noted that in addition to scenarios involving MEAs with TREMs, there is the potential for 
conflict of jurisdiction between the trade and environmental regimes to arise from scenarios where 
States use trade measures to enforce an environmental obligation under an international agreement, 
even where that international agreement may not be considered an MEA, and where the agreement 
does not explicitly include a TREM. As example of such a dispute arose in the Chile-Swordfish case 
                                                     
157 Ibid Article 11. 
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involving the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’), which is discussed later in 
this chapter. 
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Developing countries have expressed concern about the effect that environmental rules will have on 
trade liberalization — particularly, their ability to understand, comply with, implement and enforce the 
various and potentially conflicting obligations under MEAs and the trade agreements due to 
infrastructure and human resource constraints, financial limitations and inferior technological 
capabilities.160  The same concerns extend to the ability of developing countries to initiate and 
participate in formal dispute resolution processes involving TREM disputes.161 
Parties to both the WTO agreements and the MEAs are obligated to implement and adhere to the 
requirements of all these agreements.162 It is precisely due to the difference in objectives between the 
environment and trade regimes that the forum for the resolution of disputes is important. Whether the 
dispute is characterised as involving environmental concerns or trade obligations will impact on the 
desirability of the judicial forum — be it the WTO or pursuant to the MEA dispute resolution provisions. 
With MEAs now containing trade measures, there is increased scope for conflict between the WTO 
agreements and MEAs. The TREMs in MEAs are particularly problematic where they authorise State’s 
to take unilateral action. Bodansky proposes that unilateral ‘environmental’ action is viewed negatively 
due to the growing sense of an international environmental community and the need to address current 
environmental issues at a global cooperative level.163  Forms of ‘unilateral’ action taken by one State 
against another are often associated with ‘illegality’.164  In terms of trade issues, Article 23(1) of GATT 
1994 requires States to resolve disputes under the DSU, rather than through unilateral trade sanctions. 
Unilateral trade actions taken by States for the ‘protection of the environment’, have subsequently been 
the subject of dispute proceedings before the WTO. These environmental/trade disputes and the 
approach taken by the WTO towards trade-restrictive environmental measures will be discussed further 
below. 
C Compliance and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms  
MEAs are highly technical regimes and many of these agreements contain compliance mechanisms 
and dispute resolution provisions, usually involving a combination of negotiation, mediation, conciliation, 
and determination by arbitration or the ICJ. These provisions reflect the dispute resolution avenues set 
out in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations (‘UN Charter’). Many recent MEAs create 
compliance committees to which States are required to submit compliance reports and have 
implemented non-compliance procedures for any failure to comply with obligations in the MEAs.165 For 
example the Kyoto Protocol has compliance mechanism for emission limits and established a 
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160 Christian Bach, 'International Trade, Development Aid and the Multilateral Environmental Agreements' 
(Development Policy & Technical Advisory Service, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), April 
2004), 51. 
161 Ibid, 11. 
162 Charnovitz, above n 37, 35. 
163 Daniel Bodansky, 'What's So Bad about Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment?' (2000) 11(2) European 
Journal of International Law 339, 342. 
164 Ibid, 341-343. 
165 Wen-chen Shih, 'Conflicting jurisdictions over disputes arising from the application of Trade-Related 
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Compliance Committee.166 The Kyoto Protocol Compliance Committee comprises of two branches: a 
facilitative branch (provides advice and assistance to Parties in order to promote compliance) and an 
enforcement branch (determines consequences for non-compliance by Parties with their commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol). There exists potential for the compliance regimes and dispute mechanisms 
of the MEAs to compete with the WTO dispute resolution mechanism where the facts in dispute involve 
trade obligations invoking the provisions of both regimes.  Two examples, the CITES compliance 
procedures and the Chile-Swordfish case, are briefly examined below. 
1 Compliance Regimes: CITES 
In the specific example of CITES, the non-compliance procedures have metamorphosed into the 
imposition of trade embargoes in CITES-listed specimens with the country concerned. Illegal wildlife 
trafficking has expanded — particularly in the past few years — with this activity becoming connected 
to organized crime. Highlighting the extent of the problem, a 2013 Report of the UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime estimated that the illegal trade in wildlife products in just the region of East Asia and the 
Pacific was valued around US$2.5 billion a year.167 
In 2007, the practice of the imposition of trade embargos for non-compliance with CITES was codified 
by the Conference of the Parties Resolution 14.3 (and the Annex to the Resolution, titled Guide to 
CITES Compliance Procedures).168 Pursuant to Resolution 14.3, the Conference of the Parties or the 
Standing Committee of CITES may, as a last resort, recommend an embargo against a member State 
on trade in specimens of one or more CITES-listed species. Since the first CITES trade embargo that 
was imposed against Bolivia in 1985, there have been embargos imposed against 43 recalcitrant States 
(both CITES Parties and non-Parties).169 
The unilateral sanctions imposed by the Standing Committee or the Conference of the Parties provide 
a remedy for disputes over non-compliance — albeit without ‘judicial’ proceedings. These ‘trade’ 
sanctions also operate outside of the sphere of the WTO regime. This is an example of ostensibly an 
environmental agreement providing for, and enforcing, trade regulations. The compatibility of these 
CITES trade embargos with the WTO Agreements raises a number of interesting issues. To date, 
although some States have objected to the CITES embargos, none of the affected countries have 
brought a dispute under the WTO challenging these measures imposed under CITES.170 Analysing the 
                                                     
166 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 11 
December 1997, 2303 UNTS 162 (entered into force 16 February 2005), Art 18, 16 and 19. See also: 'UNFCCC, 
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167 'Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment' (UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime, April 2013)  
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potential for any conflict of norms between CITES and the WTO agreements is outside the scope of 
this doctoral thesis. However, what is particularly relevant to consider and hypothesise about is the 
treatment that would be given by the WTO to a dispute brought before it by a member State that 
challenged the trade embargo placed upon it by the Conference of the Parties or the Standing 
Committee of CITES. It is significant to note that the negotiation of MEAs is contemplated in Article XX 
of GATT 1994, which permits States to implement their own trade measures for the protection of the 
environment and human health as an exception to the WTO trade rules. That being said, Article 23 of 
the DSU of the WTO operates to prevent unilateral countermeasures being imposed by a State relating 
to what constitute breaches of WTO trade law. This factual scenario would then turn on the 
consideration of the ‘validity’ of a trade embargo that was put in place pursuant to the ‘direction’ of the 
Conference of the Parties or the Standing Committee of CITES. The WTO would then need to consider 
whether the CITES ‘direction’ operated as a valid justification for the potential breach of the WTO 
obligations (if it is assumed that the trade embargo was in breach of the WTO agreements). This set of 
facts draws upon the similar situation in the Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres 
(‘Brazil — Retreaded Tyres’) case which involved an exemption to a trade measure prohibiting imports 
of retreaded tyres for the Parties to the MERCOSUR agreement.171 The ruling in this case, which is 
discussed in detail later in this chapter, casts doubt on the application of non-WTO law as justification 
for breaches of the WTO agreements. Further complicating this situation would be if the State that 
imposed the trade embargo sought to establish the validity of the embargo though the dispute resolution 
provisions of CITES. This would then result in two international dispute institutions formed to consider 
the ‘legality’ of the same trade measure. 
2 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: Chile-Swordfish Case 
The dispute between Chile and the EU involving swordfish in the late 1990s through to early 2000s is 
another example of the potential for parallel proceedings pursuant to the dispute settlement 
mechanisms of both international environmental and international trade agreements.  
Case Study: Chile-Swordfish case 
This dispute centred on the Chilean prohibition introduced in 1991 on the unloading of swordfish 
catches, taken from the high seas bordering Chile’s Exclusive Economic Zone, in Chilean ports, 
either to land them for warehousing or to tranship them onto other vessels.172 The prohibition was 
justified by Chile as being necessary to address environmental concerns over the rapid depletion 
of shoals of swordfish. The EU claimed that the denial of port access by Chile was a violation of its 
trade obligations under GATT 1947, including Articles V (providing for freedom of transit for goods 
through the territory of each contracting party on their way to or from other contracting parties) and 
Article XI (prohibition on quantitative restrictions on imports of agricultural or fisheries products). 
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Consequently, the EU brought dispute proceedings against Chile in the WTO in April 2000.173 
Arbitral proceedings were also brought by Chile under UNCLOS claiming that the EU breached 
Article 64 of UNCLOS (requiring cooperation in ensuring conservation of highly migratory species) 
and Articles 116-119 (conservation of the living resources of the high seas).174 In December 2000, 
a request was made for the formation of a special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea (ITLOS) to hear the dispute.175  
Chile and the EU reached a negotiated settlement and both the UNCLOS and the WTO proceedings 
were discontinued without either forum having an opportunity to consider how to resolve the conflict of 
jurisdiction in this case. Nevertheless, the diametrically opposed policy positions of the two States in 
this case are illustrative of the complexities and tension between the international trade and 
environment regimes.  
Since the 1990s, disputes involving trade and environmental obligations have been brought under the 
WTO dispute settlement framework. Accordingly, a body of trade jurisprudence on environmental 
issues has been developed. This next section will briefly consider some of these cases and the interplay 
between trade and environmental obligations.  
III ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE CASES IN THE WTO  
The tension between trade and environmental objectives first came to prominence before an 
international judicial forum in 1991 in the cases commonly referred to as Tuna-Dolphin I and Tuna-
Dolphin II.176 The first dispute involved a challenge by Mexico (under the GATT 1947 dispute 
procedures) to the trade restrictions imposed by the United States on the imports of certain Mexican 
yellowfin tuna. The trade ban was imposed by the United States in response to the concern that the 
harvesting methods employed by Mexican fisherman resulted in an unreasonably high number of 
dolphins being taken incidentally as part of the tuna catch. Under the US Marine Mammal Protection 
Act,177 Mexico was required to demonstrate that it had dolphin protection standards comparable to that 
of the US and that the average rate of incidental taking of dolphins was comparable to that of US 
vessels. 
The United States contended that its embargo was consistent with Art III of GATT 1947 or in the 
alternative, was justified under the exceptions in paragraphs (b) or (g) of Article XX of GATT 1947. 
Article XX relevantly provides: 
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Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or 
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;  
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective 
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.  
This case received considerable attention as it raised the precise question of whether one State could 
use trade restrictions to control the environmental regulations of another State. The GATT Panel found 
that the United States had breached its trade obligations under GATT 1947 and that the embargo was 
not supported by the exceptions in Article XX. In particular, the Panel found that: 
- the exceptions in Article XX are to be interpreted narrowly; 
- the United States failed to prove that its embargo on Mexican tuna was ‘necessary’ (the least-trade-
restrictive option to protect dolphins); 
- Article XX did not permit the United States to take unilateral trade action to regulate the natural 
resources practices of another State outside of its borders. 
In 1992, the European Union brought its own complaint against the US in relation to the same measure 
under the US Marine Mammal Protection Act. A second panel was formed, known as the Tuna-Dolphin 
II case to hear the dispute.  The second panel upheld the same findings as in Tuna-Dolphin I in that the 
measure was held not to be covered by the exceptions in Article XX (b), (g) or (d) of the GATT 1947. 
The ruling in the Tuna-Dolphin I and II cases shaped the debate over the environment and trade conflict 
through the late 1990s and early 2000s.178  Even now, the prospect that one country can unilaterally 
impose environmental protection measures extra-territorially, particularly when these measures breach 
the WTO agreements, is quite controversial. Although both Panel reports were circulated, they were 
not adopted by the Parties (which was a requirement under GATT 1947).179     
A The ‘Greening’ of Trade Jurisprudence 
More recently, the WTO has subsequently departed from the controversial decision in the Tuna-Dolphin 
cases. The WTO Appellate Body and Panels have sought to integrate accepted environmental 
approaches and issues into their rulings in trade disputes.180 This has been described as the ‘greening 
of trade jurisdiction’.181 Some of these cases will be discussed below.  
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In the 1996 ruling in United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, the WTO 
Appellate Body recognised that Article XX empowers States to implement unilateral measures to protect 
human health and the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.182 Particularly notable is that this 
case, which considered a unilateral environmental protection measure implemented by the United 
States, was the first decision to be handed down under the WTO DSU since its inception in January 
1995. This case involved a dispute commenced by Venezuela and Brazil against the US regarding the 
US baseline standards introduced for reformulated gasoline under the Clean Air Act Amendment of 
1990.183 Known as the ‘Gasoline Rule’, these provisions established a ‘baseline’ standard for 
compliance for refiners, blenders and importers. Under the Gasoline Rule, domestic entities were 
permitted to establish individual baselines, however, foreign entities were required to use statutorily 
determined baselines. The Appellate Body found that the Gasoline Rule was a measure permitted under 
Article XX (g) of GATT 1994 — being a measure ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources’. In pointing to the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, the Appellate 
Body held that the WTO members have significant autonomy to determine their own environmental 
policies and the relationship of these with trade law.184 This autonomy is ‘circumscribed only by the 
need to respect the requirements of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements’.185 
However, the Appellate Body went on to determine that the measure must also satisfy the ‘chapeau’ 
(the introductory sentence) of Article XX of GATT 1994 that ‘such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade’. The Appellate Body found that 
in permitting different approaches to the baseline standards as between foreign refiners and domestic 
refiners, the Gasoline Rule amounted to unjustifiable discrimination and a disguised restriction on trade. 
Accordingly, the Gasoline Rule was in breach of the US obligations under GATT 1994. 
In 1998, in the United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (‘US — 
Shrimp’) dispute,186 the WTO Appellate Body was again called upon to interpret the operation of the 
environmental exceptions in Article XX. This case involved US legislation relating to endangered sea 
turtles. The US Endangered Species Act of 1973,187 listed five species of sea turtles that were found in 
US waters as ‘endangered’ or ‘threatened’. The legislation prohibited the ‘take’ of these turtles within 
US territorial waters and the high seas and required US shrimp trawlers to use ‘turtle excluder devices’ 
(TEDs) on their nets in areas where there was a significant likelihood of encountering sea turtles. For 
shrimp imports into the US, section 609 of US Public Law 101–102 required harvesting States to have 
a regulatory program and an incidental sea turtle take-rate comparable to that of the US or demonstrate 
that the fishing technology employed (such as a TED) did not pose a threat to sea turtles.188 
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The WTO Appellate Body found that US extraterritorial trade measures imposed to protect seas turtles 
could be justified under the general exceptions in paragraph (g) of Article XX.189  However, these 
measures must also satisfy the chapeau in Article XX and they must not be applied in either an arbitrary 
or unjustifiably discriminatory way.190  The WTO Appellate Body ruled that the US measures were within 
the scope of measures permitted under Article XX.191  However, as the United States provided technical 
and financial assistance and longer transition periods for some countries in the western hemisphere 
and not others, the United States was found to have discriminated against some WTO Members.192  
Interestingly, the WTO Panel commented that the parties should: 
cooperate fully in order to conclude as soon as possible an agreement which will permit the protection 
and conservation of sea turtles to the satisfaction of all interests involved and taking into account the 
principle that States have common but differentiated responsibilities to conserve and protect the 
environment.193    
Not only is this a policy direction, which would be significant in its own right, but the statement relates 
to environmental law, which is beyond the WTO’s own purpose. Surprisingly, this statement by the WTO 
was not criticised by any WTO member government as being ultra vires.194 
In two recent decisions involving China, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten, and Molybdenum (‘China — Rare Earths’) and China — Measures Related to the Exportation 
of Various Raw Materials (‘China — Raw Materials’),195 the United States challenged certain Chinese 
export restrictions.  In China — Rare Earths, China had imposed export restrictions on earths, tungsten, 
and molybdenum -— raw materials used in the production of electronic goods.  In China — Raw 
Materials, the export restrictions related to various forms of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, 
manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal, yellow phosphorus and zinc — these materials are used to 
produce many everyday items as well as many technological devices. In relation to its export quotas on 
these raw materials and rare earths, China defended its trade restrictions on the grounds of Article 
XX(g) of GATT 1994, that the restrictions relate to the conservation of its exhaustible natural resources, 
and were necessary to reduce pollution caused by mining. In considering the definition of ‘natural 
resources’ in Article XX(g), the Appellate Body referred, to and upheld the reasoning in US — Shrimp, 
that the generic term "natural resources" is not "static" in content,  but is rather, "by definition, 
evolutionary".196 Similarly, the Appellate Body gave a broad definition to the meaning ‘conservation’ 
stating that the:  
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precise contours of the word "conservation" can only be fully understood in the context of the exhaustible 
natural resource at issue in a given dispute. For example, "conservation" in the context of an exhaustible 
mineral resource may entail preservation through a reduction in the pace of its extraction, or by stopping 
its extraction altogether. In respect of the "conservation" of a living natural resource, such as a species 
facing the threat of extinction, the word may encompass not only limiting or halting the activities creating 
the danger of extinction, but also facilitating the replenishment of that endangered species.197 
Ultimately, on the facts of the case, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s original finding that China's 
export quotas on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum were not justified under Article XX(g) of the 
GATT 1994 as the measures did not ‘relate to’ the conservation of natural resources and were not 
‘made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption’.198 
Another recent ‘environmental’ case that was brought under the WTO dispute resolution framework is 
the European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products 
(‘EC — Seal Products’) case. This dispute concerned two EU regulations — the Regulation (EC) No. 
1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the EC Council of 16 September 2009 and Commission 
Regulation (EU) No. 737/2010 (implementing measure) — which introduced a general prohibition on 
the import and placing on the market of seal products (the ‘EU Seal Regime’).199 The EU Seal Regime 
included some exceptions to the prohibition, including an exception for seal products derived from hunts 
conducted by Inuit or indigenous communities (IC exception) and hunts conducted for marine resource 
management purposes (MRM exception). Both Canada and Norway challenged the EU Seal Regime 
on the grounds that the provisions were inconsistent with obligations under GATT 1994, the TBT 
Agreement and the Agriculture Agreement.200  The EU sought to defend the EU Seal Regimes pursuant 
to the exception found in Article XX (a) of GATT 1994, that the measures were necessary to protect 
public morals. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that the EU Seal was ‘necessary to protect 
public morals’ within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.201 However, the Appellate Body 
held: 
the function of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 is to prevent the abuse or misuse of a 
Member's right to invoke the exceptions contained in the subparagraphs of that Article. In that way, the 
chapeau operates to preserve the balance between a Member's right to invoke the exceptions of Article 
XX, and the rights of other Members to be protected from conduct proscribed under the GATT 1994.202 
The Appellate Body confirmed that one of the most important factors in the assessment of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination pursuant to the chapeau of Article XX, is whether the ‘discrimination’ can be 
reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the policy objective with respect to which the measure has 
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been provisionally justified under Article XX.203 In considering this test, the Appellate Body held that the 
exceptions in the EU Seal Regime for IC hunts as compared to "commercial" hunts cannot be reconciled 
with the policy objective of addressing EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare.204 It was further 
noted that the Appellate Body was not convinced the EU had made ‘comparable efforts’ to facilitate the 
access of the Canadian Inuit to the IC exception as it did with respect to the Greenlandic Inuit.205 
Accordingly, it was held that the EU Seal Regime did not meet the requirements of the chapeau of 
Article XX and could not be justified under the public morals exception in Article XX(a) of GATT 1994.206 
On the issue of technical standards, it is noted the broader dispute involving the US and Mexico over 
dolphins and tuna is still on-going. In particular, the more recent tension related to US technical 
regulations granting the use of an official US Department of Commerce ‘dolphin-safe’ label on tuna 
products.207 The grant of the label was conditional upon the provision of documentary evidence — the 
required evidence varied depending on the location, vessel type and harvesting method of the tuna. In 
2007, following the US 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth, the US 
government prohibited the use of a “dolphin-safe” label for any tuna caught in the Eastern Tropical 
Pacific by the fishing method of ‘setting’ upon dolphins with purse seine nets.208 This restriction on the 
granting of an eco-label, precluded the access of Mexico’s tuna exports to the US market. In 2008, 
Mexico brought dispute proceedings before the WTO against the US on the grounds that the US 
provisions for the granting of dolphin-safe labels was in breach of its obligations under Articles I(1) and 
III(4) of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.209 
On appeal, the Appellate Body found in United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, that the US dolphin-safe labelling measure was 
inconsistent Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement in that it afforded less favourable treatment to Mexican 
tuna.210 The Appellate Body found that in singling out the fishing method of ‘setting’ on dolphins and not 
addressing the adverse effects on dolphins resulting from other fishing methods in other areas of the 
ocean, the US measure was not even-handed.211 Interestingly, the Appellate Body found that the US 
measure was in breach of the TBT Agreement due to the discriminatory application, not on the basis 
that the measure regulated the product and production methods of a foreign nation.212 It is noted that 
compliance dispute proceedings are still on-going. 
In 2013, the first renewable energy dispute was decided by the WTO Appellate Body in the case Canada 
— Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program (‘Canada — Feed-In Tariff Program’). This dispute 
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concerns domestic content requirements implemented in Ontario, Canada, requiring the use of a 
qualifying percentage of Ontario-produced ‘renewable energy generation equipment’ in the design and 
construction of certain wind and solar powered electricity generation facilities in order to qualify for 
guaranteed electricity prices offered under the Feed-In Tariff (FIT) Programme. The FIT Programme 
involves a long-term government contract at set prices, which is usually above the relevant regionally 
wholesale price for power.  
The EU and Japan claimed that the domestic-content requirement in the FIT Programme had a 
detrimental effect on the exports of EU and Japanese renewable energy generation equipment to 
Ontario. In particular, it was argued that these requirements constituted a violation of Canada’s 
obligations under (i) the national treatment principle in Article III(4) of the GATT 1994; (ii) Article 2.1 of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (‘TRIMs Agreement’) which prohibits any trade-
related investment measures that are inconsistent with Article III of the GATT 1994; and (iii) the 
prohibition in Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘SCM 
Agreement’) which prohibits subsidies that are contingent on the use of domestic over imported 
goods.213 
The Appellate Body found that the domestic-content requirements in the FIT Program was inconsistent 
with the national treatment obligations of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs 
Agreement214. However, in relation to the prohibited subsidy claim under the SCM Agreement, the 
Appellate Body determined that the government financial contribution (payment by the Government of 
Ontario for the electricity) did not equate to a ‘benefit’, which is necessary to establish that the FIT 
Program constituted a ‘subsidy’ within the meaning of SCM Agreement.215 Accordingly, the Appellate 
Body found it unnecessary to complete the analysis of whether the FIT program constituted a subsidy. 
As recognised by Charnovitz and Fischer, ‘by avoiding the determination of whether an environmentally 
minded program confers a benefit under the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body may have opened 
the door for any number of well or poorly intentioned interventions.’216 Although the Canada — Feed-In 
Tariff Program is considered an ‘environmental’ dispute, the narrowing of the issues in this case turned 
more on the technical interpretation of the relevant trade provisions rather than environmental issues 
or specifically environment vs trade objectives.  However, it is likely that cases involving renewable 
energy technologies will be brought to the WTO in the coming years. 
The cases discussed above signify a movement in the WTO, at least within its judicial arm, towards 
bridging the conflict between trade and environment regimes, in that unilateral measures for the 
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protection of the environment, animal and plant life were recognised as valid exceptions to the trade 
rules pursuant to Article XX. However, as demonstrated by these cases, any evidence that the measure 
is applied arbitrarily or discriminatorily or is a disguised restriction on trade will result in the failure of the 
test in the chapeau of Article XX and the measure being held to be a breach of GATT 1994. This 
effectively results in a final over-riding free trade requirement for what would otherwise be a valid 
unilateral environmental measure – tipping the scales towards the pursuit of free trade objectives over 
environmental protection. This is not necessarily a negative outcome. If the trade-restrictive measure 
in question is truly aimed at environment protection, then it follows that such a measure should be 
applied in a non-discriminatory way to all parties in order to be fully effective.  
B The Precautionary Principle and the WTO 
While the founders of the WTO may have envisioned an organisation dedicated solely to the promotion 
of free trade, the modern day ‘WTO’ is not just a ‘trade’ organisation.217 Charnovitz argues that the WTO 
is also an environmental organisation in that it is responsible for overseeing the environmental 
provisions contained in its trade agreements and that this arm of its jurisdiction will continue to grow.218 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the conflict in the objectives of the international trade law and 
international environmental law is one of the tension points between the two specialised regimes.  In 
this regard, there is a growing body of international trade disputes where WTO panels (and the 
Appellate Body) have considered the application of the ‘principles’ of environmental law to the dispute 
at hand, in particular the relevance of the ‘precautionary principle’ in trade disputes within the WTO. 
In the European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (‘EC — 
Hormones’) case,219 the WTO considered the application of the ‘precautionary principle’ found in 
international environmental law, as a part-justification for the implementation of unilateral environmental 
measures. This case involved the prohibition put in place by the EU on imports and market-release of 
meat or meat products derived from cattle which had been injected with certain natural growth 
hormones (oestradiol-17b, progesterone, testosterone) or certain synthetic growth hormones 
(trenbolone acetate, zeranol or melengestrol acetate (MGA)). The United States and Canada contested 
the EU beef hormone ban on the ground that the EU failed to comply with the risk assessment 
procedures in the SPS Agreement. In particular, Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement provides that  
Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as 
appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account 
risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organizations. 
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In defence of the allegation that its beef hormone ban was based on an inadequate scientific risk 
assessment, the EU relied in part on the precautionary principle. An articulation of the precautionary 
principle can be found in Principle 15 of the United Nations Declaration on Environment and 
Development, which states: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.220 
The precautionary principle is recognised in international environmental law and has been included, 
albeit with different wording, in many key international environmental agreements as a guiding 
principle.221 The precautionary principle can be directly contrasted with the science-based approach 
taken in the SPS Agreement that provides that SPS measures (that would otherwise be in breach of 
the nation’s WTO obligations) must have a ‘scientific justification’ (Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement), 
be based on ‘scientific principles’ (Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement), must not be ‘maintained without 
sufficient scientific evidence’ (Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement) and must be based on a risk 
assessment carried out by the importing State (Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement).222  
In order to be applied by the WTO (as a justification for the EU beef hormone ban), the precautionary 
principle would either need to have been included in the text of the SPS Agreement or form part of 
customary international law (being a source of general international law and applicable within the WTO 
by virtue of Article 3(2) of the DSU). In considering whether the precautionary principle had formed part 
of customary international law, the Appellate Body held that its status as binding customary international 
law was uncertain. 
The precautionary principle is regarded by some as having crystallised into a general principle of 
international environmental law. Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as a principle of 
general or customary international law appears less clear.223 
In analysing the text of the SPS Agreement, the ‘precautionary principle’, as formulated in international 
environmental law (and advanced by the EU in this case), is not included in the text of the SPS 
Agreement. However, the notion of ‘precaution’ is found in the preamble, Article 3.3 and, in particular, 
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. The SPS Agreement refers to the use of provisional precautionary 
measures only where the scientific evidence is ‘insufficient’, with an obligation to carry out a proper risk 
assessment as soon as possible. This provision can be distinguished from the overall precautionary 
approach permitted in international environmental law.  
As surmised by Wirth, it was open to the Appellate Body to ‘harmonize normative standards for 
precautionary decision-making with the SPS Agreement’ — either by (a) accepting the precautionary 
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principle as binding customary international law, such that both the SPS Agreement and the 
precautionary principle could be applied as sources of law in determining the dispute; or (b) using the 
precautionary principle as guidance in the interpretation of the SPS Agreement and the determination 
of compliance of Member States domestic regulations.224 This would have helped to have bridged the 
gap between the objectives of the international trade law and international environmental law, at least 
in regard to the use of the ‘precaution’ in the sanitary and phytosanitary standards of Member States. 
However, this was not the approach taken by the Appellate Body in the EC — Hormones case. 
In differentiating the principles of international environmental law from general international law, the 
Appellate Body held that the status of the precautionary principle as part of general international law 
was uncertain.225 The Appellate Body concluded that ‘precaution’ was applicable in the context of the 
express provisions of the SPS Agreement.226 In applying the requirements of the SPS Agreement, the 
Appellate Body found that the EU’s measures were not based on a risk assessment that sufficiently 
supported or warranted the prohibition on hormone-beef imports.227 
After the EC — Hormones case, a number of environmental SPS disputes have been brought before 
the WTO. The Australia — Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon case involved a challenge by 
Canada to Australia’s import ban on Canadian fresh, chilled or frozen salmon so as to protect the 
domestic salmon population from disease;228 the Japan — Measures Affecting Agricultural Products 
case concerned a challenge by the US to Japan’s quarantine requirement to test each variety of eight 
different agricultural products prior to import so as to protect against the introduction of coddling 
moths;229 and the Japan — Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples case concerned Japan’s 
prohibition on importing mature symptomless apples from the US in an effort to prevent the spread of 
fire blight (a plant disease).230 These cases turned on the consideration of Article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement, which provides that: 
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the relevant 
international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. 
In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more 
objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a 
reasonable period of time. 
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In these cases, it was confirmed that, as a matter of WTO law, Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement is the 
only ‘exception to the obligation to base sanitary measures on a risk assessment’.231  Accordingly, the 
precautionary principle does not, of itself, justify an SPS measure that is otherwise inconsistent with the 
SPS Agreement. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the distinction between the precautionary principle and the WTO’s 
‘science-based’ approach in the SPS Agreement was considered in the EC — Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products case (a background summary of this case can be found in chapter 1).232 This case 
turned on the risk assessment provisions in Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. The EU sought to rely 
on the precautionary principle as ‘customary international law’ in support of its de facto moratorium on 
the importation of agricultural biotech products — that is, that they were permitted to take a 
precautionary approach as the science on the effects of genetically modified (GM) agricultural products 
was ‘uncertain’. It is noted that the EU had carried out a limited risk assessment. The WTO Panel 
followed the decision in EC — Hormones and held that as the formulation of the precautionary principle 
differs between international environmental agreements, the principle cannot be considered customary 
international law and accordingly its legal force ‘remains unsettled’.233 The WTO Panel therefore applied 
the science-based approach set out in the provisions of the SPS Agreement, specifically the 
requirement in Article 5.1 that SPS measures restricting imports must be based on a risk assessment 
carried out by the State imposing the measure. In this context, the WTO Panel made a distinction 
between the precautionary principle and a general precautionary ‘approach’ and found that ‘if there are 
factors which affect scientists' level of confidence in a risk assessment they have carried out, a Member 
may in principle take this into account in determining the measure to be applied for achieving its 
appropriate level of protection from risks.’234 However, it was noted that even if a WTO Member followed 
such a precautionary ‘approach’, its SPS measure would need to be ‘based on’ a risk assessment.235 
The EU had carried out limited risk assessments on the GM products performed by the Competent 
Authority of the relevant EU member State to which the product application was originally submitted, 
and by the relevant EU scientific committees. However, the diverging scientific views on the ‘safety’ of 
GM products were not included in detail in the risk assessments. The Panel found that the limited risk 
assessments carried out by the EU member states did not support a prohibition on biotech products 
and found that the EU measures were in breach of Article 5.1 as they were not ‘based’ on risk 
assessment.236 Further, the Panel held that as there was sufficient scientific evidence to enable the EU 
to assess the risks posed by these GM products, there was no recourse to Article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement (which permits provisional measures where there is insufficient scientific evidence).237  
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These cases involving SPS measures reflect the diverging approaches between the international 
environmental law regime and the trade law regime. The WTO Appellate Body could have opted to 
apply the precautionary principle as a guiding tool in the interpretation of the SPS Agreement.238 This 
would have gone a long way towards ‘harmonizing’ the SPS Agreement with the precautionary principle. 
These cases highlight the potential for conflict of norms, prompted by the conflict of objectives, between 
the specialised areas of international environmental and international trade law.239 This is problematic 
as the boundaries between what is a ‘trade law’ dispute and what is an ‘environmental law’ dispute is 
becoming increasing less clear — particularly given the growing number of MEAs that contain TREMs 
and conversely, RTAs that have environmental provisions.  
C The Brazil — Retreaded Tyres Case: Clash of 
Environment and Trade Polices Before Multiple 
Dispute Institutions  
In the recent case of Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (‘Brazil — Retreaded 
Tyres’) the WTO clearly held that its primary objective remains upholding the trade rules, regardless of 
the pressing environmental and health concerns that underlined the policy objectives of trade measures 
in question in that dispute. Further, this case demonstrates the potential for conflict between obligations 
under WTO Agreements, RTAs and over-arching environmental objectives. The decision by the 
Appellate Body in the Brazil —Retreaded Tyres case illustrates the collision between environmental 
and trade objectives, played out across the engagement of multiple dispute institutions.240 
Case Study: Brazil — Retreaded Tyres case 
This dispute involved Brazil’s trade provisions restricting the importation of retreaded tyres into its 
territory. Brazil has historically struggled with controlling dengue fever, which is spread by the Aedes 
aegypti mosquito. An important breeding ground for this mosquito is the stagnant water found in 
the millions of tyres dumped across Brazil. In addition, there was growing concern in Brazil over the 
health and the environmental risks arising from the toxic emissions caused by tyre fires. 
Accordingly, the Brazilian Government had in place from the 1990s a range of separate trade 
measures to limit the importation of used tyres.241  In 2000, Brazil introduced legislation (Portaria 
SECEX 8/2000) which banned the importation of used tyres, specifically including retreaded tyres, 
into its territory. In August 2001, Uruguay commenced dispute resolution proceedings under the 
MERCOSUR agreement on the grounds that Brazil’s import ban on retreaded tyres curbed its 
exportation of remoulded tyres (a particular type of retreaded tyre) into Brazil. The MERCOSUR ad 
hoc arbitral tribunal upheld Uruguay’s claim and found that Portaria SECEX 8/2000 breached the 
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decision of the MERCOSUR Common Market Council that no parties will take any new trade 
restrictive measures against other MERCOSUR parties.242 In compliance with the decision of the 
Arbitral Tribunal, Brazil then introduced Article 40 of Portaria SECEX 14/2004, which provided for 
a general import ban on retreaded and used tyres with an exemption for remoulded tyres from other 
countries of the MERCOSUR (referred to as the ‘MERCOSUR exemption’).243 
In 2005, the EU commenced separate WTO proceedings against Brazil in relation to the import ban 
on retreaded and used tyres and the MERCOSUR exemption contained in Article 40 of Portaria 
SECEX 14/2004. Brazil defended its trade ban on the basis of the exception in Art XX (b) of GATT 
1994 that the measure was necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. While the 
WTO Panel found that the import ban was a ‘necessary’ measure within the ambit of Article XX(b), 
the trade restrictive provisions must also comply with the Chapeau of Article XX — that is, that the 
measure is not applied: 
                in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between    
countries where the same conditions prevail. 
In determining whether the import ban was a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, the 
WTO Panel took into account the evidence that numerous injunctions against the ban had been 
granted by Brazilian courts to private companies seeking the right to import waste tyres into Brazil, 
thus circumventing the import ban. The WTO Panel held that the objective of the trade ban was 
undermined by these injunctions. Accordingly, while the import ban itself fulfilled the requirements 
of the Article XX (b) exception on environmental and health grounds, it failed at the Chapeau level 
as it constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination.244  Given this finding against Brazil, the 
WTO Panel exercised ‘judicial economy’ finding it unnecessary to rule on the MERCOSUR 
exemption specifically, however it did accepted Brazil’s submission that the MERCOSUR 
exemption was included in order to satisfy its obligations pursuant to the ruling of the MERCOSUR 
arbitral tribunal — a legally binding ruling on Brazil.245 
The dispute was appealed to the Appellate Body of the WTO where the reasoning of the Panel was 
overturned (although not the ultimate findings). The Appellate Body ruled that when determining 
compliance with the Chapeau of Article XX, the policy objective for introducing the restrictive trade 
measure should be considered.246 Unlike the WTO Panel, the Appellate Body did consider the 
MERCOSUR exemption and held that, regardless of the fact that the provision was implemented in 
compliance with the ruling of the MERCOUSUR Arbitral Tribunal, it bore no relationship to the 
legitimate objective pursued by the import ban (to protect human, animal or plant life or health).247  
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The same reasoning was applied by the Appellate Body to the imports of used tyres pursuant to 
the Brazilian court injunctions — that such action was contrary to the policy objective of a trade 
import ban. In this regard the Appellate Body concluded that the import ban on used and retreaded 
tyres in Article 40, including the MERCOSUR exemption, was inconsistent with the chapeau of 
Article XX of GATT 1994 and constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.248   
This case demonstrates the emphasis placed by the WTO Appellate Body on trading obligations 
compared to health and environmental issues.249 In somewhat reverse logic, Brazil’s measure fell short 
of the exemption in Article XX because it was not strict enough in its enforcement of its environmental 
policy. By allowing exceptions (both through the injunctions and also the MERCOSUR exemption), 
Brazil’s import ban constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination from a trade perspective. This 
‘technical’ approach by the WTO to the interpretation of its trade laws created the unsatisfactory 
outcome of perpetuating the problems Brazil faced in controlling dengue fever, which could have at 
least been partially addressed by the import ban on used and retreaded tyres — a measure which both 
the WTO Panel and Appellate Body had conceded was ‘necessary’ for health and environmental 
reasons.  
Brazil proposed that as the MERCOSUR exemption was included to satisfy the judicial ruling (or quasi-
judicial ruling) of the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal, it should be held that the MERCOSUR exemption 
was a priori compatible with WTO law. This argument was rejected by the Appellate Body.250 This is 
particularly significant given the MERCOSUR agreement falls under the customs union provisions in 
Article XXIV of GATT 1994, which allows for preferential treatment within a customs union/free trade 
area. It is arguable that this ruling elevates the judicial authority of the WTO over the dispute settlement 
bodies of RTAs and creates a nominal hierarchy of trade obligations, with the provisions of WTO 
agreements and the WTO judicial bodies at the top of the hierarchy.251  
The Appellate Body took the opportunity to comment that in the arbitral proceedings under 
MERCOSUR, Brazil elected not to justify its import ban on the environmental and health grounds found 
in Article 50(d) of the Treaty Establishing the Latin American Integration Association (‘Treaty of 
Montevideo’) — which is similar to Article XX of GATT 1994.252 While purporting not to ‘second-guess’ 
Brazil’s decision not to invoke Article 50(d), it is somewhat surprising that the Appellate Body made any 
reference to the legal strategy of a sovereign State in other legal proceedings. The lack of judicial 
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deference afforded by the Appellate Body to the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal proceedings in Brazil — 
Retreaded Tyres is of particular interest in light of the rising number of dispute settlement mechanisms 
that oversee trade obligations both in RTAs and outside of the WTO regime in MEAs. This case will be 
discussed further throughout the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
IV CONCLUSION 
It is well established that there are substantial overlaps between environmental concerns and trade 
objectives. The WTO has been, and will continue to be, called upon to determine trade disputes 
involving environmental measures. As of January 2015, another environmental/trade case is currently 
before the WTO dispute resolution process — a WTO Panel has been formed at the request of 
Argentina to determine a dispute regarding anti-dumping measures imposed by the EU on biodiesel 
from Argentina.253 With the WTO being called upon to consider environmental objectives and the move 
to include trade provisions in what are otherwise international environmental agreements, the tension 
between these two specialised regimes will continue to build.  
Further complicating the issue is the provisions within RTAs, many of which contain their own dispute 
resolution mechanisms. As the successful completion of the Doha round of trade negations has become 
increasingly unlikely, countries are moving towards achieving trade liberalization through the 
negotiation of RTAs. Going forward, the formation of mega-RTAs, such as the TPP, could lead to further 
fragmentation, particularly since these RTAs often include provisions relating to both trade and 
environment. Not only is international law fragmented into the two specialised areas of environmental 
law and trade law, but, as demonstrated by the WTO’s treatment of the MERCOSUR RTA in the Brazil 
— Retreaded Tyres case, there is increasing fragmentation within these two specialised areas. The 
scope for conflicts of jurisdiction between disputes involving provisions in MEAs, the WTO and RTAs is 
increasing over time. This potential conflict between different jurisdictions will be analysed in the next 
two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION — 
DO LEGAL PRINCIPLES ASSIST? 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis demonstrated the complex web of agreements and cross-over between 
international environmental law and international trade law, and the broader phenomenon of the 
fragmentation of international law. The trade in agricultural biotechnology products is one example of 
the potential for multiple dispute proceedings presenting a conflict of jurisdiction between international 
judicial institutions. This chapter will consider, in the broader context, the principles relating to conflict 
of jurisdiction to assist in the event of multiple proceedings under the different specialised regimes in 
international law. The conflict of jurisdiction principles discussed in this chapter will then be applied to 
the case study of agricultural biotechnology in chapter 5. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
With the proliferation of new forums for the resolution of international legal disputes, there is potential 
for ‘conflict of jurisdiction’ between these international judicial institutions — that is, where dispute 
settlement provisions in two or more treaties lead to 'concurrent' or 'overlapping' jurisdiction between 
different international judicial institutions involving parallel or sequential proceedings arising out of the 
same factual matrix. 
Should we consider the proliferation of international institutions to be a problem?  In analysing this 
question, it is necessary to set apart the two areas of concern: 1) the potential conflict arising out of the 
applicable law as determined by these international judicial institutions (conflict of norms); and 2) 
potential conflict of jurisdiction between international judicial institutions.  The focus of this chapter is 
the potential for jurisdictional conflict between these international judicial institutions, and how such 
conflict can be addressed to provide a degree of unity in international law.  
This chapter first considers the ‘problem’ of conflict of jurisdiction in public international law briefly 
looking at the absence of a judicial hierarchy and the doctrine of precedent. The middle section of this 
chapter considers the types of jurisdictional overlap and the complexities arising out of the engagement 
of multiple international judicial institutions. The last section of this chapter examines the legal principles 
relating to jurisdictional conflict.  
II THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION 
The potential for jurisdictional conflict in international law has grown as the number of international 
judicial institutions has increased over the past century. 
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In 1899, 28 States agreed to the creation of a Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) for the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes.1  The PCA was the first ‘standing’ dispute institution for the 
resolution of international disputes, thus constituting an important milestone for international legal 
adjudication.2  In 1922, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was established — the first 
permanent international court with general jurisdiction and the predecessor of the current International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).  From these two early institutions, the international community now has access 
to a wide range of international judicial institutions.  In his research published in 2011 on the number 
and classification of international courts and tribunals, Romano cited over 142 international bodies or 
procedures involved in international dispute resolution.3 However, Romano does not claim that his list 
of international organisations is exhaustive stating that it is ‘too vast a world’.4 In an attempt to document 
this vast labyrinth, ‘The Yearbook of International Organizations’, a database maintained by the Union 
of International Associations, lists over 66,000 international organisations.5 In chapter 2, the multiplicity 
of international judicial institutions was discussed (including a list of some of the current judicial 
institutions). The proliferation of international judicial institutions (not to mention the staggering number 
international organisations) is further complicated by the following two issues: 1) the absence of any 
judicial hierarchy between international judicial institutions; and 2) the absence of any formal doctrine 
of precedent (doctrine of stare decisis) in international law.  
A Judicial Hierarchy 
Over the past 60 years, the proliferation of international judicial bodies has occurred horizontally,6 with 
little reference or guidance as to structure, hierarchy or relations between the judicial institutions.7 
Where once the creation of the ICJ may have been considered the beginning of a stable, structured 
and successful international judicial system, the reality is that many States have not acceded to its 
jurisdiction and its case load remains light. Posner cites both an institutional hypothesis and a 
geopolitical hypothesis for the ‘decline’ of the ICJ.8 The institutional hypothesis surmises that ICJ judges 
rule in support of their home States’ interests rather than independently applying the provisions of 
international law. The geopolitical hypothesis for the decline of the ICJ asserts that judges needed to 
be more sensitive to the interests of the major powers. Thus, the first hypothesis suggests that the 
judges should have applied international law impartially, while the second suggests that the judges 
should have applied international law with greater sensitivity to political realities. The fact that these two 
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hypothesis are at odds with each other is reflective of the complex institutional arrangement that is 
‘international law’, with international judicial institutions struggling with overlapping jurisdictions, judicial 
supremacy, legal legitimacy and competing norms between international agreements.9 
There is no ‘highest’ international court or even a universal ‘appellate’ court, creating the perfect 
circumstances for ‘legal chaos’ as courts effectively operate in isolation from each other.10  However, 
as discussed in chapter 2, the hierarchical solution to the fragmentation of international law is fraught 
with problems. Attempting to organise the judicial institutions into a complex tiered structure of authority 
would be a somewhat daunting task, if not impossible. The options for an international judicial hierarchy 
is further considered in chapter 6 in relation to the potential reforms. 
In the absence of any such formal judicial hierarchy, the resolution of conflicts over jurisdiction is left to 
the provisions in the agreements between the parties, the rules and procedures of the institution itself 
and, perhaps, principles from private international law. However, as will be demonstrated in chapter 5, 
the provisions in the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements and the Cartagena Biosafety 
Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity (‘Biosafety Protocol’) do not assist in resolving a 
conflict of jurisdiction if multiple proceedings were to be commenced in under each regime relating to a 
dispute involving agricultural biotechnology. 
B Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
The doctrine of stare decisis (precedent) provides that prior judicial rulings are binding (or at least 
persuasive) on present judges when ruling on cases with similar facts. The purpose of the doctrine is 
to provide consistency and predictability between judicial rulings. The doctrine of precedent is a 
distinctive feature of common law legal systems.11 However, the use of precedent in the process of 
judicial decision-making does not form part of the civil law system.12 In international law, there is no 
formal doctrine of precedent.  In particular, Article 59 of the ICJ Statute provides that the rulings of the 
ICJ do not create binding precedents: 
The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular 
case. 
It is generally agreed that the object of Article 59 was to ensure that the ruling of the ICJ in a particular 
case did not affect the rights of States that were not a party to the dispute and also that the ruling was 
not binding on future disputes.13 However, the absence of the formal doctrine of precedent in 
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international law does not mean that previous judicial rulings are without persuasive force.  Specifically, 
the application of previous judicial rulings by the ICJ in the determination of proceedings brought before 
it is provided for in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, which states:  
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. (emphasis 
added) 
In considering the obligation on the ICJ to follow previous cases (although such rulings are not binding) 
the Honourable Mohamed Shahabuddeen listed three grounds on which the ICJ may depart from earlier 
rulings: (i) the legal rule or principle has subsequently been modified; (ii) the original decision was in 
error; or (iii) the original decision no longer reflects the requirements of the international community.14 
While it is recognised that the ICJ will, for the purposes of ensuring consistency and harmonisation, 
follow the previous rulings of the Court, the same judicial deference has not been displayed by other 
judicial institutions. An example of the complexities generated by the absence of the doctrine of 
precedent was highlighted in the decision in the Prosecutor v Tadic (‘Tadic’).15 In this case, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) departed from the 
previous ruling of the ICJ in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against 
Nicaragua (‘Nicaragua’) case.16  These conflicting judgments are discussed in more detail below. 
The doctrine of legitimate expectations in international trade law can be traced back to disputes under 
GATT 1947.17 The doctrine provides for upholding the ‘legitimate expectations’ of the WTO members 
as to the conditions and obligations of the trading rules with the objective of providing some level of 
certainty and predictability.18 The doctrine of legitimate expectations was commonly applied in the 
context of a principle of treaty interpretation.19 However, in more recent WTO disputes, the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations has been broadened to include recognition among WTO Members that earlier 
Panel and Appellate Body decisions will be taken into account where they are relevant to the dispute 
at hand.20 In United States — Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (‘US — 
Stainless Steel’), the Appellate Body commented: 
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17 See one of the first GATT cases to discuss the doctrine of legitimate expectations: Australian Subsidy on 
Ammonium Sulphate, GATT, BISD Vol. II, 188 (1952). 
18 James Cameron and Kevin R Gray, 'Principles of international law in the WTO dispute settlement body' (2001) 
50(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 248, 260. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Appellate Body Report, Japan — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R (4 October 1996). 
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It is well settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding, except with respect to resolving the 
particular dispute between the parties. This, however, does not mean that subsequent panels are free 
to disregard the legal interpretations and the ratio decidendi contained in previous Appellate Body 
reports that have been adopted by the DSB.21 
However, a slight step back from the ruling in US — Stainless Steel was taken by the WTO Panel in 
United States — Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology.22 On the issue of 
whether the doctrine of legitimate expectations creates a vertical stare decisis framework as between 
the Panels and Appellate Body, the Panel stated: 
a panel cannot simply follow the adopted report of another panel, or of the Appellate Body, without careful 
consideration of the facts and arguments made by the parties in the dispute before it. To do so would be 
to abdicate its responsibilities under Article 11. By the same token, however, neither should a panel make 
a finding different from that in an adopted earlier panel or Appellate Body report on similar facts and 
arguments without careful consideration and explanation of why a different result is warranted, and 
assuring itself that its finding does not undermine the goals of the system.23 
The responsibility of WTO Panels under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (‘DSU’) and in particular, the requirement in Article 11 for Panels to make an 
objective assessment of the matter before it, will be further discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.24  
Can there be a doctrine of precedent in the absence of a judicial hierarchy?  In applying the doctrine of 
precedent, courts are bound by the decisions of higher courts.  However, the ‘highest’ court is not bound 
to follow its own previous decisions — such decisions may be persuasive, but not binding. This is in 
keeping with the application of the doctrine of precedent by many of the highest common law courts 
that have reserved the right to depart from their previous decisions.25  Accordingly, one line of thinking 
is that the doctrine of precedent, however desirable, has no place in international law — in the absence 
of a judicial hierarchy, there can be no binding rulings on ‘lower’ courts.26 There is merit to this argument 
and thus the absence of both a judicial hierarchy and the doctrine of precedent in international law are 
intrinsically linked — together creating the potential for conflict of jurisdiction in international law. 
III TYPES OF JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT 
Jurisdictional ‘conflict’ pertains to circumstances of overlap and competition between the jurisdictions 
of different international judicial institutions. That is, potential litigants have the option of bringing the 
                                                     
21 Appellate Body Report, United States — Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, 
WT/DS344/AB/R (30 April 2008) [158]. 
22 Panel Report, United States — Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/R (1 
October 2008). 
23 Ibid [7.180]. 
24 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 2 (Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes) (‘DSU’). 
25 Haazen, above n 11, 590. 
26 Ibid 589. 
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same factual dispute before multiple judicial forums. Broadly speaking, for two proceedings to be 
‘competing’, they must involve both the same parties and the same factual matrix.27 Given the 
complexities of international legal disputes, this doctoral thesis considers conflicting jurisdiction in 
disputes between two States (excluding mixed state/non-state disputes) concerning a single situation 
that falls within the scope of the dispute settlement provisions of two or more treaties to which the 
disputing States are bound. Accordingly, the areas of potential jurisdictional conflict between 
international institutions can be divided into three broad sub-groups:  
1. Complete overlapping jurisdiction: proceedings commenced before two different international 
judicial institutions both mandated to apply general international law. 
2. Partial overlapping jurisdiction: proceedings commenced before two different international 
judicial institutions where the jurisdiction only overlaps in part — for example an international 
institution applying general international law and another international judicial institution 
mandated to apply the provisions of a specialised agreement.  
3. Indirect overlapping jurisdiction: proceedings commenced before two different international 
judicial institutions mandated to apply the provisions of two different specialised agreements 
relating to the same subject matter and parties in dispute. As the power of the international 
judicial institution is derived from the relevant agreement, the jurisdictional mandate of the two 
institutions is limited to the provisions of the agreement.  
These three ‘categories’ are by necessity, generalised. Some jurisdictional conflicts may not fit squarely 
into any of these categories due to complications such as: multi-party disputes; challenges to the validity 
of one or more of the treaties relied upon for jurisdiction; disputes involving an overlap between 
international, regional and/or national judicial bodies; competing dispute mechanisms between ‘judicial’ 
institutions and alternative dispute resolution protocols such as compulsory mediation or conciliation; 
and where two or more (conflicting) specialised legal instruments confer jurisdiction on a single 
international judicial body.  
A Complete Overlapping Jurisdiction 
The two permanent international institutions vested with universal/general-subject matter jurisdiction to 
review disputes involving States are the ICJ and the PCA. There have been no cases involving 
jurisdictional conflict between these institutions.  
Ad hoc arbitral tribunals can also be vested with general jurisdiction to determine disputes between 
States (although such proceedings are often commenced by parties pursuant to a compromissory 
clause).28 Multiple proceedings have taken place before the ICJ and arbitration tribunals; in many cases 
                                                     
27 Complexities arising out of divergences in judgments between different international tribunals involving the 
interpretation of the same (or broadly similar) international legal provisions (where the parties to the proceedings 
are different) will be briefly discussed later in this Chapter. 
28 Compromissory clauses are specific clauses in an agreement whereby a State undertakes in advance to accept 
the jurisdiction of a judicial institution for the resolution of a dispute with another State arising out of that agreement. 
The ICJ website states that over 300 international agreements contain compromissory clauses: International Court 
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the proceedings before the ICJ have been brought in an attempt to challenge the proceedings of the 
arbitral tribunal.29 In these circumstances, the principle of res judicata may apply — a bar against 
subsequent proceedings between the parties involving the same factual matrix after the first 
proceedings have been finalised.  The doctrine of res judicata is discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
In the context of parallel proceedings before two general-subject matter international judicial institutions, 
both judicial institutions arguably have competent authority to determine the dispute.   As both 
international judicial institutions are equally vested with jurisdiction to determine disputes involving 
‘general’ international law, principles such as lex specialis (the more specific treaty prevails over a 
general treaty) and lex posterior (the later treaty prevails over the earlier treaty) do not apply to assist 
with resolving the overlapping jurisdiction. In the absence of any other specific agreement between the 
parties (such as an ‘exclusive forum’ clause in the relevant agreements),  the question then turns to 
whether an international judicial institution with valid jurisdiction should decline to exercise its jurisdiction 
in favour of another judicial institution.30 
B Partial Overlapping Jurisdiction 
This second category of jurisdictional conflict incorporates a large number of international judicial bodies 
that could potentially compete with the general subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICJ or the PCA, 
including: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS); the dispute settlement mechanism 
of the WTO; the International Criminal Court (ICC); the UN human rights bodies; the World Bank 
Inspection Panel; specialised regional bodies (e.g. European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the dispute 
settlement mechanisms under North American Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’)31 and the Treaty 
Establishing a Common Market (Asunción Treaty) between the Argentine Republic, the Federal 
Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay — Common Market 
of the South (MERCOSUR)32); and regional human rights bodies (e.g. European Court of Human Rights 
(‘EurCtHR’)).  
Disputes involving partial overlapping jurisdictions have arisen particularly in regards to disputes 
involving the law of the sea.  This specialised area of the law, which traditionally fell within the purview 
of the ICJ, is now also subject to the provisions of the specialised legal regime created under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’) and its tribunal the ITLOS (as well as the 
                                                     
of Justice, Practical Information - Frequently Asked Questions <http://www.icj-
cij.org/information/index.php?p1=7&p2=2>. 
29 Shany, above n 7, 30. 
30 Vaughan Lowe, 'Overlapping Jurisdiction in International Tribunals' (1999) 20 Australian Yearbook of 
International Law 191, 196. 
31 North American Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature 17 December 1992 (1993) 32 ILM 605 (entered 
into force 1 January 1994) (‘NAFTA’).  
32 Treaty Establishing a Common Market (Asunción Treaty) between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic 
of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, opened for signature 26 March 1991, 
2140 UNTS 319 (entered into force 29 November 1991).  See also the Olivos Protocol for the Settlement of 
Disputes in Mercosur, opened for signature 18 February 2002, 42 ILM 2 (entered into force on 10 February 2004) 
(‘Olivos Protocol’). 
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UNCLOS arbitral tribunals).33  The creation of the ITLOS was not without controversy. His Honour 
Shigeru Oda (subsequently elected to the bench of the ICJ) wrote the following on the creation of the 
ITLOS: 
The creation of a court of judicature in parallel with the International Court of Justice, which has been in 
existence for many years as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, will prove to have been a 
great mistake. One should not lose sight of the fact that the law of the sea always has been, and always 
will be, an integral part of international law as a whole. The law of the sea must be interpreted in the light 
of the uniform development of jurisprudence within the international community and must not be dealt with 
in a fragmentary manner. ... If the development of the law of the sea were to be separated from the general 
rules of international law and placed under the jurisdiction of a separate judicial authority, this could lead 
to the destruction of the very foundation of international law.34  
An example of partial overlapping jurisdiction involving proceedings before both general and specific 
judicial institutions occurred in the cases relating to the French nuclear testing program in the South 
Pacific in 1995.  ICJ proceedings were commenced by New Zealand against France in 1995.35  
Simultaneously, proceedings were also commenced against France in the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (UNHRC), and the European Commission of Human Rights (‘EurCommHR’).36 In 
addition, proceedings were brought in the ECJ by a different set of claimants against the European 
Union (EU) in the case Danielsson v European Communities,37 in which it was argued that the EU 
‘assent’ to the French Nuclear Testing Program was in violation of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community.38 All of these cases related to the same factual situation, although 
proceedings were commenced by different claimants in different international judicial institutions. 
In theory, disputes that fall within the purview of these specialised international judicial bodies could 
also be referred for settlement under the ICJ or to arbitration. However, the competing jurisdiction 
between a specialised international judicial institution and a general law institution such as the ICJ 
depends on the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the latter by the parties involved in the 
dispute. As only a small number of States have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ 
(particularly without any ‘reservations’), the number of cases where both ‘competing’ international 
judicial bodies have jurisdiction is limited.39  It is unlikely that parties will consent to the jurisdiction of 
the ICJ, the PCA or an arbitral panel if they prefer the case to be determined by a specialised judicial 
institution. 
                                                     
33 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 
(entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘UNCLOS’). 
34 Shigeru Oda, 'Dispute Settlement Prospects in the Law of the Sea' (1995) 44(4) The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 863, 864. 
35 Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France) (Order) [1995] ICJ Rep 288. 
36 Tauira v France (1995) 83 Eur Comm HR 112; Bordes v France (Admissibility, Communication No 645/1995) 
(UN Human Rights Committee) (UN Doc CCPR/C/57/D/645/1995) (22 July 1996) 4 IHRR 284. 
37 Danielsson, Largenteau and Haoa v Commission of the European Communities, (T-219/95R) [1995] ECR II-
3051. 
38 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, opened for signature 25 March 1957, 298 UNTS 
167 (entered into force 1 January 1958). 
39 Shany, above n 7, 34. 
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C Indirect Overlapping Jurisdiction  
Indirect overlapping jurisdiction occurs when claims are commenced before two different ‘specialised’ 
judicial institutions pursuant to the provisions of specialised international agreements and such claims 
involve the same parties and the same factual matrix. The crossover between the environment and 
trade law regimes has been used as a common example of this third category of jurisdictional conflict.  
In this example, the claim for breach of international environmental law is brought before the relevant 
international judicial body under the international environmental law agreement and the separate trade 
law proceedings are commenced in the WTO. Strictly, there would be no jurisdictional conflict in this 
factual scenario as each judicial institution would be mandated to determine clearly defined issues 
involving different questions of law. However, with the cross-over of regimes, specifically the inclusion 
of trade-related environmental measures (TREMs) in what are otherwise international environmental 
agreements, the dichotomy between specialised areas of law has been blurred. It is noted that with 
regard to agricultural biotechnology, the Biosafety Protocol provides for a dispute between the parties 
to be submitted to arbitration or the ICJ.40 In this case, the ICJ would be determining the dispute 
pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred to it under the multilateral environmental agreement (MEA), thus 
the provisions of a ‘specialised’ treaty. This will be discussed further in chapter 5, when the principles 
of jurisdictional conflict are applied to the case study of agricultural biotechnology. 
An example of indirect overlapping jurisdiction occurred in the dispute between Chile and the EU 
involving swordfish. The background on this dispute was discussed in chapter 3 (in the boxed case 
study). In this dispute, the EU commenced dispute proceedings in the WTO against Chile for 
infringement of the WTO agreements.41 Simultaneously, Chile brought proceedings before the ITLOS 
against the EU for breach of UNCLOS.42 Accordingly, two different international judicial institutions (from 
two specialised regimes in international law) were simultaneously engaged involving the same factual 
dispute and the same parties. A negotiated settlement was reached between Chile and the EU before 
the issue of overlapping jurisdiction from these parallel proceedings before the ITLOS and the WTO 
could be judicially considered.  
The complexities arising from the engagement of multiple judicial institutions will now be considered. 
                                                     
40 By virtue of Article 32 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened 
for signature 29 January 2000, 2226 UNTS 208 (entered into force 11 September 2003) (‘Biosafety Protocol’, the 
dispute resolution provisions in Article 27 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 
1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993) (‘Convention on Biological Diversity’) are adopted. 
41 A WTO panel was formed in December 2000: Chile — Measures Affecting the Transit and Importing of Swordfish 
— Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, WT/DS193 (19 April 2000). 
42 Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern 
Pacific Ocean (Chile v European Community) (Constitution of Chamber, Order 2000/3) (International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea, 20 December 2000). 
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IV CONFLICT AND COMPLEXITIES: ENGAGEMENT OF 
MULTIPLE JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 
We are entering a new era of ‘multiple institution engagement’, where proceedings could be 
commenced before different judicial institutions involving different issues arising out of the same factual 
situation.43 This raises the interesting question of whether an international judicial institution, upon 
establishing its own jurisdiction to hear the dispute, needs to be concerned about the existence of 
possible other sources of jurisdiction conferred on a different judicial institution. Alternatively, does each 
international judicial institution operate in isolation from each other and, if so, what are the 
consequences of this approach?  This section will briefly explore these questions. 
One approach in the circumstances of multiple institution engagement, is to require the judicial 
institution to consider whether its own jurisdiction has been modified through the provisions of the other 
treaty that bestows concurrent jurisdiction on another tribunal.44  The premise is that as ‘the parties are 
masters of the situation and they are free to modify one treaty by a later one’,45 the resolution of the 
apparently conflicting provisions is a matter of the legal interpretation of the priorities between the two 
treaties. This approach of ‘treaty interpretation’ could be used to clarify jurisdictional conflict in the 
situation of partial overlapping jurisdiction involving a general treaty and a specialised treaty, as 
consideration could turn on, for example, which treaty is more ‘specialised’. However, it does not provide 
clarification where the dual proceedings both involve either broad-scoped international treaties or both 
involve specialised treaties, as the later treaty has not necessarily ‘modified’ the earlier treaty. The 
problems associated with using tools for treaty interpretation as a solution to conflict of jurisdiction is 
further explored later in this chapter.  
A second consideration is whether the mere existence of other relevant legal proceedings should impact 
on the decision to proceed with the determination of the case at hand.  In the case between the United 
States and Mexico, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the 
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law (‘Information on Consular Assistance’), 46 the jurisdiction of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights was challenged on the grounds of existing proceedings before 
the ICJ on the same legal provisions (albeit, different claimants). The issues before the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in the Information on Consular Assistance case involved the interpretation of 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations on the powers of consular officials of one 
State to communicate with and assist nationals that have been detained or arrested in another State.47 
                                                     
43 Suzannah Linton and Firew K Tiba, 'The International Judge in an Age of Multiple International Courts and 
Tribunals' (2008) 9 Chicago Journal of International Law 407, 427. 
44 Lowe, above n 30, 194. 
45 Arnold Duncan McNair, The Law of Treaties (Clarendon House Press, 1961), 219. 
46 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law 
(Requested By The United Mexican States) (Advisory Opinion OC-16/99) (1999)) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Series A No.16 (‘Information on Consular Assistance’). 
47 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature 24 April 1963, 596 UNTS 261 (entered into 
force 19 March 1967). 
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The interpretation of this same Article 36 was concurrently before the ICJ in the LaGrand case,48 and 
separately in another contested case brought by Paraguay against the United States in the ICJ.49 In its 
submissions to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the United States argued that the Court 
should refrain from delivering an Advisory Opinion in the Information on Consular Assistance case light 
of the ICJ proceedings, given that the issues in both cases were similar: 
an advisory opinion would create confusion, be detrimental to the legal positions of the parties and could 
create the risk of inconsistency between the findings of the Inter-American Court and those of the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations. Moreover, the Inter-American Court’s interpretation of a treaty to 
which a vast number of States outside the hemisphere are party could create problems elsewhere in the 
world.50  
In considering whether the existence of a contentious case pending in another international judicial 
institution was a factor in declining a request for an advisory opinion, the Court held that: 
However, this Court cannot be restrained from exercising its advisory jurisdiction because of contentious 
cases filed with the International Court of Justice.  It is important to recall that under its Statute, this Court 
is an autonomous judicial institution.51 
This finding is consistent with an earlier Advisory Opinion given by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in 1982 in the "Other Treaties” Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court case which found:  
the possibility of conflicting interpretations is a phenomenon common to all those legal systems that have 
certain courts which are not hierarchically integrated. Such courts have jurisdiction to apply and, 
consequently, interpret the same body of law. Here it is, therefore, not unusual to find that on certain 
occasions courts reach conflicting or at the very least different conclusions in interpreting the same rule 
of law. On the international law plane, for example, because the advisory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice extends to any legal question, the UN Security Council or the General Assembly might 
ask the International Court to render an advisory opinion concerning a treaty which, without any doubt, 
could also be interpreted by this Court.52 
The rulings in these two cases readily acknowledge the potential for competing judgments.  However, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights did not view this as a limitation on its jurisdiction.  In support 
of this position is the fact that the principle of stare decisis has not been accepted in international law.  
Therefore, judicial rulings do not have a binding effect on future proceedings.53  On the potential for 
conflicting judgments, the Hon Thomas Buergenthal commented: 
                                                     
48 For the judgment in this case see: LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 
466. 
49 The ICJ case by Paraguay against the US was discontinued prior to the delivery of the Advisory Opinion by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
50 Information on Consular Assistance (1999)) Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series A No.16 [27]. 
51 Ibid [67]. 
52 "Other Treaties” Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court (Advisory Opinion OC-1/82) (1982) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Series A No. 1, para 50. 
53 See Article 59 of the Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945 (1945) 1 UNTS XVI 
(entered into force 24 October 1945) Annex: Statute of the International Court of Justice (‘Statute of the 
International Court of Justice’); Shany, above n 7, 25. 
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I do not see the likelihood of these conflicts as major risks, at this time, to the unity of the international 
legal system, provided the various tribunals stay within their respective spheres of competence, apply 
traditional international legal reasoning, show judicial restraint by seeking to avoid unnecessary conflicts, 
and remain open to reconsider their prior legal pronouncements in order to take account of the case-law 
of other international courts.54  
His Honour then went on to propose that any major risks to the ‘unity of international law’ from these 
conflicting judgments can be overcome as long as these international institutions (in this case, the Inter-
American Court) adopt a policy of ‘judicial deference’ with regard to the interpretation of universal 
treaties by the ICJ.55  That is, where a decision of an international judicial institution relating to the 
provisions of a universal treaty is rendered in conflict with a subsequent decision of the ICJ, the 
international judicial institution would need to reconsider its position in any subsequent judgment to be 
in line with the ICJ.  His Honour did note that judicial deference is not a ‘one-way street’, and that the 
ICJ will have to reconsider or modify some of its rulings to avoid conflict with determinations of regional 
or specialised tribunals within their primary jurisdiction.56  While this provides a neat theoretical solution, 
its practical application is less certain.  This played out in the conflicting decisions given by the ICJ in 
the Nicaragua case and the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic case. 
In the Tadic case,57 the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY delivered a divergent judgment from the ruling 
of the ICJ in the previous Nicaragua case.58 The Tadic case concerned the legal attribution of 
responsibility to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) for acts committed by the Bosnian Serb Army 
in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina that were contrary to international criminal law.   
Looking first at the ruling of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ applied a test of ‘dependency and 
control’ in determining whether the actions of the Contras rebels (a rebel group fighting to overthrow 
the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua) could be equated, for legal purposes, as an organ of the 
United States, or to establish that they were acting on behalf of the US Government.59 The ICJ held in 
the Nicaragua case that in the absence of satisfaction of the ‘dependency and control’ test, it must be 
demonstrated that there was ‘effective control’ with respect to the specific operation ‘in the course of 
which the alleged violations were committed’.60 
In Tadic, the ICTY departed from the tests developed by the ICJ in Nicaragua, finding the ruling by the 
ICJ to be unpersuasive, not consonant with the logic of the law of State Responsibility and at ‘variance 
with international judicial and State practice’ where a lower degree of control than that demanded by 
the Nicaragua test has been applied.61 The ICTY held the view that under international rules, the ‘degree 
                                                     
54 Thomas Buergenthal, 'Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or Bad?' (2001) 14(02) 
Leiden Journal of International Law 267, 273. 
55 Ibid 273. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Tadic (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 July 
1999). 
58 Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid [115]. 
61 Tadic (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 July 
1999), [116] — [124]. In support of this statement, the Appeal Chamber cites the cases United States v. Mexico 
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of control’ test for determining whether the State is held responsible for the actions of the subject(s) in 
question differs depending on whether the facts concern the actions of private individuals or the actions 
of an armed group.62 Specifically, the ICTY stated: 
In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a State, it must be proved that the State 
wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and financing the group, but also by 
coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military activity. Only then can the State be held 
internationally accountable for any misconduct of the group. However, it is not necessary that, in addition, 
the State should also issue, either to the head or to members of the group, instructions for the commission 
of specific acts contrary to international law. ... Where the question at issue is whether a single private 
individual or a group that is not militarily organised has acted as a de facto State organ when performing 
a specific act, it is necessary to ascertain whether specific instructions concerning the commission of that 
particular act had been issued by that State to the individual or group in question; alternatively, it must be 
established whether the unlawful act had been publicly endorsed or approved ex post facto by the State 
at issue.63 
The divergent rulings in Nicaragua by the ICJ and Tadic by the ICTY have been further complicated by 
the recent ICJ decision in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro).64  In 
this case the ICJ considered the ruling of the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY in Tadic and rejected it on 
two grounds. First, the ICJ held that the test enunciated by the ICTY on state responsibility arose from 
issues concerning ‘general international law which do not lie within the specific purview of its [the ICTY] 
jurisdiction and, moreover, the resolution of which is not always necessary for deciding the criminal 
cases before it’.65  Second, the ICJ distinguished the claims in the proceedings before it from the specific 
legal issues that were the subject of the appeal in Tadic before the ICTY; therefore the ICJ held that the 
ruling of the ICTY was unpersuasive.66  
While these cases are not examples of conflicting jurisdictions per se, they demonstrate the difficulties 
that arise when proceedings involving broadly the same factual matrix (albeit different parties) and 
essentially the same legal issues are determined in different international judicial institutions.67 The 
proliferation of such international judicial institutions increases the possibility of conflicting judgments 
                                                     
(Stephens Case), Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. IV, pp. 266-267; Kenneth P. Yeager v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports, 1987, vol. IV, p. 92; Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), Eur. Court 
of H. R., Judgement of 18 December 1996 (40/1993/435/514. 
62 Tadic (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 July 
1999 [137]. 
63 Tadic (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 July 
1999), [131] — [137]. 
64Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 43. 
65 Tadic (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 July 
1999), [403]. 
66 Ibid [405] — [406]. 
67 The competing decisions in the cases of Vermeulen v Belgium [1996] I Eur Court HR 224 and Emesa Sugar 
(Free Zone) NV v Aruba (C-17/98) [2000] ECR I-675 are another example of how two international judicial 
institutions, in this case the European Court of Human Rights and ECJ can reach alternate holdings on similar 
issues. 
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— that two judicial institutions will ‘hold differently on the same subject matter’.68 It is for this reason that 
dual legal proceedings involving the same parties and same factual matrix are of concern. This is 
pertinent to the cross-over between international trade and international environmental law and will be 
considered in more detail in chapter 5 in relation to the case study of agricultural biotechnology.  
The next section of this chapter considers the broad legal principles that are available to address the 
conflict of jurisdiction between international judicial institutions. 
V LEGAL PRINCIPLES RESOLVING CONFLICT OF 
JURISDICTION 
As the potential for jurisdictional conflict in public international law is real and potentially problematic, 
this section turns to consider the legal principles relevant to address such conflicts. This section has 
been divided into two parts: (1) exclusive jurisdiction provisions (norms contained in treaties); and (2) 
private international law principles (norms not derived from treaties). 
A Exclusive Jurisdiction Provisions in Treaties 
As previously discussed, a number of the recent ‘specialist’ treaties include provisions specifying a 
menu of dispute resolution avenues open to the parties in dispute. These dispute resolution provisions 
in international agreements serve to establish the jurisdictional competence of the relevant international 
judicial institution established to resolve the dispute. For example, under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (‘CBD’),69 parties can make Declarations in writing to the Depositary that it accepts the 
compulsory dispute resolution settlement by arbitration or by determination by the ICJ.70 To date, 
Austria, Georgia and Latvia have made Declarations accepting both the ICJ and arbitration as means 
of compulsory dispute settlement under the CBD.  In comparison, Cuba has made a Declaration that 
disputes between CBD Parties shall be settled by negotiation through the diplomatic channel or, failing 
that, by arbitration.71 In another example, for disputes involving obligations in UNCLOS, Parties can 
give advance notification for resolution of any disputes under the Convention by any of the tribunals 
specified in Part XV of UNCLOS.72  For example, Australia, Italy, Belgium, Finland, and Oman have 
nominated both the ICJ and the ITLOS (in no order of preference). A different approach was taken by 
Austria, Chile, Argentina and Germany that filed Declarations setting out a specific order of preference 
                                                     
68 Pemmaraju Sreenivasa  Rao, 'Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of 
International Law or Its Fragmentation' (2003) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 929, 931. 
69 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 
December 1993) (‘CBD’). 
70 Ibid Article 27. 
71 The list of declarations made under the CBD can be found in the United Nations Treaty Collection: 
<http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-8&chapter=27&lang=en> 
72 The full list of declarations under the UNCLOS can be found at United Nations — Department of the Oceans and 
Laws of the Sea: Declarations made upon signature, ratification, accession or succession or anytime thereafter 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm>. 
127  
 
for resolution of disputes by the available judicial institutions. For example, Austria chooses the following 
means for the settlement of disputes, in this particular order: 
1. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI; 
2. A special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII; 
3. The International Court of Justice.73 
 This can be compared to Algeria which has declared that it is not bound to the submission of disputes 
to the ICJ. Then there is Angola that only accepts the ITLOS as the forum for dispute resolution. For 
any legal claim involving a jurisdictional challenge, consideration of the dispute resolution provisions in 
the relevant agreement as between the parties should be the first port of call.  However, for the most 
part, these dispute resolution provisions in treaties will merely set out the options available to the parties 
for the resolution of the disputes that fall under that agreement. They do not touch upon conflict of 
jurisdiction with other judicial institutions formed pursuant to other international agreements. It is then 
necessary to look at whether there are any other provisions in the agreements between the parties that 
consider the issue of jurisdictional conflict.  
There are broadly three types of ‘jurisdiction’ clauses that can be found in treaties:  
- Exclusive jurisdiction clauses: Confers jurisdiction on a particular judicial institution to determine 
a special set of disputes, to the exclusion of all other judicial institutions.  
- Excluding jurisdiction clauses:  Negates the jurisdiction of a judicial institution if proceedings 
have been commenced elsewhere.  
- Choice of Forum clauses:  Provides for the choice of forum for disputes, but once selected, that 
forum becomes the exclusive judicial institution for the resolution of the dispute between the 
parties. 
1 Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses 
In some instances, forum selection has been controlled by exclusive jurisdiction clauses contained in 
the agreements between the parties. The premier example of an exclusive jurisdiction clause is found 
in Article 344 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of The European Union 
relating to the jurisdiction of the ECJ.74 This article confers exclusive jurisdiction on the ECJ to determine 
disputes: 
Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein. 
As discussed in chapter 1, in the MOX Plant dispute the ECJ confirmed that this provision conferred 
exclusive jurisdiction on the ECJ to determine disputes between EU members involving questions of 
                                                     
73 Ibid. 
74 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47 (entered into 
force 26 October 2012). 
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EU law.75 In this case, Ireland was found to have breached the exclusive jurisdiction clause in Article 
344 in commencing proceedings against the UK (involving questions of EU law) in a judicial institution 
other than the ECJ, namely pursuant to UNCLOS.  Pursuant to the ruling of the ECJ, this exclusive 
jurisdiction clause purports to curtail the otherwise valid jurisdiction of other judicial institutions where 
the dispute involves EU Members and EU law, regardless of the rights of the parties under the non-EU 
agreement to litigate. 
This leads us into the complex situation when two proceedings are commenced in two different judicial 
institutions, both of which have ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction clauses. In the MOX Plant dispute, the 
‘showdown’ was avoided by the decision of the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal to stay the proceedings before 
it, and then ultimately, at Ireland’s request, to dismiss the proceedings. In the event that both judicial 
institutions maintain their exclusive jurisdiction, how the two competing exclusive jurisdiction clauses 
would operate together and which forum would prevail, is unknown. This issue is explored further in 
chapter 5 in relation to the characterisation of Article 23.1 of the DSU as an exclusive jurisdiction clause. 
This potential issue of the clash between multiple exclusive jurisdiction clauses was recognised by the 
legal scholar Lowe in his writings in 1999. Lowe contended that the interplay of two exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses would be the result of an oversight, and the expectation would be that the later treaty would 
have dealt with this potential conflict in its provisions.76 However, since Lowe’s article in 1999, there is 
no evidence of the inclusion in MEAs of even general provisions addressing the potential for conflict of 
jurisdiction, whether between exclusive or non-exclusive competing forums. MEAs have been silent on 
this issue, including the Biosafety Protocol, which is examined in more detail in chapter 5. It is 
recognised that the more likely conflict situation will be between one forum that has an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause and another forum that does not purport to exclude jurisdiction of other judicial 
institutions.  In these cases, the matter would turn on whether principles of jurisdictional conflict (or any 
other provisions in the agreements) would apply to resolve the overlapping jurisdiction.  This is 
discussed in the next part of this chapter. 
2 Excluding Jurisdiction Clauses 
A slightly different type of jurisdiction clause is one that negates the jurisdiction of the relevant 
international judicial institution upon the occurrence of a set event. An example is found in Article 14 of 
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (‘NAAEC’),77 which has codified a 
restriction on the jurisdiction of the Secretariat of the Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) 
in the event of other parallel proceedings.  Relevantly, Article 14(3)(a) of the NAAEC provides: 
The Party shall advise the Secretariat within 30 days or, in exceptional circumstances and on notification 
to the Secretariat, within 60 days of delivery of the request: 
                                                     
75 Commission of the European Communities v Ireland (C-459/03) [2006] ECR I-4635.  See the case study box in 
Chapter 1 for the discussion of this dispute. 
76 Lowe, above n 30, 194. 
77 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, opened for signature 14 September 1993, 32 ILM 
1482 (entered into force 1 January 1994). 
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(a)    whether the matter is the subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding, in which case 
the Secretariat shall proceed no further; 
In the case of Methanex Corp v United States,78 proceedings were brought by a private gas company 
against the US under the dispute provisions in Chapter 11 of NAFTA and simultaneously under Article 
14 of the NAAEC.  The CEC determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute pursuant to 
the principle found in Article 14(3)(a) of the NAAEC.  Accordingly, Article 14 of the NAEEC operated to 
deny jurisdiction to the CEC Secretariat, rather than the traditional ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction clauses which 
convey jurisdiction onto an institution to the exclusion of other institutions. 
A similar provision can also be found in the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.79  Article 5(2)(a) of the Optional Protocol restricts the ability of the UNHRC from 
considering any complaint from an individual unless it has ascertained that: 
(a) The same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation 
or settlement.80  
Due to the wording of this provision, it only restricts parallel proceedings currently pending before other 
institutions. To address this issue, a number of States have adopted a reservation to the Optional 
Protocol to prohibit parties from bringing subsequent proceedings to the HRC, where the dispute 
between the parties had been examined by another international investigative or dispute settlement 
body. This course of action was recommended by the Committee of Experts Report to the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe.81  
An interesting jurisdiction provision is found in Article 281(1) in Part XV of UNCLOS, which states: 
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the 
procedures provided for in this Part apply only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such 
means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any further procedure.82 
The operation of Article 281(1) as a limitation to the jurisdiction of the dispute resolution institutions of 
UNCLOS was considered in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case. This case is particularly interesting as the 
parties had a choice of three international dispute forums for resolving the dispute: an ad hoc arbitral 
tribunal constituted under Article 16 of the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
(‘CCSBT’);83 the ICJ; or the dispute settlement procedures of the UNCLOS.   
                                                     
78 Methanex Corp v United States (CEC Secretariat, Doc A14/SEM/00-001/06/14(3) 30 June 2000). 
79 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976). 
80 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
81 Committee of Experts Report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 'Problems arising from the 
co-existence of the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights' 
(29 February 1998) , 7-11. 
82 UNCLOS, Article 281(1). 
83 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, opened for signature 10 May 1993, 1819 UNTS 359 
(entered into force 20 May 1994). 
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Case Study: Southern Bluefin Tuna case 
In 1993, Australia, Japan and New Zealand concluded the CCSBT to govern the fishing of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna (SBT) after serious depletion of the stock.84 In 1998, Japan announced that while it 
would voluntarily adhere to its previous quota for commercial SBT fishing (pursuant to the quotas 
set by the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna established under the 
CCSBT), it would commence a unilateral, three-year Experimental Fishing Program (EFP) as of the 
summer of 1998. Australia and New Zealand expressed concern about the capacity of the SBT 
stock to bear any extra fishing, even for research purposes and under controlled circumstances. 
The negotiations between the three nations reached a stalemate as any decision on catch 
allotments under the CCSBT required a unanimous vote of the three parties (Article 7 of the 
CCSBT).  Despite protests from both Australia and New Zealand, Japan commenced its pilot EFP 
as planned in 1998, with an estimated catch of 1,464 tonnes (outside of its separate commercial 
quota).85  
In response, Australia and New Zealand, requested the establishment of an arbitral tribunal under 
UNCLOS to resolve the dispute. Japan raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the UNCLOS arbitral 
tribunal on a number of grounds, including, relevantly, that jurisdiction was relinquished over the 
dispute by virtue of Article 281(1) as, in negotiating the CCSBT, the parties had agreed to resolve 
disputes relating to southern bluefin tuna pursuant to the dispute resolution provisions in the CCSBT 
and that Article 16 of the CCSBT excluded other procedures.  Article 16(1) of the CCSBT provides 
as follows: 
          1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Parties concerning the interpretation or 
implementation of this Convention, those Parties shall consult among themselves with a view to 
having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
           2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent in each case of all parties to the 
dispute, be referred for settlement to the International Court of Justice or to arbitration; but failure to 
reach agreement on reference to the International Court of Justice or to arbitration shall not absolve 
                                                     
84 In May 1994, the Commission established by the 1993 Convention set a total allowable catch at 11,750 tons, 
with the national allocations among Japan, Australia and New Zealand: see Southern Bluefin Tuna (Australia v 
Japan) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (2000) 39 ILM 1359 (‘Southern Bluefin Tuna’), [24]. 
85 Ibid [25]. 
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parties to the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various 
peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 above. 
           3. In cases where the dispute is referred to arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal shall be constituted as 
provided in the Annex to this Convention. The Annex forms an integral part of this Convention. 
In considering Japan’s objection to its jurisdiction to determine the dispute, the UNCLOS arbitral 
tribunal stated: 
               … it is a commonplace of international law and State practice for more than one treaty to bear upon 
a particular dispute … There is frequently a parallelism of treaties … The universal range of 
international legal obligations benefits from a process of accretion and accumulation.86 
The UNCLOS arbitral tribunal then concluded that while the dispute centred on the provisions of 
the 1993 CCSBT, it also involved obligations under UNCLOS: 
                It does so because the Parties to this dispute — the real terms of which have been defined above 
— are the same Parties grappling not with two separate disputes but with what in fact is a single 
dispute arising under both Conventions. To find that, in this case, there is a dispute actually arising 
under UNCLOS which is distinct from the dispute that arose under the CCSBT would be artificial.87 
Pursuant to Article 281(1), the events that trigger the negation of UNCLOS jurisdiction are: (1) the 
parties elect to settle the dispute by peaceful means; (2) those means for settling the dispute have 
not been exhausted; and (3) the relevant agreement between the parties contains a provision 
excluding other dispute settlement proceedings.  
Article 281(1) refers to an agreement between the parties to resolve a dispute, once arisen, by peaceful 
means. Australia and New Zealand contested that such an agreement for peaceful settlement by the 
parties needed to relate to the resolution of a dispute involving the rights and obligations under 
UNCLOS.  Australia and New Zealand contested that Article 16 of the CCSBT was not an agreement 
covering disputes concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, but rather an agreement for 
the resolution of disputes arising under the CCSBT.88 Also, that Article 16 of the CCSBT did not exclude 
further recourse to Part XV of UNCLOS — a requirement to trigger Article 281(1) — but was merely a 
list of ‘menu options’ available to the parties.89 In considering the dispute settlement provisions in Article 
16 of the CCSBT, the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal held that the intention of the parties was to exclude 
binding dispute settlement procedures outside the framework of the CCSBT.  Further, that the parties 
had not exhausted the obligations in the CCSBT for the resolution of the dispute by ‘peaceful means of 
their own choice’.90 In so reaching this conclusion, the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal found that it had no 
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case pursuant to the ‘exclusion’ provisions in Article 281(1) of 
UNCLOS. 
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88 Ibid [41]. See specifically submission (i) on page 76. 
89 Ibid [41]. See specifically submission (i) on page 76. 
90 Ibid [55]. 
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The finding by the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case received criticism from 
international legal scholars — both in regards to the interpretation given to Article 16 of the CCSBT and 
the uncertainty created about the competency of the UNCLOS regime as a compulsory and binding 
dispute settlement forum.91 Article 281(1) of UNCLOS becomes an ‘excluding jurisdiction’ clause by 
virtue of the interpretation of the provisions in the other relevant agreement, in this case it was Article 
16 of the CCSBT. However, Article 16 reflects the general ‘options’ for dispute resolution found in many 
MEAs which contain the dispute resolution avenues set out in Article 33 of the UN Charter. These 
clauses are more naturally categorised as an ‘agreement to agree’ to dispute resolution should a dispute 
arise, rather than as actual dispute settlement procedures.92 It is concerning that these rather ‘pro forma’ 
dispute clauses were held to oust the dispute provisions of UNCLOS. While the CCSBT was brought 
into force at an earlier date than UNCLOS (which was negotiated in 1982, but did not enter into force 
until 1994), there was no evidence that both Australia and New Zealand intended to displace their rights 
and obligations under UNCLOS. In the case of Southern Bluefin Tuna, the ‘consent’ based dispute 
resolution clauses in the CCSBT was sufficient for the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal to hold itself to be 
without jurisdiction, thus denying Australia and New Zealand access to the ‘compulsory’ dispute 
resolution framework under UNCLOS and the determination of their rights and obligations under that 
Convention.93  If the reasoning in Southern Bluefin Tuna is followed in subsequent cases, then arguably 
any convention between the parties in the dispute that contains dispute resolution provisions may 
operate to limit the jurisdiction of the UNCLOS dispute settlement institutions pursuant to Article 281(1). 
Whether this ruling in Southern Bluefin Tuna will be followed in future cases is yet to be seen. While the 
findings by the Arbitral Tribunal in this case were somewhat surprising, it did result in avoiding potential 
parallel proceedings under the two international agreements.  Whether this was the ‘optimal’ outcome 
largely rests on ones view of the ‘preferred’ forum for the resolution of the dispute.   In this regard, the 
comment of a leading scholar on the ruling of the Arbitral Panel in Southern Bluefin Tuna that it lacked 
jurisdiction, is pertinent: 
Ad hoc Tribunals can make ad hoc justice. While this may be useful to preserve international peace, it is 
not necessarily beneficial to the preservation of the international legal order.94 
                                                     
91 For the debate concerning the problems that emerge as a result of the Tribunal’s preferring the dispute settlement 
provisions of the regional treaty to the provisions of Part XV UNCLOS, see:  Cesare Romano, 'The Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Dispute: Hints of a World to Come . . . Like It or Not' (2001) 32 Ocean Development & International Law 313, 
331; Shany, above n 7, 237; Jacqueline Peel, 'A Paper Umbrella Which Dissolves in the Rain? The Future for 
Resolving Fisheries Disputes under UNCLOS in the Aftermath of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration' (2002) 3 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 53.  
92 Romano, above n 91, 331. 
93 It is noted that the Arbitral Tribunal found that “‘UNCLOS falls significantly short of establishing a truly 
comprehensive regime of compulsory jurisdiction entailing binding decisions”: Southern Bluefin Tuna (2000) 39 
ILM 1359, [62]. It is outside of the scope of this research to properly contemplate the ‘compulsory’ nature of the 
dispute resolution framework under UNCLOS, however, it is proposed that UNCLOS is an overarching framework 
designed to provide binding resolutions for disputes involving the international laws of sea. 
94 Romano, above n 91, 334.   
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3 Choice of Forum Clauses 
The third type of jurisdiction clause found in treaties is the ‘choice of forum’ clause, also commonly 
referred to as a ‘fork-in-the-road’ clause.  Pursuant to such a clause, the parties to the dispute select 
the forum to commence proceedings; this forum then becomes the forum of ‘choice’ and parallel or 
subsequent proceedings before other international judicial institutions are barred.  
A choice of forum clause is found in Article 2005 of the NAFTA, which states: 
1. Subject to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, disputes regarding any matter arising under both this Agreement and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, any agreement negotiated thereunder, or any successor 
agreement (GATT), may be settled in either forum at the discretion of the complaining Party. 
2. Before a Party initiates a dispute settlement proceeding in the GATT against another Party on grounds 
that are substantially equivalent to those available to that Party under this Agreement, that Party shall 
notify any third Party of its intention. If a third Party wishes to have recourse to dispute settlement 
procedures under this Agreement regarding the matter, it shall inform promptly the notifying Party and 
those Parties shall consult with a view to agreement on a single forum. If those Parties cannot agree, the 
dispute normally shall be settled under this Agreement. 
3. In any dispute referred to in paragraph 1 where the responding Party claims that its action is subject to 
Article 104 (Relation to Environmental and Conservation Agreements) and requests in writing that the 
matter be considered under this Agreement, the complaining Party may, in respect of that matter, 
thereafter have recourse to dispute settlement procedures solely under this Agreement. 
4. In any dispute referred to in paragraph 1 that arises under Section B of Chapter Seven (Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures) or Chapter Nine (Standards-Related Measures): 
a. concerning a measure adopted or maintained by a Party to protect its human, animal or plant life or 
health, or to protect its environment, and 
b. that raises factual issues concerning the environment, health, safety or conservation, including 
directly related scientific matters,  
where the responding Party requests in writing that the matter be considered under this Agreement, the 
complaining Party may, in respect of that matter, thereafter have recourse to dispute settlement 
procedures solely under this Agreement. 
5. The responding Party shall deliver a copy of a request made pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4 to the other 
Parties and to its Section of the Secretariat. Where the complaining Party has initiated dispute settlement 
proceedings regarding any matter subject to paragraph 3 or 4, the responding Party shall deliver its 
request no later than 15 days thereafter. On receipt of such request, the complaining Party shall promptly 
withdraw from participation in those proceedings and may initiate dispute settlement procedures under 
Article 2007. 
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6. Once dispute settlement procedures have been initiated under Article 2007 or dispute settlement 
proceedings have been initiated under the GATT, the forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of the 
other, unless a Party makes a request pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4.95 
Relevantly, the effect of this choice of forum clause was raised by Mexico in the WTO dispute 
proceedings Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drink and Other Beverages (‘Mexico — Taxes on Soft 
Drinks’) case.96 This dispute was commenced by the US regarding Mexico’s tax provisions on soft 
drinks and beverages containing a sweetener other than can sugar. Mexico raised a preliminary 
question of law submitting that the WTO Panel should decline to exercise its jurisdiction and should 
refer the parties to the dispute settlement provisions under NAFTA.97 It is noted that neither Mexico nor 
the US had actually invoked the choice of forum clause in Article 2005 of NAFTA, nor had a NAFTA 
dispute panel been established. However, both the WTO Panel and the Appellate Body commented on 
Mexico’s jurisdictional challenge.  The WTO Panel held that under the DSU, it has no discretion to 
decide whether or not to exercise its jurisdiction in a case properly before it.98 On appeal, the Appellate 
Body found that WTO Panels have the right to determine the question of jurisdiction in a given case, 
but that once jurisdiction was established, the Panel does not have the authority to decline to rule on 
the dispute.99 This case is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
The limitations on the discretion of a WTO Panel to decline jurisdiction once it is prima facie established 
creates a problem for the effective implementation of choice of forum clauses. In addition to NAFTA, 
similar choice of forum clauses appear in a number of other regional trade agreements (RTAs), 
including: the MERCOSUR dispute settlement mechanism;100 the Free Trade Agreement between the 
EFTA States and the Republic of Chile;101 United States — Singapore Free Trade Agreement;102 United 
States — Australia Free Trade Agreement;103 and the Dominican Republic — Central America-United 
States Free Trade Agreement.104 These RTAs allow parties to select either the WTO or the dispute 
resolution provisions of the RTAs; once selected, that forum becomes the exclusive forum for the 
dispute. If, for example, the RTA’s dispute resolution forum is selected, then access to the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism is restricted.105  These choice of forum clauses, which are increasingly popular 
in RTAs, may not provide a solution to parallel proceedings in the event that the WTO will not uphold 
                                                     
95 NAFTA Article 2005. 
96 Panel Report, Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO Doc WT/DS308/R (7 October 
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98 Ibid [7.18]. 
99 Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks, WTO Doc WT/DS308/AB/R, AB-2005-10 (6 March 
2006), [45]-[46]. 
100 Olivos Protocol Article 1(2). 
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Community (SADC) and Overlaps with the WTO and Other Jurisdictions' (2004) 13 Minnesota Journal of Global 
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such provisions.106 The effect of these clauses in the context of a dispute involving agricultural 
biotechnology is further analysed in chapter 5. This thesis contends that choice of forum clauses are a 
solution going forward and recommendations are made in chapter 6 in order to give effect to such 
clauses within the framework of international environmental and international trade disputes and also 
specifically for agricultural biotechnology. 
Considered next in this chapter is the application of the general private international law principles for 
the resolution of jurisdictional conflict to multiple proceedings involving public international law disputes. 
B Private International Law Principles for 
Jurisdictional Conflict 
Private international law principles for jurisdictional conflict (also known as ‘conflict of laws’ principles), 
were historically created as part of domestic law to address conflicts between different domestic 
substantive laws that may apply to the same factual matrix.107 Such principles have been applied to 
determine conflicts of jurisdiction between the legal systems of two States (e.g. whether a dispute 
between two private parties should be determined according to the domestic laws of Germany or New 
Zealand?).108 This section considers whether these principles can be used to resolve a conflict of 
jurisdiction involving multiple proceedings before international judicial institutions, namely a dispute 
between States involving questions of public international law.   
1 Forum non Conveniens and Substantial Connection 
Forum non conveniens is a common law legal principle that gives the court the discretion to relinquish 
jurisdiction (by staying or dismissing the proceedings) to another more appropriate forum. The principle 
of forum non conveniens has a long history, tracing back to the late 1800s in Scottish law where trial 
courts refused to hear cases on the basis that justice would best be served by trial in another location.109 
The essence of the principle is to balance the right of the plaintiff to commence proceedings in the forum 
of choice, versus the burden placed on the defendant (and other participants in the proceedings) from 
the location of the forum. Issues taken into consideration when determining the appropriate forum 
include: the physical residence and location of the defendant and witnesses, including financial costs 
and hardship associated with attending proceedings at that forum; the location of evidence; any 
infrastructure challenges at the location of the selected forum; the location at which the facts giving rise 
to the proceedings took place; public policy issues; and the availability of an adequate alternate forum.  
Understandably, the principle of forum non conveniens is particularly relevant to transnational civil 
proceedings involving private defendants and corporations. However, it is arguable that the principle of 
forum non conveniens is less relevant to disputes involving public international law.  In disputes between 
                                                     
106 For a  discussion on choice of forum clauses in RTAs, see: Songling Yang, 'The Key Role of the WTO in Settling 
its Jurisdictional Conflicts with RTAs' (2012) 11(2) Chinese Journal of International Law 281. 
107 Ralf Michaels and Joost Pauwelyn, 'Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws: Different Techniques in the 
Fragmentation of Public International Law' (2011) 22 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 349, 351. 
108 Ibid 351. 
109 Edward Barrett Jr, 'The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens' (1947) 35 California Law Review 380, 387. 
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States, the weight placed on the location of evidence, the convenience of witnesses and financial costs 
are of less importance. There is the possibility that if the proceedings involve an election between an 
international judicial institution of general jurisdiction (such as the ICJ) and a regional judicial institution 
(for example, under an RTA like NAFTA) that a case could be made on the grounds of forum non 
conveniens that the regional judicial institution is the more appropriate forum.  However, the application 
of the principle in these circumstances still depends on the willingness of the initial international judicial 
institution to relinquish its jurisdiction over the proceedings — something it may not be willing to do 
without persuasive evidence that it is an inconvenient forum. Kwak and Marceau go one step further 
and propose that unless there is a specific agreement between States, the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, or of forum conveniens, is inapplicable to an overlap of jurisdiction between public 
international law tribunals.110 There is no real support for the utilisation of the forum non conveniens 
principle in the case law for public international law disputes.111 In civil law legal systems, the principles 
of judicial comity and lis alibi pendens has been utilised rather than forum non conveniens, and these 
are considered in the next section.112  
Another legal principle that may assist with resolving conflicts of jurisdiction is the principle of 
‘substantial connection’. The principle of ‘substantial connection’ is applied in private international law 
to determine jurisdiction and has been articulated in the publication Principles of Transnational Civil 
Procedure in the following terms: 
When there is a substantial connection between the forum state and the party or the transaction or 
occurrence in dispute. A substantial connection exists when a significant part of the transaction or 
occurrence occurred in the forum state, when an individual defendant is a habitual resident of the forum 
state or a jural entity has received its charter of organization or has its principal place of business therein, 
or when property to which the dispute relates is located in the forum state.113 
The principle of ‘substantial connection’ provides that the ‘appropriate’ forum be selected by weighing 
up the connection between the forum, the party, and the transaction or the place where the dispute 
occurred. As with the principle of forum non conveniens, disputes between States are more likely to be 
held in a neutral setting, with the actual physical location of the dispute in issue, the evidence or 
witnesses being of little importance.  The ‘appropriate’ judicial institution may be the one that is vested 
with the interpretation of the treaty substantially involved in the dispute.114 However, this largely turns 
on the characterisation of the dispute and the importance of the claims — such as, is the dispute 
primarily an environmental dispute or a trade dispute? Often this is problematic in disputes involving 
issues that cross over different ‘specialised’ regimes, with the dispute legitimately being founded in the 
two areas of law. In particular, whether the dispute is an ‘environmental’ dispute or a ‘trade’ dispute 
often goes straight to the core of the disagreement between the Parties.  Furthermore, which 
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international judicial institution should be the one to determine which treaty is ‘primary’ in order to 
establish the jurisdiction that has the best ‘substantial connection’? As there is a general reluctance 
amongst international dispute institutions to decline jurisdiction in matters properly brought before them, 
it is doubtful that the application of the principle of ‘substantial connection’ will be successful in practice 
to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction in public international law. 
2 Lis Alibi Pendens and Judicial Comity 
Two legal principles that operate to provide guidance on forum choice involving parallel proceedings 
are lis alibi pendens and judicial comity. The principle of lis alibi pendens provides that a judicial 
institution should declare proceedings inadmissible if there are already existing proceedings on foot 
before another judicial institution involving the same factual dispute and the same parties.  The rationale 
for the principle lis alibi pendens stems from the more general doctrine of litispendance, articulated in 
1926 in the case Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia as follows:  
[The doctrine,] the object of which is to prevent the possibility of conflicting judgments, can be invoked in 
international relations, in the sense that the judges of one State should, in the absence of a treaty, refuse 
to entertain any suit already pending before the courts of another State.115 
In 1927, the PCIJ was called upon to look at principles governing forum selection in the Factory at 
Chorzów Claim for Indemnity case on German claims for indemnity against Poland for the confiscation 
of property belonging to German companies.116 In this case, Poland argued that the PCIJ should decline 
to exercise its jurisdiction given that there were two pending cases brought by private citizens before 
the Germano-Polish mixed Arbitral Tribunal and the Upper Silesian Arbitration Tribunal.117 These 
parallel cases involved the same question of law arising out of German claims for indemnity.  In 
upholding its jurisdiction to determine the case, the PCIJ ruled: 
the Court, when it has to define its jurisdiction in relation to that of another tribunal, cannot allow its own 
competency to give way unless confronted with a clause which it considers sufficiently clear to prevent 
the possibility of a negative conflict of jurisdiction involving the danger of a denial of justice.118 
However, in the subsequent case Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia,119 the PCIJ applied a slightly 
different test to its ruling in the Factory at Chorzów Claim for Indemnity case.  In the case Rights of 
Minorities in Upper Silesia, the PCIJ again affirmed its jurisdiction and stated that consent to its 
jurisdiction by the parties would only become inoperative in those ‘exceptional cases’ that a competing 
forum has been conferred by the States with ‘exclusive jurisdiction’.120 It is noted that in both of these 
cases, the ‘competing’ alternate claim in question did not ‘technically’ amount to a jurisdictional conflict 
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between the two institutions. In the Factory at Chorzów Claim for Indemnity case, the alternate claim 
involved proceedings brought by private citizens (as compared to the proceedings before the PCIJ 
which involved a dispute between two States) and in the Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia case 
Poland argued that the treaty between the States granted primary jurisdiction of the resolution of the 
dispute to the Council of the League of Nations, a political organ. 
More recently, the principle of lis alibi pendens was considered by ITLOS in the Camouco case.121 The 
ITLOS declined to apply the lis alibi pendens rule to restrict its jurisdiction in light of a pending case 
before the French national court involving the same parties and the same set of facts.  This case 
involved an application pursuant to Article 292 of UNCLOS which relates to the prompt release of 
vessels and crew.  The ITLOS held: 
Article 292 provides for an independent remedy and not an appeal against a decision of a national court. 
No limitation should be read into article 292 that would have the effect of defeating its very object and 
purpose.122 
This case supports the principle that the doctrine of lis alibi pendens does not apply to parallel 
proceedings between tribunals belonging to different legal orders (in this case the international legal 
order and domestic courts), further highlighting the complexity of utilising litispendence as a tool for 
addressing conflicts between the jurisdiction of international tribunals. The same reasoning was applied 
in the earlier case of Southern Pacific Properties Ltd v Egypt (also commonly known as the ‘Pyramids’ 
case), where the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) held: 
When the jurisdictions of two unrelated and independent tribunals extend to the same dispute, there is no 
rule of international law which prevents either tribunal from exercising its jurisdiction. 123  
This broad statement of the ICSID casts doubt on the application of lis alibi pendens generally in 
international law, not just to the specifics of this case.124  That said, the ICSID indicated a preference 
towards the principle of judicial comity as a tool available to address conflict of jurisdiction between 
judicial institutions: 
However, in the interest of international judicial order, either of the tribunals may, in its discretion and as 
a matter of comity, decide to stay the exercise of its jurisdiction pending a decision by the other tribunal.125 
The principle of comity is founded in legal reciprocity — that one jurisdiction will extend certain 
courtesies and respect to the laws of another jurisdiction, recognizing the validity and effect of their laws 
and judicial decisions.  While traditionally a principle of national common law systems, the principle of 
comity could be utilised in the international judicial arena. Through the exercise of judicial comity, one 
international judicial institution may refrain from exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances of parallel 
proceedings in order to avoid a conflicting judgment with another judicial institution.  It is noted that in 
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the Pyramids case, the ICSID tribunal surmised that comity could be relied upon, as a matter of 
discretion, to stay proceedings pending the decision of the French national court — as distinct from 
declining jurisdiction. In this way, the application of the principle of comity side-stepped any legal issues 
with declining jurisdiction and dismissing the claim. 
The issue of judicial comity and jurisdiction was also considered in the MOX Plant dispute between 
Ireland and the United Kingdom.126 In considering the jurisdictional objection raised by the UK, the 
UNCLOS arbitral tribunal clarified: 
However, before proceeding to any final decision on the merits, the Tribunal must satisfy itself that it has 
jurisdiction in a definitive sense. Moreover, even to proceed to hear argument on the merits of the dispute 
brought before it, the Tribunal needs to be satisfied at least that there are no substantial doubts as to its 
jurisdiction.127 
Although finding that it did have prima facie jurisdiction, the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal suspended the 
proceedings until a determination on jurisdiction could be made by the ECJ on the questions of law, 
which ‘essentially concern the internal operation of a separate legal order (namely the legal order of the 
EU) to which both of the Parties to the present proceedings are subject’.128 The UNCLOS arbitral 
tribunal explained its reasoning as follows: 
In the circumstances, and bearing in mind considerations of mutual respect and comity which should 
prevail between judicial institutions both of which may be called upon to determine rights and obligations 
as between two States, the Tribunal considers that it would be inappropriate for it to proceed further with 
hearing the Parties on the merits of the dispute in the absence of a resolution of the problems referred to. 
Moreover, a procedure that might result in two conflicting decisions on the same issue would not be helpful 
to the resolution of the dispute between the Parties.129 (emphasis added) 
The findings by the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal demonstrate the underlying premise of judicial comity, to 
promote systematic consistency within a judicial order.130 While it appears that the UNCLOS arbitral 
tribunal has applied judicial comity to stay its own proceedings, whether other international judicial 
institutions will follow this same path is less certain. It is further noted that in the absence of the doctrine 
of precedent in international law, future UNCLOS arbitral tribunals (and ITLOS) may find these rulings 
persuasive, but are not bound to follow this same practice of applying judicial comity. 
In considering judicial comity in its broadest sense of providing ‘courtesy’ to other judicial institutions, 
the ruling of the WTO in the Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (‘Brazil — 
Retreaded Tyres’) case is relevant (see the boxed case study in chapter 3).131 In this case, the Appellate 
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Body declined to exercise comity towards the ruling of the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal in determining 
the non-compliance of Brazil’s trade measure with the WTO agreements. In compliance with the ruling 
of the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal, Brazil had amended its trade ban on retreaded tyres to include an 
exclusion from the ban for other MERCOSUR parties (the MERCOSUR exemption).  Brazil submitted 
to the WTO Appellate Body that as the MERCOSUR exemption was included to satisfy the judicial ruling 
(or quasi-judicial ruling) of the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal, it should be held that the MERCOSUR 
exemption was ‘a priori’ compatible with WTO law.  This argument was rejected by the Appellate Body: 
In our view, the ruling issued by the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal is not an acceptable rationale for the 
discrimination [between MERCOSUR countries and other WTO Members], because it bears no 
relationship to the legitimate objective pursued by the Import Ban that falls within the purview of Article 
XX(b), and even goes against this objective, to however small a degree.132   
The utilisation of judicial comity appears as a ‘neat’ solution to parallel proceedings. Applied as a 
principle of ‘discretion’, it is not necessary for the judicial institution to find itself to be ‘without 
jurisdiction’, but simply to ‘stay’ the proceedings pending the conclusion of the other legal proceedings. 
However, if we take an example of a dispute that involves two specialised areas of international law, 
for example the WTO and an MEA, which judicial institution should exercise judicial comity in favour of 
the other?  Does this then necessitate consideration of which judicial institution is the ‘preferred’ dispute 
forum? How is this determined? Should we consider whether one forum has binding and compulsory 
dispute resolution provisions? Should we take into account the remedies and enforcement mechanisms 
of each judicial institution? Do we make a determination based on the characterisation of the issues in 
dispute, which is often a subjective task?  It is impossible to reason through all of these thorny issues 
to conclude definitively in favour of one judicial institution over another. The argument thus becomes 
circular; the ‘problem’ of parallel international legal proceedings stems from the inter-woven nature of 
the international legal system and the absence of any systematic divisions or hierarchy between 
international judicial institutions; but the ‘solution’ of determining which judicial institution should 
exercise comity is burdened by the exact same issues. Lastly, even if the judicial institution enjoys the 
discretionary power to exercise judicial comity in the case of parallel proceedings, will they, in reality, 
opt to exercise such a right? There is also an issue of consistency over time, not only between 
institutions but within institutions as to whether and how they would exercise judicial comity to address 
conflicts of jurisdiction. As only a few international cases have referred to the principle of comity, there 
is insufficient precedent to confidently assert the acceptance of the principle of judicial comity as a tool 
for resolving jurisdictional competition between international institutions. These issues are further 
considered in chapter 5 in relation to the potential use of judicial comity to resolve a trade dispute 
brought under the WTO and also under the Biosafety Protocol dispute resolution provisions. 
3 Good Faith and Abuse of Rights/Process 
The broad doctrine of acting in ‘good faith’ has received some acceptance at the international judicial 
level. As a general concept encompassing human behaviour such as honesty and reasonableness, the 
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principle of good faith is hard to define.  However, a definition of the principle as it operates in 
international law was provided by O’Connor in his book on this subject, as follows: 
The principle of good faith in international law is a fundamental principle from which the rule pacta sunt 
servanda and other legal rules distinctively and directly related to honesty, fairness and reasonableness 
are derived, and the application of those rules is determined at any particular time by the compelling 
standards of honesty, fairness and reasonableness prevailing in the international community at that 
time.133 
The principle of ‘good faith’ also consists of more narrowly defined obligations, including the obligations 
to negotiate in good faith and to exercise rights in good faith.134  In relation to parallel international legal 
proceedings, the principle of ‘good faith’ may be framed as a challenge to jurisdiction in the following 
two scenarios: 
1. The second proceedings were not commenced in good faith as the parties have an obligation 
to first negotiate and consult under the other relevant agreement which is the more appropriate 
forum for the dispute. 
2. The second proceedings were not commenced in good faith as the proceedings were brought 
as a way to circumvent the first proceedings (abuse of rights/process). 
Examining the first scenario, there is a general acceptance that parties to international agreements will 
attempt, in good faith, to consult and negotiate a solution prior to taking any unilateral action. This was 
recognised in the case North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands), in 
which the ICJ held that the parties were under an obligation to enter into negotiations: 
This obligation was merely a special application of a principle underlying all international relations, which 
was moreover recognized in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations as one of the methods for the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes.135  
It may therefore be argued that parties have an obligation to conduct good faith negotiations to settle 
disputes pursuant to the dispute resolution provisions of the international agreements to which they are 
parties. However, in the absence of any normative provision obligating the parties to pursue the dispute 
resolution provisions under one agreement to the exclusion of any other dispute resolution forum, it is 
difficult to see how a State could be held to have acted in bad faith for commencing validly established 
proceedings to enforce their rights. Even in the event of exclusive dispute resolution clauses, should 
this negate a State’s right to seek judicial resolution for infringement of their rights and obligations in a 
different forum? Arguably the obligation to conduct good faith negotiations actually applies to both 
treaties. Accordingly, it is difficult to see an international judicial institution dismissing ‘valid’ proceedings 
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solely on the grounds that such proceedings were not commenced in ‘good faith’ as the parties were 
obligated to conduct negotiations pursuant to a different international agreement. 
Turning to the second scenario, could the principle of good faith operate to invalidate the second legal 
proceedings on the basis that the exercise of the right (namely commencing the legal proceedings) was 
not in good faith? This would be a finding of an ‘abuse of process’, which is where a party exercises: 
a right either in a way which impedes the enjoyment by other States of their own rights or for an end 
different from that for which the right was created, to the injury of another State.136 
First, it is important to note that for the purpose of this discussion, we are assuming that the jurisdiction 
of the judicial institution before which the proceedings being challenged is otherwise valid.  Accordingly, 
it is necessary to consider whether the absence of good faith/abuse of process is sufficient, on its own, 
to lead to a ruling by the jurisdiction to decline to determine the case. Some of the uncertainties 
concerning the principle of good faith as articulated by Lowe are worth repeating here: 
Is good faith an independent principle having normative force, or is it merely an abstraction from more 
specific rules? Can it operate so as to impose positive obligations (for example, of the kind which might 
have been grouped under the unfashionable heading of ‘voisinage’), or is its effect limited to the 
invalidation of legal actions affected by an absence of good faith (as in the case of estoppel and 
preclusion)?137 
When will a judicial institution dismiss proceedings purely based on an abuse of rights?  Cheng listed 
the following situations where a right has been exercised in a manner so as to constitute an abuse of 
rights/process: (a) in a malicious manner, with the sole intent of causing injury to another; (b) in a 
‘fictitious’ way, for a purpose utterly different than that for which the right was originally granted; or (c) 
in a wholly unreasonable manner, causing harm disproportionate to the right-holder’s interests.138  
On the one hand, the parallel proceedings may be regarded as ‘wholly unreasonable’ in balancing the 
interests of the parties when the same case is pending before another judicial institution.139 However, 
this line of argument becomes more problematic if the parties are seeking the clarification of different 
‘laws’ and different available remedies, even though the factual matrix and parties are identical.  This 
‘good faith’ principle is only useful if there is some evidence of bad faith by the parties. What if it is open 
to the parties to commence proceedings in either judicial institution and both happen to approach a 
different one without bad faith? In the case of the WTO, Member States have a right of standing to bring 
disputes before the WTO. It would be difficult to hold that a party acted in bad faith, or that the 
proceedings where an abuse of rights/process, given the standing consent given by WTO members to 
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the jurisdiction of the WTO DSU.140 Clearly, there would be an ‘abuse of process’ if parallel proceedings 
were commenced in order to harass the other party or if the claim is frivolous or manifestly 
groundless.141 But, in the context of two States, this would be difficult to prove, particularly if the parties 
are invoking dispute resolution provisions in the agreements to which both States are parties and 
ostensibly have therefore agreed to uphold.   
If there is an agreement between the parties granting a particular judicial institution exclusive jurisdiction 
then perhaps an argument may be made that the parallel proceedings (in the non-exclusive forum) are 
an abuse of process or have been commenced in bad faith. For this argument to be successful, the 
judicial institution must first uphold the application of the exclusive jurisdiction clause that purports to 
limit its jurisdiction. As discussed above, it is uncertain whether such clauses will be upheld. As each 
international judicial institution is independent from each other, it is not legally bound by another 
agreement (that is not its ‘founding’ statute) that purports to limit its jurisdiction. In conclusion, in regards 
to parallel proceedings, it is unlikely that an argument of good faith/abuse process would be sufficient 
as a sole basis for nullifying jurisdiction. 
The principle of good faith may be applicable to the situation of successive proceedings, particularly if 
the later proceedings will, in effect, re-litigate issue that have already been determined by the original 
judicial institution. However, the primary principle relevant to overlapping jurisdiction arising out of 
successive proceedings is res judicata.  An argument of good faith or abuse of process would likely be 
made in addition to a claim of res judicata. The principle of res judicata in successive proceedings 
involving the same parties is discussed next.   
4 Res Judicata 
The principle of res judicata provides that the judicial ruling in the legal proceedings between the parties 
acts as the final decision on the issues in dispute (in the context of a specific factual scenario).142 
Whereas the principle of lis alibi pendens, discussed above, bars simultaneous proceedings between 
the same parties (when the first proceedings are still on foot), res judicata bars subsequent proceedings 
between the parties after the first proceedings have been finalised. For the purpose of common law 
jurisdictions, Black’s Law Dictionary has defined res judicata as: 
[a] matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. Rule 
that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the 
rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action 
involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.143 
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Scholarly discussion has concentrated on whether res judicata is considered as a general principle of 
international law or as a rule of customary international law.144 In Effect of Awards of Compensation 
made by the UN Administrative Tribunal Advisory Opinion, the ICJ confirmed that res judicata was a 
'well-established and generally recognised principle of law' and therefore applied to the judgments of 
an international judicial body.145 Similarly, in the 1998 case Request for Interpretation of the Judgment 
of 11 June 1998 in the Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and 
Nigeria the Court held that Nigeria’s request for interpretation was inadmissible on the grounds of res 
judicata.146 It is also clear that the doctrine of res judicata applies to international arbitration proceedings, 
as stated in the Waste Management v Mexico case:  
There is no doubt that res judicata is a principle of international law, and even a general principle of law 
within the meaning of Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.147 
References were made during the drafting of the statute of the PCIJ to res judicata as a general principle 
of law.148 The doctrine of res judicata has been codified into the founding statute of some international 
judicial institutions by the parent treaty. In particular, the ICJ Statute specifically embraces the finality 
principle of res judicata: 
Article 59: The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of 
that particular case. 
Article 60: The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of 
the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party. 
Similarly, Article 42 and 44 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that judgments of 
the Chambers and the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights ‘shall be final’.149    
While the principle of res judicata is accepted as part of international law, the effectiveness of this 
principle as a tool for addressing potential or actual conflicts in jurisdiction between international judicial 
institutions is not as certain.  
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Res judicata is premised on the avoidance of repetitive litigation between the parties involving the same 
questions of law arising out of the same factual scenario.150 In China Navigation Co. Ltd. (Great Britain) 
v United States (S.S. Newchwang) the arbitral tribunal determined:  
[i]t is a well established rule of law that the doctrine of res judicata applies only where there is identity of 
the parties and of the question at issue.151 
The formation of the elements of res judicata are commonly referenced from the dissenting judgment 
of Justice Anzilotti in the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Interpretation of Judgments) case: 
we have here the three traditional elements for identification, persona, petitum, causa petendi, for it is 
clear that ‘the particular case’ (le cas qui á été décidé) covers both the object and the grounds of the 
claim.152 
These three pre-conditions for res judicata were summarised in the Hubeau case by the Administrative 
Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation (ILOAT) as follows: 
(a) the same parties (persona); 
(b) the relief sought is the same (petitum); and 
(c) the same cause of action (causa petendi).153 
Looking at the first pre-condition of the ‘persona’, in the case Cereceda Martin and Others v Spain, the 
EurCommHR considered the requirement for the same ‘parties’ as an element for res judicata.154 The 
EurCommHR found that the 23 individual applicants in the claim before it, were essentially the ‘same 
parties’ as the four trade union workers groups (to which they belonged) that had previously brought 
proceedings before the Committee on Freedom of Association of the International Labour Organisation 
– involving the same factual dispute (concerning the dismissal of the 23 applicants from the Alumina-
Aluminio factory).  Accordingly, the EurCommHR found that the claim before it was barred under Article 
27(1)(b) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,155 as the 
parties in the two proceedings were ‘essentially the same’.156  In reaching this ruling, the EurCommHR 
stated: 
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The Commission takes the view that a situation of this type is not compatible with either the spirit or the 
letter of the Convention which seeks to avoid a plurality of international proceedings relating to the same 
cases.157  
There is little case law on how to determine whether the parties to two public international law 
proceedings are the ‘same’. Perhaps this is an indication that for public international law disputes 
between two States, the pre-condition of the ‘same parties’ is not that controversial — if the same two 
sovereign States are involved, then the pre-condition is satisfied.   
For res judicata to apply as a tool limiting subsequent duplicitous proceedings in public international 
law, the second and third pre-conditions prove to be more problematic — that is, the object or substance 
of the claim and cause of action must be the same.  At this point, a distinction is made between 
situations where a party seeks to re-open the proceedings in the same forum (e.g. due to fresh 
evidence) and where a party commences second proceedings before a different international judicial 
institution involving the same factual dispute. Although the principle of res judicata may apply to the first 
situation, this does not involve a conflict of jurisdiction between two judicial institutions, but rather 
consideration of whether the same judicial institution can determine the case, or part of the case, again. 
This doctoral thesis is concerned with the second situation and the potential for ‘competing’ judgments 
between two judicial institutions where, for example, the first proceedings involve a claim under one 
specialised area of international law (such as international trade law) and the subsequent proceedings 
are brought under a different specialised area of international law (such as international environmental 
law).   
In regards to the ‘petitum’ requirement for res judicata, the courts have looked at the remedies sought 
by the applicant. International judicial institutions have applied a broad interpretation to what constitutes 
‘identical’ remedies between the two proceedings.158 Taking a broad approach to the determination of 
‘identical remedies’ can be justified where the applicant in the subsequent proceedings is the same as 
in the first proceedings. To do otherwise would encourage the applicant to engage in ‘claim splitting’ so 
as to preserve the option to commence a subsequent action claiming a different form of legal ‘relief’ in 
the event the first action is not successful.159 The principle of res judicata may be raised in two scenarios 
involving multiple international legal proceedings between two States: (a) proceedings have been 
commenced in two forums, but one judicial institution hands downs its decision first, leading to a claim 
that the other proceedings are then barred on the grounds of res judicata; and (b) where the first 
proceedings have rendered a judgment and then the second proceedings are commenced. In scenario 
(a), in the context of a public international law dispute crossing over between two specialised areas of 
international law, the applicant in the two proceedings may not be the same. In this regard, what may 
amount to a breach under one specialised regime may not be a breach of obligations under the other 
— rendering the application of res judicata even less likely (on this point, the conflict of norms has a 
bearing on the outcomes of a conflict of jurisdiction). If we take for example the Chile-Swordfish case 
                                                     
157 Cereceda Martin and Others v Spain (Application No. 16358/90) (1992) 73 Eur Comm HR 133, 134. 
158 Reinisch, above n 144, 62. 
159 Ibid. 
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(although this case involves parallel not successive proceedings, it is still useful for illustrative 
purposes), the dispute involved the EU and Chile, with the EU being the ‘applicant’ in the WTO 
proceedings, whereas Chile was the applicant in the UNCLOS proceedings. In these circumstances, 
there is no evidence of claim splitting by the applicant. To apply a broad definition to ‘identical remedies’ 
seems less justified if the end result is to prevent a State’s action for legal relief on the grounds that 
they were a defendant in other proceedings where a different remedy was sought (even though the 
factual situation may be the same).  Should we then, however, distinguish the situation where a 
defendant State commences subsequent proceedings if they lose in the first proceedings as described 
in scenario (b) above? Should this be treated differently to the situation where both proceedings are on 
foot with different applicants, such as in the Chile-Swordfish case (see the boxed case study in Chapter 
3 for more details on this dispute)? Arguably, there is still no ‘claim splitting’ in this scenario either.  In 
a dispute between two States that involves both international trade law and international environmental 
law, the remedies sought in the environmental proceedings are for damages/liability/estoppel for the 
environmental breaches and, in comparison, the WTO proceedings would involve a claim for trade 
sanctions under the WTO DSU.  In this situation, it is difficult to see how a judicial institution could hold 
that these two proceedings involved the same ‘remedy’. Ultimately, it is a balancing act between 
avoiding incompatible competing judgments and restricting the access of parties to judicial relief. 
Turning to the issue of identical ‘causes of action’, the doctrine of res judicata only applies to bar 
subsequent proceedings where the ‘grounds’ of the two proceedings are identical.  Will res judicata 
operate to prevent subsequent international legal proceedings where States seek the same remedy but 
on formally different legal grounds? If ultimately the relief sought is the same, then arguing that the 
cause of action differs as the source of the ‘legal entitlement’ (for example, the two actions are brought 
under different treaties), has been suggested to be an ‘artificial distinction’.160 This is supported by the 
statement made by the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case that the parties in 
the two disputes were: 
the same Parties grappling not with two separate disputes but with what in fact is a single dispute arising 
under both Conventions. To find that, in this case, there is a dispute actually arising under UNCLOS which 
is distinct from the dispute that arose under the CCSBT would be artificial.161 
It was proposed by Reinisch that following the reasoning of the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal in Southern 
Bluefin Tuna case, the principle of res judicata could be applied on the basis that the two proceedings 
arise from a single identical dispute relating to the same factual background even though the claims are 
based on two different treaties. This sits well with the approach enunciated by Lord McNair in the 
International Status of South West Africa case that, when ‘importing’ private legal doctrines into 
international law, the elements of the doctrine may not be replicated exactly:  
                                                     
160 Ibid 64. 
161 Southern Bluefin Tuna (2000) 39 ILM 1359, [54]. 
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The way in which international law borrows from this source is not by means of importing private law 
institutions 'lock, stock and barrel', ready-made and fully equipped with a set of rules. It would be difficult 
to reconcile such a process with the application of 'the general principles of law’ ...162 
When considering conflict of jurisdiction in multi-faceted disputes, the cause of action is derived from 
different international instruments containing different normative provisions.163  Should then a claim for 
breach of environmental obligations be denied on the basis that proceedings for trade breaches have 
already been determined between the parties? Would a judicial institution deny proceedings on the 
basis of res judicata in these circumstances or would it hold that the doctrine has no application? With 
the development of self-contained regimes and specialised judicial institutions, it may become 
increasingly more difficult to make a case for res judicata against subsequent proceedings commenced 
before different judicial institutions. This position is strengthened if the legal grounds (or relief sought) 
in the second proceedings are not available in the first proceedings. It is possible that judicial institutions 
established pursuant to the specialised regimes in international law will consider these parallel 
proceedings to have different causes of action and relief pursuant to the different specialised 
agreements, accordingly the principle of res judicata is not applicable. This may be the case even 
though a general-subject matter judicial institution may have viewed the two proceedings as one and 
the same dispute.  
Considering this issue further, two proceedings have been held to have the same ‘factual matrix’ where 
there is evidence of competing claims relating to the ‘same fact pattern’ and the ‘same legal claims’.164 
For example, in the ICJ case Haya de la Torne between Peru and Columbia, the ICJ determined that 
an earlier case between the parties involving broadly the same factual pattern did not preclude the later 
ICJ proceedings as the previous judgment related to the granting of diplomatic asylum while the 
proceedings in question concerned extradition. Accordingly, even though the parties and facts in the 
dispute were the same, the legal claims were very different — one involving extradition law and the 
other diplomatic law.165 Similarly, in the case Pauger v Austria,166 it was found that proceedings before 
the UNHRC regarding a violation of the non-discrimination principle did not prevent the proceedings 
between the parties before the EurCommHR concerning a breach of due process.  
If the legal claims are clearly different, such as in Haya de la Torne, then it is easy, and potentially 
‘acceptable’ to classify these as different disputes.  However, this distinction on the grounds of legal 
claims becomes problematic when considering the cross-over of norms between the specialised 
regimes of environment and trade law — particularly if the dispute involves a trade provision in an 
environmental agreement and a trade provision in the WTO Agreement. In this scenario, the parties are 
the same, the factual pattern is the same and the issues in dispute are the same (both involving trade 
issues). However, one claim would involve normative provisions regulating trade under the relevant 
                                                     
162 International Status of South West Africa (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep 128, separate opinion of McNair J, 
146-148 
163 González-Calatayud and Marceau, above n 140, 283. Lowe, above n 30, 203. 
164 Shany, above n 7, 25. 
165 Haya de la Torre (Colombia v Peru) (Judgment of June 13th 1951) [1951] ICJ Rep 71, 82. 
166 Pauger v Austria (Decision on Admissibility) (Application 6717/90) (1995) 80 Eur Comm HR 24. 
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environmental agreement (such as the Biosafety Protocol)167 and the other legal proceedings would 
involve the trade provisions in the WTO. Given the different normative provisions, do the two legal 
proceedings involve the same legal claims?  As both legal proceedings would involve questions of the 
‘trade’ obligations of the parties, it could be argued that these are the same legal claims as between the 
parties.  The complexities of this argument and the challenges it poses for the resolution of conflicts of 
jurisdiction between international judical institutions is further explored in the next chapter in relation to 
the case study of agricultural biotechnology. 
C Conflict of Norms: Lex Specialis and Lex Posterior   
The doctrine of lex specialis derogat legi generali stipulates that the provisions of a treaty governing a 
specific subject matter (lex specialis) overrides a treaty covering general matters (lex generalis) where 
both treaties apply to the same set of facts. Where both a specific treaty and a general treaty relate to 
a dispute, the principle of lex specialis may assist to resolve any overlap of jurisdiction.168  In these 
cases, it is proposed that the tribunal with general jurisdiction should decline to accept the case as the 
parties are legally bound to refer the case to another tribunal with ‘specific’ jurisdiction.169 While this 
doctrine provides a resolution for jurisdictional conflict in situations involving an institution applying 
general international law (such as the ICJ) and a specialist tribunal like the ECJ, it becomes more 
problematic when the dispute involves provisions of two specialised treaties. In these circumstances, 
the determination of which treaty is lex specialis is dependent on the characterisation of the subject 
matter of the dispute, with the doctrine stipulating that the ‘specialised’ treaty dictates the appropriate 
jurisdiction of the dispute.  More often than not, however, which treaty is more specialised is not clear 
and the question goes to the essence of the dispute between the parties. Further, it is possible that an 
international judicial institution might be reluctant to give up its prima facie jurisdiction based solely on 
another judicial institution having more specialised jurisdiction.  The application of lex specialis becomes 
even more complicated in the case of MEAs which, being specialised agreements, confer jurisdiction 
on a general-subject matter judicial institution, such as the ICJ. 
As Koskenneimi comments when discussing disputes that cross over jurisdiction between the ICJ and 
the ICTY, ‘a suggestion to submit one to the other would immediately seem an unwelcome intrusion in 
its institutional environment’.170  Further, as stated in the Factory at Chorzów Claim for Indemnity case:   
A Court cannot allow its own competence to give way [to another Court] unless confronted with a 
jurisdictional clause which it considers ‘sufficiently clear’ to prevent the possibility of negative conflict 
jurisdiction involving the danger of a denial of justice.171 
                                                     
167 See the provisions in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for 
signature 29 January 2000, 2226 UNTS 208 (entered into force 11 September 2003). 
168 Lowe, above n 30, 194. See also: Cheng, above n 138; McNair, above n 45. 
169 Lowe, above n 30, 195. 
170 Martii Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, 'Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties' (2002) 15(03) 
Leiden Journal of International Law 553 at 564. 
171 Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Claim for Indemnity, Jurisdiction) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 9, 30. 
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The lex posterior principle stipulates that the provisions of the later treaty should prevail over any 
inconsistent provisions of an earlier treaty. This principle has been codified in Article 30 para 3 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,172 which provides that where two treaties have incompatible 
provisions relating to the same subject matter, the relevant provisions of the later treaty prevail.  
However, the application of Article 30 is limited to circumstances where the States in dispute are parties 
to both of the conflicting treaties in question.173 The difficulty in applying the principle of lex posterior to 
resolve disputes over conflict of jurisdiction is that treaties are negotiated over time and accession by 
different States occurs at different dates. Often the framework of the treaty evolves, is amended and 
interpreted making it difficult to assign a specific date for the purpose of applying the lex posterior 
principle.174 For these reasons, the principle of lex posterior is not particularly helpful in resolving 
jurisdictional conflict in public international law disputes between international judicial institutions. 
 
VI CONCLUSION 
In the absence of any express provisions on jurisdiction in the agreements between the parties, one is 
left with the general legal principles relating to jurisdictional conflict. Although these principles work in 
the context of private international law, their application to public international legal disputes is less 
certain.  This is particularly the case for dual proceedings commenced pursuant to separate agreements 
before international judicial institutions with specialised jurisdiction. In the absence of any judicial 
hierarchy or doctrine of precedent, there exists no institutional structure necessary for these principles 
to be effective. In conclusion, there is little confidence that existing international legal principles can 
address the conflict of jurisdiction arising out of multiple legal proceedings commenced by States in an 
effective and consistent way. This will now be explored in chapter 5 in relation to the specific example 
of a conflict of jurisdiction involving public international law disputes regarding the trade in agricultural 
biotechnology.
                                                     
172 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into 
force 27 January 1980) (‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’). 
173 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 30(4). 
174 Joost Pauwelyn, 'Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands' 
(2003) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 903, 908. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION 
INVOLVING TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 
I INTRODUCTION 
In the event that a dispute between States gives rise to a valid legal claim under both the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreements and the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (‘Biosafety Protocol’),1 we are left with the complex legal quandary of overlapping jurisdiction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider and apply the conflict of jurisdiction principles discussed in 
chapter 4 to a dispute involving parallel proceedings regarding the trade in agricultural biotechnology. 
First, the general provisions for dispute resolution under the WTO agreements and also the Biosafety 
Protocol, are outlined. Then, each framework is examined to determine whether it contains an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause governing disputes involving trade in agricultural biotechnology. Following the 
consideration of the dispute resolution provisions of the WTO agreements and the Biosafety Protocol, 
this chapter then analyses the application of private international law principles as a solution to parallel 
or successive dual proceedings.  
II DISPUTE RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK 
A WTO: Dispute Settlement Mechanism  
The dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO is set out in the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (‘DSU’).2 The jurisdiction of WTO Panels and the 
Appellate Body is derived from the standard terms of reference found in Articles 1(1), 3(2), 7(1), and 11 
of the DSU and the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to the DSU (the ‘Covered Agreements’). Article 
1(1) of the DSU provides: 
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the 
consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this 
Understanding (referred to in this Understanding as the ‘covered agreements’). The rules and procedures 
of this Understanding shall also apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes between Members 
concerning their rights and obligations under the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World 
                                                     
1 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 29 January 2000, 
2226 UNTS 208 (entered into force 11 September 2003) (‘Biosafety Protocol’). 
2 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 2 (Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes) (‘DSU’). 
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Trade Organization (referred to in this Understanding as the ‘WTO Agreement’) and of this Understanding 
taken in isolation or in combination with any other covered agreement. 
Pursuant to Article 1 of the DSU, Member States of the WTO grant compulsory jurisdiction ex ante for 
disputes involving issues under the Covered Agreements. This is distinct from a grant of general 
jurisdiction over all trade disputes.3 While the jurisdiction of the WTO Panels and the Appellate Body is 
broadly stated in Article 1(1) of the DSU, the valid basis for the complaint is determined from the content 
of the specific Covered Agreement pursuant to which the action is brought. Accordingly, the specific 
basis for the cause of action is found in the provisions of the Covered Agreements.  
The purpose of the dispute settlement system is outlined in Article 3(2) of the DSU as follows: 
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and 
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided 
in the covered agreements. (emphasis added) 
Article 3(2) of the DSU is particularly relevant in the context of the judicial power of the WTO Panel and 
the Appellate Body to determine non-WTO legal issues — which will be discussed in more detail 
throughout this chapter. 
The terms of Reference of WTO Panels are stated in Article 7 of the DSU as to ‘address the relevant 
provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute.’  A WTO Panel 
is established ad hoc upon the request of a WTO Member to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).4 The 
function of the Panel is to: 
make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of 
the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such 
other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for 
in the covered agreements.5 
A WTO Panel is comprised of three (and in some cases, five) qualified and independent members. The 
Panel members are nominated by the Secretariat of the WTO.6 Article 8.1 of the DSU provides the 
following examples of qualified individuals: persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, 
persons who have served as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (‘GATT 1947’)7 or as a representative to the Council or Committee 
of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or who have worked in the Secretariat, taught 
                                                     
3 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 444. 
4 DSU Article 4. 
5 Ibid Article 11. 
6 The Secretariat maintains a ‘List’ of potential panel members that meet the qualification and experience 
requirements. WTO members can nominate individuals to be included on the List. 
7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 194 (entered into 
force 1 January 1948). 
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or published on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member. 
Pursuant to Article 8.6 of the DSU, the parties to the dispute can oppose the nominated individuals only 
where there is a compelling reason. In practice, nominations are often opposed by the parties and the 
reasons for such opposition are not reviewed.8 Where no agreement on the panel members is reached, 
Article 8.7 of the DSU invests the Director-General with power to appoint the panel members in 
consultation with the chairperson of the DSB and the chairperson of the relevant Council or Committee. 
Pursuant to Article 6.1 of the DSU, a WTO Panel will be formed unless there is a consensus vote against 
its formation. Given their ad hoc nature, WTO Panels have been described as somewhere between 
arbitration and judicial dispute settlement in reference to their mode of establishment.9 However, in 
terms of their mode of operation, the WTO Panels operate as judicial bodies. The WTO Appellate Body 
confirmed the ‘judicial function’ of WTO Panels in Mexico — Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-
Fructose Corn Syrup from the United States Syrup (‘Mexico — Corn Syrup’): 
First, as a matter of due process, and the proper exercise of the judicial function, panels are required to 
address issues that are put before them by the parties to a dispute.10 (emphasis added) 
The WTO Appellate Body has a more ‘traditional’ judicial function and as such was categorised by 
Romano (in his 2011 research which updated earlier work on classifying and categorising international 
courts and tribunals) into the group of ‘international courts and tribunals’, and specifically the family of 
‘State-only courts and the genus of courts with specialized jurisdiction’.11  
The Report of the WTO Panel is adopted by the DSB by the process of reverse-consensus — that is 
the Report is taken to be automatically adopted by the DSB unless the DSB determines by consensus 
not to adopt the Report, or one party to the dispute appeals the WTO Panel Report to the Appellate 
Body.12 Where a Panel or the Appellate Body conclude that the measure in dispute is inconsistent with 
the provisions of a Covered Agreement, it is required to recommend that the WTO Member bring the 
measure into conformity with that agreement.13 Further, Article 21 of the DSU requires prompt 
compliance by the WTO Member with such rulings and any recommendations of the DSB. 
To enhance readability, the term ‘WTO Panel’ will be used generically throughout the remainder of this 
doctoral thesis to refer to both the jurisdiction of WTO Panels and the WTO Appellate Body (unless 
specifically referring to a judicial decision). 
                                                     
8 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 6 - The process — Stages in a 
typical WTO dispute settlement case, The panel stage  
 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s3p2_e.htm>. 
9 Pauwelyn, above n 3, 442. The emphasis and phrase ‘mode of establishment’ was used by the author. 
10 Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup from the United 
States — Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WTO Doc WT/DS132/AB/RW, AB-2001-5 (22 
October (2001) [36]. 
11 Cesare PR Romano, 'A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions' (2011) 2(1) Journal of International 
Dispute Settlement 241, 248. 
12 Article 16(4) of the DSU. 
13 Article 19(1) of the DSU. 
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As illustrated in the graph below, dispute resolution within the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
started off strongly in the 1990s and early 2000s, presumably due to the novelty and appeal of the new 
DSU framework and the need to establish a body of precedent resolving uncertainties in the new 
international trade regime (although there is no formal doctrine of precedent in the DSU framework). 
This initial period was then followed by a lull in the late 2000s. Over the last few years the utilisation of 
the WTO dispute settlement process has increased again. In 2013, a total of 12 panels were established 
— from a low of only 3 panels established in 2008. In addition, there was an increase in the usage of 
the WTO dispute settlement procedures by Members that previously had little or no dealings with the 
DSU (such as Cuba, Indonesia, Panama, Russia, and Vietnam).14 Disputes were also commenced in 
2013 against Members that have not traditionally been respondents — such as Australia, Colombia, 
Pakistan, Peru, and the Ukraine.15 In his reflections as Chairman of the DSB in 2013, Jonathan T. Fried 
stated: 
With nearly 20 years of experience, we can say with confidence that the dispute settlement system [of the 
WTO] provides ‘security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’, and facilitates — for the most 
part, and certainly in relative terms — the ‘prompt settlement’ of disputes.16 
 
Source: data from Fried;17 author’s own graph. 
                                                     
14 World Trade Organization, 2013 in WTO Dispute Settlement:  Reflections from the Chair of the Dispute 
Settlement Body - Jonathan T. Fried Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the WTO (2013) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/jfried_13_e.htm>. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid 
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B Biosafety Protocol: Dispute Resolution Provisions 
The process for the resolution of disputes involving obligations in the Biosafety Protocol are set out in 
Article 27 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (‘CBD’).18  Article 27 provides as follows: 
1. In the event of a dispute between Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of 
this Convention, the parties concerned shall seek solution by negotiation. 
2. If the parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation, they may jointly seek the good 
offices of, or request mediation by, a third party. 
3. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, or at any time thereafter, a 
State or regional economic integration organization may declare in writing to the Depositary that for 
a dispute not resolved in accordance with paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 above, it accepts one or both 
of the following means of dispute settlement as compulsory: 
(a) Arbitration in accordance with the procedure laid down in Part 1 of Annex II; 
(b) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice. 
4. If the parties to the dispute have not, in accordance with paragraph 3 above, accepted the same or 
any procedure, the dispute shall be submitted to conciliation in accordance with Part 2 of Annex II 
unless the parties otherwise agree. 
5. The provisions of this Article shall apply with respect to any protocol except as otherwise provided 
in the protocol concerned. 
Article 27, which allows Contracting Parties to select their preferred forum for the resolution of disputes, 
is a common dispute resolution clause found in MEAs and is derived from Article 33 of the Charter of 
the United Nations. As previously noted in chapter 4, currently Austria, Georgia and Latvia have made 
‘Declarations’ accepting both the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and arbitration as means of 
compulsory dispute settlement under the CBD. In comparison, Cuba has made a Declaration that 
disputes between CBD Parties shall be settled by negotiation through the diplomatic channel or, failing 
that, by arbitration.19  No other Declarations relating to dispute resolution have been made by the other 
parties to the CBD. This is perhaps reflective of the general non-contentious/cooperative approach to 
dispute resolution taken in international environmental law — some of the earlier international 
environmental agreements did not even include dispute resolution provisions.20 In contrast, MEAs 
                                                     
18 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 
December 1993) (‘CBD’). By virtue of Article 32 of the Biosafety Protocol which provides that ‘Except as otherwise 
provided in this Protocol, the provisions of the Convention relating to its protocols shall apply to this Protocol’ and 
Article 27(5) of the CBD which states ‘The provisions of this Article shall apply with respect to any protocol except 
as otherwise provided in the protocol concerned.’ 
19 The list of declarations made under the CBD can be found in the United Nations Treaty Collection: 
<http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-8&chapter=27&lang=en>. 
20 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 159. 
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negotiated since the 1990s (including the Biosafety Protocol) have included detailed compliance 
mechanisms, including reporting requirements and the dissemination of environmental information.21  
Before moving on to consider the complexities arising out of competing dispute forums, it is noteworthy 
that the dispute resolution framework for the Biosafety Protocol makes no reference to the WTO dispute 
resolution system. It seems unlikely that this omission was simply an oversight, given the purpose of 
the Biosafety Protocol is to regulate the trade and movement of living modified organisms. Should the 
decision in the Biosafety Protocol to refer to the general provisions for dispute resolution in the CBD 
(rather than include its own specific dispute resolution clause) be construed as indicating a deliberate 
preference against the resolution under the WTO dispute resolution mechanism for trade disputes 
involving these products?  Further, the so called ‘savings provision’ in the Preamble to the Biosafety 
Protocol which sets out its relationship with other agreements does not refer to the WTO trade rules. 
This fits with the theory of the fragmentation of international law and the development of specialised 
regimes as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  At the very least, the deliberate omission in the text 
of the Bisoafety Protocol to any reference to the WTO dispute resolution provisions (and more generally, 
the WTO agreements) is indicative of the complex context in which international agreements are 
negotiated, with the need to balance legally binding provisions against State sovereignty and political 
constraints. The text of the ‘savings provision’ in the Biosafety Protocol is discussed below in the section 
on Exclusive Forum clauses. 
III SCOPE OF JURISDICTION: APPLYING ‘OTHER’ 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
A different, but pertinent aspect of conflict of jurisdiction is the extent to which judicial institutions can 
determine disputes that involve questions of law that cross over between specialised legal regimes (e.g. 
where legal issues raised by the parties fall under various treaties), giving rise to the potential for 
multiple institution engagement, as outlined in chapter 4.  
A Biosafety Protocol Dispute: Applying WTO 
agreements  
In international environmental law, disputes relating to the provisions in the Biosafety Protocol can be 
submitted to the ICJ or to arbitration. For the ICJ, Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice relevantly provides that, in deciding disputes, the Court shall apply international conventions, 
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states.22 It is 
                                                     
21 For further information on compliance mechanisms and techniques in international environmental law, see: 
Philippe Sands, 'Compliance with international environmental obligations: existing international legal arrangements' 
in Jacob Werksman, James Cameron and Peter Roderick (eds), Improving Compliance with International 
Environmental Law (Routledge, 1996) 48. 
22 Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945 (1945) 1 UNTS XVI (entered into force 24 
October 1945) Annex: Statute of the International Court of Justice (‘Statute of the International Court of Justice’). 
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clear from this provision that in a dispute commenced before the ICJ for breach of the Biosafety 
Protocol, the ICJ is also empowered to consider the WTO agreements, providing that the parties are 
members of the WTO. 
The procedures for arbitration of a dispute involving the Biosafety Protocol are set out in Part 1 of Annex 
II of the CBD. Article 4 states as follows: 
The arbitral tribunal shall render its decisions in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, any 
protocols concerned, and international law. 
Accordingly, it appears that if the parties to the dispute before the arbitral tribunal are members of the 
WTO, then the WTO agreements form part of the body of ‘international law’ and can be considered by 
the arbitral tribunal in rendering its decision. However, Article 1 of Part 1 of Annex II of the CBD 
relevantly states: 
The claimant party shall notify the secretariat that the parties are referring a dispute to arbitration pursuant 
to Article 27. The notification shall state the subject-matter of arbitration and include, in particular, the 
articles of the Convention or the protocol, the interpretation or application of which are at issue. 
Reading Article 1 and Article 4 together, it can be argued that consideration of ‘international law’ is 
limited to the determination of the articles of the CBD or the protocol (in this case the Biosafety Protocol) 
in dispute.23 Whether the arbitral tribunal can determine, apply and enforce the provisions of the WTO 
agreements, say for example as a cross-claim or a point in defence, is uncertain. As there has yet to 
be any case law on this point, the approach that would be taken by an arbitral tribunal is unknown. 
Hypothetically, one would assume that the international judicial institution, in this case the arbitral panel 
formed under the CBD, would revert to its raison d'être in determining the scope of its jurisdiction – its 
formation to oversee a specialised agreement in international law. Thus the discussion returns to the 
characteristics of specialised regimes (their independence and linkages), demonstrating the circular 
nature of this scholarly research.  
B WTO Disputes: Applying non-WTO Agreements 
This section will consider whether the WTO Panels have power to determine disputes where the trade 
measures in question are taken pursuant to (or are otherwise justified by) the provisions of non-WTO 
agreements. This issue involves two separate questions for consideration:- (1) Can the provisions of 
the Biosafety Protocol form part of the substantive claim before the WTO Panel; and (2) Can the 
provisions of the Biosafety Protocol otherwise be considered by the WTO Panel in determining the 
rights and obligations of the parties in the dispute? The extent to which non-WTO norms, as a 
substantive claim, can be considered by the WTO Panel, will be considered first.  
                                                     
23 Pursuant to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 
1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) (‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’), ‘A treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose’. 
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The WTO Panels are not embodied with jurisdiction pursuant to the DSU to determine claims made 
pursuant to rights under non-WTO international agreements or even WTO rules that are outside of the 
Covered Agreements listed in Appendix 1.24  However, there is a distinction between jurisdiction and 
applicable law. If the parties wish for the WTO Panel to determine a breach of the provisions of the 
Biosafety Protocol as a substantive legal claim, then the WTO Panel would need to consider its 
jurisdiction over such proceedings. Clearly, such proceedings do not fall within the very specific 
jurisdictional provisions of the WTO DSU that give rise to a cause of action (and legal standing to 
commence such proceedings). Therefore jurisdiction would need to be bestowed ad hoc by mutual 
consent of the parties as a specific term of reference for the WTO Panel formed to determine the 
dispute.25  The validity of conferring such jurisdiction and the mechanism for this action is untested and 
potentially contentious, thereby raising a whole new avenue of scholarly discussion which is outside the 
scope of this thesis.26  
Less clear is the situation where the claim before the WTO Panel properly involves the provisions of 
the WTO Covered Agreements, but also involves issues under the Biosafety Protocol. Pauwelyn posed 
the question succinctly in the following terms:  ‘do WTO panels still have jurisdiction, and, if so, should 
they exercise this jurisdiction, in the event the dispute largely concerns other rules of international 
law?’.27 Given the express reference contained in Art 3(2) of the DSU, it is generally accepted that it is 
within the power of the WTO Panel to refer to and apply general international law when interpreting 
WTO trade agreements.28 This turns to the consideration of the ‘applicable law’, which was mentioned 
in the preceding paragraph as being distinct from the ‘jurisdiction’ of the judicial institution. In addition, 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,29 as discussed in chapter 4, provides 
for the consideration of those rules of international law which are applicable to the relations between all 
parties to the treaty which is being interpreted.30 The consideration of general international law as a tool 
for interpreting the WTO agreements was confirmed by the Appellate Body in US — Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline: 
The general rule of interpretation [as set out in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties] has attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law. As such, it forms part 
of the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ which the Appellate Body has been 
directed, by Article 3(2) of the DSU, to apply in seeking to clarify the provisions of the General Agreement 
and the other ‘covered agreements’ of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (the ‘WTO Agreement’). That direction reflects a measure of recognition that the General 
Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law.31 
                                                     
24 Henry Gao and Chin Leng Lim, 'Saving the WTO from the Risk of Irrelevance: The WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism as a ‘Common Good’ for RTA Disputes' (2008) 11(4) Journal of International Economic Law 899, 906. 
25 Pauwelyn, above n 3, 444. 
26 See further: ibid. 
27 Ibid 454. 
28 See: ibid. 
29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31(3)(c). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc 
WT/DS2/AB/R and WT/DS4/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (29 April 1996), 17. 
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It is now well settled that non-WTO agreements between the parties, can be used as a tool for 
interpreting the WTO agreements. However, the extent to which non-WTO agreements, such as the 
Biosafety Protocol, will operate so as to amend, influence or otherwise challenge, the obligations of the 
parties under the WTO agreements is unknown. Particularly given the proviso in Article 3(2) of the DSU 
that ‘[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements.’ It was anticipated that this issue may have been considered by 
the WTO Panel in the European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products (‘EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products’) case.32 
In this regard, Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that when 
interpreting a treaty, it shall be taken into account together with: 
 (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.33 
As stated in chapter 1, the complainants in this case were not parties to the Biosafety Protocol (although 
Argentina and Canada had signed the Biosafety Protocol, they had not ratified it), accordingly, this 
thorny issue did not need to be determined by the WTO Panel: 
it is important to note that the present case is not one in which relevant rules of international law are 
applicable in the relations between all parties to the dispute, but not between all WTO Members, and in 
which all parties to the dispute argue that a multilateral WTO agreement should be interpreted in the light 
of these other rules of international law. Therefore, we need not, and do not, take a position on whether 
in such a situation we would be entitled to take the relevant other rules of international law into account.34 
In addition to considering the extent to which the WTO Panel can consider and apply the provisions of 
non-WTO agreements that are relevant to the dispute, it is pertinent to consider if the WTO Panel should 
do so. Returning to the issue of competing jurisdiction, if the dispute involves non-WTO issues, should 
the WTO Panel refrain from determining the dispute or should it ‘carve-out’ these non-WTO issues?  
One view is that the WTO Panel formed to determine the dispute pursuant to its jurisdiction under the 
Covered Agreements is not required to suspend proceedings due to the existence of these other issues 
in dispute.35 The general proposition underlying this view was adopted by the ICJ in United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, where the Court found that: 
No provision of the Statute or Rules contemplates that the Court should decline to take cognizance of one 
aspect of a dispute merely because the dispute has other aspects, however important.36  
                                                     
32 Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
WTO Doc WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (29 September 2006) (‘EC — Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products’). 
33 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31(3)(c). 
34 Panel Report, EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO Doc WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, 
WT/DS293/R, [7.72]. 
35 Pauwelyn, above n 3, 451. 
36 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) (Judgment) [1980] ICJ 
Rep 3, 19. 
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Further, there is no provision in the DSU that empowers a WTO Panel, once properly formed, to 
suspend DSU proceedings in the absence of the agreement of the parties.37  However, there have been 
circumstances where a WTO Panel has opted to not determine certain issues in the dispute 
proceedings before it. For instance, in the dispute United States — Measures Affecting Imports of 
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses, India appealed the decision of the Panel not to determine all of India’s 
claims.38  Relying on the principle of judicial economy (conservation of the limited resources of the 
judicial system), the Appellate Body held: 
Nothing in this provision [Article 11 of the DSU] or in previous GATT practice requires a panel to examine 
all legal claims made by the complaining party. 
Given the explicit aim of dispute settlement that permeates the DSU, we do not consider that Article 3.2 
of the DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to ‘make law’ by clarifying existing 
provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular dispute. A panel need only 
address those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute.39 
(emphasis in original) 
This can be directly compared to the decision made under the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’)40 dispute resolution framework in both The MOX Plant Case and the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna dispute.41 As discussed earlier in this thesis,42 in both of these cases the UNCLOS 
proceedings were suspended in favour of overlapping claims before other dispute resolution institutions 
involving the same parties and the same factual matrix. The propensity of the UNCLOS arbitral tribunals 
to decline to exercise jurisdiction is curious. In both cases jurisdiction was clearly established under 
UNCLOS provisions. While the decision to suspend proceedings can be explained on the basis of both 
judicial economy and the principle of judicial comity (extending courtesy and respect to the laws and 
judicial institutions of other jurisdictions), the denial to adjudicate a State’s claim that is properly 
commenced, and with legal and jurisdictional foundation, raises other interesting legal issues relating 
to the right to a legal hearing. 
The proposition that the WTO Panel should, like the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal, suspend proceedings in 
favour of another more ‘appropriate’ international judicial institution turns to the question of the 
characterisation of the dispute — for example, whether the key issues in dispute between the parties is 
properly characterised as a WTO trade dispute or a claim under the Biosafety Protocol, or more broadly 
as a ‘trade dispute’ or an ‘international environmental dispute’. The jurisdiction of the WTO Panel, from 
                                                     
37 Kyung Kwak and Gabrielle Marceau, 'Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the World Trade 
Organization and Regional Trade Agreements' (2003) 41 Canadian Year Book of International Law 83, 105-106. 
38 Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses, WTO 
Doc WT/DS33/AB/R, AB-1991-1 (25 April 1997). 
39 Ibid 18-19. 
40 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 
(entered into force 16 November 1994). 
41 The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Order No. 3 — Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and 
Merits) (2003) 42 ILM 1187; Southern Bluefin Tuna (Australia v Japan) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (2000) 39 
ILM 1359. 
42 The boxed case study for the MOX Plant case is detailed in chapter 1, and the boxed case study for the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna dispute is contained in chapter 4. 
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a strictly legal perspective, is triggered by a claim falling under the WTO Covered Agreements. WTO 
members have a right of access to the DSU and no special leave is required to commence dispute 
resolution proceedings. The characterisation of the issues in dispute thus becomes a question of legal 
determination of the merits of the claim, rather than a matter of jurisdictional competence of the WTO 
Panel. This idea of the ‘proper’ characterisation of the issues between the parties leads us away from 
the legal question of jurisdiction to the muddier territory of whether or not it is appropriate or desirable, 
from a policy perspective, for the WTO Panel to abrogate its jurisdiction in favour of another international 
judicial body. While important, this thesis leaves the political agendas that drive preferences for the 
most dispute ‘appropriate’ forum to the work of other scholars. 
In considering conflict of jurisdiction specifically in relation to multiple proceedings involving the dispute 
mechanisms of the WTO and an RTA, Nguyen advanced the notion of ‘mutual integration’ of WTO and 
RTA norms.43 This approach utilises the rules of treaty interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to integrate WTO and RTA norms into each other to mitigate 
negative outcomes from divergent judicial rulings on the interpretation and application of the provisions 
in these trade agreements. However in regards to multiple proceedings involving provisions of an MEA 
and the WTO agreements, the differences in the regimes would be much more difficult to reconcile. 
This chapter next considers whether there exist provisions in the international agreements or applicable 
legal ‘principles’ of conflict resolution to resolve competing jurisdiction between dual dispute 
proceedings before the WTO Panel and pursuant to the Biosafety Protocol. 
IV EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION: NORMATIVE 
PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AND THE BIOSAFETY 
PROTOCOL 
In light of the two dispute resolution frameworks for trade disputes involving agricultural biotechnology 
products, we turn first to consider whether there are any normative provisions in the DSU or under the 
Biosafety Protocol that address the engagement of multiple judicial institutions. Judicial institutions are 
bound by the terms of reference of their enabling treaty, their own jurisprudence and their rules of 
procedure.44  In the Prosecutor v Tadic case (discussed in chapter 4), the Appeals Chamber for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) expressed this in the following terms: 
International law, because it lacks a centralized structure, does not provide for an integrated judicial 
system operating an orderly division of labour among a number of tribunals, where certain aspects or 
components of jurisdiction as a power could be centralized or vested in one of them but not the others. In 
international law, every tribunal is a self-contained system (unless otherwise provided). This is 
                                                     
43 Tan Son Nguyen, Conflicts of jurisdiction between dispute settlement mechanisms of the World Trade 
Organization and regional trade agreements: possibility and potential responses (Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, 
Monash University, 2013). 
44 Tullio Treves, 'Fragmentation of International Law: The Judicial Perspective' (2009) 16(27) Agenda International 
213, 233. 
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incompatible with a narrow concept of jurisdiction, which presupposes a certain division of labour. Of 
course, the constitutive instrument of an international tribunal can limit some of its jurisdictional powers, 
but only to the extent to which such limitation does not jeopardize its ‘judicial character’, as shall be 
discussed later on. Such limitations cannot, however, be presumed and, in any case, they cannot be 
deduced from the concept of jurisdiction itself.45 (emphasis added) 
In the absence of any prescriptive clause in the relevant treaties regarding the exclusive choice of forum, 
we are left with the general rules pertaining to treaty interpretation and jurisdictional conflict.46 The first 
point for consideration is whether the WTO DSU or the Biosafety Protocol contain provisions addressing 
the occurrence of overlapping jurisdiction with other international dispute institutions. This is considered 
below in turn. 
A Biosafety Protocol: Exclusive Jurisdiction? 
As stated above, the Biosafety Protocol adopts the general provisions in the CBD for dispute resolution. 
There is no specific reference in the Biosafety Protocol or the CBD relating to the forum of choice for 
dispute resolution or an exclusive jurisdiction clause that prohibits any other (subsequent or parallel) 
claims before a different judicial institution. This can be contrasted with the approach taken in many 
RTAs which provide for the selection of either the RTA’s dispute framework or the WTO Panel as an 
exclusive forum for the resolution of the dispute between the parties.47  
The Preamble to the Biosafety Protocol contains three relevant statements referring to the relationship 
of the Biosafety Protocol with other international agreements (also called a ‘savings clause’): 
Recognizing that trade and environment agreements should be mutually supportive with a view to 
achieving sustainable development, 
Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations 
of a Party under any existing international agreements,  
                                                     
45 Prosecutor v Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) (International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995) [11]. 
46 See: Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 
2004), 180. 
47 For example, such clauses can be found in the following RTAs: North American Free Trade Agreement, opened 
for signature 17 December 1992 (1993) 32 ILM 605 (entered into force 1 January 1994); Olivos Protocol for the 
Settlement of Disputes in Mercosur, opened for signature 18 February 2002, 42 ILM 2 (entered into force on 10 
February 2004), Article 1(2); Agreement between the EFTA States and the Republic of Chile, signed 26 June 2003 
(entered into force 1 December 2004)Article 88; United States — Singapore Free Trade Agreement, signed 6 May 
2003, 42 ILM 1026 (entered into force 1 January 2004) , Article 20.4 (3)(c);United States — Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, signed 18 May 2004, 43 ILM 1248 (entered into force 1 January 2005), Article 21.4; Dominican 
Republic — Central America — United States Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature 5 August 2004, 43 ILM 
514 (entered into force 1 March 2006), Article 20.3; United States — Singapore Free Trade Agreement, signed on 
May 6, 2003, text is available at <http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Singapore/final.htm>; Agreement between Japan and 
the Republic of Singapore for a New-Age Economic Partnership, signed on January 13, 2002 and entered into 
force on November 30, 2002, text is available at <http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/FTA/ frm_FTADefault.asp?sid=28>; 
Singapore — Australia Free Trade Agreement, signed on February 17, 2003 and entered into force on July 28, 
2003, text is available at <http://www.austlii. edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2003/16.html>. 
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Understanding that the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other international 
agreements.48 
The Preamble to Biosafety Protocol does not utilising any paragraph numbering — accordingly, for ease 
of reference in this thesis, these statements will be referred to as the ‘first’, ‘second’ and ‘third’ statement 
respectively, in the order they appear above. 
Before considering these statements and their relevance to the issue of conflict of jurisdiction (as a 
potential exclusive jurisdiction clause), it is necessary to briefly provide some background on the 
operation of ‘savings clauses’ in international law. 
As there exists no ‘inherent hierarchy’ between international agreements, all international agreements 
are in principle of equal value.49 This basic premise is then altered by the application of principles such 
as lex posterior (provisions of a later treaty prevail over the inconsistent provisions of an earlier treaty) 
and lex specialis (provisions of a specific-matter treaty overrides a general-matter treaty). The principle 
of lex posterior has also been codified in Article 30(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not 
terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its 
provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.50 
Where the later treaty does not include all of the parties to the earlier treaty, the later treaty prevails 
only with respect to those who are party to both agreements.51 The rule enunciated in Article 30(3) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,52 can be altered by the inclusion of a savings clause in 
the subsequent treaty that has the effect of ‘saving’ the incompatible provision of the early agreement.53  
1 First Statement in the Biosafety Protocol Savings Clause 
The first statement indicates a general preference for compatibility between trade and environmental 
agreements. This statement does little more than repeat the fundamental principle of legal interpretation 
for a presumption against conflict between treaties as enunciated by Jenks in his 1953 publication: 
The presumption against an interpretation which involves a conflict between law-making treaties is simply 
a detailed application of such fundamental principles of treaty interpretation as the principle of 
reasonableness, the principle of good faith, and the presumption of consistency with international law.54 
                                                     
48 Biosafety Protocol, Preamble. It is noted that the Preamble contains eleven different statements, however only 
the last three statements potentially constitute a ‘savings clause’ and are relevant to the issue conflict of jurisdiction. 
49 Joost Pauwelyn, 'The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How far can we go?' (2001)  American Journal 
of International Law 535, 545. 
50 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 30(3). 
51 Ibid Article 30(4). 
52 Ibid Article 30(3). 
53 Sabrina Safrin, 'Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade Organization Agreements' 
(2002) 96(3) American Journal of International Law 606 at 613. 
54 C Wilfred Jenks, 'The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties' (1953) 30 British Yearbook of International Law 401, 428. 
Also see: Gabrielle Marceau, 'Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions: The Relationship between the WTO 
Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties' (2001) 35(6) Journal of World Trade 1081; Ian McTaggart Sinclair, The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester University Press, 2nd ed, 1984) and Safrin, above n 53. 
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The presumption against conflict arises from the fact that, due to the absence of a hierarchy between 
international legal norms, all new international agreements are negotiated in the context that pre-
existing international treaties continue to exist, unless and until new international treaties overturn these 
provisions.55 Accordingly, a finding of conflict between treaties is one of ‘last rather than first resort’.56  
In conclusion, the first statement in the Biosafety Protocol savings clause does little more than restate 
the optimistic policy objective of the parties for environment and trade agreements to coexist. 
2 Second and Third Statements in the Biosafety Protocol 
Savings Clause 
In analysing the second and third statements in the Biosafety Protocol savings clause, it is helpful to 
conceptualise the application of these provisions to dual proceedings brought under both the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism and the Biosafety Protocol (pursuant to Article 27 of the CBD). In such 
a scenario, an argument could be raised challenging the jurisdiction of the WTO Panel on the basis that 
the third statement provides that it is not intended by the Parties that the Biosafety Protocol be 
‘subordinate’ to other international agreements. Accordingly, the argument would follow that the WTO 
Panel should therefore refrain from exercising jurisdiction in favour of the proceedings commenced 
under the Biosafety Protocol which is arguably the more specific treaty (lex specialis). However, the 
second statement in the savings clause, that the Biosafety Protocol ‘shall not be interpreted as implying 
a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements’, seems 
to give support to the jurisdiction of the WTO Panel to determine disputes between the parties. It is 
noted that the second and third statement would equally be relevant to arguments challenging the 
jurisdiction regarding the parallel proceedings commenced under the Biosafety Protocol (however, this 
would only apply to compulsory proceedings pursuant to Article 27(3) of the CBD, as otherwise the 
defending party would not agree to the commencement of the proceedings).  
What is the effect of the second and third statements in the Biosafety Protocol savings clause and do 
they assist to solve conflict of jurisdiction involving parallel proceedings under the WTO agreements 
and the Biosafety Protocol? At first reading, the second and third statements appear to be conflicting 
statements. Looking at the second statement, it acts to preserve the rights of the parties under existing 
international agreements. There was a strong push during the negotiations of the Biosafety Protocol by 
the negotiating block knows as the ‘Miami Group’ (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the United 
States, and Uruguay) for the inclusion of a clause in the operative text of the Biosafety Protocol that 
ensured that the rights and obligations under the WTO agreements continued to apply to trade in Living 
Modified Organisms (LMOs) covered by the Biosafety Protocol.57 In the absence of the inclusion of a 
‘savings’ provision, Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties would apply and 
                                                     
55 Pauwelyn, above n 49, 550. 
56 Safrin, above n 53, at 623 
57 Report of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties for the Adoption of the Protocol on Biosafety 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/3 (20 February 2000) 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/excop-01/official/excop-01-03-en.pdf'>, Outstanding Issues and Necessary 
Revisions to the Text of the Draft Protocol: Submission by the Miami Group, at 17, [ 7(a)]. 
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accordingly the Biosafety Protocol would prevail over the earlier WTO agreements.58 The European 
Union (EU) suggested the inclusion of the following wording in the Preamble (it is noted that this 
paragraph did not make it to the final text of the Biosafety Protocol in this precise form): 
Recognising that the Parties to the Protocol should implement this Protocol in a manner mutually 
supportive of their other international obligations.59 
The ‘Like-Minded Group’ (made up of mostly developing countries) proposed a compromise ‘savings’ 
clause that followed Article 22 of the CBD such that in the event of a conflict between the Biosafety 
Protocol and an earlier agreement, the earlier agreement would prevail, ‘except where the exercise of 
those [earlier] rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity’.60 
The inclusion of the third statement in the Biosafety Protocol savings clause reflected the wording used 
in the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade — this agreement had been concluded in September 
1998, only five months prior to the start of the negotiations in Cartagena for the Biosafety Protocol.61 
The third statement addressed the political concern expressed at the time that environmental 
agreements were perceived to be of less importance than trade agreements.62 Ultimately, the two 
statements in the Preamble, which form a ‘compromise’ between the positions of the different 
negotiating groups, were only agreed upon in the final hours of the negotiations. 
Before considering the interplay between the second and third statement, it is necessary to consider 
whether the fact that these statements appear in the Preamble, and not the operative provisions of the 
text, has any repercussions. As a savings clause details the intentions of the parties to preserve existing 
rights rather than imposing an obligation on the parties, it is not an operative provision in itself. 
Accordingly, there is some argument that savings clauses correctly belong in the preamble to a treaty. 
In any event, Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (which would apply in the 
absence of a savings clause) does not distinguish between the different parts of the agreement. Further, 
in detailing the rules for interpretation of treaties, Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties refers to the ‘preamble’ as part of a treaty: 
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including 
its preamble and annexes. ...63 
                                                     
58 Report of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties for the Adoption of the Protocol on Biosafety 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/3 (20 February 2000) 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/excop-01/official/excop-01-03-en.pdf>, Submission by the European Union 
Annex II, at 16, para. 3. 
59 Ibid, Submission by the European Union Annex II, at 16, [ 3]. 
60 Ibid, Submission by the Like-Minded Group of Countries, Annex IV, at 19. 
61 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade, opened for signature 10 September 1998, 2244 UNTS 337 (entered into force 24 
February 2004). 
62 Safrin, above n 53 at 620 
63 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31(2). 
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It is generally accepted by legal scholars that declaratory statements reflecting the intent of the parties 
may be expressed either in the preamble or in the operative articles of the agreement.64 For example, 
in his seminal publication in 1957 on treaty interpretation, Sir Gerald Gray Fitzmaurice, former Senior 
Judge of the ICJ and former Judge of the European Court of Human Rights, specifically considered the 
nature of clauses contained in the preamble of treaties and concluded:  
Although the objects of a treaty may be gathered from its operative clauses taken as a whole, the preamble 
is the normal place in which to embody, and the natural place in which to look for, any express or explicit 
general statement of the treaty's objects and purposes. Where these are stated in the preamble, the latter 
will, to that extent, govern the whole treaty.65 
For these reasons, it is concluded that the parties intended to give effect to the savings clause in the 
Preamble of the Biosafety Protocol. 
There are three ways that the inter-relationship between the second and third statements in the 
Biosafety Protocol savings clause can be interpreted: 
1. The third statement effectively undermines the second statement, with the result that the 
‘savings’ provision preserving existing rights and obligations in international agreements is 
nullified. 
2. The third statement simply reflects the intention of the parties that the Biosafety Protocol was 
to be held in the same status as other international agreements, but that it does not undermine 
the operation of the second statement to preserve the rights and obligations under existing 
international agreements. 
3. The second and third statements are inconsistent or at least, unclear, leaving the relationship 
between the Biosafety Protocol and other international agreements uncertain.  
While there has been some scholarly literature supporting each of the above three divergent views on 
the application of the savings provision in the Biosafety Protocol to a conflict of norms, this doctoral 
thesis considers the relevance of the savings provision in the Biosafety Protocol, if any, to a conflict of 
jurisdiction.66 In terms of a dispute giving rise to a conflict of jurisdiction, the operation of these 
                                                     
64 See: Sinclair, above n 54, Safrin, above n 53; Gerald Fitzmaurice, 'The Law and Procedure of the International 
Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points' (1957) 33 British Yearbook of International 
Law 203. 
65 Fitzmaurice, above n 64, 228. 
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a Balance Between Progress and Safety (Conservation International, Center for Applied Biodiversity Science, 
2000); Paul E Hagen and John Barlow Weiner, 'The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: New Rules for International 
Trade in Living Modified Organisms' (1999) 12 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 697; Sean D 
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statements is uncertain. The statements do not expressly bestow exclusive jurisdiction on the judicial 
institutions listed in Article 27 of the CBD for disputes arising out of the trade in agricultural 
biotechnology. It is then a question of whether the statements can be interpreted as indicating an 
intention of the parties to confer exclusive jurisdiction to one dispute forum or another. Given the 
ambiguity surrounding the overall effect of statements two and three in the savings clause of the 
Biosafety Protocol, it is unlikely that a judicial institution would read in this intention by virtue of the 
‘savings’ provision in the Preamble. As was noted by the International Law Commission (ILC) in its 2006 
report on fragmentation of international law, judicial institutions are inherently biased to interpret savings 
clauses in their own favour:   
 Nevertheless, the resulting interpretative openness creates a danger of ‘structural bias’ — namely that 
what is understood as a ‘mutually supportive’ solution is determined in accordance with the priorities of 
the body whose task it is to interpret the conflict clause.67 
In the face of the ambiguity of the second and third statement in the Biosafety Protocol savings clause, 
the pre-disposition to maintain jurisdiction over proceedings will most likely take precedence. 
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the ‘savings’ provisions in the Preamble to the Biosafety Protocol will 
operate to void the jurisdiction of the WTO Panel, or in the alternative, establish exclusive jurisdiction 
under the Biosafety Protocol, in the circumstances of dual proceedings.  
In conclusion, the dispute resolution provisions in the Biosafety Protocol (and the CBD) do not provide 
for an exclusive forum for the resolution of trade disputes involving agricultural biotechnology.  
B WTO DSU: Exclusive Jurisdiction? 
The next issue to consider is whether the WTO Panel enjoys exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
international trade disputes between States. This section will now consider the specific provisions of 
the DSU to determine whether the WTO DSU contains an exclusive jurisdiction clause. 
In regard to whether the WTO Panel has exclusive jurisdiction over trade disputes, Article 23 of the 
DSU is relevant. Article 23 of the DSU prevents States from engaging in unilateral determinations of 
breach of ‘trade law’ or the imposition of countermeasures outside the ‘specific subsystem’ of the WTO 
regime.68  Specifically, Article 23.1 states: 
When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits 
under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered 
agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding. 
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As noted above, the WTO DSU only has jurisdiction to determine disputes brought before it for relief 
involving the provisions of the Covered Agreements. The jurisdiction does not extend generally to all 
‘trade’ issues. While Article 23.1 may bestow exclusive jurisdiction on the WTO DSU in regards to 
disputes involving the provisions of the Covered Agreements, whether it operates to deny jurisdiction 
to other international judicial institutions is less clear. This involves two separate considerations. First, 
does Article 23.1 operate so as to ‘pull in’ to its jurisdiction any and all disputes that involve questions 
of trade law?  Second, does Article 23.1 operate to negate the jurisdiction of another judicial institution 
if the proceedings involve questions of trade law (assuming that the proceedings also involve other 
substantive questions of law giving rise to the jurisdiction of that other judicial institution), thereby 
requiring that the other international judicial institution stay the proceedings before it, in favour of the 
case being brought before the WTO Panel?   
It is at this point that the distinction needs to be drawn between compulsory dispute resolution and an 
exclusive dispute resolution forum. Is the intention of Article 23.1 to simply create a framework where 
Member States are required to resolve disputes involving rights and obligations under the WTO 
Covered Agreements in the DSU instead of taking unilateral action?  Or does Article 23.1 invest the 
WTO Panel with exclusive jurisdiction over all other international judicial institutions for any dispute that 
involves the Covered Agreements? 
In 1999, the WTO Panel considered the ‘exclusive’ nature of the WTO DSU in United States — Sections 
301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US — Section 301 Trade Act’), and found:  
Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other 
system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one 
could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’ is an important new element of Members' rights and 
obligations under the DSU.69 
The ‘compulsory’ element of Article 23 was also referred to by a WTO Panel in US — Import Measures 
on Certain Products from the EC.70 In this case, the Panel held that Article 23.1 prohibits the unilateral 
determination that a violation of the WTO agreements has occurred and the unilateral imposition of 
suspensions of concessions or other obligations.71 In contrast to US — Section 301 Trade Act this case 
appears to indicate that the intention behind Article 23.1 was to prevent unilateral action by Member 
States in response to perceived infringements of their rights under the WTO agreements; Article 23.1 
was not intentionally designed to establish an ‘exclusive’ judicial forum. This reasoning is consistent 
with the timing of the negotiation of the WTO DSU, which corresponded with the two proceedings United 
States — Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (commonly known as ‘Tuna-Dolphin I’ and ‘Tuna-Dolphin 
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II’),72 and the concerns about the unilateral imposition by States of trade-restrictive measures on 
environmental grounds.73  
However, in the more recent case Canada Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC — Hormones 
Dispute, the Appellate Body held that Article 23.1 restricts the conduct of WTO members in the following 
two ways:  
First, Article 23.1 establishes the WTO dispute settlement system as the exclusive forum for the resolution 
of such disputes and requires adherence to the rules of the DSU. Secondly, Article 23.2 prohibits certain 
unilateral action by a WTO Member.74 
The use of the word ‘exclusive’ in this case is somewhat ambiguous, given that the DSU itself limits the 
scope of its jurisdiction to the provisions of the Covered Agreements. The holes in the argument that 
the WTO Panel is the ‘exclusive’ dispute forum for all trade issues, appears from the treatment afforded 
in the WTO cases to RTAs (pursuant to Article XXIV General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(‘GATT 1994’)).75 These agreements contain varying dispute resolution clauses, many of which set up 
their own dispute resolution framework. Arguably, the resolution of trade issues under these 
agreements falls outside the purview of the Covered Agreements and therefore the DSU — despite the 
fact that the key purpose of these agreements is to regulate the trading relations between the parties, 
consistent with the WTO framework. The Appellate Body alluded to this in the Mexico — Tax Measures 
on Soft Drink and Other Beverages (‘Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks’) case, in which it held that it was 
not the function of the WTO Panel to determine whether there was a violation of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’), being a non-WTO agreement.76 
It is not necessarily contentious to propose that if the primary claim of the applicant involves an alleged 
breach of the WTO Covered Agreements by another State, then such a claim should, and would, be 
brought before the WTO DSU pursuant to Article 23.1. Similarly, it is clear that Article 23.1 does not 
nullify the jurisdiction of another tribunal to determine a dispute that involves trade measures that are 
not contained in the Covered Agreements. However, it is less clear whether Article 23.1 ostensibly pulls 
into the ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction of the WTO DSU all disputes which may involve the application and 
interpretation of the WTO Covered Agreements. This could occur in a scenario where the provisions in 
the Covered Agreements do not form the substance of the claim, but, for example, they are raised in 
defence to claim.  
In considering the extent to which Article 23.1 ‘pulls in’ all disputes that involve the potential 
interpretation and application of the Covered Agreements, it is useful to compare the wording of Article 
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23.1 with the exclusive jurisdiction clause in Article 344 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, (previously Article 292 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community), which, as stated in chapter 4, is a classic example of an exclusive jurisdiction clause.77 
Article 344 provides: 
Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein. 
In the MOX Plant dispute, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) considered whether the parallel 
proceedings before the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal (which had been stayed pending the ECJ judgment) 
had any bearing on its exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving EU law and held:  
An international agreement such as the Convention cannot affect the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court in 
regard to the resolution of disputes between Member States concerning the interpretation and application 
of Community law.78  
Accordingly, the ECJ found that the wording used in Article 344 required EU Member States to bring 
disputes involving EU law exclusively before the ECJ, regardless of the valid jurisdiction of another 
judicial institution. The ECJ held that EU Members are required to bring all proceedings that potentially 
involve questions of EU law before the ECJ as: 
It is for the Court, should the need arise, to identify the elements of the dispute which relate to provisions 
of the international agreement in question which fall outside its jurisdiction.79 
In this way, the exclusive jurisdiction clause of the ECJ operates to ‘pull in’ all disputes between EU 
Member States that involve EU law. In comparison, Article 23.1 of the WTO DSU does not expressly 
prevent members from commencing disputes before other international judicial institutions where that 
dispute may involve the interpretation and application of the WTO Covered Agreements. While parties 
are required under Article 23.1 to bring disputes to the WTO Panel, this provision falls short of 
conclusively stating that only the WTO Panel has the power to adjudicate on disagreements that may 
involve the interpretation and application of the WTO Covered Agreements. Given the fragmented and 
independent nature of international judicial institutions, it would be reasonable to assume that a judicial 
institution (not being the WTO Panels) would be reluctant to stay or dismiss proceedings properly 
commenced before it on the basis of the WTO Panel claiming exclusive jurisdiction over part of the 
subject matter in the dispute. Although, as noted above, the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal seems willing to 
yield its jurisdiction over proceedings, this is the exception not the rule. 
Adding weight to the argument that the WTO Panel is not an exclusive jurisdiction forum (in the context 
of being the only judicial body that can determine claims involving the WTO agreements) is the provision 
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contained in Article 11(3) of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(‘SPS Agreement’): 
Nothing in this Agreement shall impair the rights of Members under other international agreements, 
including the right to resort to the good offices or dispute settlement mechanisms of other international 
organizations or established under any international agreement.80 
The SPS Agreement, is one of the WTO Covered Agreements, and relates to food safety and animal 
and plant health measures — making it particularly relevant to trade disputes involving agricultural 
biotechnology.  
In summary, neither the WTO agreements nor the Biosafety Protocol contain exclusion jurisdiction 
provisions. Accordingly, in the event of parallel dispute proceedings brought under the WTO 
agreements and also under the Biosafety Protocol involving trade in agricultural biotechnology, the 
following questions remain: 
1. Should a non-WTO judicial institution abdicate its jurisdiction to the WTO Panel if the 
substantive issues in the dispute properly brought before it involve WTO law? 
2. Should the WTO Panel abdicate its jurisdiction if the substantive issues in the dispute properly 
brought before it involve non-WTO law? 
The next section of the chapter considers whether any other provisions or principles (outside of the two 
relevant treaties) assist with resolving the conflict of jurisdiction.  
V PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES 
In the absence of normative provisions in either the WTO DSU or the Biosafety Protocol specifying the 
appropriate jurisdiction for the resolution of disputes, we are left to consider the application of conflict 
of jurisdiction rules found in private international law. As a preliminary issue, it is necessary to analyse 
the basis for the application of these private international law principles by the WTO Panel or the dispute 
body engaged under the CBD.  
In relation to disputes referred to the ICJ under the Biosafety Protocol, Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice provides that the Court shall apply (amongst other things) international 
custom (as evidence of a general practice accepted as law) and general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations. For arbitration of disputes arising under the Biosafety Protocol, Article 4 in Part 1 
of Annex II of the CBD states that the arbitral tribunal is empowered to take into account ‘international 
law’ in rendering its decision. These broad statements provide a general legal basis for the application 
of conflict of jurisdiction principles. In the alternative, judicial institutions also enjoy an inherent power 
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to determine jurisdiction. This will be discussed further in the next paragraph in relation to the WTO 
Panel. 
Turning to the power of the WTO Panel to apply the conflict of jurisdiction principles, Article 3.2 of the 
DSU empowers the WTO Panels to apply the principles of general international law when interpreting 
the Covered Agreements. It is arguable that Article 3(2) confers the power on the WTO Panel to apply 
the principles of private international law in determining whether it has substantive jurisdiction pursuant 
to the Covered Agreements to hear a claim brought before it. Another basis for reliance on the general 
principles of conflict of jurisdiction is founded on the inherent powers of the court. The WTO Panels, like 
all international judicial institutions, possess inherent powers to determine whether (or not) they have 
jurisdiction to hear a case. Relevantly, there are two aspects to this inherent power: 1) the inherent 
power to determine whether substantive jurisdiction to determine the dispute exists; 2) the inherent 
power to determine whether or not to refrain from deciding the dispute where substantive jurisdiction 
has been established.81 It is pursuant to these inherent powers that the WTO Panels can utilise the 
conflict of jurisdiction principles found in private international law. 
The WTO Panel does not have a long history of applying its inherent powers regarding jurisdiction, 
however it has recognised their existence. These inherent powers to determine jurisdiction are derived 
under the principle of la competence de la competence, and were endorsed by the Appellate Body of 
the WTO in the case United States — Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, where it recognised that there is a: 
widely accepted rule that an international tribunal is entitled to consider the issue of its own jurisdiction on 
its own initiative and to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case that comes before it.82  
In the case Mexico — Corn Syrup, the Appellate Body went one step further, holding that when there 
is an issue relating to substantive jurisdiction to determine the dispute, WTO Panels ‘must deal with 
such issues — if necessary, on their own motion — in order to satisfy themselves that they have 
authority to proceed’.83 The Appellate Body reaffirmed this in the Appellate Body Report, United States 
— Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 case, holding that it was within its power to 
review the issue of jurisdiction even if this issue was not set out in the Notice of Appeal because: 
the issue of a panel's jurisdiction is so fundamental that it is appropriate to consider claims that a panel 
has exceeded its jurisdiction even if such claims were not raised in the Notice of Appeal.84 
Although these private international law principles relating to the resolution of jurisdictional conflict are 
accepted generally as valid legal principles, the relevance of these principles to matters involving issues 
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of public international law is less certain.85 These principles (as introduced and discussed broadly in 
Chapter 4) will now be analysed in relation to the case study. 
1 Forum Non Conveniens and Substantial Connection   
The discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a judicial institution to decline jurisdiction in 
the favour of another more ‘appropriate’ forum.86 In private international law, it is more commonly 
applied to determine the forum most ‘convenient’ having regard to factors such as expenses, the 
availability of witnesses, the applicable law, physical residence and nationality of the parties, place of 
business, location of the judges, and the general interest of justice. The same considerations apply to 
the doctrine of ‘substantial connection’ — that the ‘appropriate’ judicial forum is determined by which 
judicial institution has the best ‘connection’ with the parties, and the transaction or the place where the 
dispute occurred. As discussed in chapter 4, most of these factors are irrelevant to disputes between 
States involving matters of public international law. In relation to a dispute involving trade in agricultural 
biotechnology between States, it would be difficult to substantiate an argument that one judicial 
institution was a more appropriate forum than another, given the international character of the dispute 
and the resources of States.  This would particularly be the case if the two dispute resolution frameworks 
engaged were the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and the ICJ — given the permanent nature and 
legal standing of both of these frameworks. In conclusion, neither the principles of forum non 
conveniens or ‘substantial connection’ provide a convincing solution to parallel disputes between two 
States relating to the trade in agricultural biotechnology. 
2 Lis Alibi Pendens and Judicial Comity 
The principle of lis alibi pendens empowers a court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction on the basis 
of parallel litigation taking place in another jurisdiction. As discussed in chapter 4, the case law has cast 
doubt over the application of lis alibi pendens to disputes before international judicial institutions.87 In 
international law, there are no formal institutional linkages between the international judicial institutions 
that would create a judicial ‘system’ with a judicial hierarchy. On the contrary, international judicial 
institutions operate independently from each other and there is no doctrine of precedent. Accordingly, 
the application of lis alibi pendens as a bar to parallel legal proceedings commenced before different 
international dispute resolution frameworks is problematic.88 A judicial institution constituted to hear a 
dispute under the Biosafety Protocol is completely independent from the formation of a WTO Panel. 
Further, the claims before one judicial institution may not be identical to the claims under the other 
judicial institution. It follows that the judicial institutions under the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO Panel 
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may not be amenable to applying the principle of lis alibi pendens to refrain from determining a dispute 
over which they have substantive jurisdiction. From a scholarly perspective, we easily associate 
negative connotations with the prospect of competing proceedings and the potential for conflicting 
rulings. However, a judicial institution, empowered to uphold and enforce rights and obligations under 
the agreement(s) which it oversees, is justifiably biased towards exercising its judicial function. In fact, 
the potential for conflicting judgments where the other judicial institution may deal with the legal claims 
differently (or if the legal grounds open to the parties in the other proceedings are different) may be 
more of a reason for an international judicial institution to ‘hold on’ to its jurisdiction. Compiling these 
motivations with the uncertainty in the case law, it is unlikely that the principle of lis alibi pendens would 
be exercised in the event of parallel proceedings commenced before the WTO Panel and also under 
the Biosafety Protocol. 
Consideration is now given to the principle of ‘judicial comity’ — that one judicial institution will refrain 
from exercising its jurisdiction to determine a case as a courtesy to, and out of respect for, another 
judicial institution before which parallel proceedings are on foot. As discussed in chapter 4, while the 
principle of judicial comity is an amicable ‘solution’ to the challenges posed by parallel proceedings, it 
is at odds with the demonstrated preference of judicial institutions to exercise jurisdiction if they possibly 
can.  
In relation to the WTO Panel, the application of the principle of judicial comity has been advocated by 
Henckels, who proposes that the WTO Panel should use its ‘inherent power to apply comity’ and decline 
to exercise jurisdiction in appropriate cases of competing jurisdiction.89 However, the principle of comity 
is not a magic solution to overlapping jurisdiction between the WTO Panel and the dispute resolution 
body under the Biosafety Protocol. Looking first at proceedings before the WTO Panel, there is no 
normative provision in the DSU vesting the WTO Panel with the power to exercise judicial comity. In 
fact, it is quite the opposite — the decision to decline to exercise legally valid jurisdiction may amount 
to a denial of the rights of the Parties under Article 23 to have recourse to the provisions of the DSU for 
the resolution of the dispute.90  It could also be argued that such action could be a potential breach of 
the functions of the Panel under Article 11 to make an objective assessment of the matter before it. In 
the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case, the Appellate Body considered several key DSU provisions, 
including Articles 3.2, 7.1, 7.2, 11, 19.2, and 23 and upheld the conclusions of the WTO Panel that it 
‘would seem … not to be in a position to choose freely whether or not to exercise its jurisdiction’.91 In 
particular, the WTO Appellate Body stated: 
Under Article 11 of the DSU, a panel is, therefore, charged with the obligation to ‘make an objective 
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the 
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.’  Article 11 also requires that a panel 
‘make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings 
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provided for in the covered agreements.’  It is difficult to see how a panel would fulfil that obligation if it 
declined to exercise validly established jurisdiction and abstained from making any finding on the matter 
before it.92 
The Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Although a judicial 
institution’s inherent power to decline to exercise jurisdiction has a legal basis in international law, this 
must be balanced against compliance with specific normative obligations. The Appellate Body of the 
WTO recognised this tension and held that despite the existence of inherent powers, Panels are 
required by the DSU to determine the dispute once valid jurisdiction has been established.93 
The situation may not be the same in regards to proceedings pursuant to the Biosafety Protocol. There 
is no formalised right of ‘standing’ or specific obligations to determine disputes imposed on a judicial 
institution vested with power to hear a dispute involving the Biosafety Protocol. It is possible that in such 
circumstances, the judicial institution formed pursuant to the Biosafety Protocol (and the provisions of 
the CBD), could exercise judicial comity in favour of the WTO Panel proceedings. However, would the 
judicial institution formed to determine the Biosafety Protocol dispute take such action? This must be 
considered in the context that the request to exercise judicial comity is made by only one of the parties 
to the dispute — if both parties agreed, then the proceedings would be withdrawn or stayed by consent. 
It is possible that the international judicial institution formed to determine the Biosafety Protocol dispute, 
such as the ICJ, may exercise judicial comity. However, this is by no means a certainty. Even if one of 
the two judicial institutions engaged in the trade dispute involving agricultural biotechnology did in fact 
exercise judicial comity, the fact remains that this is a discretionary power and there is no certainty that 
a subsequent judicial institution would exercise this same discretion if faced with multiple proceedings. 
3 Good Faith and Abuse of Rights/Process 
Consideration is now given as to whether the second proceedings (either parallel or subsequent), may 
be viewed as an abuse of process or procedural rights, or otherwise as having been commenced in bad 
faith. Taking the three situations constituting an ‘abuse of process’ outlined by Cheng, the ‘right’ must 
have been exercised: (a) in a malicious manner, with the sole intent of causing injury to another; (b) in 
a ‘fictitious’ way, for a purpose utterly different from that for which the right was originally granted; or (c) 
in a wholly unreasonable manner, causing harm disproportionate to the right-holder’s interests.94 
Members are obliged at all times to respect both international agreements — with this comes the 
associated right to seek enforcement against another party of the obligations under the international 
agreement. Given the ‘right’ of access afforded to WTO members in Article 23.1 of the DSU, it is unlikely 
that a WTO Panel would find its proceedings to be an abuse of process or not in ‘good faith’, purely on 
the grounds of other parallel proceedings under the Biosafety Protocol (or any other multilateral treaty). 
The same reasoning also applies in reverse to dispute proceedings brought under the Biosafety 
Protocol — there is a legitimate expectation that members would uphold the rights and obligations 
                                                     
92 Ibid [51]. 
93 Ibid [48] — [53]. 
94 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by international Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 130. 
176  
 
afforded under this international agreement, including the right to seek to enforce these obligations. It 
is, therefore unlikely that the existence of the parallel proceedings itself is sufficient evidence of malice 
or being wholly unreasonable. As surmised by two academic scholars, the inclusion of various dispute 
resolution avenues indicates the intention of the States to retain the possibility of using these different 
judicial forums freely, yet in good faith.95 That said, the claim before the judicial institution must not be 
frivolous or manifestly groundless.96 Support for this principle can be found in Article 3.7 of the DSU 
itself, which states: 
Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgement as to whether action under these 
procedures would be fruitful. 
Further, given the independent nature of each international judicial institution, the argument that a State 
is limited to accessing only one judicial institution to the exclusion of others is unconvincing. This is 
particularly the case given that the applicant and respondent in the respective proceedings may well be 
reversed. In the event that the parallel proceedings involving a trade dispute between States where 
both seek the legitimate enforcement of rights and obligations under the WTO agreements or the 
Biosafety Protocol, it is unlikely (in the absence of any additional evidence) that an international judicial 
institution would refrain from exercising jurisdiction on the grounds of abuse of process or more 
generally, on the grounds that the claim was not brought in good faith. 
4 Res Judicata 
As discussed in chapter 4, the principle of res judicata (final decision on the legal issues in dispute 
between the parties), operates to prevent any subsequent legal action involving the same claim 
between the parties.  
In the situation that a State brings subsequent international legal proceedings (under the WTO DSU, or 
under the Biosafety Protocol, as the case may be) it is rather doubtful that the principle of res judicata 
would be applied by the relevant judicial institution as a bar to the subsequent proceedings, given: the 
independent nature of judicial institutions; the lack of any international judicial hierarchy; the absence 
of the doctrine of precedent in international law between specialised regimes (and generally even within 
the specialised regime); the separation between the specialised fields of international law; and the 
different nature of the claims and relief sought (one set of proceedings would be for breach of the WTO 
Covered Agreements and the other for breach of obligations under the Biosafety Protocol).97 
Nevertheless, given the general acceptance of res judicata as a principle of private international law, 
the elements of res judicata will briefly be considered in relation to this conflict of jurisdiction scenario. 
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As discussed in chapter 4, for the principle of res judicata to act as a bar to subsequent claims, the 
proceedings must involve: (a) the same parties; (b) the same relief sought; and (c) the same legal 
claims. These elements are considered one at a time. 
(a) Same Parties 
Dispute proceedings under the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO DSU involve States’ obligations under 
the respective international agreements. The right of standing to invoke the WTO DSU as a ‘Party’ to 
the dispute is only afforded to contracting States.98 This is the same as under Article 27 of the CBD 
which governs disputes concerning obligations under the Biosafety Protocol. It is assumed that the 
parties in the dispute are members of both the Biosafety Protocol and the DSU, otherwise the conflict 
of jurisdiction issue does not arise as the dispute resolution provisions can only be commenced against 
‘Parties’ to the relevant agreement. As discussed previously in this thesis, this was the situation in the 
EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products case as the United States is not a party to the 
Biosafety Protocol thereby leaving the WTO Panel as the sole international judicial body with jurisdiction 
over the dispute between those States. It is likely that both dispute proceedings would involve the same 
States and therefore the requirement of the ‘same parties’ would be satisfied. 
(b) Same Relief Sought 
For res judicata to apply as a tool limiting subsequent proceedings, the object of the two claims, being 
the relief sought, must be the same. This ‘petitum’ requirement, as discussed in chapter 4, refers to the 
remedies sought by the applicant. International tribunals have applied a broad interpretation to what 
constitutes ‘identical’ remedies between the two proceedings so as to avoid ‘claim-splitting’ by the 
applicant — that is, only bringing one claim at a time, so that subsequent proceedings can be 
commenced in the event the first claim is unsuccessful.99 Despite this approach, the remedies available 
pursuant to a cause of action for alleged breach of international environmental obligations will be vastly 
different from the remedies available under the WTO regime. This is not surprising as international 
environmental law and international trade law were developed to address very different objectives. It is 
difficult to envision how a claim for res judicata could be maintained against successive proceedings 
for damages, redress and estoppel for environmental breaches (damage to biodiversity resulting from 
living modified organisms) if the earlier proceedings sought the suspension of concessions under the 
WTO DSU (or vice versa). However, it may be a different situation if the proceedings commenced under 
the Biosafety Protocol relate purely to a breach of the trade provisions in the Biosafety Protocol. In any 
event, it would turn on the facts of the case. 
                                                     
98 Article 1(1) of the DSU provides that: ‘The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall also apply to 
consultations and the settlement of disputes between Members ……’ (emphasis added). 
99 August Reinisch, 'The Use and Limits of Res Judicata and Lis Pendens as Procedural Tools to Avoid Conflicting 
Dispute Settlement Outcomes' (2004) 3 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 37, 62. 
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(c) Same Legal Claims 
Turning to the issue of identical ‘causes of action’, the doctrine of res judicata only applies to bar 
subsequent proceedings where the ‘grounds’ of the two proceedings are identical. When considering 
conflict of jurisdiction in multi-faceted disputes, the cause of action is derived from different international 
instruments. While the facts in dispute would ostensibly involve the trade of agricultural biotechnology 
products, it would be difficult to argue that the claims under these two disputes are the ‘same legal 
claim’ — or that the ‘grounds’ are the same. One dispute would fall under the obligations contained in 
the Biosafety Protocol relating to the import/export of LMOs and the other claim would refer to the trade 
obligations on the same parties under the WTO agreements. The legal nature of these claims is derived 
from different international agreements. 
As mentioned in chapter 4, in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal categorised 
the legal issues between the parties as one single dispute even though the legal issues arose under 
two different Conventions.100 However, it is noted that in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, regardless of 
which ‘Convention’ applied to the dispute resolution between the parties, the ‘applicants’ in the dispute 
would be the same. The jurisdiction of the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal was challenged by Japan (the 
respondent) on the basis that Australia and New Zealand (the applicants) were properly required to 
comply with the dispute resolution provisions under the Convention for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna,101 (and accordingly the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal was without jurisdiction). This can be 
contrasted with the factual scenario where State (A) has commenced proceedings against State (B) 
under the Biosafety Protocol and then State (B) brings subsequent proceedings against State (A) under 
the WTO DSU — in this scenario, the applicants would be different and the claims would be different. 
With respect to the decision of the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, it is 
difficult to see how the cause of the action under two separate proceedings before the WTO Panel and 
under the Biosafety Protocol would be the ‘same cause of action’. Although the factual matrixes of the 
dispute are the same, the norms in question (that is the normative provisions that have allegedly been 
breached) are not the same. In fact, if the norms giving rise to the cause of action were identical, then 
arguably it would matter less which international judicial body heard the dispute. A key example of this 
conflict between the normative provisions relates to the use of the precautionary principle in the 
Biosafety Protocol as an acceptable tool for consideration in determining the restrictions of trade in 
LMOs. This differs from the scientific risk assessment approach under the SPS Agreement. 
In summary, it is unlikely that the principle res judicata will be applied by a judicial institution (formed 
either under the WTO DSU or the Biosafety Protocol) to bar subsequent legal proceedings in a dispute 
between States involving the trade in agricultural biotechnology. 
                                                     
100 Southern Bluefin Tuna (Australia v Japan) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (2000) 39 ILM 1359 [54]. 
101 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, opened for signature 10 May 1993, 1819 UNTS 359 
(entered into force 20 May 1994). 
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B Conflict of Norms Principles: A Solution for 
Competing Jurisdiction? 
Lastly, the principles relating to conflict between norms, namely, lex specialis and lex posterior are 
considered to determine what, if any, assistance they provide to resolve jurisdictional conflict arising 
out of competing proceedings before the WTO Panel and under the Biosafety Protocol. As discussed 
in chapter 4, overlapping jurisdiction between judicial institutions could potentially be characterised as 
a matter of conflict of norms between two treaties and accordingly be resolved by applying the principles 
of conflict of norms to the dispute in question.102 However, concern has been expressed over assuming 
the automatic application of these principles without first carefully considering the particulars of the 
case.103 
In applying these principles to the scenario of a dispute involving the trade in agricultural biotechnology, 
the argument put forward is that the more specific treaty, being the Biosafety Protocol, should prevail 
as the forum of choice and the WTO Panel should refrain from exercising jurisdiction (lex specialis). At 
first instance, there may be an argument that the Biosafety Protocol is a more specific treaty governing 
the trade in LMOs, whereas the WTO agreements cover trade ‘generally’. However, in the broader 
context of international law, the WTO agreements would not be considered ‘general-subject-matter’ 
treaties. Further, there exist specific provisions in the WTO agreements, particularly in the SPS 
Agreement, governing the ability of WTO Members to enact trade-restrictive measures based on 
environmental and health grounds. Nevertheless, an argument may be advanced that in negotiating 
and signing the Biosafety Protocol, the parties to that agreement intended it to be the more specific 
agreement governing trade in agricultural biotechnology. However, the flaw in this reasoning is evident 
from the statement in the Preamble to the Biosafety Protocol: 
Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations 
of a Party under any existing international agreements 
Combining the wording in the Preamble of the Biosafety Protocol with the general acceptance of the 
WTO agreements as a ‘specialised regime’, the submission that the Biosafety Protocol is the ‘specialist’ 
treaty (lex specialis) is far from convincing. 
Turning to the lex posterior principle (which has been codified in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties), the provisions of the later treaty prevail over any inconsistent provisions of an 
earlier treaty.104 As highlighted in chapter 4, it is difficult to assign one specific date to an international 
agreement as they are often negotiated over time, amended and added to, and signed, ratified and 
implemented by different States at different times. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior offers little 
                                                     
102 Pauwelyn, above n 3, 1015. 
103 ILC Report, above n 67, 226, 233. 
104 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 30(3) and Article 30(4). 
180  
 
assistance to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between multiple proceedings commenced before the 
WTO Panel and under the Biosafety Protocol. 
VI CONCLUSION 
In the absence of specific ‘choice of forum’ or exclusive forum provisions in the agreements, it is possible 
that both the WTO DSU and the dispute resolution provisions under the Biosafety Protocol (found in 
the CBD) could be simultaneously or sequentially invoked by the parties to resolve trade disputes over 
agro-biotech products. This is further complicated by the legal quandary that parties to both the WTO 
agreements and the Biosafety Protocol are obligated to uphold the commitments under both 
international agreements — including complying with the dispute resolution framework of both 
agreements.105 The private law principles of conflict of jurisdiction provide little to no assistance in 
resolving jurisdictional conflict in relation to the case study. With the possibility of multiple proceedings 
and contradictory rulings, the international legal community is left with uncertainty as to the resolution 
of this jurisdiction conflict. The next chapter of this thesis considers some of the possible solutions for 
addressing this potential for jurisdictional conflict both in the broader context of jurisdictional conflict 
between disputes involving international environmental law and international trade law, and also 
specifically in relation to the case study of agricultural biotechnology trade disputes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
105 Kwak and Marceau, above n 37, 97. 
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CHAPTER 6: SOLUTIONS? 
With the growing trend towards including trade provisions in multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) and environmental provisions in regional trade agreements (RTAs), there is real potential for 
multiple proceedings before different international judicial institutions. As demonstrated in chapter 5, in 
the case of the trade in agricultural biotechnology, the normative provisions of the relevant agreements 
do not address the conflict of jurisdiction arising from the engagement of multiple dispute forums. This 
chapter builds on the brief discussion at the conclusion of chapter 2 on the potential solutions for 
addressing collision between the specialised regimes in international law in the context of jurisdictional 
conflict, with a particular focus on the case study of agricultural biotechnology. The first part of this 
chapter re-visits and considers in greater detail the solution of creating a judicial hierarchy in 
international law. Given the difficulties in creating a judicial hierarchy, the alternative solution of ‘Choice 
of Forum’ clauses in international agreements is then considered. The last section of this chapter 
analyses the practical and legal considerations involved in introducing and giving effect to these Choice 
of Forum clauses. 
I INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL HIERARCHY — A 
UTOPIAN DREAM 
As discussed in chapters 2 and 4, one legal solution to the challenges posed by the conflict of jurisdiction 
would be to arrange the plethora of international judicial institutions into a formal hierarchy. However, 
as previously foreshadowed, implementing such a solution in reality is hindered by political motivations, 
power dynamics, institutional constraints, ideology and the lack of global cooperation. A clear example 
of this can be seen in the shifts in the policy of the United States towards the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). Under the Clinton Administration, the US supported the creation of a permanent 
international judicial institution with criminal jurisdiction and signed the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (creating the ICC) in 2000.1 However, President Clinton did not submit this treaty to the 
US Senate for ratification. On 6 May 2002, the Bush Administration formally notified the UN Secretary 
General of its intent not to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This 
Communication from the US Government is recorded in the depositary listings of the Rome Statue of 
the International Criminal Court as follows: 
This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 
July 17, 1998, that the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the 
United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000. The United States 
                                                     
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 1 July 2002). 
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requests that its intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reflected in the depositary’s 
status lists relating to this treaty.2 
A central concern of the US was the extension of the criminal jurisdiction of the ICC to US nationals, in 
particular, the scrutiny of the activities of the US military forces.3 With the change of government to the 
Obama administration, the US has ‘softened’ its policy towards the ICC stating it is prepared to provide 
assistance to the ICC prosecutor.4  However, this policy is still caveated in terms of the priority of US 
national interests, as evidenced in the Statement on the website of the US Department of State:  
Although the United States is not a party to the I.C.C.’s Statute, the Obama administration has been 
prepared to support the court’s prosecutions and provide assistance in response to specific requests from 
the I.C.C. prosecutor and other court officials, consistent with U.S. law, when it is in U.S. national interest 
to do so.5 (emphasis added) 
As demonstrated by the case study of the US and the ICC, while a clearly defined judicial hierarchy 
would provide a comprehensive solution for streamlining the relationships between international judicial 
institutions, it is unlikely that such a major institutional framework could be successfully negotiated — 
at least not in a timely fashion. 
Further, the divergences between which States accept the compulsory jurisdiction of each judicial 
institution significantly hinders the potential for successfully negotiating a universal international judicial 
hierarchy. In the absence of the universal acceptance of jurisdiction, any attempt to define a single 
hierarchy becomes almost impossible, with the order of the hierarchy potentially changing depending 
on the parties to a particular dispute and the extent to which they accepted the jurisdiction of the judicial 
institutions that could potentially hear the dispute. While the ‘perfect’ scenario would involve the 
universal acceptance of international judicial institutions, it is highly unlikely that all States would be 
willing to subrogate their sovereignty by agreeing to accept the jurisdiction of each international judicial 
institution in the hierarchy.  
                                                     
2 Ibid Depositary. (See: footnote 11 of the Depositary) 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
10&chapter=18&lang=en#Participants>. 
3 For extensive scholarly articles on the position of the US towards the International Criminal Court, see:; Jimmy 
Gurule, 'United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal Court: Is the 
Court's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions' (2001) 35 Cornell International Law 
Journal 1; Michael P Scharf, 'The United States and the International Criminal Court: A Recommendation for the 
Bush Administration' (2000) 7 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 385; William A Schabas, 'United 
States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s all about the security council' (2004) 15(4) European Journal 
of International Law 701;Mark S Ellis, 'The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic Law and 
National Capacity Building' (2002) 15 Florida Journal of International Law 215; Bartram S Brown, 'US Objections 
to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Brief Response' (1998) 31 New York University Journal of 
International Law & Politics 855; Benjamin B Ferencz, 'Misguided Fears About the International Criminal Court' 
(2003) 15 Pace International Law Review 223; Diane Marie Amann and Mortimer NS Sellers, 'The United States 
of America and the International Criminal Court' (2002) 50 The American Journal of Comparative Law 381; 
Roseann M Latore, 'Escape out the back door or charge in the front door: US reactions to the International Criminal 
Court' (2002) 25 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 159. 
4 International Criminal Court, United States Department of State <http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/icc/>. 
5 Ibid. 
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Given the difficulties in creating a comprehensive judicial hierarchy, one suggestion has been to simply 
create a two-tiered hierarchy with the ICJ above all other courts.6  As previously mentioned in chapter 
4, this proposition faces two immediate challenges: 1) the lack of universal acceptance of the jurisdiction 
of the ICJ hinders the effectiveness of elevating the ICJ to the top of the jurisdictional hierarchy; and 2) 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice would need to be amended to invest the Court with 
appellate jurisdiction.7 The Statute of the International Court of Justice is annexed to the Charter of the 
United Nations and the process for amending the Statute of the International Court of Justice is the 
same process as for amending the Charter of the United Nations: a two-thirds majority vote in the UN 
General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the States.8  To date, the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice has never been amended. Looking at the amendment process of the Charter of the 
United Nations itself, amendments have been made to four different provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations to reflect the increase in membership of the UN;  
- Articles 23 and 27: to increase membership numbers on the UN Security Council and 
accordingly to change the necessary affirmative vote to nine Member States (previously it was 
7); 
- Article 61 to increase the membership numbers of the UN Economic and Social Council; and  
- Article 109 to provide that a General Conference of Member States for the purpose of reviewing 
the Charter of the United Nations may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds 
vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members (formerly 
seven) of the Security Council.   
The last time the Charter of the United Nations was amended was in 1973.9 To obtain a two-thirds 
majority vote in the UN General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the States, to a proposal to 
amend the Statute of the International Court of Justice to invest the ICJ with appellate jurisdiction, is in 
reality, unrealistic. 
Further, looking at the evidence for universal acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICJ (which would 
presumably be necessary if the ICJ was to sit at the top of the hierarchy): of the 193 Member States of 
the UN, only 70 have made a declaration recognising the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.10 Among 
the G-20 nations, only seven have made declarations recognising the ICJ jurisdiction as compulsory. 
In relation to those States that have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, these declarations 
are, in many cases, conditional. For example, the declaration made by Australia accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, states that it does not apply to: 
                                                     
6 Christian Leathley, 'An Institutional Hierarchy to Combat the Fragmentation of International Law: Has the ILC 
Missed an Opportunity' (2007) 40 International Law and Politics 259, 272-273. 
7 Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945 (1945) 1 UNTS XVI (entered into force 24 
October 1945) Annex: Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
 8Ibid, Article 69. 
9 Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945 (1945) 1 UNTS XVI (entered into force 24 
October 1945) Introductory Note. 
10 International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3>. 
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(a) any dispute in regard to which the parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some 
other method of peaceful settlement; 
(b) any dispute concerning or relating to the delimitation of maritime zones, including the territorial sea, 
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, or arising out of, concerning, or relating to the 
exploitation of any disputed area of or adjacent to any such maritime zone pending its delimitation; 
(c) any dispute in respect of which any other party to the dispute has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court only in relation to or for the purpose of the dispute; or where the acceptance of the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction on behalf of any other party to the dispute was deposited less than 12 months 
prior to the filing of the application bringing the dispute before the Court.11 
Particularly interesting for this doctoral thesis is the declaration made by India, which provides an 
exception to its acceptance of the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction for: 
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a multilateral treaty unless all the parties to the 
treaty are also parties to the case before the Court or Government of India specially agree to jurisdiction.12 
Conditional declarations have also been made by Canada and Germany.13 The exclusion of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in relation to maritime zones, including the territorial sea boundaries 
and fishing, is common across many States. Also, many Commonwealth States exclude disputes from 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ that are between Members of the Commonwealth.14  In summary, 
the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICJ is complicated, varies between States and is far from 
universal. 
Even if universal acceptance of the ICJ jurisdiction were to be achieved, a two-tiered hierarchy is not 
without its complications. Is the ICJ at the top of the hierarchy only in regards to disputes that fall with 
the specific jurisdiction listed in the Statute of the International Court of Justice? Or would this mean 
that treaties (such as MEAs) that explicitly list the ICJ as a dispute resolution mechanism are then 
automatically elevated above other judicial institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), in parallel proceedings? Further, it is uncertain how this two-tiered 
hierarchy would solve conflict of jurisdiction between judicial institutions on the lower level of the 
hierarchical framework. Is the ICJ to provide an ‘advice’ on the overlapping jurisdiction to determine 
which of the two engaged judicial institutions should proceed to hear the dispute? Or is it anticipated 
that if two different judicial institutions are engaged, then the matter is to be referred to the ICJ for 
determination of the merits of the claim? How would this interact with the exclusive jurisdiction clause 
                                                     
11 International Court of Justice, Australia: Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, 
States Entitled to Appear before the Court <http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&code=AU>. 
12 International Court of Justice, India: Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, States 
Entitled to Appear before the Court <,http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&code=IN>. 
13 International Court of Justice, Canada: Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=CA>; International Court of Justice, 
Germany: Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court<http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=DE>. 
14 International Court of Justice, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Declarations Recognizing 
as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, States Entitled to Appear before the Court < http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&code=GB>. 
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of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), such as in the factual scenario in the MOX Plant dispute (see 
case study in chapter 1)? If proceedings are commenced in both the ECJ and under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’),15 would the dispute be referred to the ICJ? In effect 
then, the only judicial institution that can have ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction is the ICJ, and the Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union would require amendment.16 These are 
just a few of the complexities that exist with this ‘simpler’ two-tiered judicial hierarchy. 
A significant hurdle with the creation of a judicial hierarchy is the relationship and priority to be assigned 
to the various specialised international judicial institutions, such as the WTO Panel,17 the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the ICC. With the proliferation of specialised international judicial 
institutions, there are now over 142 international dispute bodies (or dispute ‘procedures’), each 
operating under specific terms of reference.18 While it may be straightforward to determine a hierarchy 
between general-subject-matter international judicial institutions, such as the ICJ and the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA), would a hierarchical framework solve a conflict of jurisdiction involving two 
specialised judicial institutions? To illustrate, would an arbitration panel constituted to determine a 
dispute under the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity (‘Biosafety 
Protocol’),19 be on a lower level than the WTO Panel? If the WTO Panel is placed on a higher level in 
the hierarchy (perhaps based on the WTO’s larger Member numbers and the ‘compulsory’ nature of 
dispute resolution), then does this result in the international trade regime being the forum of choice for 
environment/trade disputes? In fact, should the WTO Panel be at the top of the hierarchy as it has a 
higher level of general acceptance of its jurisdiction than the ICJ, or perhaps any other global dispute 
resolution body? Would this be acceptable to the international environmental community? Would this 
prompt the foundation of an international environmental court? How does the hierarchy fit with judicial 
institutions under an RTA? If the dispute falls under the Biosafety Protocol and the trade provisions of 
a RTA, would one of these judicial institutions be deferential to the other? If the specialised ad-hoc 
judicial institutions are all on the same level in the hierarchy, then this ‘formalised’ judicial system does 
not necessarily solve a conflict of jurisdiction generated by the crossover of norms between the 
specialised regimes in public international law.  
II ‘CHOICE OF FORUM’ CLAUSE — A SOLUTION? 
Given the difficulties and complexities involved in creating a formalised judicial hierarchy in international 
law, this thesis proposes the inclusion of Choice of Forum clauses in international environmental 
                                                     
15 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 
(entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘UNCLOS’). 
16 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47 (entered into 
force 26 October 2012). In particular the exclusive jurisdiction clause contained in Article 344. 
17 As stated in Chapter 4, to enhance readability, the term ‘WTO Panel’ is used in this chapter generically to refer 
to both the jurisdiction of WTO Panels and the WTO Appellate Body (unless specifically referring to a judicial 
decision). 
18 Cesare PR Romano, 'A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions' (2011) 2(1) Journal of International 
Dispute Settlement 241, 242. 
19 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 29 January 
2000, 2226 UNTS 208 (entered into force 11 September 2003) (‘Biosafety Protocol’). 
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agreements to address conflict of jurisdiction in public international law disputes, particularly in the 
circumstance of the crossover of norms between specialised regimes. This ‘solution’ was foreshadowed 
in chapter 2 and is discussed here in more detail.  
A Choice of Forum clause necessitates the selection of a single forum (by either the complaining party 
or by agreement between the parties) for the resolution of the dispute and prohibits litigation in any 
other available dispute forums for the same dispute.20  In essence, this is the codification of the lis alibi 
pendens principle.21 These clauses have been routinely included in RTAs to clarify the choice of forum 
between the dispute resolution mechanisms established by the RTA and the WTO agreements.  
Some Choice of Forum clauses, such as Article 1(2) of Protocol of Olivos,22 require the consensus of 
the parties in the dispute to the selected dispute forum. In contrast, many of the trade agreements 
negotiated by the United States provide that the dispute forum selection is at the discretion of the 
complaining party. For example, Article 20.4.3(c) of the United States — Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement provides: 
Once the complaining Party has selected a particular forum, the forum selected shall be used to the 
exclusion of other possible fora.23 
In the North American Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’), Article 2005 provides that the forum is 
determined at the discretion of the complaining party:  
1. Subject to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, disputes regarding any matter arising under both this Agreement and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, any agreement negotiated thereunder, or any successor 
agreement (GATT), may be settled in either forum at the discretion of the complaining Party. ... 
6. Once dispute settlement procedures have been initiated under Article 2007 or dispute settlement 
proceedings have been initiated under the GATT, the forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of the 
other, unless a Party makes a request pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4.24 
However, NAFTA is quite interesting in that it provides an exception to the Choice of Forum provisions 
in relation to particular disputes involving environmental, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. 
In these disputes, the responding party can request in writing that the dispute be determined under the 
NAFTA dispute provisions (not the WTO agreements) and the complaining party, upon such request, 
is required to withdraw any WTO proceedings.25 The complaining party then has the option to bring the 
dispute under the NAFTA dispute provisions if it so wishes. The singling out of environmental and health 
                                                     
20 World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2011:  The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: from co-
existence to coherence, (2011) <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr11_e.htm>173. 
21 Henry Gao and Chin Leng Lim, 'Saving the WTO from the Risk of Irrelevance: The WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism as a ‘Common Good’ for RTA Disputes' (2008) 11(4) Journal of International Economic Law 899. 907-
908. 
22 Olivos Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes in Mercosur, opened for signature 18 February 2002, 42 ILM 2 
(entered into force on 10 February 2004). 
23 United States — Singapore Free Trade Agreement, signed 6 May 2003, 42 ILM 1026 (entered into force 1 
January 2004) . 
24 North American Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature 17 December 1992 (1993) 32 ILM 605 (entered 
into force 1 January 1994) (‘NAFTA’). 
25 Ibid Articles 2005(3), 2005(4) and 2005(5).  
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disputes may be explained by the political concerns about environment and trade at the time of the 
negotiations of the NAFTA in the early 1990s.26 The US was concerned over Mexico’s history of 
inconsistent enforcement of its environmental laws.27 Further, concerns had been expressed by 
environmental agencies that a RTA between the three countries would result in the United States and 
Canada weakening their environmental laws to prevent companies from relocating to Mexico (given 
Mexico’s less stringent environmental standards and lower industry/production costs). These policy 
concerns reflected the rising prominence of global environmental issues in the international arena, 
following the 1987 report titled Our Common Future and the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) in 1992.28  Finally, the negotiations of NAFTA coincided with the handing 
down of the decisions by the WTO Panel in the dispute between the US and Mexico in the United States 
— Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (‘Tuna-Dolphin I’) in 1991,29 in which the US trade restriction imposed 
by the United States on the imports of certain Mexican yellowfin tuna was held to be in breach of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (‘GATT 1947’).30 
It is possible that MEAs that contain trade-related provisions could include a Choice of Forum clause 
that governs forum selection for those disputes. It is worth noting that the provisions of MEAs may also 
cross over with other areas of international law, such as international human rights law and intellectual 
property law, generating the potential for conflicting jurisdiction with the dispute provisions of those 
specialised regimes. Whether Choice of Forum clauses would also be appropriate in those 
circumstances warrants detailed consideration; however, this is outside of the scope of this doctoral 
thesis, which concentrates on the environment/trade tension.  
If a Choice of Forum clause had been included in the Biosafety Protocol, the question then is whether 
such a clause if invoked by a party (selecting dispute resolution under the Biosafety Protocol) would 
operate to foreclose WTO jurisdiction (or vice versa). Some guidance may be had from two WTO cases 
in which Choice of Forum clauses were raised in the proceedings: Argentina — Definitive Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Poultry from Brazil (‘Argentina — Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties’) and the Mexico — Tax 
Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages (‘Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks’) case.31 
In Argentina—Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, the WTO Panel was called upon to consider whether 
dispute proceedings pursuant to a RTA impacted upon its jurisdiction. On 7 November 2001, Brazil 
                                                     
26 For a detailed account of the environmental and trade concerns in the lead-up to the NAFTA negotiations, see: 
Pierre Marc Johnson and Andre Beaulieu, The environment and NAFTA: Understanding and implementing the new 
continental law (Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
27 Richard B Stewart, 'The NAFTA: Trade, Competition, Environmental Protection' (1993) 27(3) The International 
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commenced proceedings dispute proceedings in the WTO by way of the request for ‘consultations’ 
against Argentina in relation to the definitive anti-dumping duties imposed by Argentina on imports of 
poultry from Brazil. On 25 February 2002, Brazil requested the formation of a WTO Panel. Before the 
WTO Panel, Argentina submitted that Brazil was estopped from pursuing the WTO dispute proceedings 
as they had first commenced dispute resolution proceedings under the MERCOSUR agreement.32 The 
WTO Panel disagreed with Argentina’s claims and found that the principle of estoppel did not apply to 
prevent Brazil’s claim as there was no evidence that Brazil had made an express statement that it would 
not bring WTO dispute settlement proceedings in respect of measures previously challenged through 
MERCOSUR.33 In addition, the Panel found that they were not bound by the earlier ruling by the 
MERCOSUR dispute tribunal: 
Rather than concerning itself with the interpretation of the WTO agreements, Argentina actually argues 
that the earlier MERCOSUR Tribunal ruling requires us to rule in a particular way. In other words, 
Argentina would have us apply the relevant WTO provisions in a particular way, rather than interpret them 
in a particular way. However, there is no basis in Article 3.2 of the DSU, or any other provision, to suggest 
that we are bound to rule in a particular way, or apply the relevant WTO provisions in a particular way.34 
Interestingly, Brazil signed the Protocol of Olivos in February 2002 (a protocol to the MERCOSUR 
agreement), in which Article 1(2) contains a Choice of Forum clause as follows: 
Disputes falling within the scope of application of this Protocol that may also be referred to the dispute 
settlement system of the World Trade Organisation or other preferential trade systems that the Mercosur 
State Parties may have entered into, may be referred to one forum or the other, as decided by the 
requesting party. Provided, however, that the parties to the dispute may jointly agree on a forum. 
Once a dispute settlement procedure pursuant to the preceding paragraph has begun, none of the parties 
may request the use of the mechanisms established in the other fora, as defined by article 14 of this 
Protocol. 
However, at the time of the proceedings of the WTO Panel, the Protocol of Olivos had not yet entered 
into force. Accordingly, the WTO Panel held in Argentina—Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties: 
The Protocol of Olivos, however, does not change our assessment, since that Protocol has not yet entered 
into force, and in any event it does not apply in respect of disputes already decided in accordance with 
the MERCOSUR Protocol of Brasilia. Indeed, the fact that parties to MERCOSUR saw the need to 
introduce the Protocol of Olivos suggests to us that they recognised that (in the absence of such Protocol) 
a MERCOSUR dispute settlement proceeding could be followed by a WTO dispute settlement proceeding 
in respect of the same measure.35  
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The ruling in Argentina—Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties left open the possibility that the WTO Panel may 
uphold the Protocol of Olivos, and other Choice of Forum clauses, going forward. However, this is now 
less certain given the ruling in the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case.  
As mentioned in chapter 4, in the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case, the WTO considered the Choice 
of Forum clause in Article 2005 of NAFTA.36 This dispute was commenced by the US in regard to 
Mexico’s tax provisions on soft drinks and beverages containing a sweetener other than cane sugar. 
The US alleged Mexico’s tax on these drinks breached Art III:2 and Art III:4 of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘GATT 1994’). Mexico raised a preliminary question of law submitting that 
the Panel should decline to exercise its jurisdiction and should refer the parties to the dispute settlement 
provisions under NAFTA.37 It is noted that neither Mexico nor the US had actually invoked the Choice 
of Forum clause in Article 2005 of NAFTA, nor had a NAFTA dispute panel been established. However, 
both the WTO Panel and the Appellate Body commented on Mexico’s jurisdictional challenge. 
In considering Mexico’s challenge to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Panel, it was held that, under the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (‘DSU’),38 the Panel 
has no discretion to decide whether or not to exercise its jurisdiction in a case properly before it.39 The 
Panel’s reasoning was based on a combination of the functions of Panels set out in Article 11 of the 
DSU and the provisions of Article 23.1 preventing unilateral determinations of breach of WTO 
obligations. The Panel stated:  
Were a panel to choose not to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular case, it would be failing to 
perform its duties. More specifically, the panel would be failing to perform its duty to make ‘an 
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of 
the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and to 
make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving 
the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.’ ...40 
And: 
In the Panel's view, the terms of Article 23 of the DSU make it clear that a WTO Member that considers 
that any of its WTO benefits have been nullified or impaired as a result of a measure adopted by another 
Member has the right to bring the case before the WTO dispute settlement system.41 
However, the Panel made no findings on whether there may exist other circumstances where its 
jurisdiction may be legally restrained.42   
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On appeal, Mexico argued that the US claims before the WTO Panel were inextricably linked to a 
broader dispute, and that only a NAFTA panel could resolve the dispute as a whole.43 However, Mexico 
conceded that the subject matter and position of the parties in the WTO Panel proceedings were not 
identical to the dispute under NAFTA. In considering these issues, the WTO Appellate Body concluded: 
It is furthermore undisputed that no NAFTA panel as yet has decided the ‘broader dispute’ to which Mexico 
has alluded. Finally, we note that Mexico has expressly stated that the so-called ‘exclusion clause’ of 
Article 2005.6 of the NAFTA had not been ‘exercised’. We do not express any view on whether a legal 
impediment to the exercise of a panel's jurisdiction would exist in the event that features such as those 
mentioned above were present. In any event, we see no legal impediments applicable in this case.44  
Ultimately, the Appellate Body found that WTO Panels have inherent powers to determine the question 
of their own jurisdiction in a given case, but that once jurisdiction was established, the Panels do not 
have authority to decline to rule on the dispute: 
In our view, it does not necessarily follow, however, from the existence of these inherent adjudicative 
powers that, once jurisdiction has been validly established, WTO panels would have the authority to 
decline to rule on the entirety of the claims that are before them in a dispute.45   
The finding in the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case is consistent with an earlier decision of the WTO 
Appellate Body, which held: 
it is a widely accepted rule that an international tribunal is entitled to consider the issue of its own 
jurisdiction on its own initiative, and to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case that comes before 
it.46  
This reasoning by the WTO Appellate Body would equally apply to a ‘Choice of Forum’ clause in the 
Biosafety Protocol (or more broadly in any MEA) that attempts to nullify WTO jurisdiction. However, the 
Appellate Body (and the Panel) was careful to limit the ruling to the specific facts of the case by stating 
in the judgment that no view was expressed on whether a legal impediment would exist under other 
circumstances — such as a Choice of Forum clause that had been invoked by one of the parties to the 
dispute. In essence, in the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case, the WTO Appellate Body maintained 
the sphere of its own autonomy by side-stepping the consideration of the Choice of Forum clause in 
NAFTA based on the fact that Mexico had not invoked the clause, even though NAFTA dispute 
proceedings were being pursued. Accordingly, we are left without a clear legal ruling on whether a 
Choice of Forum clause in a non-WTO agreement (for example, if such a clause were to be included in 
the Biosafety Protocol) will operate to limit the jurisdiction of a WTO Panel.  
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A Post the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case: will 
the WTO uphold Choice of Forum clauses? 
In the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case, the WTO Panel (and the Appellate Body) did not need to 
determine the application of the Choice of Forum clause in NAFTA as it had not been invoked by 
Mexico.47 This next section will consider the potential outcome before the WTO if such a clause were 
to be properly invoked by one of the parties to the dispute. 
Although the Choice of Forum clause in NAFTA was not specifically invoked by Mexico, the WTO Panel 
and Appellate Body were called upon in the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case to consider the effect 
of the obligations on the parties under NAFTA. Mexico contended that, in commencing WTO 
proceedings, the United States had prevented Mexico, by an illegal act (namely, the alleged refusal by 
the United States to nominate panellists to the NAFTA panel), from having recourse to the NAFTA 
dispute settlement mechanism to resolve the bilateral dispute. In reliance on the ruling of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Factory at Chorzów Claim for Indemnity case,48 Mexico 
alleged that the stalling actions of the US ‘calls into question the “applicability” of its WTO obligations 
towards the United States in the context of this dispute’. The relevant passage relied upon by Mexico 
in the Factory at Chorzów Claim for Indemnity case is as follows: 
 … one party cannot avail himself of the fact that the other has not fulfilled some obligation, or has not had 
recourse to some means of redress, if the former party has, by some illegal act, prevented the latter from 
fulfilling the obligation in question, or from having recourse to the tribunal which would have been open to 
him.49 
In considering Mexico’s claim that the refusal of the US to participate in the NAFTA dispute resolution 
proceedings affected the applicability of the WTO obligations between the parties, the Appellate Body 
held: 
Mexico's arguments, as well as its reliance on the ruling in Factory at Chorzów, is misplaced. Even 
assuming, arguendo, that the legal principle reflected in the passage referred to by Mexico is applicable 
within the WTO dispute settlement system, we note that this would entail a determination whether the 
United States has acted consistently or inconsistently with its NAFTA obligations. We see no basis in the 
DSU for panels and the Appellate Body to adjudicate non-WTO disputes. Article 3.2 of the DSU states 
that the WTO dispute settlement system ‘serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under 
the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements’. Accepting Mexico's 
interpretation would imply that the WTO dispute settlement system could be used to determine rights and 
obligations outside the covered agreements.50 (emphasis added) 
At this point, it is interesting to note the trend for NAFTA-related disputes to be brought before the WTO 
for judicial resolution — supporting the proposition of the existence of a preference for the WTO judicial 
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forum over dispute resolution provisions in NAFTA. 51  In addition to the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks 
case (where the formation of the NAFTA panel was blocked by the United States), the Softwood Lumber 
dispute is another example of where the WTO judicial forum was engaged by the parties to the dispute 
in addition to the dispute resolution provisions in NAFTA.52 This trend has been attributed to the 
procedural efficiency and expedited delivery of rulings of the WTO and the desire of applicants to 
establish a body of favourable international jurisprudence (which would go towards creating a ‘legitimate 
expectation’ that future international judicial bodies would apply similar reasoning).53 It also calls into 
question the efficacy of the Choice of Forum clause in NAFTA.  This is discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter in the context of the implementation of Choice of Forum clauses. 
 
It is well established that the WTO Panel can only determine a claim brought pursuant to a right or 
obligation under the Covered Agreements. Accordingly, the application by the WTO Panel of a Choice 
of Forum clause in a non-WTO Covered Agreement (RTAs are not listed as Covered Agreements) 
could prove to be somewhat problematic. While WTO agreements are not to be applied in ‘clinical 
isolation’ from international law, the line becomes blurred where such non-WTO provisions could 
operate to nullify rights afforded under the WTO agreements.54 Thinking through the scenario, the WTO 
Panel would be faced with one State maintaining its right to bring the WTO proceedings while the other 
State seeks to uphold the Choice of Forum clause under a non-WTO agreement. If the WTO Panel 
applies the Choice of Forum clause then in effect it is denying the complaining party the right to 
commence dispute proceedings under the DSU. Accordingly, the application of Choice of Forum 
clauses must be considered in light of the entitlement afforded to WTO Members to have their disputes 
determined under the DSU (found in Articles 3.2, 3.3 and 23) and also the limitation on WTO Panels 
not to add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the Covered Agreements. In the absence 
of any hierarchy between international norms, then the WTO Panel is arguably equally free to follow its 
own charter in preference to other non-WTO agreements. In fact, in India — Measures Affecting the 
Automotive Sector, the WTO Panel was even reluctant to clearly state whether a mutually agreed upon 
solution between the European Union (EU) and India to refrain from WTO dispute settlement under 
certain conditions (agreed upon in the settlement of an earlier WTO trade dispute and notified to the 
DSB) would be accepted under the WTO DSU.55 
The statements by the WTO Panel and Appellate Body in these cases indicate a general tone of 
reluctance to apply provisions in non-WTO agreements in the WTO dispute forum. It is possible that 
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the WTO Panel and Appellate Body will hold that a Choice of Forum clause is a legal issue under the 
non-WTO agreement (such as an MEA, or more specifically, the Biosafety Protocol, if such a clause 
were to be included) and accordingly does not operate to restrict the jurisdiction of the WTO Panel over 
the dispute.  
B Preliminary Question: ‘Admissibility’ and 
‘Jurisdiction’ 
Pauwelyn and Salles propose that Choice of Forum clauses contained in non-WTO agreements can be 
applied by the WTO Panel by drawing the distinction between preliminary questions that relate to 
jurisdiction and questions that relate to the admissibility of the claim.56 Thus, the WTO may have 
jurisdiction over the proceedings as the claims relate to a breach of an obligation under the Covered 
Agreements, however, the Panel may refrain from determining the dispute as it is not admissible due 
to the Choice of Forum clause in the specific agreement between the parties. This distinction between 
‘admissibility’ and ‘jurisdiction’ is explored next in relation to Choice of Forum clauses. 
The following arguments have been raised in support of the distinction between admissibility and 
jurisdiction:   
1. Absence of jurisdiction is directed towards the competence or field-of-jurisdiction of the judicial 
body to rule on the case before it. Objections to admissibility are specific to the action or the 
parties to the claim.57 
2. Absence of field-of-jurisdiction is raised and determined on the initiative of the institution. The 
inadmissibility of the claim is usually raised by the parties.58 
3. Absence of field-of-jurisdiction carries with it the force of res judicata. Whereas a claim that is 
inadmissible may be cured by steps taken to remedy the restricting treaty. Pauwelyn and Salles 
give the example that if a claim is inadmissible because the parties failed to undertake 
negotiations as required under a relevant multilateral agreement, then commencing and 
completing the said negotiations would remedy this ground of inadmissibility.59   
For these reasons, Pauwelyn and Salles refute the assertion that a WTO Panel cannot decline to 
exercise its jurisdiction, on the basis that such reasoning is founded on the confusion between a panel’s 
field-of-jurisdiction and its incidental jurisdiction.60   
In fact, the dichotomy between jurisdiction and admissibility is embedded in the separation between the 
authority of the tribunal (determined by its own constitutive instruments — jurisdiction) and the more 
general procedural relationship between the parties (determined by the set of legal norms binding on them 
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— admissibility). The development of this distinction before the ICJ, and its spillover to the ECHR and 
arbitral tribunals, indicates that there is a more general role for it in international dispute settlement.61 
In this regard, reliance is placed by Pauwelyn and Salles on the decisions of the PCIJ and the ICJ, 
including the ruling in the Oil Platforms case, in which the Court held: 
Objections to admissibility [(recevabilité)] normally take the form of an assertion that, even if the Court has 
jurisdiction and the facts stated by the applicant State are assumed to be correct, nonetheless there are 
reasons why the Court should not proceed to an examination of the merits.62   
However, there is no distinction in the WTO DSU between ‘admissibility’ and ‘jurisdiction’. In fact, the 
word ‘admissible’ (and its derivatives, thereof) is not found in the DSU at all. In the absence of a specific 
power in the DSU, the authority of the WTO Panel to refrain from determining the merits of a claim 
based on the reasoning proposed by Pauwelyn and Salles turns to the consideration of the inherent 
powers of the WTO as a judicial institution. Does the WTO Panel have an inherent power to decline to 
rule on a case brought before it on the basis that it is inadmissible due to the existence of a Choice of 
Forum clause in a non-WTO agreement between the parties? How does this sit with the ruling in Mexico 
— Taxes on Soft Drinks that once jurisdiction is established the WTO Panel does not have the power 
to decline to determine the dispute? 
As discussed in chapter 5, the WTO enjoys certain inherent powers as a judicial institution. The WTO 
Appellate Body has confirmed that it has the inherent power to determine the matter of its own 
jurisdiction.63  It was recognised by the Appellate Body in Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks, that these 
powers extend to include those that are ‘inherent’ to their adjudicative function.64 However, even if one 
accepts the proposition of Pauwelyn and Salles regarding the distinction between admissibility and 
jurisdiction, do WTO Panels have the inherent power to decline to determine the dispute based on it 
being ‘inadmissible’ between the parties, if valid ‘jurisdiction’ is otherwise established? 
This raises the question of whether the WTO Panel has power to decline to determine proceedings. As 
discussed in chapter 5 under judicial comity, there is consistent authority that the WTO Panel does not 
have the power to refrain from determining a dispute where jurisdiction has been validly established.  
In response, Pauwelyn and Salles suggest a somewhat tenuous (and at this stage, hypothetical) 
argument that in refusing to examine substantive claims based on their inadmissibility, the Panel is by 
definition exercising jurisdiction, albeit to decline to rule on the merits of the case.65 This line of 
reasoning by Pauwelyn and Salles is not in keeping with the judgment of the Appellate Body which 
states as follows: 
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In our view, it does not necessarily follow, however, from the existence of these inherent adjudicative 
powers that, once jurisdiction has been validly established, WTO panels would have the authority to 
decline to rule on the entirety of the claims that are before them in a dispute. To the contrary, we note 
that, while recognizing WTO panels' inherent powers, the Appellate Body has previously emphasized that:  
Although panels enjoy some discretion in establishing their own working procedures, this discretion 
does not extend to modifying the substantive provisions of the DSU. … Nothing in the DSU gives a 
panel the authority either to disregard or to modify ... explicit provisions of the DSU.66 
In the context of the current jurisprudence, drawing a distinction between admissibility and jurisdiction 
in support of the application of a Choice of Forum clause by the WTO Panel is untested at best. At the 
end of the day whether we call the entire gamut of preliminary questions of law as ‘jurisdiction’ or if we 
divide it up between the ‘field of jurisdiction of the tribunal’ and the ‘admissibility of the claim as between 
the parties’ — we are still left with the same overarching issue of whether such preliminary 
considerations operate as a valid means to restrict the ability of the WTO Panel to determine the merits 
of the claim before it. 
Even if one accepts that the WTO Panel could utilise this inherent power relating to admissibility as a 
preliminary question (which is doubtful), there is no legal basis dictating that the WTO Panel must 
determine its authority over a case before it in this way. Such an approach may be a useful interpretative 
tool for a judicial body that wishes to refrain from determining the merits of a claim — however, it falls 
short of a binding rule of judicial reasoning to be applied by every WTO Panel. If one assumes that the 
WTO Panel wishes to maintain its sphere of power over trade disputes involving rights and obligations 
under the Covered Agreements, then the WTO Panel may not exercise this ‘inherent’ power to decline 
a case on the basis of ‘inadmissibility’. Furthermore, even if a Panel (or the Appellate Body) finds that 
a Choice of Forum clause in a non-WTO agreement between the Parties renders a parallel WTO claim 
‘inadmissible’, this has no binding effect on Panels in future WTO cases. 
In addition, it is possible that the Choice of Forum clause in a non-WTO agreement could easily be 
avoided by applying a narrow definition to the characterisation of the ‘same’ dispute. The specific legal 
question before the WTO Panel (which would involve the interpretation and application of a WTO rule 
under the Covered Agreements) would most likely not be the identical legal claim before the other 
judicial institution under the MEA (or RTA), even though the broader dispute involves the same parties 
and the same factual matrix. If the legal claims are different, would the Choice of Forum clause be 
applied by the WTO Panel to foreclose its jurisdiction?  It is possible that ‘Choice of Forum clauses’ 
suffer the same fate as claims made under res judicata or lis alibi pendens  — the WTO Panel would 
apply a narrow interpretation and hold that the WTO proceedings are effectively a different dispute 
rendering the Choice of Forum clause inapplicable.  
It is unclear, as the law currently stands, whether incorporating Choice of Forum clauses in MEAs, such 
as the Biosafety Protocol, would be sufficient of itself to resolve conflict of jurisdiction — a party could 
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be in breach of the MEA by also commencing proceedings in the WTO, but the WTO Panel would not 
necessarily decline to hear the parallel proceedings. In conclusion, the application of Choice of Forum 
clauses by the WTO Panel is only one element of the solution to the conflict of jurisdiction from multiple 
dispute proceedings — and a patchwork solution at best. It is not sufficient on its own to solve the 
pressing issue of overlapping jurisdiction.67  But, at this stage, it is the best solution available, given the 
difficulties in implementing a more comprehensive formalised institutional solution, such as a judicial 
hierarchy. The next issue to consider is the mechanism for giving effect to Choice of Forum clauses, in 
light of the current legal framework.   
III IMPLEMENTING CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSES 
Where the same factual matrix gives rise to a dispute involving the trade provisions in an MEA and the 
WTO agreements (or in an RTA), Choice of Forum clauses provide a (limited) solution to address 
conflict of jurisdiction and forum shopping. There are two possible ways that such clauses could be 
implemented into the current international legal framework: 
a. Including Choice of Forum clauses in MEAs.  
b. Including a Choice of Forum clause in the WTO DSU. 
An alternative avenue to gain support for the use of Choice of Forum clauses as a solution to conflict 
of jurisdiction involving trade and environmental disputes, if neither option (a) or (b) above prove 
successful, is through the G-20 forum. Accordingly, at the end of this section, the effectiveness of the 
release of a G-20 Statement in favour of Choice of Forum clauses is considered. 
A Choice of Forum clause in MEAs 
A straight-forward course of action is to include a Choice of Forum clause in all MEAs that contain trade-
related measures. This section will first consider the importance of the wording of Choice of Forum 
clauses and then the avenues available to give legal effect to these clauses.   
1 Forum Selection: Consent-Based or First-Engagement? 
The strongest (and most effective) Choice of Forum clause is one where the forum is selected on the 
basis of first engagement. It is noted however, that some Choice of Forum clauses are drafted so as to 
require the consent of the parties to the forum selected.68 However, if the parties could actually agree 
to the forum, then there would be little risk of forum shopping and parallel proceedings. The purpose of 
Choice of Forum clauses is to address the situation where there is no consensus on the selection of 
the dispute forum. While the inclusion of the requirement for the consent of the parties to the selected 
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forum is in keeping with the ‘consensual’ nature of the international judicial framework and the 
preservation of State sovereignty, such a requirement undermines the effectiveness of the Choice of 
Forum clause in scenarios where consensus is not achievable. However, a Choice of Forum clause 
that stipulates that the first engaged judicial institution will be the ‘exclusive’ forum for the dispute may 
encourage the parties to rush to commence formal legal proceedings in their preferred forum rather 
than attempt to resolve the dispute through non-litigious avenues such as negotiation and good offices. 
The filing of legal proceedings then becomes another tool in legal case strategy to ensure forum choice. 
However, whether this is an entirely negative outcome is debateable. Do we view the increased 
engagement of international judicial institutions as an undesirable result? Is not the commencement of 
legal proceedings simply part of the overall strategy to settle the dispute anyway? If a mutually 
agreeable solution can be negotiated after the filing of legal proceedings, then the expectation is that 
the legal proceedings would be withdrawn. However, the desirability of advocating for a strongly drafted 
Choice of Forum clause (that has no consent requirement) needs to be balanced against the question 
of whether States would be willing to agree to the loss of sovereignty that results from the inclusion of 
such wording in an MEA. While clauses framed this way have been included in a number of RTAs, it 
may be the case that such a clause would not receive support in the context of an MEA, where mutual 
(and regional) interests may not be so closely aligned. 
The interpretation that may be given to the phrase ‘same dispute’ between the parties is an important 
drafting consideration for Choice of Forum clauses. As discussed above, a potential way around a 
Choice of Forum clause is to argue that the legal claim before the WTO Panel is different from the legal 
claim before the dispute resolution forum of the MEA (and vice-versa), and therefore no ‘choice’ of 
forum has been made — the proceedings are two separate and unrelated proceedings. In order to 
address this issue, the language of the Choice of Forum clause would need to apply to the broader 
factual matrix of the dispute between the parties, rather than being limited to the specific legal claims 
or remedies. Drafting such a clause could prove challenging. In addition, how does this sit with the 
factual scenario where the legal claims/remedies available under one regime are not available under 
the other? Does this solution only really work if the judicial institution engaged has the power to 
determine all of the legal claims that can be made under both specialised regimes? Accordingly, the 
limitations of Choice of Forum clauses as an effective solution to the crossover of jurisdiction are readily 
acknowledged. In some ways this brings one back to the broader issues of fragmentation and forum 
shopping discussed in chapter 2 — whether the international judicial institutions will continue to operate 
in isolation as self-contained spheres of legal autonomy, or if the gap can be bridged towards a more 
integrated international legal ‘system’.  
Taking into account the considerations outlined above, a proposed Choice of Forum clause that could 
be included in an MEA to resolve parallel proceedings involving trade disputes, is as follows: 
(a) Where a dispute regarding any matter referred to in [insert trade provisions] arises under this 
Agreement and under the WTO Agreements, to which both Parties are party, the complaining 
Party may select the forum in which to settle the dispute. 
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(b) The complaining Party shall notify the other Party in writing of its intention to bring a dispute to 
a particular forum before doing so. 
(c) Once the complaining Party has selected a particular forum, the forum selected shall be used 
to the exclusion of other possible forums. 
(d) For the purposes of this paragraph, a Party shall be deemed to have selected a forum when it 
has requested the establishment of, or referred a matter to, a Dispute Settlement Institution. 
The above draft Choice of Forum clause has been adapted from the provisions contained in the United 
States bilateral trade agreements — see for example, Article 20.4 (3)(c) of the United States — 
Singapore Free Trade Agreement.69  The reference to ‘WTO Agreements’ in the draft Choice of Forum 
clause would be defined to mean the Covered Agreements as listed in Appendix 1 of the DSU. The 
‘Dispute Settlement Institution’ would be defined in the draft Choice of Forum clause to include a WTO 
Panel and the relevant judicial institution for the resolution of the dispute under the MEA, such as 
arbitration or the ICJ. The draft clause provides for selection of the dispute form by the complaining 
party, in order to avoid the difficulties involved in forum selection by consensus. The clause is drafted 
broadly to refer to ‘a dispute involving any matter’, in an attempt to capture the broader dispute between 
the parties as opposed to limiting it to the same specific legal claim in each forum. Finally, the clause 
only takes effect upon the establishment of the Dispute Settlement Institution, allowing for States to 
engage in the consultations and negotiations processes offered under the WTO without necessarily 
invoking the exclusivity provision of the Choice of Forum clause. The next section of this chapter will 
discuss the mechanism for inserting a Choice of Forum clause in the Biosafety Protocol. 
2 Choice of Forum Clause in the Biosafety Protocol 
Hypothetically, the inclusion of a Choice of Forum clause, using the wording outlined above, in the 
Biosafety Protocol would address the conflict of jurisdiction arising out of multiple proceedings involving 
a dispute over trade of agricultural biotechnology products. However, this would require an amendment 
to the Biosafety Protocol. 
Pursuant to Article 29 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (‘CBD’),70 amendments to the Biosafety 
Protocol may be proposed by any Party to the Protocol and adopted at a meeting of the Parties to the 
Protocol. In support of clause Article 29 of the CBD, the text of the Biosafety Protocol bestows specific 
power on the Conference of the Parties (serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol) to: 
Consider and adopt, as required, amendments to this Protocol and its annexes, as well as any additional 
annexes to this Protocol, that are deemed necessary for the implementation of this Protocol.71 
                                                     
69 United States — Singapore Free Trade Agreement, signed 6 May 2003, 42 ILM 1026 (entered into force 1 
January 2004), Article 20.4 (3)(c). 
70 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 
December 1993) (‘CBD’). 
71 Biosafety Protocol Article 29(4)(e). 
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Article 29(3) of the CBD sets out the procedures for voting on a proposed amendment to the Biosafety 
Protocol as follows: 
The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed amendment to this Convention 
or to any protocol by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement 
reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a two-third majority vote of the Parties to 
the instrument in question present and voting at the meeting, and shall be submitted by the Depositary to 
all Parties for ratification, acceptance or approval. 
Amendments to the Biosafety Protocol enter into force among Parties having accepted them on the 
ninetieth day after the deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval by at least two thirds 
of the Contracting Parties to the Protocol.72 
This two-step procedure for amendments (namely, voting and then entry into force) can lead to delays 
— as seen in the negotiation of the Nagoya — Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and 
Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (‘Supplementary Protocol on Liability’).73 Unable to 
reach consensus on the issues of liability and redress during the negotiation of the Biosafety Protocol 
in 2000, these issues were left to further negotiations by the Conference of the Parties to complete 
within 4 years.74  The negotiation on the text of the Supplementary Protocol on Liability was not agreed 
to until October 2010, ten years after the initial negotiations.  The Supplementary Protocol on Liability 
was opened for signature on 7 March 2011, but is still awaiting the ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession by 40 Parties to enter into force.75  
While obtaining agreement within the international community is often a challenging and drawn-out 
process, the Parties to the Biosafety Protocol have already established considerable common ground 
in their shared desire to negotiate this specific framework governing the trade in agricultural 
biotechnology outside of the WTO provisions. In this context, the Parties to the Biosafety Protocol may 
be partial to the inclusion of a Choice of Forum clause that provides a mechanism for disputes to be 
exclusively determined by a judicial institution formed under the Biosafety Protocol. Even if a Choice of 
Forum clause could be inserted into the Biosafety Protocol, the next issue to consider is how to give 
effect to such a clause in light of the ruling in the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case. This next section 
will consider this issue in relation to giving legal effect to Choice of Forum clauses in MEAs in the context 
of trade disputes involving parallel proceedings in the WTO. 
3 Legal effect of Choice of Forum clauses in MEAs 
Even if a broadly drafted Choice of Forum clause was included in an MEA (and specifically in the 
Biosafety Protocol) as suggested above, it is uncertain whether the WTO Panel and Appellate Body 
                                                     
72 CBD Article 29(4). 
73 Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, opened for signature 7 March 2011, Doc: UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/5/17 (not yet in force). 
74 Biosafety Protocol Article 27. 
75 Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Status of Signature, 
and ratification, acceptance, approval or accession <https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/#tab=1> 
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would uphold such a clause. In the absence of certainty on this issue, the pursuit of Choice of Forum 
clauses in MEAs alone may be somewhat futile. If Choice of Forum clauses in MEAs are to be pursued 
as a solution to conflicting jurisdiction involving trade disputes, then consideration must be given to how 
to give legal effect to such clauses. There are two possible solutions to ensure that the WTO Panel and 
Appellate Body are empowered to give consideration to Choice of Forum clauses in MEAs (and 
specifically to the Biosafety Protocol): 
a. Through a formal amendment to the DSU; 
b. By a Ministerial Declaration of the WTO Ministerial Conference. 
(a) Amendment to the DSU 
The first and most legally binding solution to ensure that the WTO Panels and Appellate Body have the 
power to enforce Choice of Forum clauses would be to amend the DSU to give effect to these clauses. 
As such, the DSU would be amended to provide that a specific Choice of Forum clause between the 
WTO Members in the dispute (even if the Choice of Forum clause is contained in a non-WTO 
agreement), operates to limit the jurisdiction of the WTO Panels and Appellate Body in accordance with 
the provisions of that specific clause. Such an amendment to the DSU would address the two central 
concerns expressed in the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case by clarifying that; (1) the WTO Panels 
can refrain from determining disputes based on a Choice of Forum clause, even though jurisdiction is 
otherwise validly established, and (2) the WTO Panels and Appellate Body may have regard and give 
effect to the clauses even though it is in a non-WTO agreement. 
While amending the DSU to include a provision giving effect to Choice of Forum clauses works well in 
theory, the reality of such an action is more challenging. The formal process for amending the provisions 
of the DSU (which is contained in Annex 2), is set out in Article X:8 of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (‘Marrakesh Agreement’) as follows: 
Any Member of the WTO may initiate a proposal to amend the provisions of the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements in Annexes 2 and 3 by submitting such proposal to the Ministerial Conference. The decision 
to approve amendments to the Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 2 shall be made by consensus and 
these amendments shall take effect for all Members upon approval by the Ministerial Conference. 
Decisions to approve amendments to the Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 3 shall take effect for all 
Members upon approval by the Ministerial Conference.76 
The Ministerial Conference is composed of representatives of all the Members of the WTO. Accordingly, 
to amend the DSU there must be a consensus by all Members of the WTO. The consensus requirement 
in Article X:8 does not require all WTO Members to actively vote in favour of the proposed amendment. 
Rather, the meaning of ‘consensus’ is specifically clarified in a footnote to Article IX of the Marrakesh 
Agreement as follows:  
                                                     
76 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘Marrakesh Agreement’), Article X:8. 
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The body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its 
consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the 
proposed decision.77 
Historically, there have been two types of ‘voting’ in the international trade forum — consensus voting 
and a vote of two-thirds majority. The movement away from two-thirds majority voting for trade decisions 
under GATT 1947 to consensus voting occurred around the 1950s. When negotiating the newly formed 
WTO in the 1990s, the pattern of consensus voting was embedded in the Marrakesh Agreement by 
virtue of Article IX: 
The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947. 
However, some WTO agreements can be amended by a vote of two-thirds majority if a consensus is 
not reached.78 In regards to proposed amendments to the DSU, Article 10:8 provides no fall-back to 
two-thirds majority voting — an amendment to the DSU must be made by consensus. The arguments 
for and against consensus voting in the WTO has attracted significant scholarly analysis.79 On the side 
in favour of consensus voting, Ambassador Celso Lafer (Chairman of the DSU and of the WTO General 
Council) summarised the justification succinctly as follows: 
Consensus is justified due to the fact that WTO’s assets are not financial resources, but legal norms. In 
order to be effective, such norms must be accepted by all members. They cannot be imposed by the 
heteronomy represented by the power of some. They require the autonomy of a pactum societatis, 
resulting from the participation of all.80 
Further, once the consensus decision to approve an amendment to the DSU is reached, Article X:8 
provides that the amendment takes effect for all Members upon approval by the Ministerial Conference. 
In comparison, for amendments to the multilateral trading agreements in Annex 1, such as GATT 1994, 
after the decision on the amendment is reached, the amendment is then open for ‘acceptance’ by the 
Members. In the absence of this second ‘acceptance’ step in Article X:8, this potentially amounts to a 
‘self-executing’ clause.81  While this point raises interesting legal questions, it is sufficient for this 
                                                     
77 Ibid Article IX, footnote 1. 
78 Ibid Articles X:1 and X:3. 
79 See: Jaime Tijmes-Lhl, 'Consensus and majority voting in the WTO' (2009) 8(03) World Trade Review 417; 
Richard H Steinberg, 'In the shadow of law or power? Consensus-based bargaining and outcomes in the 
GATT/WTO' (2002) 56(02) International Organization 339; Low, Patrick, WTO decision-making for the future, WTO 
Staff Working Paper, No. ERSD-2011-05 (2011) http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57614>; Mary E Footer, 'Role of 
Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-making' (1996) 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 653; 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring, 'Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization Is the Consensus 
Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International 
Trade?' (2005) 8(1) Journal of International Economic Law 51; Jeffrey J Schott and Jayashree Watal, 'Decision 
Making in the WTO' in Jeffrey J Schott (ed), The WTO after Seattle (Institute for International Economics, 2000) 
283. 
80 Lafer Celso, 'Outgoing Chairman Highlights WTO’s Unique Decision-Making Process' (1998) WTO Focus 27, 3.  
81 For a discussion on self-executing treaties, see: Carlos Manuel Vázquez, 'The four doctrines of self-executing 
treaties' (1995) 89(4) American Journal of International Law 695; David L Sloss, 'Executing Foster v. Neilson: The 
Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties' (2012) 53 Harvard International Law Journal 135; Carlos 
Manuel Vázquez, 'Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties' 
(2008) 122(2) Harvard Law Review 599; Curtis A Bradley, 'Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties' 
(2008) 102(3) American Journal of International Law 540; Margaret E McGuinness, 'Medellín v Texas' (2008) 
102(3) American Journal of International Law 622 and Jordan J Paust, 'Medellin, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties 
and Relevant Executive Authority' (2008) 31 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 301. 
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doctoral thesis to recognise that it will most likely impact on the decision by a Member State to vote in 
favour of an amendment to the DSU. 
Obtaining the consensus of all WTO Members to change the DSU would be an uphill challenge. On the 
one hand, it could be argued that the amendment to the DSU would only operate so as to give effect to 
Choice of Forum clauses that the parties have agreed to between themselves. That is, if the WTO 
Members do not wish to establish an exclusive jurisdiction then such a clause would not be included in 
the MEA. However, if they do wish that forum selection between the WTO Panel and the MEA dispute 
resolution forum be enforceable between the parties to the dispute, then this amendment would allow 
for that. While this seems simple and straightforward, the legal and political dynamics in international 
relations is anything but simple. In some cases a WTO Member may wish to have a Choice of Forum 
clause enforced (if it operates in their favour) and in other situations they may wish to avoid the clause. 
If the WTO DSU was amended to give effect to Choice of Forum clauses then the discretion to rely on, 
or avoid, such clauses is removed — a factor that may prove worrying to some WTO Members. It is not 
certain that all WTO Members would be in favour of amending the DSU in this way. In addition, there is 
little evidence of success in obtaining the consensus of WTO Members at the Ministerial Conference. 
Since the creation of the WTO in 1994, only two proposed changes to the multilateral trading 
agreements have received support — an amendment to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS Agreement’) and new provisions relating to trade facilitation (see 
the two case studies below).82 In both of these examples, the approval process has been long and 
drawn-out since the early 2000s and is still awaiting final approval before the amendments can take 
effect.  
Case Study: Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement 
On 6 December 2005, the WTO Members agreed to make permanent the earlier 2003 decision to 
grant a ‘waiver’ to certain provisions in the TRIPS Agreement to assist poorer countries to obtain 
cheaper generic versions of patented medicines (countries that are unable to produce these 
medicines).83 For the amendment to take effect, Article X:3 of the Marrakesh Agreement provides 
that two-thirds of WTO Members must formally accept the amendment (this provision permits the 
fall-back to majority voting where a consensus is not obtained). The original deadline for the 
approval by two thirds majority of WTO Members was 1 December 2007. In total, the deadline for 
approval has been extended four times, most recently to 31 December 2015.84  
 
                                                     
82 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 1C (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights). 
83 World Trade Organization, Members accepting amendment of the TRIPS Agreement 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm>. 
84 World Trade Organization, General Council Decision, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement – fourth extension 
of the period for the Acceptance by members of the protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Doc WT/L/899 
(27 November 2013). 
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Case Study:  Trade Facilitation Agreement 
In December 2013, the WTO Members agreed by consensus to the Trade Facilitation Agreement 
at the Bali Ministerial Conference. Negotiations on the topic of trade facilitation commenced 9 years 
earlier as part of the ‘July Package’ agreed to by the General Council in 2004. The Trade Facilitation 
Agreement aims to ‘facilitate’  the movement, release and clearance of goods through more efficient 
customs procedures as well as providing technical assistance and capacity building measures to 
improve trade facilitation. A Protocol of Amendment was adopted on 27 November 2014 to insert 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement into Annex 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement (Annex 1A comprises 
the multilateral trade agreements of the WTO).85  
While there is no doubt that obtaining approval for changes to trade facilitation and also to the TRIPS 
Agreement is a significant achievement, it is not certain that proposed amendments to the DSU would 
be successful. Most importantly, both the TRIPS amendments and the new trade facilitation provisions 
come into effect upon the acceptance of two-thirds majority of WTO Members — and then, only for the 
Members that accept the provisions. In comparison, the DSU must be amended by consensus and is 
binding on all Members. The TRIPS amendments, in essence, are the formalisation of the existing 
practice under the waiver since 2003. The Trade Facilitation Agreement, while introducing new 
provisions, has general support and provides major cost saving benefits for WTO Members:  
The OECD estimates that for every one-percent reduction in global trade costs, global incomes go up by 
$40 billion — and that the new WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement struck at the 9th WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Bali, Indonesia can cut trade costs by almost 14.5 percent for low-income countries, 10 
percent for high-income countries. Other studies estimate that significant trade facilitation like that 
supported in this agreement could increase global GDP by almost $1 trillion.86 
In contrast, amending the DSU to give effect to Choice of Forum clauses has the potential to curb 
access to the WTO Panels and Appellate Body procedures when the clause is invoked — thus 
significantly changing the rights of access of Members to WTO dispute resolution. It would no doubt be 
harder to obtain a consensus to such a permanent and binding change to the DSU. Apart from the 
above two case studies (which both were drawn out over a number of years), it has been historically 
difficult to achieve a consensus a vote in the WTO. Accordingly, achieving a consensus of WTO 
Members to an amendment to the DSU to recognise Choice of Forum clauses is, in all likelihood, 
unrealistic. 
                                                     
85 World Trade Organization, General Council Decision: Protocol Amending the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Decision of 27 November 2014, WTO Doc WT/L/940, Annex (Agreement on Trade 
Facilitation). 
86 Saving Money, Growing Trade, Raising Incomes Worldwide: The New WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, Office 
of the United States Trade Representative, December 2013 <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-
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(b) Ministerial Declarations 
Another possible option to give effect to Choice of Forum clauses is by way of a Ministerial Declaration 
by the Ministerial Conference. The WTO Ministerial Conference usually meets every two years and can 
take decisions on all matters under any of the multilateral trade agreements. Pursuant to Article IX:1 of 
the Marrakesh Agreement, the Ministerial Conference enjoys extensive decision-making powers: 
The Ministerial Conference shall have the authority to take decisions on all matters under any of the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements, if so requested by a Member, in accordance with the specific requirements 
for decision-making in this Agreement and in the relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement. 
From the first Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996, there has been a trend by the Ministers, at 
the conclusion of the Conference, to release formal Ministerial Declarations and Ministerial Decisions. 
Ministerial Decisions are commonly statements of ‘agreement’ relating to a proposal made by a WTO 
Member regarding the WTO agreements. While the power to issue a Ministerial Decision is clearly 
supported by Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement, the basis of power for Ministerial Declarations is 
less clear. In neither Article IX (Decision-Making powers) nor Article X (Amendments) of the Marrakesh 
Agreement, does the phrase ‘Ministerial Declaration’ appear. Therefore the ‘legal’ basis for Ministerial 
Declarations is uncertain — are these Declarations merely political statements of intent of the WTO 
Members or do they carry the force of law?  Interestingly, this issue has received little scholarly attention. 
Given the repeated use of Ministerial Declarations, it is possible that such statements could be 
considered a ‘decision’ within the meaning of the Marrakesh Agreement. It may not be necessary for 
the entire Declaration to be considered a ‘Decision’ — it could contain a mix of general assertive 
statements as well as statements that amount to a ‘Decision’ of the Ministerial Conference. Perhaps 
the ‘form’ of the statement is of less importance (that is titling the document as a ‘Decision’) than the 
content of the text. For example, there would be a clear distinction made between a formal statement 
in a Ministerial Declaration that reads like a legal amendment to the DSU (which would be a ‘Decision’), 
compared to a more generalised statement expressing the ‘intent’ of WTO Members. However, if in fact 
the Ministerial Declaration leans towards the formal legal statement amending the DSU, then it is 
arguable that the proper procedures for ‘amendments’ under Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement, 
requiring the consensus of the WTO Members, should be followed. While support for a formal 
amendment to the DSU may be difficult to obtain, a general statement of ‘intent’ in a Ministerial 
Declaration may prove a more attainable goal. Ministerial Declarations have, in the past, contained 
statements of ‘intent’ of the WTO Members, such as paragraph 6 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration: 
We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective of sustainable development, as stated in the 
Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement. We are convinced that the aims of upholding and safeguarding 
an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and acting for the protection of the 
environment and the promotion of sustainable development can and must be mutually supportive. We 
take note of the efforts by members to conduct national environmental assessments of trade policies on 
a voluntary basis. We recognize that under WTO rules no country should be prevented from taking 
measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or of the environment at the levels it 
considers appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would 
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constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with 
the provisions of the WTO Agreements ...87  
A possible way forward is for the WTO Members to make a Ministerial Declaration indicating a general 
‘intent’ to give effect to Choice of Forum clauses —  but stopping short of making a formal ‘decision’ to 
amend the DSU. Although Ministerial Declarations are issued generally by consent, it would be easier 
to obtain a consensus to a broad statement in a Declaration than to a specific legal Decision amending 
the DSU. This next section will consider whether a Ministerial Declaration indicating a general ‘intention’ 
of the WTO Members would carry sufficient weight so as to be implemented by the WTO Panel and 
Appellate Body. 
It is possible that a general statement of ‘intent’ in a Ministerial Declaration could be given effect by the 
WTO Panel and Appellate Body as a ‘subsequent agreement’ between the WTO Members. The terms 
of reference for WTO Panels, as stated in Article 7(2) of the DSU, specifically provides that the Panels:  
shall address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the 
dispute.’ (emphasis added) 
In addition, Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that in the context 
of interpreting a treaty, such an agreement comprises the text of the treaty as well as: 
Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application 
of its provisions. (emphasis added) 
It is well established that the principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, are relevant 
to the legal interpretation by the WTO Panels and Appellate Body of the agreements in the dispute. As 
held by the Appellate Body in United States — Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant 
Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany: 
At the outset of our analysis, we recall that Article 3.2 of the DSU recognizes that interpretative issues 
arising in WTO dispute settlement are to be resolved through the application of customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law. It is well settled in WTO case law that the principles codified in 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the ‘Vienna Convention’) are such 
customary rules.88 
There is precedent in the WTO jurisprudence of regard being given to Ministerial Conference 
documents as an interpretive tool of the WTO agreements. In the United States — Import Prohibition 
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (‘US — Shrimp’) case,89 the Appellate Body considered the 
obligations on the United States to conduct serious and substantial negotiations with other Member 
                                                     
87 Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, World Trade Organization, WTO Doc 
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88 Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat 
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States prior to implementing unilateral trade measures. In making its determination, the Appellate Body 
referred to and relied upon Section VII of the Report of the General Council to the 1996 Ministerial 
Conference (Singapore).90 This section of the Report of the General Council contained the statement 
of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) endorsing multilateral solutions based on 
international cooperation and consensus as the best and most effective way for governments.91 
Accordingly, the Appellate Body utilised the Report of the General Council made to the Ministerial 
Conference to interpret the obligations of the United States under the WTO agreements in light of the 
intentions expressed and endorsed by the WTO Members at the Ministerial Conference. Applying the 
same reasoning, it is possible that a Ministerial Declaration made by the WTO Members at a Ministerial 
Conference stating an intention to give effect to Choice of Forum clauses could be applied by the WTO 
Panels and Appellate Body. This fits nicely within the work already undertaken by the WTO Committee 
on Trade and Environment (CTE) on the relationship between MEAs and the WTO as discussed in 
chapter 3 of this thesis. The CTE is a suitable forum in which the negotiations of a draft Ministerial 
Declaration could take place. 
Having established that the WTO Panels and Appellate Body could apply a Ministerial Declaration that 
gives effect to Choice of Forum clauses, doubt still remains as to whether, in reality, they would do so. 
Such a statement can be differentiated from the US — Shrimp case where reliance was placed on the 
rather uncontroversial statement in the Report of the General Council supporting multilateral 
negotiations and international co-operation. In contrast, in the current scenario the WTO Panel and 
Appellate Body would be faced with applying a Choice of Forum clause that curtails its jurisdiction to 
determine the dispute, against the objection of the complaining party who maintains their right of access 
to the WTO dispute forum. Further, the WTO Panel and Appellate Body could conclude that if the WTO 
Members intended for the Choice of Forum clauses to be binding then they would have implemented it 
through the formal amendment process of the DSU, rather than a Ministerial Declaration. What the 
WTO Panels and Appellate Body would do in this situation remains uncertain. 
B Choice of Forum Clause in the WTO DSU 
Another alternative is to consider inserting a Choice of Forum clause into the DSU, rather than relying 
on the inclusion of these clauses in MEAs (and specifically in relation to the case study of agricultural 
biotechnology, the Biosafety Protocol). Accordingly, there would be a single clause in the DSU that 
provides that parties to a trade dispute can select the exclusive forum for dispute resolution on the basis 
of first engagement of a judicial institution (or by consensus — but the failings of consensus-based 
Choice of Forum clauses is outlined above). The operation of this clause is straight forward in the 
situation where a WTO Member clearly first engages the DSU for the resolution of the dispute — the 
WTO Panel would be the exclusive forum under the Choice of Forum clause. However, if the WTO 
dispute proceedings are engaged second, then this clause would operate to nullify its jurisdiction to 
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91 Report of the General Council to the 1996 Ministerial Conference, WTO Doc WT/MIN(96)/2 (26 November 1996), 
Section VII, Report of the Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/1, 12 November 1996. 
207  
 
determine the dispute. As each judicial institution is pre-disposed to uphold the validity of its jurisdiction 
(partly in order to maintain its own relevance), would a WTO Panel seek to distinguish the proceedings 
before it from the parallel MEA legal proceedings on the grounds that the legal claims are different?  
Put another way, would the WTO Panel be satisfied to refrain from exercising jurisdiction if the legal 
claims available under the WTO agreements are not available under the MEA?  In fact, can the MEA 
judicial institution apply WTO law? What about in reverse — would the MEA dispute resolution forum 
be bound by the WTO Choice of Forum clause?  
By including the Choice of Forum clause in the WTO agreements, it then applies to all trade disputes, 
even if the WTO Member does not wish to give preference to the dispute resolution of a particular MEA. 
Not only would such a clause clarify that the WTO can refrain from exercising jurisdiction, it ultimately 
provides that it must do so — arguably then undermining the unique nature of the WTO DSU as a 
compulsory and legally binding international judicial institution with enforceability power. In essence, a 
Choice of Forum clause in the WTO DSU links ‘jurisdiction’ to the point of time of the legal proceedings 
rather than the appropriateness of the judicial institution or the integrity of the legal claims. 
These complexities and uncertainties affect the likelihood of achieving support from the WTO Members 
to amend the DSU to include a Choice of Forum clause, which, as detailed above, would require the 
consensus of the WTO Members. 
C G-20 Statement: An Additional Option 
The G-20 nations have taken an active role in the WTO deliberations process, particularly in the Doha 
Round. Prior to the last Ministerial Conference in Bali in 2013, the Ministers of the G-20 met in an 
attempt to agree to a set of agricultural deliverables to present to the WTO Ministerial Conference — a 
key topic of the Doha negotiations. Although unsuccessful, the G-20 did deliver a G-20 Ministerial 
Communiqué, which formed part of the official documents of the Bali Ministerial Conference.92 In this 
Communiqué, the G20 Ministers made some strong statements relating to agriculture and trade, 
including, for example: 
We deeply regret that the overdue elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export 
measures with equivalent effect was not achieved in 2013 as set out in the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration. Our determination to put an end to these measures is undiminished. Among all the measures 
that distort trade, export subsidies are by far the worst.93 
In addition, in September 2013 the G-20 nations approved an annex to the Leaders Declaration on 
‘Advancing Transparency in Regional Trade Agreements’, advancing transparency of the obligations of 
the G-20 nations under RTAs.94 The implementation by the WTO of Choice of Forum clauses in RTAs 
falls neatly into this larger topic of ‘Transparency’ in RTAs. It is not too long a bow to draw that Choice 
                                                     
92 G-20 Ministerial Communiqué, World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference, Ninth Session, Bali, WTO Doc 
WT/MIN(13)/20 (2 December 2013) <https://mc9.wto.org/official-documents-bali-ministerial>. 
93 Ibid. 
94 'Advancing Transparency in Regional Trade Agreements', G20, Russia (September 2013) 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000013980.pdf>. 
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of Forum clauses in MEAs (not just in RTAs) is a transparency issue that the G-20 should pursue. 
Outside of the WTO arena, the G-20 nations could place on their own agenda the negotiation of an 
agreement to implement and abide by Choice of Forum clauses in disputes involving G-20 Members 
— that is, that parallel proceedings will be discontinued. Even if such an agreement could be negotiated, 
the question remains as to how long the agreement would remain in place and whether it would 
enforceable. Governments change and national interests are always likely to prevail over international 
understandings. 
That said, if the G-20 Ministers released a Communiqué (or a formal agreement binding on the G-20 
group) supporting the use of Choice of Forum clauses and proposed that the WTO Panels and Appellate 
body give effect to such clauses, such a statement would carry significant weight. Of course, a G-20 
Ministerial Communiqué would carry no real legal force under the WTO DSU, but it may be taken into 
account as a non-binding political statement of intent and would certainly place political pressure on G-
20 members (if not all of the WTO Members) to abide by Choice of Forum clauses. 
IV CONCLUSION 
To address the overlapping jurisdiction between trade disputes brought before the WTO and also 
pursuant to an MEA, and specifically relating to the trade in agricultural biotechnology, this doctoral 
thesis advocates the use of Choice of Forum clauses. However, as the law currently stands, it is 
uncertain whether such Choice of Forum clauses (for example, included by way of an amendment to 
the Biosafety Protocol or in a new MEA going forward) will be given effect by the WTO Panel and 
Appellate Body. To address this uncertainty, the legal options explored in this chapter include either 
inserting a Choice of Forum clause in the WTO DSU or amending the DSU to invest the WTO dispute 
forum with power to apply a Choice of Forum clause in an MEA. As any amendment to the DSU must 
be passed by the consensus of the WTO Members, it is highly unlikely that such an amendment would 
succeed. As previous negotiations in the WTO have demonstrated, such as the failed Doha round, it is 
very difficult to consistently overcome national interests when applying international law principles. 
Accordingly, we are left with the non-legal processes of Ministerial Declarations and G-20 Statements. 
While not necessarily legally binding, these documents carry significant political weight. Whether they 
will be implemented by the WTO Panel or Appellate Body (or by the international judicial institution 
under the MEA) in proceedings where the Choice of Forum clause is contested, is unclear. However, it 
is one step in the right direction of addressing the problems posed by conflicting jurisdiction from the 
crossover of legal norms between different specialised regimes of international law. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE WAY FORWARD 
This doctoral thesis draws attention to the less considered, but vitally important, aspect of fragmentation 
of international law — the potential for overlapping jurisdiction between international judicial institutions 
due to the crossover of normative provisions between the different specialised areas of international 
law. As aptly described by Pauwelyn, these specialised regimes are ‘inter-connected islands’ containing 
subject-specific norms.1 Trade disputes involving agricultural biotechnology products has been used as 
a case study in this thesis to demonstrate the potential for parallel proceedings in public international 
law and the deficiencies that exist in the current legal framework for addressing such parallel 
proceedings. 
To conclude this doctoral thesis, we return to the five questions posed in the chapter 1: 
1. Is the fragmentation of international law into specialised regimes, and the associated 
proliferation of international judicial institutions, a concern? 
2. Is there a primary jurisdiction for the resolution of trade disputes that falls under both the 
specialised regimes of international trade law (the WTO and RTAs) and international 
environmental law (a TREM in an MEA), using the case study of agricultural biotechnology? 
3. If there is no primary jurisdiction, what, if any, are the ramifications of having parallel 
jurisdictions? 
4. If there is no primary jurisdiction, what, if any, legal tools are available to resolve the conflict of 
jurisdiction between the dual dispute resolution options under the international trade law and 
international environmental law regimes and, specifically, in the case study of agricultural 
biotechnology?   
5. What, if any, reforms are necessary to address jurisdictional conflict, both specifically for the 
trade in agricultural biotechnology and more broadly for the competing specialised areas of 
international environmental law and international trade law?  
                                                     
1 See: Joost Pauwelyn, 'Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected 
Islands' (2003) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 903. 
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I FRAGMENTATION: SPECIALISED REGIMES AND 
THE PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL 
INSTITUTIONS  
Is the fragmentation of international law into specialised regimes, and the associated proliferation 
of international judicial institutions, a concern? 
The fragmentation of international law into specialised legal regimes and the associated proliferation of 
international judicial institutions to oversee these regimes is a growing concern. As discussed 
throughout this doctoral thesis, there are a plethora of international judicial institutions, which in turn 
gives rise to the potential for parallel proceedings. 
The literature to date has concentrated on the concept of fragmentation of international law in the 
context of the conflict between the normative provisions of specialised regimes. In particular, the 2006 
report by the International Law Commission (ILC Report) considered the challenges posed by conflict 
of norms between the specialised regimes in international law and provided a conceptual framework for 
the legal profession to utilise in resolving such conflict.2 The ILC elected to not address the institutional 
challenges posed by overlapping jurisdiction between the specialised regimes and associated 
proliferation of judicial institutions.  
Of particular concern is the growing trend for international agreements negotiated under the purview of 
a specialised regime to include provisions that address subject matters outside of their ‘specialised’ 
mandate. This doctoral thesis has focused on the crossover between the trade and environment 
regimes, using agricultural biotechnology as a case study. In the area of international environmental 
law, at least 16 key multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) now contain trade-related 
provisions. As these MEAs contain dispute resolution provisions, there is overlapping jurisdiction with 
the WTO dispute forum for the resolution of trade disputes. In addition, there are 51 currently active 
RTAs that include clauses directly relating to environmental issues and 133 RTAs that include sanitary 
and phytosanitary (SPS) measures.3 Given the large number of MEAs and RTAs currently in force, as 
well as the WTO agreements, the scope for conflict between these agreements is substantial. What 
has evolved is a complex web of potentially conflicting agreements (each with their own dispute 
resolution clauses) that include MEAs, RTAs and the WTO agreements. 
                                                     
2 'Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law' (International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, 2006) (‘ILC Report’). 
3 World Trade Organization, WTO Regional Trade Agreement Database (14 November 2013) 
<http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx>  
<http://rtais.wto.org/UI/publicsummarytable.aspx>. 
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II PRIMARY JURISDICTION CLAUSE? 
Is there a primary jurisdiction for the resolution of trade disputes that falls under both the 
specialised regimes of international trade law (the WTO and RTAs) and international 
environmental law (a TREM in an MEA), using the case study of agricultural biotechnology? 
Generally, there is no primary jurisdiction for the resolution of trade disputes that fall under both 
international trade law and international environmental law, in the absence of any specific clause in the 
international agreement in question. Focussing on the example of trade involving agricultural 
biotechnology, it would be possible for trade disputes to be resolved under either the WTO agreements 
or the provisions of the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(‘Biosafety Protocol’).4  
Looking first at the WTO agreements, Article 23.1 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (‘DSU’) requires Member States to utilise the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism to resolve disputes that involve questions of a breach of the WTO Covered 
Agreements.5 However, this provision falls short of conclusively stating that only the WTO Panel has 
the power to adjudicate on disagreements that may involve the interpretation and application of WTO 
law. To date, there has been no decision by the WTO Panel that unequivocally establishes the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism as an exclusive dispute resolution forum to the exclusion of all others 
where the issues in the dispute may involve WTO law. This can be contrasted with the ruling by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Commission of the European Communities v Ireland (being the 
ECJ case in the MOX Plant dispute),6 which clarified the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ pursuant to 
Article 344 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
(previously Article 292 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community).7 
In comparison, Article 23.1 of the DSU does not specifically exclude other forms of dispute settlement. 
Distinguishing between ‘compulsory’ and ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction, the WTO DSU requires WTO Members 
to utilise the dispute settlement mechanism for the resolution of disputes as opposed to taking unilateral 
action. However, Article 23.1 does not operate to ‘pull-in’ disputes involving issues of WTO law that 
have otherwise been commenced before other judicial institutions. 
Looking specifically at the trade of agricultural biotechnology under the Biosafety Protocol, there is 
nothing specific in the Biosafety Protocol (or in Article 27 of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(‘CBD’))8 stating the forum of choice for dispute resolution or an exclusive jurisdiction clause that 
                                                     
4 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 29 January 2000, 
2226 UNTS 208 (entered into force 11 September 2003) (‘Biosafety Protocol’). 
5 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 2 (Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes) (‘DSU’). 
6 Commission of the European Communities v Ireland (C-459/03) [2006] ECR I-4635 
7 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47 (entered into 
force 26 October 2012). 
8 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 
December 1993). 
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prohibits any other (subsequent or parallel) claims before a different judicial institution. Further, as 
discussed in detail in chapter 5, it is unlikely that the ‘savings’ provisions in the Preamble to the Biosafety 
Protocol will operate to void the jurisdiction of the WTO Panel, or in the alternative, establish exclusive 
jurisdiction under the Biosafety Protocol, in the circumstances of dual proceedings. Accordingly, the 
provisions of the Biosafety Protocol (and the CBD) do not provide for exclusive jurisdiction for the 
resolution of trade disputes involving agricultural biotechnology.  
In the absence of normative provisions conveying exclusive jurisdiction on either the dispute forum 
under the WTO or the Biosafety Protocol (or at least addressing jurisdictional conflict), there is 
overlapping jurisdiction between the two dispute resolution frameworks. 
III PARALLEL CONFLICTING JURISDICTION — THE 
‘PROBLEM’ 
If there is no primary jurisdiction, what, if any, are the ramifications of having parallel jurisdictions? 
The third question posed in this doctoral thesis contemplates whether parallel jurisdiction between the 
dispute resolution frameworks of the different specialised regimes in international law is in fact an issue 
of concern. 
The opportunity for forum shopping in international law is well known. Concerns about the engagement 
of multiple institutions include: the negative implications of forum shopping; inconsistent judgments; and 
divergent interpretations of international law. These concerns go to the essence of what makes an 
effective and reliable legal ‘system’. As aptly summarised by Jonathan T. Fried, the 2013 Chairman of 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body: 
But, though perhaps not as exciting, procedural matters — well, matter. The most precisely drafted 
Agreement is not worth much if the Members are not clear on how it is to be made operative in the WTO 
system, and how it affects their legal rights and obligations.9 
While nation States may disapprove of forum shopping by opposing parties in their disputes, there is 
little rush to introduce institutional change to prevent this from occurring. Accordingly, forum shopping 
has been described as an ‘endogenous design choice’.10 
As discussed in chapter 2, some scholars disagree with the apprehension expressed about the 
proliferation of international institutions and the possibility of overlapping jurisdiction. The concerns 
about multiple institutional engagement have been dismissed on the grounds that as the legal claims 
                                                     
9 World Trade Organization, 2013 in WTO Dispute Settlement: Reflections from the Chair of the Dispute Settlement 
Body - Jonathan T. Fried Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the WTO (2013) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/jfried_13_e.htm>. 
10 Marc L Busch, 'Overlapping institutions, forum shopping, and dispute settlement in international trade' (2007) 
61(4) International Organization 735, 737. 
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are distinct, there is no conflict of jurisdiction between the two proceedings per se.11 This argument 
becomes particularly relevant with regards to the application of the principles of lis albi pendens and 
res judicata as legal tools available for resolving jurisdictional conflict (and these principles are 
discussed in the next section). However, dismissing concerns about the potential for parallel legal 
proceedings in international public law based on a distinction of the legal claims ignores the broader 
institutional challenges posed by multiple institutional engagement. If the legal claims and remedies 
were identical (and the outcomes the same) then it may not matter as much which judicial institution 
determined the proceedings. But the potential for different judicial outcomes and remedies involving the 
same parties and the same factual matrix is precisely the issue of concern. The trend for the crossover 
between specialised regimes in international law, such as the inclusion of trade provisions in MEAs, 
poses an even greater concern about the proliferation of international judicial institutions. Agricultural 
biotechnology is just one example of where dual proceedings regarding trade obligations may be 
commenced pursuant to an MEA and under the WTO agreements. Side-stepping the problems arising 
out of parallel proceedings and multiple institutional engagement on the legal technicality that the legal 
claims are not identical would further perpetuate the potential for forum shopping in international legal 
disputes.  
The provisions of international agreements, like any legal ‘provision’, should be open to enforcement 
and application as between the parties. However, the principles of predictability, fairness and 
consistency are undermined by the potential for parallel proceedings before different international 
judicial institutions, particularly if: (a) there are divergences in the proceedings of the judicial institutions 
(e.g. the available remedies, the standard or proof, the binding nature of the decision); (b) the overall 
objective of the judicial institutions differ (e.g. environment protection vs free trade); and (c) if ultimately 
the rulings handed down by each judicial institution are inconsistent. 
IV EXISTING SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICT OF 
JURISDICTION? 
If there is no primary jurisdiction, what, if any, legal tools are available to resolve the conflict of 
jurisdiction between the dual dispute resolution options under the international trade law and 
international environmental law regimes and, specifically, in the case study of agricultural 
biotechnology?   
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis considered whether, in the absence of exclusive jurisdiction provisions 
in the relevant international agreements in dispute (in this case, the Biosafety Protocol or the WTO 
agreements), any other legal principles could assist to resolve a conflict of jurisdiction involving the 
engagement of multiple judicial institutions. 
                                                     
11 Wen-chen Shih, 'Conflicting jurisdictions over disputes arising from the application of Trade-Related 
Environmental Measures' (2009) 8 Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 351, 386. 
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A Private International Law Principles 
This doctoral thesis considered the application of the following private international law principles to a 
conflict of jurisdiction involving a public international law dispute: 
- Forum non conveniens 
- Substantial connection 
- Lis alibi pendens 
- Judicial comity 
- Good faith and abuse of rights/process 
- Res judicata 
It was concluded in chapters 4 and 5 that these principles of conflict of jurisdiction provide little to no 
assistance in addressing overlapping jurisdiction in relation to multiple proceedings involving two 
specialised regimes of public international law, and in particular, in relation to the case study of 
agricultural biotechnology. 
B Conflict of Norms Principles  
Consideration was also given in chapters 4 and 5 as to whether the conflict of norms principles of lex 
specialis and lex posterior could assist in resolving a conflict of jurisdiction between international judicial 
institutions involving public international law proceedings.  
The principle of lex specialis provides little assistance in the situation where proceedings fall under two 
specialist regimes of international law such as environment and trade, since both agreements may be 
described as dealing with ‘specific’ subject matter. It is doubtful that an argument seeking to establish 
that one agreement is ‘more’ specific than the other would be successful without a clear statement of 
intent in the agreement to displace obligations found in other international agreements that deal with 
the same subject matter. In the case study, the Preamble to the Biosafety Protocol, contains a statement 
that provides that the Biosafety Protocol ‘shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and 
obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements.’  
The principle of lex posterior (and its codification in Article 30 para 3 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties),12 is also of little assistance in the context of public international law disputes as it is 
difficult to conclusively determine with any specificity which international agreement is the ‘later treaty’ 
given that such agreements are negotiated over time, amended and added to, and signed, ratified and 
implemented by different States at different times. 
                                                     
12 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into 
force 27 January 1980). 
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In conclusion, it is doubtful that the principles of lex specialis and lex posterior could be effectively 
applied to resolve a scenario of overlapping jurisdiction arising out of parallel proceedings commenced 
pursuant to different specialised regimes of international trade law and international environmental law 
and in particular in relation to the case study of the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO agreements. 
C Harmonization and Judicial Economy 
Applying the concept ‘harmonization’, as advanced by Koskenniemi in the ILC Report, to overlapping 
jurisdiction, the collision between international judicial institutions (and more broadly, specialised 
international legal regimes) can theoretically be resolved informally through judicial dialogue or through 
the willingness of the parties to the dispute to negotiate a solution.13 
In this context ‘harmonization’ embraces both the concepts of judicial economy (efficiency in the 
operation of the courts and the judicial system) and judicial comity (grant of reciprocity, where one court 
defers to the jurisdiction of another in a dispute where both have jurisdiction). It serves to inject some 
form of unity and cohesiveness in the absence of formalised institutional linkages. As proposed by 
Justice Higgins: 
We judges are going to have to learn how to live in this new, complex world, and to regard it as an 
opportunity rather than a problem: 
- We must read each other's judgments. 
- We must have respect for each other's judicial work. 
- We must try to preserve unity among us unless context really prevents this.14 
Harmonization may prove effective where the issues in dispute between the parallel proceedings are 
legally distinct. However, in the case of agricultural biotechnology trade disputes, given the interwoven 
nature of the issues in dispute and the crossover of normative provisions, it is not clear cut which judicial 
institution should proceed to determine the case. Coupled with this is the inherent reluctance of judicial 
institutions such as the WTO Panel to relinquish what is otherwise ‘valid’ jurisdiction to another judicial 
institution.15  
The application of the informal principle of harmonization is even more problematic when the dispute 
involves separate proceedings in two specialised institutions. Which judicial institution should relinquish 
its jurisdiction? How should this be determined? What if both parties contest that their valid claims by 
heard by different institutions? Should one judicial institution be preferred over another? The 
                                                     
13 See: ILC Report, above n 2. 
14 Rosalyn Higgins, 'A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench' (2006) 55(4) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 791, 804. 
15 Panel Report, Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO Doc WT/DS308/R (7 October 
2005) (‘Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks’). Reluctance to relinquish valid jurisdiction was also expressed by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the 
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law (Requested By The United Mexican States) (Advisory Opinion OC-16/99) 
(1999)) Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series A No.16  [61]. However, compare the position of taken by 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’) arbitral tribunal in The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v 
United Kingdom) (Order No. 3 — Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits) (2003) 42 ILM 1187. 
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determination of which judicial institution is the more ‘appropriate’ forum would partly depend on the 
characterisation of the dispute (is it a trade dispute or an environmental dispute?) drawing in the 
subjective motivating factors of policy and ethics, inevitably leading to further disagreement and debate 
between the parties and potentially between the judicial institutions.  
Harmonization, (including judicial comity and judicial economy), is not a comprehensive ‘solution’ to 
overlapping jurisdiction — it is a fall-back position to manage the current situation. However, in the 
absence of any provisions on jurisdiction in the international agreement in dispute, these judicial 
institutions have no obligation and little incentive to forgo their own jurisdiction to hear a dispute. In this 
way, relinquishing jurisdiction on the basis of ‘harmonization’ is at odds with the inherent motivation of 
each international judicial institution to maintain its relevance.  
Turning back to the case study of agricultural biotechnology, even if one embraces the principle of 
harmonization as a way of handling potential jurisdictional overlaps, there is real doubt over whether a 
WTO Panel or Appellate Body has authority to refrain from determining a dispute once valid jurisdiction 
has been established. There is no normative provision in the DSU vesting a WTO Panel with the power 
to exercise judicial comity or judicial economy. In the Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages (‘Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks’) case, the Appellate Body considered the obligations of a 
WTO Panel, in particular the obligation under Article 11 of the DSU (to make an objective assessment 
of the matter before it) and held that ‘[i]t is difficult to see how a panel would fulfil that obligation if it 
declined to exercise validly established jurisdiction and abstained from making any finding on the matter 
before it’.16 As the case law currently stands, it is doubtful that a WTO Panel has the power to refrain 
from exercising validly established jurisdiction. Given the absence of case law in relation to disputes 
involving the Biosafety Protocol, it is not known how a judicial institution engaged to determine a dispute 
involving the provisions of that agreement will approach an application to forgo jurisdiction. However, it 
is surmised that most judicial institutions have a predisposition to hear proceedings if jurisdiction has 
been validly established. 
V THE WAY FORWARD: REFORMS 
What, if any, reforms are necessary to address jurisdictional conflict, both specifically for the trade 
in agricultural biotechnology and more broadly for the competing specialised areas of 
international environmental law and international trade law?  
The final question posed at the beginning of this doctoral thesis contemplates what, if any, reforms are 
necessary to address jurisdictional conflict between the judicial institutions of the specialised regimes 
of international environment and trade law, in particular in a trade dispute involving agricultural 
biotechnology. 
                                                     
16 Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks, WTO Doc WT/DS308/AB/R, AB-2005-10 (6 March 
2006) [51]. 
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The utopian legal solution proposed to address the proliferation of international judicial institutions, and 
thereby overlapping jurisdiction in multiple institutional engagement, is to create an international judicial 
hierarchy. Proposed models for the judicial hierarchy range from the ‘formal’ creation of a 
comprehensive judicial hierarchy, to the two-tiered hierarchy where the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) is invested with appellate jurisdiction or the authority to make preliminary rulings on jurisdictional 
conflict. 
This doctoral thesis concludes that the creation of a formal international judicial hierarchy is not feasible. 
Obtaining agreement on the determination and classification of judicial institutions on different tiers in 
the hierarchy is unlikely, at least in the near to medium term. In particular, a judicial hierarchy would 
only work if States agreed to be subject to the jurisdiction of each judicial institution — or at least to the 
judicial institutions at the top of the hierarchy. Given that only 70 States of the 193 Member States of 
the United Nations (UN) have made a declaration recognising the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, 
and many of these States have imposed specific limitations on its jurisdiction, obtaining universal 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of all judicial institutions in an international hierarchy is realistically 
impossible. In the absence of the universal acceptance of jurisdiction, any attempt to define a 
comprehensive hierarchy is unachievable.  
Creating a simple two-tiered hierarchy with the ICJ at the top has also been proposed as a solution to 
fragmentation and the proliferation of judicial institutions. The appeal of the two-tiered hierarchy is that 
obtaining consensus from the international community appears less challenging, at least in comparison 
to the proposal of a comprehensive hierarchy. However, a two-tiered hierarchy does not solve a conflict 
of jurisdiction between the multitude of judicial institutions on the lower level of the hierarchical 
framework. It is unclear how such issues of multiple institutional engagement of specialised judicial 
institutions would be addressed in such a hierarchy. Would the ICJ then be vested with jurisdiction to 
determine these disputes? How would the hierarchy function for disputes involving States that do not 
accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ?  If the dispute resolution provisions of an international agreement list 
the ICJ as an option to the parties for dispute resolution (which is common in MEAs), would this then 
elevate the MEA proceedings above the parallel WTO proceedings in the judicial hierarchy? In 
summary, even a two-tiered judicial hierarchy raises significant complications regarding the relationship 
and priority to be assigned to the various specialised international judicial institutions. 
International law is a melting pot of complex legal agreements negotiated in the context of conflicting 
national interests, divergent cultural perspectives, varying power dynamics and political agendas. 
Proposing the creation of an international judicial hierarchy that reflects national legal systems is a 
utopian dream. International law does not, and will not, enjoy the cohesion and unity that exists in 
national legal systems. As aptly summed up by Koskenniemi in the conclusion to the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation: 
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no homogenous, hierarchical meta-system is realistically available to do away with such problems. 
International law will need to operate within an area where the demands of coherence and reasonable 
pluralism will point in different directions. In order for it to do this successfully, increasing attention will 
have to be given to the collision of norms and regimes and the rules, methods and techniques for dealing 
with such collisions.17 (emphasis in original) 
In the absence of the establishment of a comprehensive judicial hierarchy in international law, this 
doctoral thesis proposes the use of Choice of Forum clauses in international agreements as a 
mechanism for addressing conflict of jurisdiction between different international judicial institutions. 
A Choice of Forum Clauses 
Choice of Forum clauses create institutional priorities between judicial institutions through the inclusion 
of clauses in each specific international agreement. These clauses permit States to elect and invoke 
the jurisdiction of one particular international judicial institution to the exclusion of others. In this way a 
Choice of Forum clause creates a judicial hierarchy between the parties in dispute pursuant to that 
particular international agreement. Choice of Forum clauses have been included in RTAs (such as 
Article 1(2) of the Protocol of Olivos),18 particularly in those negotiated by the United States (such as 
Article 2005 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’)).19  
For completeness, it is worth repeating in this concluding chapter the proposed wording for a Choice of 
Forum clause for inclusion in an MEA (as set out in chapter 6) to resolve parallel proceedings involving 
trade disputes: 
(a) Where a dispute regarding any matter referred to in [insert trade provisions] arises under this 
Agreement and under the WTO Agreements, to which both Parties are party, the complaining 
Party may select the forum in which to settle the dispute. 
(b) The complaining Party shall notify the other Party in writing of its intention to bring a dispute to 
a particular forum before doing so. 
(c) Once the complaining Party has selected a particular forum, the forum selected shall be used 
to the exclusion of other possible fora. 
(d) For the purposes of this paragraph, a Party shall be deemed to have selected a forum when it 
has requested the establishment of, or referred a matter to, a Dispute Settlement Institution. 
                                                     
17 ILC Report, above n 2, 249. 
18 Olivos Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes in Mercosur, opened for signature 18 February 2002, 42 ILM 2 
(entered into force on 10 February 2004). 
19 North American Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature 17 December 1992 (1993) 32 ILM 605 (entered 
into force 1 January 1994). 
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The above draft Choice of Forum clause has adapted from the provisions contained in the United States 
RTAs — see for example, Article 20.4.3(c) of the United States — Singapore Free Trade Agreement.20   
Choice of Forum clauses are, in theory, a comprehensive normative solution for the selection of an 
exclusive judicial forum for the resolution of disputes. As one leading scholar, Pauwelyn highlights:  
‘states should regulate forum shopping explicitly in their treaty regimes, and international tribunals 
should defer to such explicit treaty clauses’.21  However, Choice of Forum clauses are only effective if 
respected by the parties in the dispute and implemented by the judicial institution whose jurisdiction is 
curtailed by the clause. This doctoral thesis considered whether, in the case study of the trade in 
agricultural biotechnology, a hypothetical Choice of Forum clause in the Biosafety Protocol would 
operate to foreclose WTO jurisdiction (or vice versa). It is noted that to insert a Choice of Forum clause 
in the Biosafety Protocol requires the amendment of the Biosafety Protocol pursuant to the provisions 
set out in Article 29 of the CBD — requiring a two-thirds majority vote (if no consensus can be obtained) 
and only enters into force upon acceptance, ratification or approval by two-thirds majority of the Parties. 
As the law currently stands, it is uncertain whether a Choice of Forum clause in a non-WTO agreement 
will be upheld by the WTO Panel.  
In the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case, Mexico raised a preliminary question of law submitting that 
the WTO Panel should decline to exercise its jurisdiction and should refer the parties to the dispute 
settlement provisions under NAFTA.22 The WTO Panel upheld its jurisdiction and found that a Panel is 
required to perform its function to determine a dispute that is properly brought before it. On appeal, the 
WTO Appellate Body again considered the question of its jurisdiction. It was noted by the WTO 
Appellate Body that although Mexico had challenged the Panel’s jurisdiction to determine the case, 
Mexico had not invoked the choice of forum clause in Article 2005 of NAFTA. In this way, the WTO 
Appellate Body maintained its own jurisdiction by side-stepping the consideration of the Choice of 
Forum clause in NAFTA. Although the WTO Appellate Body was careful to note that it did not ‘express 
any view on whether a legal impediment to the exercise of a panel's jurisdiction would exist’ in the event 
of the exercising of a Choice of Forum, the comments it did make on jurisdiction are notable. The WTO 
Appellate Body held in the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case that once jurisdiction has been validly 
established, it has no power to refrain from determining the case: 
In our view, it does not necessarily follow, however, from the existence of these inherent adjudicative 
powers that, once jurisdiction has been validly established, WTO panels would have the authority to 
decline to rule on the entirety of the claims that are before them in a dispute. 23   
                                                     
20 United States — Singapore Free Trade Agreement, signed 6 May 2003, 42 ILM 1026 (entered into force 1 
January 2004).  
21 Joost Pauwelyn and Luiz Eduardo Salles, 'Forum shopping before international tribunals: (real) concerns, 
(im)possible solutions' (2009) 42 Cornell International Law Journal 77, 78. 
22 Panel Report, Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks, WTO Doc WT/DS308/R, [4.102]–[4.109]. 
23 Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks, WTO Doc WT/DS308/AB/R, [45]–[46]. 
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Following the comments made by the WTO Appellate Body in the Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks case, 
it is uncertain whether a Choice of Forum clause in a non-WTO agreement will be upheld by the WTO 
Panel. 
Given this uncertainty, this doctoral thesis has explored the options for giving legal effect to Choice of 
Forum clauses in the case of international environment and trade disputes (such as the inclusion of a 
Choice of Forum clause in an MEA). The following four broad options for giving effect to Choice of 
Forum clauses have been considered:  
1. Inserting a Choice of Forum clause in the WTO DSU. 
2. Amending the DSU to give effect to choice of forum clauses in MEAs. 
3. Making a Ministerial Declaration to give effect to Choice of Forum clauses in MEAs. 
4. Making a commitment in a G-20 Leaders Communiqué or Ministerial Communiqué to uphold 
Choice of Forum clauses. 
 
By including the Choice of Forum clause in the WTO DSU itself, the clause would then apply to all WTO 
trade disputes, even if the WTO Member does not wish to give preference to the dispute resolution of 
a particular MEA. While such a clause would undeniably clarify the power of the WTO Panels to refrain 
from exercising jurisdiction (in light of parallel proceedings), it has the potential drawback of making the 
WTO DSU wholly subservient to other judicial institutions, arguably then undermining the binding, 
enforceable and compulsory nature of the WTO DSU. The second option considered in this thesis is to 
amend the DSU to give effect to a choice of forum clause in an MEA. The WTO Panels then have clear 
authority to refer to, and adhere to, a choice of forum clause in an MEA and thereby refrain from 
exercising its valid jurisdiction to determine the dispute. The benefit of this option is that it leaves it to 
the discretion of the parties in each MEA to include the Choice of Forum clause. However, both of these 
first two options would require an amendment to the DSU. As discussed in chapter 6, passing any 
amendment to the DSU, which requires a consensus vote of the WTO Members, is extremely 
challenging. As the protracted trade negotiations in the Doha round have demonstrated, achieving a 
consensus of the WTO Members is a drawn-out and difficult process. 
Accordingly, we are left with the non-legal process of a Ministerial Declaration or a G-20 Communiqué. 
While not necessarily legally binding, these documents carry significant political weight. This doctoral 
thesis supports the option of a Ministerial Declaration indicating a general ‘intent’ to give effect to Choice 
of Forum clauses. The Declaration would stop short of making a formal ‘decision’ to amend the DSU 
(which would invoke the formal amendment procedures in Article X:8 of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization)24. Although Ministerial Declarations are issued generally by 
consent, it would be easier to obtain a consensus to a broad statement in a Declaration than to a specific 
legal Decision amending the DSU. In chapter 6, this doctoral thesis sets out the legal basis pursuant to 
which the WTO Panels and Appellate Body could apply a Ministerial Declaration that gives effect to 
                                                     
24 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995). 
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Choice of Forum clauses, including: as a ‘subsequent agreement’ between the parties under Article 
7(2) of the DSU; under Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; or as an 
‘interpretative’ tool of the WTO agreements as in the United States — Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products (‘US — Shrimp’) case.25  
In addition to a WTO Ministerial Declaration (or in the alternative in the event that a non-G-20 member 
of the WTO objected to such a declaration), a G-20 Ministerial Communiqué (or a formal agreement 
binding on the G-20 group) supporting the use of Choice of Forum clauses in international agreements 
and calling on the WTO to uphold such clauses, would be influential. Although such a statement would 
have no legal effect, it would place political pressure on G-20 members (if not all of the WTO Members) 
to abide by Choice of Forum clauses. Given that the G-20 economies account for at least three quarters 
of international trade, such a commitment by the G-20 nations could be an effective means of avoiding 
conflicts of jurisdiction in major trade-related disputes.26 
Although the issuing of a Ministerial Declaration or G-20 Ministerial Communiqué is a relatively 
achievable reform option, whether such political statements would be implemented by the WTO Panel 
or Appellate Body (or by the international judicial institution under the MEA) in proceedings where the 
Choice of Forum clause is contested by the parties involved, remains uncertain. 
VI  CONCLUSION 
Given the ongoing fragmented development of international law and the proliferation of international 
judicial institutions, there is real potential for the engagement of multiple judicial institutions by the 
parties to a dispute. This has been demonstrated in the MOX Plant dispute, the Chile-Swordfish dispute, 
the Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres case and the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
case.27 The crossover between the specialised regimes of international law is likely to amplify given the 
increased participation by States in the international legal arena and the move towards the negotiation 
of complex multilateral agreements. Any attempt to compartmentalise international legal disputes into 
specialised regimes such as ‘environment’, ‘trade’, ‘intellectual property’, ‘human rights’ or ‘health’ 
inevitably conflicts with the interwoven nature of the issues involved in these global disputes and the 
crossover between the normative provisions of the various international agreements.  
                                                     
25 Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS58/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (12 October 1998). 
26 Fact Sheet: Australia and the G20  
<https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/documents/factsheets/G20Factsheet61213.pdf>. 
27 The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Order No. 3 — Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and 
Merits) (2003) 42 ILM 1187; Commission of the European Communities v Ireland (C-459/03) [2006] ECR I-4635 
Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v 
European Community) (Constitution of Chamber, Order 2000/3) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 20 
December 2000); Chile — Measures Affecting the Transit and Importing of Swordfish — Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, WT/DS193 (19 April 2000) Appellate Body Report, Brazil 
— Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, AB-2007-4 (3 December 2007); Southern 
Bluefin Tuna (Australia v Japan) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (2000) 39 ILM 1359. 
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In relation to the case study of agricultural biotechnology, there are no general principles of international 
law that resolve an overlap of jurisdiction between parallel proceedings commenced before the WTO 
Panel and pursuant to the dispute resolution provisions in the Biosafety Protocol. Neither the WTO DSU 
nor the Biosafety Protocol contain exclusive jurisdiction provisions to address such parallel (or 
successive) proceedings. Accordingly, there is no real legal ‘solution’ for resolving the overlap in 
jurisdiction for trade disputes brought under both the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO agreements 
involving the same factual matrix. Agricultural biotechnology is just one example of the broader problem 
that exists due to the crossover of normative provisions of specialised regimes in international law and 
the associated proliferation of international judicial institutions. 
As the law currently stands, international judicial institutions have little guidance as to how to resolve 
overlapping jurisdiction and are left to determine the appropriate legal approach based on each matter 
before them. However, each judicial institution is bound by the parameters of its own charter and the 
obligation to uphold and implement the normative provisions for which it was created. This doctoral 
thesis concludes that it is not satisfactory to leave the solution to jurisdictional conflict to this form of ad 
hoc resolution. Arguably it is better that the solution to overlapping jurisdiction between judicial 
institutions be resolved by States through the inclusion of Choice of Forum clauses in each specific 
international agreement. However, Choice of Forum clauses only work if all judicial institutions uphold 
them. Accordingly, reforms are needed to give effect to Choice of Forum clauses. In the area of 
international trade law and international environmental law, this doctoral thesis has proposed the 
release of a Ministerial Declaration (in the absence of the realistic possibility of amending the WTO 
DSU) or a G-20 Communiqué stating a commitment by States to respect Choice of Forum clauses. 
Such statements will put political pressure on States to adhere to the Choice of Forum clauses in the 
international agreements and may also provide a basis upon which a WTO Panel could implement the 
Choice of Forum clause as a reflection of the intention of the parties to the dispute. 
In conclusion, the fragmentation of international law has given rise to the potential for conflict of 
jurisdiction for disputes that involve normative provisions that cross over specialised regimes — as is 
the case for trade in agricultural biotechnology. The leaders of States should consider the appropriate 
forum for the judicial resolution of disputes that potentially give rise to parallel proceedings before 
multiple judicial institutions when negotiating future international agreements.
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